July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[liberationtech] The Guardian: British firm offered spying software to Egyptian regime b documents
by Cyrus Farivar 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/28/egypt-spying-software-gamm… -- Cyrus Farivar "suh-ROOS FAR-ih-var" Freelance technology journalist and radio producer Author, "The Internet of Elsewhere" http://www.internetofelsewhere.com DE: +49 163 763 3108 (m) US: +1 510 394 5485 (m) Twitter/Skype: cfarivar "Being a good writer is 3% talent, 97% not being distracted by the Internet." http://cyrusfarivar.com cfarivar(a)cfarivar.org _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] The Guardian: British firm offered spying software to Egyptian regime b documents
by Cyrus Farivar 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/28/egypt-spying-software-gamm… -- Cyrus Farivar "suh-ROOS FAR-ih-var" Freelance technology journalist and radio producer Author, "The Internet of Elsewhere" http://www.internetofelsewhere.com DE: +49 163 763 3108 (m) US: +1 510 394 5485 (m) Twitter/Skype: cfarivar "Being a good writer is 3% talent, 97% not being distracted by the Internet." http://cyrusfarivar.com cfarivar(a)cfarivar.org _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Correction to cryptome.org
by John DeTreville 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Are you a good contact person for the information on the Microsoft DRM patent (6,330,670) on cryptome.org? The pages linked from http://cryptome.org/ms-drm-os.htm say that the authors of this patent (England, DeTreville, and Lampson) were identified by Newsweek as Palladium programmers. I can reliably state that I (DeTreville) am not a Palladium programmer, and neither is Butler Lampson. I believe that the Newsweek article was referring to a different patent. I'm sure that the Palladium participants jointly hold a significant number of important patents in the field of computer security. Cheers, John ----- John's message has been added to the file at: http://cryptome.org/ms-drm-os.htm

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[liberationtech] Privacy & activism talks at Hackmeet 3.0
by Steve Weis 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hackmeet 3.0 (https://hackmeet.org/wiki/2012-session-schedule) is happening this Saturday (10/20/12) at Noisebridge in San Francisco. There are a few sessions which may be of interest to libtech: "Mo' Dissidents, Mo' Malware, Mo' Problems" by Morgan Marquis-Boire (@headhntr) from the Google Security Team: http://hackmeet.org/wiki/mo-dissidents-mo-malware-mo-problems "Privacy Tricks for Activist Web Developers" by Micah Lee (@micahflee) from the EFF: http://hackmeet.org/wiki/privacy-tricks-for-activist-web-developers "Introduction to TOR": https://hackmeet.org/wiki/introduction-to-tor "An OTR Overview": http://hackmeet.org/wiki/an-otr-overview -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Asrg] 3. Proof-of-work analysis
by Richard Clayton 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I hope this is useful: I'm in the Security Group of the Computer Laboratory at the University of Cambridge. Ben Laurie (yes, that Ben Laurie) and I have recently been doing some sums on proof-of-work / client puzzles / hashcash methods of imposing economic constraints upon the sending of spam... Ben wanted to know how big a proof was needed for a practical scheme he was considering -- and I told him it wasn't going to work. We then carefully worked through all the calculations, using the best data that we could obtain -- and we did indeed come to the conclusion that proof-of-work is not a viable proposal :( The paper we wrote about this was presented last week in Minneapolis at the (academic, peer-reviewed) "Third Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security" (WEAS04) We've doubtless duplicated the figures on the back of many an envelope, but it is clearly useful to have the analysis in the formal literature where our assumptions and figures can be considered and possibly even improved upon by others. Paper: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/proofwork.pdf Slides from talk: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/talks/040514-ProofWork.pdf Abstract: A frequently proposed method of reducing unsolicited bulk email ("spam") is for senders to pay for each email they send. Proof- of-work schemes avoid charging real money by requiring senders to demonstrate that they have expended processing time in solving a cryptographic puzzle. We attempt to determine how difficult that puzzle should be so as to be effective in preventing spam. We analyse this both from an economic perspective, "how can we stop it being cost-effective to send spam", and from a security perspective, "spammers can access insecure end-user machines and will steal processing cycles to solve puzzles". Both analyses lead to similar values of puzzle difficulty. Unfortunately, real- world data from a large ISP shows that these difficulty levels would mean that significant numbers of senders of legitimate email would be unable to continue their current levels of activity. We conclude that proof-of-work will not be a solution to the problem of spam. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- For the avoidance of doubt, the type of scheme we believe we have shown is not viable is one where all email (except "mailing list" email) carries a "proof-of-work" along with it. It may be that it is still sensible to consider composite schemes where puzzles are only solved per sending host or where receivers use puzzles to admit senders into whitelists... ... however, we would consider it incumbent on any proposer of such a scheme to do similar calculations to ours before putting it forward. [ off-topic for here, but we also suspect that a number of proof- of-work schemes in peer-to-peer networks would fall to our type of real-world analysis :( people tend to use client puzzles as a kind of "magic fairy dust" to scatter over systems when they get stuck in their design :( ] - -- richard Richard Clayton They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBQKk5khfnRQV/feRLEQIcyACcCrGw1ZZIHV+qP7AZy9M8XJU4920AnjcW M35kvXsj8cv/ujtY9xpf79av =wEUV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Asrg mailing list Asrg(a)ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/asrg --- end forwarded text --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [HacDC:Byzantium] Re: Development sprint coming up this weekend.
by Ben Mendis 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Yes, the sprint will be at HacDC in the software/class room. We usually spread it over two days. Friday night we start around 7p and have some discussions on specifically what we want to accomplish and how we will allocate time on Saturday, and then work a little bit or just make sure everything is setup for Saturday. Also, if we have enough people there by 8p we usually have free pizza. Then on Saturday we get started at noon and work late with a break or two in the middle to keep everyone fresh and focused. In the past we have tried to set the start time at 10am, but some of us have found it difficult to wake up that early on a Saturday. ;-) You're welcome to come for either or both days. On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 10:42 AM, buzz <bkobb(a)ieee.org> wrote: > What day/time will the sprint be - > > I assume it is at hacdc? > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Project Byzantium (Emergency Mesh Networking)" group. > To post to this group, send email to Byzantium(a)hacdc.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > Byzantium+unsubscribe(a)hacdc.org. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/a/hacdc.org/group/Byzantium/?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Project Byzantium (Emergency Mesh Networking)" group. To post to this group, send email to Byzantium(a)hacdc.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to Byzantium+unsubscribe(a)hacdc.org. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/a/hacdc.org/group/Byzantium/?hl=en. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Asrg] 3. Proof-of-work analysis
by Richard Clayton 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I hope this is useful: I'm in the Security Group of the Computer Laboratory at the University of Cambridge. Ben Laurie (yes, that Ben Laurie) and I have recently been doing some sums on proof-of-work / client puzzles / hashcash methods of imposing economic constraints upon the sending of spam... Ben wanted to know how big a proof was needed for a practical scheme he was considering -- and I told him it wasn't going to work. We then carefully worked through all the calculations, using the best data that we could obtain -- and we did indeed come to the conclusion that proof-of-work is not a viable proposal :( The paper we wrote about this was presented last week in Minneapolis at the (academic, peer-reviewed) "Third Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security" (WEAS04) We've doubtless duplicated the figures on the back of many an envelope, but it is clearly useful to have the analysis in the formal literature where our assumptions and figures can be considered and possibly even improved upon by others. Paper: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/proofwork.pdf Slides from talk: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/talks/040514-ProofWork.pdf Abstract: A frequently proposed method of reducing unsolicited bulk email ("spam") is for senders to pay for each email they send. Proof- of-work schemes avoid charging real money by requiring senders to demonstrate that they have expended processing time in solving a cryptographic puzzle. We attempt to determine how difficult that puzzle should be so as to be effective in preventing spam. We analyse this both from an economic perspective, "how can we stop it being cost-effective to send spam", and from a security perspective, "spammers can access insecure end-user machines and will steal processing cycles to solve puzzles". Both analyses lead to similar values of puzzle difficulty. Unfortunately, real- world data from a large ISP shows that these difficulty levels would mean that significant numbers of senders of legitimate email would be unable to continue their current levels of activity. We conclude that proof-of-work will not be a solution to the problem of spam. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- For the avoidance of doubt, the type of scheme we believe we have shown is not viable is one where all email (except "mailing list" email) carries a "proof-of-work" along with it. It may be that it is still sensible to consider composite schemes where puzzles are only solved per sending host or where receivers use puzzles to admit senders into whitelists... ... however, we would consider it incumbent on any proposer of such a scheme to do similar calculations to ours before putting it forward. [ off-topic for here, but we also suspect that a number of proof- of-work schemes in peer-to-peer networks would fall to our type of real-world analysis :( people tend to use client puzzles as a kind of "magic fairy dust" to scatter over systems when they get stuck in their design :( ] - -- richard Richard Clayton They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBQKk5khfnRQV/feRLEQIcyACcCrGw1ZZIHV+qP7AZy9M8XJU4920AnjcW M35kvXsj8cv/ujtY9xpf79av =wEUV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Asrg mailing list Asrg(a)ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/asrg --- end forwarded text --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [HacDC:Byzantium] Re: Development sprint coming up this weekend.
by Ben Mendis 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Yes, the sprint will be at HacDC in the software/class room. We usually spread it over two days. Friday night we start around 7p and have some discussions on specifically what we want to accomplish and how we will allocate time on Saturday, and then work a little bit or just make sure everything is setup for Saturday. Also, if we have enough people there by 8p we usually have free pizza. Then on Saturday we get started at noon and work late with a break or two in the middle to keep everyone fresh and focused. In the past we have tried to set the start time at 10am, but some of us have found it difficult to wake up that early on a Saturday. ;-) You're welcome to come for either or both days. On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 10:42 AM, buzz <bkobb(a)ieee.org> wrote: > What day/time will the sprint be - > > I assume it is at hacdc? > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Project Byzantium (Emergency Mesh Networking)" group. > To post to this group, send email to Byzantium(a)hacdc.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > Byzantium+unsubscribe(a)hacdc.org. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/a/hacdc.org/group/Byzantium/?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Project Byzantium (Emergency Mesh Networking)" group. To post to this group, send email to Byzantium(a)hacdc.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to Byzantium+unsubscribe(a)hacdc.org. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/a/hacdc.org/group/Byzantium/?hl=en. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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WPI Crypto Seminar: Towards a Theory of Variable Privacy
by Monty Solomon 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

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Re: Supercookies
by Andrew Lewman 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

On 08/21/2009 10:58 AM, Freemor wrote: > You're not alone. I use a seperate browser for Tor and it is completely > stripped out no plugins, java/javascript disables, defaults to saving > to disk rather then opening stuff. etc. Try Torora, http://code.google.com/p/torora/. I've been heavily testing it and harassing Robert with long emails of "I wish it did X" recently. More testing with more real users would be good. -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identi.ca: torproject ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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