July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [roy@rant-central.com: Re: [arma@mit.edu: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]
by Nick Mathewson 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hi again, Jimmy! On Wed, Sep 28, 2005 at 06:57:37AM -0400, Jimmy Wales wrote: [...] > I said no such thing. Tor servers exist for the sole purpose of aiding > people who have a genuine need for privacy. Tor operators by and large > are unhappy that Tor users can't edit Wikipedia, and are genuinely > interested in exploring solutions, especially solutions which involve > changes or enhancements to the Tor architecture which help solve the > problem not just for Wikipedia but for _all_ internet services which > desire to carefully balance a desire for privacy and openness against abuse. I think I've identified one of the reasons some people here are disturbed about your suggestions. When you talk about changing the Tor architecture, they think you mean changes to Tor that would require all users to have pseudonyms, or ostracize the users who didn't. When you say "Tor should do X," they think you mean "the Tor software should do X".{1} If that were what you meant, they would be right to be concerned. Pseudonymity is wrong for many users. Complicating the core Tor implementation would be bad. But these aren't your goals, if I understand correctly. Wikipedia doesn't ultimately care how Tor is implemented, or what it contains, so long as it is significantly less effective as a tool for Wikipedia abuse. Yes? This could be achieved, as some people fear, through modifying the core of Tor. But that isn't the only way to change matters. As discussed, introducing a separate pseudonymous authentication service (perhaps even an anonymous credential service, if we can find a way to do this without patent infringement) would serve just as well, and require no modifications to the Tor code. Users who didn't want to use such a service would be no worse off than they are today. Users who wanted to use Tor and edit Wikipedia at the same time could decide whether the implications of such a service were acceptable to them. {1} To be clear, I think that it's more accurate to talk about changes to the User/Tor/Wikipedia interaction, and to suggest a need for action by the Tor project and its supporters, than to talk about a need for changes in Tor's architecture, and a need for action by Tor. yrs, -- Nick Mathewson ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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None
by None 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

_________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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Dz:C!
by houshen2 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

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Re: [Geowanking] Google Earth Exposes the Indian Military
by Sonny Parafina 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Its funny when the tables are turned. Long before Google Maps or Earth was released, was Cryptome's Eyeball series, which used internet mapping and photos mined from internet sources to raise awareness about different places. For exampe here's a recent Eye-Ball report: http://cryptome.org/nonas-eyeball.htm The best one was when Cryptome published the address, maps, aerial photos to convicted/pardoned felon Admiral John Pointdexter who promoted the "Total Information Awareness" program in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. sonny Allan Doyle wrote: >See also this article in the Register > >http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/13/ >google_earth_threatens_democracy/ > >and the quote about India on the first page: > >"India agrees. Reuters quotes an anonymous security official there as >confirming that "the issue of satellite imagery had been discussed at >the highest level but the government had concluded that 'technology >cannot be stopped'." >"We are aware that there are websites which give detailed pictures of >buildings like the president's house including every tree in the >compound. Our security agencies are aware of this but how can we stop >technology?" he added." > >At the end of the last page, there are links to other articles they >have been running about Google Earth. Very interesting stuff. > > Allan > > >On Sep 28, 2005, at 07:17, Shekhar Krishnan wrote: > >>Dear All: >> >>:: apologies for cross-posting :: >> >>This has caused quite an uproar in Mumbai, and the consequences will be >>interesting to follow. >> >>To read more about open geo-data and free mapping initiatives in India, >>see the Mumbai Free Map ( http://www.crit.org.in/projects/gis | >>http://freemap.crit.org.in | http://www.freemap.in ). >> >>Please also visit and sign the open geo-data manifesto hosted by the >>Open Knowledge Foundation ( http://okfn.org/geo/manifesto.php ) and >>visit Mapping Hacks ( http://www.mappinghacks.com ). >> >> >>Best, >> >> >>Shekhar >>_____ >> >>Google Earth exposes IAF bases >> >>CHARLES ASSISI >>TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2005 12:16:08 AM ] >>http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1243460.cms >> >> >>MUMBAI: Legally, you aren?t supposed to come within arm?s length of >>India?s military bases. Whether it is the naval dockyards in Mumbai or >>the air force bases in New Delhi, Bangalore and Hyderabad, they >>continue >>to be strictly out of bounds for unauthorised personnel. >> >>But technology, unerringly, finds ways to subvert the law. A little >>over >>two weeks ago, Google released fresh satellite images of New Delhi, >>south Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad as part of its new initiative, >>Google Earth ( http://earth.google.com ). These images, available to >>anybody with access to the Net, provide users with images of earth from >>space. >> >>Punch New Delhi and the software first zooms in on Rashtrapati Bhavan. >>After having taken a look at its lawns, take in a detailed perspective >>of Parliament building. Maybe, fly over the Prime Minister?s residence. >>And if that doesn?t satiates the voyeur in you, move over to Palam >>Airport where IAF planes are based. >> >>The level of detail even reveals the camouflage used to mask hangars. >> >>Pictures of Mumbai reveal with numbing clarity the docks where INS >>Viraat is berthed. Users can zoom close enough to take a reasonably >>good >>look at the deck of India?s lone aircraft carrier. Browse around and >>you >>can stroll past piers where warships of all kinds and submarines are >>docked. >> >>Pan across to take a long look at what lies beyond the fortified gates >>of Navy Nagar where access is normally controlled by gun-wielding >>guards. And if that isn?t enough, there are shots of a carrier under >>construction, which sources speculate, could be the top secret advanced >>technology vessel (ATV). >> >>It?s much the same thing with Bangalore. The air force base at >>Yelahanka >>with the jets and helicopters parked are available for all to view. And >>if it?s the HAL factory you?re interested in, zoom right in. >> >>-- >>______ >> >>Shekhar Krishnan >>9, Supriya, 2nd Floor >>709, Parsee Colony Road no.4 >>Dadar, Mumbai 400014 >>India >> >>http://www.crit.org.in/members/shekhar >>http://web.mit.edu/~shekhar/www >> >>_______________________________________________ >>Geowanking mailing list >>Geowanking(a)lists.burri.to >>http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking >> >> > _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking(a)lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Geowanking] Google Earth Exposes the Indian Military
by Shekhar Krishnan 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Dear All: :: apologies for cross-posting :: This has caused quite an uproar in Mumbai, and the consequences will be interesting to follow. To read more about open geo-data and free mapping initiatives in India, see the Mumbai Free Map ( http://www.crit.org.in/projects/gis | http://freemap.crit.org.in | http://www.freemap.in ). Please also visit and sign the open geo-data manifesto hosted by the Open Knowledge Foundation ( http://okfn.org/geo/manifesto.php ) and visit Mapping Hacks ( http://www.mappinghacks.com ). Best, Shekhar _____ Google Earth exposes IAF bases CHARLES ASSISI TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2005 12:16:08 AM ] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1243460.cms MUMBAI: Legally, you aren???t supposed to come within arm???s length of India???s military bases. Whether it is the naval dockyards in Mumbai or the air force bases in New Delhi, Bangalore and Hyderabad, they continue to be strictly out of bounds for unauthorised personnel. But technology, unerringly, finds ways to subvert the law. A little over two weeks ago, Google released fresh satellite images of New Delhi, south Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad as part of its new initiative, Google Earth ( http://earth.google.com ). These images, available to anybody with access to the Net, provide users with images of earth from space. Punch New Delhi and the software first zooms in on Rashtrapati Bhavan. After having taken a look at its lawns, take in a detailed perspective of Parliament building. Maybe, fly over the Prime Minister???s residence. And if that doesn???t satiates the voyeur in you, move over to Palam Airport where IAF planes are based. The level of detail even reveals the camouflage used to mask hangars. Pictures of Mumbai reveal with numbing clarity the docks where INS Viraat is berthed. Users can zoom close enough to take a reasonably good look at the deck of India???s lone aircraft carrier. Browse around and you can stroll past piers where warships of all kinds and submarines are docked. Pan across to take a long look at what lies beyond the fortified gates of Navy Nagar where access is normally controlled by gun-wielding guards. And if that isn???t enough, there are shots of a carrier under construction, which sources speculate, could be the top secret advanced technology vessel (ATV). It???s much the same thing with Bangalore. The air force base at Yelahanka with the jets and helicopters parked are available for all to view. And if it???s the HAL factory you???re interested in, zoom right in. -- ______ Shekhar Krishnan 9, Supriya, 2nd Floor 709, Parsee Colony Road no.4 Dadar, Mumbai 400014 India http://www.crit.org.in/members/shekhar http://web.mit.edu/~shekhar/www _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking(a)lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [roy@rant-central.com: Re: [arma@mit.edu: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]
by Nick Mathewson 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hi again, Jimmy! On Wed, Sep 28, 2005 at 06:57:37AM -0400, Jimmy Wales wrote: [...] > I said no such thing. Tor servers exist for the sole purpose of aiding > people who have a genuine need for privacy. Tor operators by and large > are unhappy that Tor users can't edit Wikipedia, and are genuinely > interested in exploring solutions, especially solutions which involve > changes or enhancements to the Tor architecture which help solve the > problem not just for Wikipedia but for _all_ internet services which > desire to carefully balance a desire for privacy and openness against abuse. I think I've identified one of the reasons some people here are disturbed about your suggestions. When you talk about changing the Tor architecture, they think you mean changes to Tor that would require all users to have pseudonyms, or ostracize the users who didn't. When you say "Tor should do X," they think you mean "the Tor software should do X".{1} If that were what you meant, they would be right to be concerned. Pseudonymity is wrong for many users. Complicating the core Tor implementation would be bad. But these aren't your goals, if I understand correctly. Wikipedia doesn't ultimately care how Tor is implemented, or what it contains, so long as it is significantly less effective as a tool for Wikipedia abuse. Yes? This could be achieved, as some people fear, through modifying the core of Tor. But that isn't the only way to change matters. As discussed, introducing a separate pseudonymous authentication service (perhaps even an anonymous credential service, if we can find a way to do this without patent infringement) would serve just as well, and require no modifications to the Tor code. Users who didn't want to use such a service would be no worse off than they are today. Users who wanted to use Tor and edit Wikipedia at the same time could decide whether the implications of such a service were acceptable to them. {1} To be clear, I think that it's more accurate to talk about changes to the User/Tor/Wikipedia interaction, and to suggest a need for action by the Tor project and its supporters, than to talk about a need for changes in Tor's architecture, and a need for action by Tor. yrs, -- Nick Mathewson ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [liberationtech] Chromebooks for Risky Situations?
by T N 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Just FYI: Chrome OS devices are not subject to roll back attacks because the verified boot does not allow that. Google has extensive documentation on this, and you can review the implementation by viewing the source code. Rollback attacks were an attack vector they specifically designed to prevent. In fact as a chrome OS user this is as much an disadvantage as it an advantage: updates are forced- you can not go back and bug regressions which don't effect security but that are annoying can occur and there isn't anything you can do about that. Also, it isn't just verified boot an attacker would have to overcome. The DM verity means any OS and onboard application code must checksum correctly or it will never run, this is true at all times. Realize as well that all of this code is always running off read only file systems. Note that the builtin data partition (not executable code, in fact data filesystem is mounted no exec) encryption is defeatable in the minimal sense that Chrome OS does allow users to choose to not have to login when waking from sleep, so user stupidity allows a small opening here. Heh- happened to me. Lost my chromebook and could not remember if I had left it "locked" (long story!), but I knew it was asleep. Finderay have had access to my login session, albeit og little use since I changed my password and I believe this deactivated access to current email login, eg. Also enterprise administrators may have the option of overriding user choice here, saving users from their stupidity. Another interesting point: the onboard ssh client is implemented partially in javavscript (the terminal portion). Before you whince, know that Google argues this is more secure than normal ssh Unix clients because in addition to all the usual ssh protections, it is necessarily running in a Chrome sandbox! They are probably right about that? I think so. Finally, I wrote up some stuff on their wiki: you can run in dev mode but still have fully verified boot and auto update. This gives the machine a larger local attack surface (not remote though), but opens access to some Unix user land such as the onboard openssl which you could use for additional encryption. Not too that chrome is devices share well and do while totally protecting users from each other. Not a security expert myself. But I have been administering Unix systems fulltime for over 15 years. No question in my mind that these things are more secure BY FAR than any other off the shelf solution you can buy as a consumer. That a normal Unix distro could be made to be as secure is IMO not true as well. Google has of course just made Chrome OS the target for their Pawnium challenge this year. Should be interesting! Trever On Feb 6, 2013 8:31 AM, "Tom Ritter" <tom(a)ritter.vg> wrote: > On 6 February 2013 10:52, micah anderson <micah(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > > > Can you say what you mean here? What is SOP in this context? > > ChromeOS's 'Apps' are all extensions or webpages. One can't interact > with any other do to the standard Same Origin Policy browsers enforce. > It's what stops evilco.com from reading your logged in gmail.com tab > in FF/Chrome/IE/any browser today. > > > > I would be surprised if you actually 'bricked' these systems, since > > neither operating system you mention involves a procedure that has the > > risk of bricking a device. I suspect this is hyperbole? > > Well, I have a colleague rebuilding a FDE Ubuntu computer right now > because we can't figure out how to repair its partition table and get > it to boot without a LiveCD. It's probably possible, but we're pretty > technical people and we made the call it would take less time to > recreate the machine than 'fix' it. Similarly, I recently paid the > gentoo tax while upgrading udev and not having a kernel switch turned > on - wouldn't boot, requiring me to LiveCD it, enable the setting, > recompile the kernel and replace it. > > So bricked in the sense of it's now a brick and might as well be sold > for parts - you're right, that's hyperbole. But for a non-technical > person, with no access to someone to repair a machine for him/her - I > don't know, I think it might as well be bricked. They can't fix it on > their own, and it's not going to boot. > > > >> - Verified Boot, automatic FDE, tamper-resistant hardware > > > > All of this reminds me of this post: > > http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/22465.html > > > > which concludes: > > > > "Some people don't like Secure Boot because they don't trust > > Microsoft. If you trust Google more, then a Chromebook is a reasonable > > choice. But some people don't like Secure Boot because they see it as an > > attack on user freedom, and those people should be willing to criticise > > Google's stance. Unlike Microsoft, Chromebooks force the user to choose > > between security and freedom. Nobody should be forced to make that > > choice." > > I don't disagree with the notion that Chromebooks, Windows 8, iOS, and > other examples make you choose between "Insecure and running your own > stuff" and "Secure and running their stuff". I completely agree with > it. I do disagree with a phrase of your except "Chromebooks force the > user to choose between security and freedom" - I would rephrase it > "Chromebooks force the user to choose between freedom and Google's > stewardship". > > My gender-inspecific-nontechnical-family-member is not interesting in > running after-market app stores or tethering apps on their phone, so > if security was the only concern I would recommend iPhone because it > is harder to root. Similarly, if an activist is not going to run > third party apps or 'jailbreak' their device (and nobody is going to > take the responsibility to do it for them and then be full time tech > support) - choosing a more secure, albeit stewarded by Google/Apple, > system makes sense. I know some people don't believe this, and I know > some people (like RMS) say we should always fight the good fight and > never give way... > > But if you nailed me down and said "Make a computer recommendation, > someone's life may depend on it." Depending on who their adversary is, > I would probably not make the Free OS recommendation. > > > > On 6 February 2013 10:52, Rich Kulawiec <rsk(a)gsp.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 06, 2013 at 10:24:28AM -0500, Tom Ritter wrote: > >> - ChromeOS's update mechanism is automatic, transparent, and basically > >> foolproof. Having bricked Ubuntu and Gentoo systems, the same is not > >> true of Linux. > > > > Concur on this point, and wish to ask a related question: > > > > Many operating systems and applications and even application extensions > > (e.g., Firefox extensions) now attempt to discover the presence of > updates > > for themselves either automatically or because a user instructs them to > do. > > Is there any published research on the security consequences of doing so? > > (What I'm thinking of is an adversary who observes network traffic > > and thus can ascertain operating system type/version/patch level, > > installed application base/version/patch level, etc.) > > I don't know of any research to point you to. > > Obviously any automatic or manual upgrade process is fraught with > peril, as it is essentially designed to be an endpoint for remote code > execution. It would be nice if Google or Microsoft did a case study > on how they architected their update systems. Obviously MSFT's went > screwy with Flame, but I still think there's lessons we can learn. > > To Michael's point, how these systems deal with rollbacks and network > isolation is interesting. I've heard that Tor Project's Thandy is an > implementation of a research paper that covers this and other topics, > but I can't find a reference. Maybe someone can find it and provide > one. > > > > On 6 February 2013 11:23, Andreas Bader <noergelpizza(a)hotmail.de> wrote: > > I think SL, Debian, Suse or CentOS are not less secure than ChromeOS. > > And if there is a secure problem then you have enough control to fix the > > system. > > I disagree with this. All of those OS (I'm actually not sure of > 'SL'?) do not do process isolation. If I get code execution in FF, I > can compromise thunderbird. You are not able to 'fix' this except by > rewriting the OS or doing some jinky hack to run every app as a > separate user. Likewise, every app running is not written to the > quality that Chrome Browser/ChromeOS is. Additionally, the OS and the > applications are stewarded by different people, and the interface > between those groups leads to bugs. Put a $100K bounty on exploiting > a desktop app running in one of those OSs and see how quickly you get > takers. And finally, I think most people who say "you have control to > fix things" forget that the 'you' in this context is a person who does > not write code (python even, let alone c), does not know what a > partition table is, does not compile their own kernel, doesn't even > have a compiler installed, doesn't understand the nuances of security > - and just needs their computer to work. > > -tom > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Correction to cryptome.org
by John DeTreville 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Are you a good contact person for the information on the Microsoft DRM patent (6,330,670) on cryptome.org? The pages linked from http://cryptome.org/ms-drm-os.htm say that the authors of this patent (England, DeTreville, and Lampson) were identified by Newsweek as Palladium programmers. I can reliably state that I (DeTreville) am not a Palladium programmer, and neither is Butler Lampson. I believe that the Newsweek article was referring to a different patent. I'm sure that the Palladium participants jointly hold a significant number of important patents in the field of computer security. Cheers, John ----- John's message has been added to the file at: http://cryptome.org/ms-drm-os.htm

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[P2P-F] Would you like to write about how to set up a mesh network
by Neal Gorenflo 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hi p2p friends, We at Shareable are looking for someone to write a how-to article about how to set up a neighborhood mesh network so neighbors can share Internet access. Please contact me if you're interested or know someone who could do a good job at it. What's especially appreciated is someone who has actually set one up or knows someone who has that can be a source. The article would add to our library of around 80 how-to share guides including how to start a housing coop, a chicken coop, hold a free market, share a vegetable garden, start a farmers market and more: http://shareable.net/how-to-share Neal -- Neal Gorenflo | Publisher, http://Shareable.net <http://shareable.net/> | 415.867.0429 _______________________________________________ P2P Foundation - Mailing list http://www.p2pfoundation.net https://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[P2P-F] Would you like to write about how to set up a mesh network
by Neal Gorenflo 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hi p2p friends, We at Shareable are looking for someone to write a how-to article about how to set up a neighborhood mesh network so neighbors can share Internet access. Please contact me if you're interested or know someone who could do a good job at it. What's especially appreciated is someone who has actually set one up or knows someone who has that can be a source. The article would add to our library of around 80 how-to share guides including how to start a housing coop, a chicken coop, hold a free market, share a vegetable garden, start a farmers market and more: http://shareable.net/how-to-share Neal -- Neal Gorenflo | Publisher, http://Shareable.net <http://shareable.net/> | 415.867.0429 _______________________________________________ P2P Foundation - Mailing list http://www.p2pfoundation.net https://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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