July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [cryptography] Digital cash in the news...
by Nathan Loofbourrow 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Ian G wrote: > The way to do this is a /contract/ which is a defined format of promise to > deliver, date, consideration, etc. You write that down in boring ascii: To your point, each issued BitCoin is a contract -- well, the completion of one, anyway. The contract states as follows: "I have performed a task you have asked me (among many others) to perform. That task is to certify the transaction log of BitCoin exchanges. Here is my proof of work; now pay me." If you were to argue that that task is currently overpaid, I would agree with you; it has been heavily subsidized, to the tune of 50 bitcoins generated by agreement that they have been issued. In spite of this overpayment, the currency appears to be rising in value over the long term. Fortunately, this subsidy wanes. It drops to 25 bitcoins, and then again, and then again, until it drops to nothing. Signing the transaction log is worth only what transactors voluntary choose to pay for the privilege of having their transactions signed. Is that signature worth paying for? Well, it prevents double spending, so probably, yes. So a monetary authority is printing BitCoins and spending them on fiscal stimulus. In spite of that, money is entering the economy because as stores of value go, the alternatives aren't that great either. Reminds me of the US dollar. I wonder whether BitCoin would have been nearly as successful if a demand for stores of stable value did not happen to be higher than they have been in a decade. If we were all rich on housing appreciation and stock speculation, BitCoin would be like the passbook savings account at the local bank paying a whopping 0.65%. But the only part of that that's about crypto is: crypto is hard, and you can get people to perform it on their computers if you pay them. Surprise, surprise. Bet you wish you'd thought of something *you* wanted people to employ thousands of computers to do that paid them money that doesn't even come out of your pocket. I don't know if Satoshi is rich from BitCoins, but if he made a bar bet that he could convince people to run billions of SHA256 hashes a second without paying them even a nickel, he won himself a beer. n _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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NSA Spying on Americans
by Barry Steinhardt 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave, As has been made plain by the many submissions to IP, the significance of the Bush/NSA spying scandal continues to grow each day. The ACLU has just posted a number of materials on our web site aclu.org and the new nsawatch.org that we hope will add to the debate. Those items include: 1. A new ACLU ad calling for a special counsel to investigate the President's illegal surveillance of U.S. Citizens.The add appeared in today's NY Times, as well as the web site along with related materials at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/. The text of the ad compares the words of President Nixon and President Bush, both of whom denied allegations of illegal spying. Next to the image of Nixon, the advertisement says: "He lied to the American people and broke the law." Below that is an image of President Bush, with the words, "So did he. 2. The Updated NSA Watch site (formerly known as Echelon watch): http://www.nsawatch.org/ which contains a wide variety of materials and links documenting the NSA's extraordinary communication interception capabilities ("sigint"), which are part of an international arrangement sometimes referred to as "Echelon". 3 A new piece explaining how the "NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal" at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/23279res20051229.html Since the Administration has sought to cast its unprecedented and lawless spying on American's as "legal", I have included the text of our piece below. You are, of course, free to use as much or little of it and the rest of this message as you would like. Have a good New Year, Barry Steinhardt ACLU Technology and Liberty Project NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/23279res20051229.html What if it emerged that the President of the United States was flagrantly violating the Constitution and a law passed by the Congress to protect Americans against abuses by a super-secret spy agency? What if, instead of apologizing, he said, in essence, ?I have the power to do that, because I say I can.? That frightening scenario is exactly what we are now witnessing in the case of the warrantless NSA spying ordered by President Bush that was reported December 16, 2005 by the New York Times. According to the Times, Bush signed a presidential order in 2002 allowing the National Security Agency to monitor without a warrant the international (and sometimes domestic) telephone calls and e-mail messages of hundreds or thousands of citizens and legal residents inside the United States. The program eventually came to include some purely internal controls ? but no requirement that warrants be obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as the 4th Amendment to the Constitution and the foreign intelligence surveillance laws require. In other words, no independent review or judicial oversight. That kind of surveillance is illegal. Period. The day after this shocking abuse of power became public, President Bush admitted that he had authorized it, but argued that he had the authority to do so. But the law governing government eavesdropping on American citizens is well-established and crystal clear. President Bush?s claim that he is not bound by that law is simply astounding. It is a Presidential power grab that poses a challenge in the deepest sense to the integrity of the American system of government ? the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, the concept of checks and balances on executive power, the notion that the president is subject to the law like everyone else, and the general respect for the ?rule of law? on which our democratic system depends. Flouting a long history The tensions between the need for intelligence agencies to protect the nation and the danger that they would become a domestic spy agency have been explicitly and repeatedly fought out in American history. The National Security Act of 1947 contained a specific ban on intelligence operatives from operating domestically. In the 1970s, America learned about the extensive domestic political spying carried out by the FBI, the military, the CIA, and the NSA, and Congress passed new laws to prevent a repeat of those abuses. Surveillance laws were debated and modified under presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton. But, President Bush would sweep aside this entire body of democratically debated and painstakingly crafted restrictions on domestic surveillance by the executive branch with his extraordinary assertion that he can simply ignore this law because he is the Commander-in-Chief. In a December 17 radio address, for example, Bush asserted that the spying was ?fully consistent with my constitutional responsibilities and authorities.? But his constitutional duty is to ?take care that the laws be faithfully executed? (Article II, Section 3); the law here clearly establishes well-defined procedures for eavesdropping on U.S. persons, and the fact is, Bush ordered that those procedures not be followed. Government eavesdropping on Americans is an extremely serious matter; the ability to intrude on the private realm is a tremendous power that can be used to monitor, embarrass, control, disgrace, or ruin an individual. Because it is so invasive, the technology of wiretapping has been subject to carefully crafted statutory controls almost since it was invented. Ignoring those controls and wiretapping without a court order is a crime that carries a significant prison sentence (in fact, criminal violations of the wiretap statute were among the articles of impeachment that were drafted against President Nixon shortly before his resignation). Clearly Illegal Unfortunately, although the law in this matter is crystal clear, many Americans, faced with President Bush?s bold assertions of ?inherent? authority for these actions, will not know what to believe. There are only 5 points they need to understand: Point #1: Electronic surveillance by the Government is strictly limited by the Constitution and Federal Law The law on surveillance begins with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which states clearly that Americans? privacy may not be invaded without a warrant based on probable cause. United States Constitution Fourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (emphasis added) The US Supreme Court (US v. Katz 389 US 347) has made it clear that this core privacy protection does cover government eavesdropping. As a result, all electronic surveillance by the government in the United States is illegal, unless it falls under one of a small number of precise exceptions specifically carved out in the law. United States Code Title 50, Chapter 36, Subchapter 1 Section 1809. Criminal sanctions (a) Prohibited activities A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally? (1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute In other words, the NSA can only spy where it is explicitly granted permission to do so by statute. Citizens concerned about surveillance do not have to answer the question, ?what law restricts the NSA?s spying?? Rather, the government is required to supply an answer to the question ?what law permits the NSA to spy?? Point #2: There are only three laws that permit the government to spy There are only three laws that authorize any exceptions to the ban on electronic eavesdropping by the government. Congress has explicitly stated that these three laws are the exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance can be carried out (18 USC, Section 2511(2)(f)). They are: ? Title III and ECPA. Title III and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act make up the statutes that govern criminal wiretaps in the United States. ? FISA. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is the law that governs eavesdropping on agents of ?foreign powers? within the United States, including suspected foreign terrorists. Point #3: The Bush-NSA spying was not authorized by any of these laws Title III and ECPA govern domestic criminal wiretaps and are not relevant to the NSA?s spying. FISA is the law under which the NSA should have operated. It authorizes the government to conduct surveillance in certain situations without meeting all of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment that apply under criminal law, but requires that an independent Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court oversee that surveillance to make sure that Americans who have no ties to foreign terrorist organizations or other ?foreign powers? are not spied upon. FISA was significantly loosened by the Patriot Act (which, for example, allowed it to be used for some criminal investigations), and parts of it now stand in clear violation of the Constitution?s Fourth Amendment in the view of the ACLU and many others. However, even the post-Patriot Act version of FISA does not authorize the president to conduct warrantless eavesdropping on U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents in the U.S. without an order from the FISA Court. Yet it is that very court order requirement ? imposed to protect innocent Americans ? that the President has ignored. In fact, one member of the FISA Court, Judge James Roberston, has apparently resigned from the court in protest of President Bush's secret authorization of this program. And the New York Times reported that the court?s chief judge complained about the program when she was (belatedly) notified of it, and refused to allow information gathered under the program to be used as the basis for FISA wiretap orders. Point #4: Congress?s post-9/11 use-of-force resolution does not legitimize the Bush-NSA spying Congress after 9/11 approved an Authorization to Use Military Force against those responsible for the attacks in order to authorize the president to conduct foreign military operations such as the invasion of Afghanistan. But that resolution contains no language changing, overriding or repealing any laws passed by Congress. Congress does not repeal legislation through hints and innuendos, and the Authorization to Use Military Force does not authorize the president to violate the law against surveillance without a warrant any more than it authorizes him to carry out an armed robbery or seize control of Citibank in order to pay for operations against terrorists. In fact, when President Truman tried to seize control of steel mills that were gripped by strikes in 1952, the Supreme Court decisively rejected his authority to make such a seizure, even in the face of arguments that the strike would interfere with the supply of weapons and ammunition to American troops then under fire on the battlefields of the Korean War. The Supreme Court also rejected similar assertions of inherent executive power by Richard Nixon. U.S. Supreme Court YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ?The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President?s military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. . . . ?Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. . . . The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. . . . ?The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.? In fact, FISA contains explicit language describing the president?s powers ?during time of war? and provides that ?the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen days following a declaration of war by the Congress." 50 U.S.C. ? 1811 (emphasis added). So even if we accept the argument that the use-of-force resolution places us on a war footing, warrantless surveillance would have been legal for only 15 days after the resolution was passed on September 18, 2001. Point #5: The need for quick action does not justify an end-run around the courts The FISA law takes account of the need for emergency surveillance, and the need for quick action cannot be used as a rationale for going outside the law. FISA allows wiretapping without a court order in an emergency; the court must simply be notified within 72 hours. The government is aware of this emergency power and has used it repeatedly. In addition, the Foreign Intelligence court is physically located in the Justice Department building, and the FISA law requires that at least two of the FISA judges reside in the Washington, DC area, for precisely the reason that rapid action is sometimes needed. If President Bush still for some reason finds these provisions to be inadequate, he must take his case to Congress and ask for the law to be changed, not simply ignore it. The president is bound by the rule of law President Bush?s claim that he has ?inherent authority? as Commander-in-Chief to use our spy agencies to eavesdrop on Americans is astonishing, and such spying is clearly illegal. It must be halted immediately, and its origins must be thoroughly investigated by Congress and by a special counsel. (See letter from the ACLU to Attorney General Gonzales calling for a special counsel <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/23184leg20051221.html> ). Given the extensive (indeed, excessive) surveillance powers that the government already possesses, the Administration?s blatantly illegal use of warrantless surveillance raises an important question: why? One possibility, raised by the New York Times in a Dec. 24, 2005 story (?Spy Agency Minded Vast Data Trove, Officials Report <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html> ?), is that the NSA is relying on assistance from several unnamed telecommunications companies to ?trace and analyze large volumes of communications? and is ?much larger than the White House has acknowledged.? This, as security expert Bruce Schneier has noted, suggests the Bush Administration has developed a ?a whole new surveillance paradigm? ? exploiting the NSA?s well known capabilities to spy on individuals not one at a time, as FISA permits, but to run communications en masse through computers in the search for suspicious individuals or patterns. This ?new paradigm? may well be connected to the NSA program sometimes known as ?Echelon,? which carries out just that kind of mass collection of communications (see www.nsawatch.org <http://www.nsawatch.org/> ). This ?wholesale? surveillance, as Schneier calls it, would constitute an illegal invasion of Americans? privacy on a scale that has never before been seen. (See Schneier, ?NSA and Bush?s Illegal Eavesdropping <http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/12/20/surveillance/> ,? Salon.com) According to the Times, several telecommunications companies provided the NSA with direct access to streams of communications over their networks. In other words, the NSA appears to have direct access to a large volume of Americans? communications ? with not simply the assent, but the cooperation of the companies handling those communications. We do not know from the report which companies are involved or precisely how or what the NSA can access. But this revelation raises questions about both the legal authority of the NSA to request and receive this data, and whether these companies may have violated either the Federal laws protecting these communications or their own stated privacy polices (which may, for example, provide that they will only turn over their customers? data with their consent or in response to a proper order). Regardless of the scale of this spying, we are facing a historic moment: the President of the United states has claimed a sweeping wartime power to brush aside the clear limits on his power set by our Constitution and laws ? a chilling assertion of presidential power that has not been seen since Richard Nixon. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] ACLU ON NSA Spying on Americans
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology
by Michael Reed 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 03/22/2011 12:08 PM, Watson Ladd wrote: > On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Joe Btfsplk<joebtfsplk(a)gmx.com> wrote: >> Why would any govt create something their enemies can easily use against >> them, then continue funding it once they know it helps the enemy, if a govt >> has absolutely no control over it? It's that simple. It would seem a very >> bad idea. Stop looking at it from a conspiracy standpoint& consider it as >> a common sense question. > Because it helps the government as well. An anonymity network that > only the US government uses is fairly useless. One that everyone uses > is much more useful, and if your enemies use it as well that's very > good, because then they can't cut off access without undoing their own > work. BINGO, we have a winner! The original *QUESTION* posed that led to the invention of Onion Routing was, "Can we build a system that allows for bi-directional communications over the Internet where the source and destination cannot be determined by a mid-point?" The *PURPOSE* was for DoD / Intelligence usage (open source intelligence gathering, covering of forward deployed assets, whatever). Not helping dissidents in repressive countries. Not assisting criminals in covering their electronic tracks. Not helping bit-torrent users avoid MPAA/RIAA prosecution. Not giving a 10 year old a way to bypass an anti-porn filter. Of course, we knew those would be other unavoidable uses for the technology, but that was immaterial to the problem at hand we were trying to solve (and if those uses were going to give us more cover traffic to better hide what we wanted to use the network for, all the better...I once told a flag officer that much to his chagrin). I should know, I was the recipient of that question from David, and Paul was brought into the mix a few days later after I had sketched out a basic (flawed) design for the original Onion Routing. The short answer to your question of "Why would the government do this?" is because it is in the best interests of some parts of the government to have this capability... Now enough of the conspiracy theories... -Michael _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology
by Michael Reed 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 03/22/2011 12:08 PM, Watson Ladd wrote: > On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Joe Btfsplk<joebtfsplk(a)gmx.com> wrote: >> Why would any govt create something their enemies can easily use against >> them, then continue funding it once they know it helps the enemy, if a govt >> has absolutely no control over it? It's that simple. It would seem a very >> bad idea. Stop looking at it from a conspiracy standpoint& consider it as >> a common sense question. > Because it helps the government as well. An anonymity network that > only the US government uses is fairly useless. One that everyone uses > is much more useful, and if your enemies use it as well that's very > good, because then they can't cut off access without undoing their own > work. BINGO, we have a winner! The original *QUESTION* posed that led to the invention of Onion Routing was, "Can we build a system that allows for bi-directional communications over the Internet where the source and destination cannot be determined by a mid-point?" The *PURPOSE* was for DoD / Intelligence usage (open source intelligence gathering, covering of forward deployed assets, whatever). Not helping dissidents in repressive countries. Not assisting criminals in covering their electronic tracks. Not helping bit-torrent users avoid MPAA/RIAA prosecution. Not giving a 10 year old a way to bypass an anti-porn filter. Of course, we knew those would be other unavoidable uses for the technology, but that was immaterial to the problem at hand we were trying to solve (and if those uses were going to give us more cover traffic to better hide what we wanted to use the network for, all the better...I once told a flag officer that much to his chagrin). I should know, I was the recipient of that question from David, and Paul was brought into the mix a few days later after I had sketched out a basic (flawed) design for the original Onion Routing. The short answer to your question of "Why would the government do this?" is because it is in the best interests of some parts of the government to have this capability... Now enough of the conspiracy theories... -Michael _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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NSA Spying on Americans
by Barry Steinhardt 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave, As has been made plain by the many submissions to IP, the significance of the Bush/NSA spying scandal continues to grow each day. The ACLU has just posted a number of materials on our web site aclu.org and the new nsawatch.org that we hope will add to the debate. Those items include: 1. A new ACLU ad calling for a special counsel to investigate the President's illegal surveillance of U.S. Citizens.The add appeared in today's NY Times, as well as the web site along with related materials at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/. The text of the ad compares the words of President Nixon and President Bush, both of whom denied allegations of illegal spying. Next to the image of Nixon, the advertisement says: "He lied to the American people and broke the law." Below that is an image of President Bush, with the words, "So did he. 2. The Updated NSA Watch site (formerly known as Echelon watch): http://www.nsawatch.org/ which contains a wide variety of materials and links documenting the NSA's extraordinary communication interception capabilities ("sigint"), which are part of an international arrangement sometimes referred to as "Echelon". 3 A new piece explaining how the "NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal" at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/23279res20051229.html Since the Administration has sought to cast its unprecedented and lawless spying on American's as "legal", I have included the text of our piece below. You are, of course, free to use as much or little of it and the rest of this message as you would like. Have a good New Year, Barry Steinhardt ACLU Technology and Liberty Project NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/23279res20051229.html What if it emerged that the President of the United States was flagrantly violating the Constitution and a law passed by the Congress to protect Americans against abuses by a super-secret spy agency? What if, instead of apologizing, he said, in essence, ?I have the power to do that, because I say I can.? That frightening scenario is exactly what we are now witnessing in the case of the warrantless NSA spying ordered by President Bush that was reported December 16, 2005 by the New York Times. According to the Times, Bush signed a presidential order in 2002 allowing the National Security Agency to monitor without a warrant the international (and sometimes domestic) telephone calls and e-mail messages of hundreds or thousands of citizens and legal residents inside the United States. The program eventually came to include some purely internal controls ? but no requirement that warrants be obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as the 4th Amendment to the Constitution and the foreign intelligence surveillance laws require. In other words, no independent review or judicial oversight. That kind of surveillance is illegal. Period. The day after this shocking abuse of power became public, President Bush admitted that he had authorized it, but argued that he had the authority to do so. But the law governing government eavesdropping on American citizens is well-established and crystal clear. President Bush?s claim that he is not bound by that law is simply astounding. It is a Presidential power grab that poses a challenge in the deepest sense to the integrity of the American system of government ? the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, the concept of checks and balances on executive power, the notion that the president is subject to the law like everyone else, and the general respect for the ?rule of law? on which our democratic system depends. Flouting a long history The tensions between the need for intelligence agencies to protect the nation and the danger that they would become a domestic spy agency have been explicitly and repeatedly fought out in American history. The National Security Act of 1947 contained a specific ban on intelligence operatives from operating domestically. In the 1970s, America learned about the extensive domestic political spying carried out by the FBI, the military, the CIA, and the NSA, and Congress passed new laws to prevent a repeat of those abuses. Surveillance laws were debated and modified under presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton. But, President Bush would sweep aside this entire body of democratically debated and painstakingly crafted restrictions on domestic surveillance by the executive branch with his extraordinary assertion that he can simply ignore this law because he is the Commander-in-Chief. In a December 17 radio address, for example, Bush asserted that the spying was ?fully consistent with my constitutional responsibilities and authorities.? But his constitutional duty is to ?take care that the laws be faithfully executed? (Article II, Section 3); the law here clearly establishes well-defined procedures for eavesdropping on U.S. persons, and the fact is, Bush ordered that those procedures not be followed. Government eavesdropping on Americans is an extremely serious matter; the ability to intrude on the private realm is a tremendous power that can be used to monitor, embarrass, control, disgrace, or ruin an individual. Because it is so invasive, the technology of wiretapping has been subject to carefully crafted statutory controls almost since it was invented. Ignoring those controls and wiretapping without a court order is a crime that carries a significant prison sentence (in fact, criminal violations of the wiretap statute were among the articles of impeachment that were drafted against President Nixon shortly before his resignation). Clearly Illegal Unfortunately, although the law in this matter is crystal clear, many Americans, faced with President Bush?s bold assertions of ?inherent? authority for these actions, will not know what to believe. There are only 5 points they need to understand: Point #1: Electronic surveillance by the Government is strictly limited by the Constitution and Federal Law The law on surveillance begins with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which states clearly that Americans? privacy may not be invaded without a warrant based on probable cause. United States Constitution Fourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (emphasis added) The US Supreme Court (US v. Katz 389 US 347) has made it clear that this core privacy protection does cover government eavesdropping. As a result, all electronic surveillance by the government in the United States is illegal, unless it falls under one of a small number of precise exceptions specifically carved out in the law. United States Code Title 50, Chapter 36, Subchapter 1 Section 1809. Criminal sanctions (a) Prohibited activities A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally? (1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute In other words, the NSA can only spy where it is explicitly granted permission to do so by statute. Citizens concerned about surveillance do not have to answer the question, ?what law restricts the NSA?s spying?? Rather, the government is required to supply an answer to the question ?what law permits the NSA to spy?? Point #2: There are only three laws that permit the government to spy There are only three laws that authorize any exceptions to the ban on electronic eavesdropping by the government. Congress has explicitly stated that these three laws are the exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance can be carried out (18 USC, Section 2511(2)(f)). They are: ? Title III and ECPA. Title III and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act make up the statutes that govern criminal wiretaps in the United States. ? FISA. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is the law that governs eavesdropping on agents of ?foreign powers? within the United States, including suspected foreign terrorists. Point #3: The Bush-NSA spying was not authorized by any of these laws Title III and ECPA govern domestic criminal wiretaps and are not relevant to the NSA?s spying. FISA is the law under which the NSA should have operated. It authorizes the government to conduct surveillance in certain situations without meeting all of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment that apply under criminal law, but requires that an independent Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court oversee that surveillance to make sure that Americans who have no ties to foreign terrorist organizations or other ?foreign powers? are not spied upon. FISA was significantly loosened by the Patriot Act (which, for example, allowed it to be used for some criminal investigations), and parts of it now stand in clear violation of the Constitution?s Fourth Amendment in the view of the ACLU and many others. However, even the post-Patriot Act version of FISA does not authorize the president to conduct warrantless eavesdropping on U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents in the U.S. without an order from the FISA Court. Yet it is that very court order requirement ? imposed to protect innocent Americans ? that the President has ignored. In fact, one member of the FISA Court, Judge James Roberston, has apparently resigned from the court in protest of President Bush's secret authorization of this program. And the New York Times reported that the court?s chief judge complained about the program when she was (belatedly) notified of it, and refused to allow information gathered under the program to be used as the basis for FISA wiretap orders. Point #4: Congress?s post-9/11 use-of-force resolution does not legitimize the Bush-NSA spying Congress after 9/11 approved an Authorization to Use Military Force against those responsible for the attacks in order to authorize the president to conduct foreign military operations such as the invasion of Afghanistan. But that resolution contains no language changing, overriding or repealing any laws passed by Congress. Congress does not repeal legislation through hints and innuendos, and the Authorization to Use Military Force does not authorize the president to violate the law against surveillance without a warrant any more than it authorizes him to carry out an armed robbery or seize control of Citibank in order to pay for operations against terrorists. In fact, when President Truman tried to seize control of steel mills that were gripped by strikes in 1952, the Supreme Court decisively rejected his authority to make such a seizure, even in the face of arguments that the strike would interfere with the supply of weapons and ammunition to American troops then under fire on the battlefields of the Korean War. The Supreme Court also rejected similar assertions of inherent executive power by Richard Nixon. U.S. Supreme Court YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ?The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President?s military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. . . . ?Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. . . . The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. . . . ?The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.? In fact, FISA contains explicit language describing the president?s powers ?during time of war? and provides that ?the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen days following a declaration of war by the Congress." 50 U.S.C. ? 1811 (emphasis added). So even if we accept the argument that the use-of-force resolution places us on a war footing, warrantless surveillance would have been legal for only 15 days after the resolution was passed on September 18, 2001. Point #5: The need for quick action does not justify an end-run around the courts The FISA law takes account of the need for emergency surveillance, and the need for quick action cannot be used as a rationale for going outside the law. FISA allows wiretapping without a court order in an emergency; the court must simply be notified within 72 hours. The government is aware of this emergency power and has used it repeatedly. In addition, the Foreign Intelligence court is physically located in the Justice Department building, and the FISA law requires that at least two of the FISA judges reside in the Washington, DC area, for precisely the reason that rapid action is sometimes needed. If President Bush still for some reason finds these provisions to be inadequate, he must take his case to Congress and ask for the law to be changed, not simply ignore it. The president is bound by the rule of law President Bush?s claim that he has ?inherent authority? as Commander-in-Chief to use our spy agencies to eavesdrop on Americans is astonishing, and such spying is clearly illegal. It must be halted immediately, and its origins must be thoroughly investigated by Congress and by a special counsel. (See letter from the ACLU to Attorney General Gonzales calling for a special counsel <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/23184leg20051221.html> ). Given the extensive (indeed, excessive) surveillance powers that the government already possesses, the Administration?s blatantly illegal use of warrantless surveillance raises an important question: why? One possibility, raised by the New York Times in a Dec. 24, 2005 story (?Spy Agency Minded Vast Data Trove, Officials Report <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html> ?), is that the NSA is relying on assistance from several unnamed telecommunications companies to ?trace and analyze large volumes of communications? and is ?much larger than the White House has acknowledged.? This, as security expert Bruce Schneier has noted, suggests the Bush Administration has developed a ?a whole new surveillance paradigm? ? exploiting the NSA?s well known capabilities to spy on individuals not one at a time, as FISA permits, but to run communications en masse through computers in the search for suspicious individuals or patterns. This ?new paradigm? may well be connected to the NSA program sometimes known as ?Echelon,? which carries out just that kind of mass collection of communications (see www.nsawatch.org <http://www.nsawatch.org/> ). This ?wholesale? surveillance, as Schneier calls it, would constitute an illegal invasion of Americans? privacy on a scale that has never before been seen. (See Schneier, ?NSA and Bush?s Illegal Eavesdropping <http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/12/20/surveillance/> ,? Salon.com) According to the Times, several telecommunications companies provided the NSA with direct access to streams of communications over their networks. In other words, the NSA appears to have direct access to a large volume of Americans? communications ? with not simply the assent, but the cooperation of the companies handling those communications. We do not know from the report which companies are involved or precisely how or what the NSA can access. But this revelation raises questions about both the legal authority of the NSA to request and receive this data, and whether these companies may have violated either the Federal laws protecting these communications or their own stated privacy polices (which may, for example, provide that they will only turn over their customers? data with their consent or in response to a proper order). Regardless of the scale of this spying, we are facing a historic moment: the President of the United states has claimed a sweeping wartime power to brush aside the clear limits on his power set by our Constitution and laws ? a chilling assertion of presidential power that has not been seen since Richard Nixon. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] ACLU ON NSA Spying on Americans
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Gustaf BjC6rksten 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/28/2011 05:42 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > Hi all, > > First of all, thanks Brett for that article about Area SpA, great news! > > Secondly, I'm in the middle of some research into how satellite > communications are being used by activists, as well as how they are being > used/intercepted by Syrian authorities in an attempt to quell the uprising. > I've read a number of articles in a disjointed fashion, and am just now > beginning to coordinate my efforts. I am working on a series of best > practices for being "most safe" as I'm not sure we can offer much better > than that with regard to satellite equipment, furthermore I'm hoping to > provide an educated understanding of just what the risks are and what might > be done to mitigate them. However my impression is that the guide will > primarily be about understanding the full extent of the risk you place > yourself in. > > I have heard rumors about Syria's capacity direct from Syrian activists, > including that some calls made with thuraya phones have been recorded, and > that a phone simply making a call, for the first time, in a distant > location was tracked by syrian authorities. unfortunately, as many of you > know, such anecdotes are not as helpful as they might seem, and that its > important to understand, as best we can, just why thuraya phones seem to be > "less safe" than inmarsat or iridium, and to ensure that syrians don't > become lax and begin to depend on an alternate tool to thuraya such as > inmarsat phones, only to find themselves equally targeted via that means, > though it may take the regime longer to establish practices. > > Anyhow, what I'm looking for are accounts of how satphones have been > used/tracked in syria, as well as articles about syria's capacity to > monitor satellite transmissions. Separately I'll be researching the > practical capabilities of various satphones to ensure that readers of the > guide have access to the best information available, though this will > obviously need to evolve over time. Hi Brian, Access has also heard a number of reports from Syria that Thuraya satellite devices have been giving away the location of the device operators as soon as the devices are used. Our reports suggest this is limited to Thuraya devices only, and that the use of satellite technology from other providers does not seem to have the consequence of position information leakage to the authorities at this time. We do know that Thuraya devices transmit their location periodically as part of their communications protocol[1][2]. While this information is encrypted there seems to be some doubt as to the strength of that encryption. The US military complex did not have much faith in it and seems to have been able to bypass or crack the encryption to access the location information of Thuraya devices used by Iraqi Government officials[2]. While it is not clear exactly how this was achieved we do know that Thuraya devices were manufactured by Boeing and this fact may have contributed to an easy decryption route for US forces. In addition to this the location information clearly appears in unencrypted form in server logs at Thuraya itself[1]. This is worrying as it turns out that Thuraya is predominantly owned by Etisalat, a telco from the UAE with a dark history regarding surveillance of their users[3]. Etisalat have telecommunications interests in places including Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Etisalat was also alleged to be involved in a $39 billion scam in 2010 in India[4], and they deployed and manage the internet censorship system under the direction of the authorities in the UAE[5]. Due to the above-mentioned technical and ownership issues we recommend civil society do not use Thuraya satellite devices in the MENA region. To our knowledge devices from other vendors do not seem to be affected at this time. Access is working to gather further evidence from the ground in Syria and elsewhere in the MENA region to shine further light on the possible misuse of Thuraya satellite device location information. We also welcome any further information from anyone on this mailing list. [1] http://americas.xsatglobal.com/news.php?ArticleID=13 "XSAT USA plays role in recent K2 mountain rescue Thursday, 14-Aug-08 XSAT USA played an intricate role in the survival of two climbers after the recent mountain disaster on K2. A team of twenty two explorers were attempting to successfully reach the summit and descend the deadly K2 when disaster struck. While descending the mountain, an ice wall collapsed upon the weary climbers and destroyed the ropes and lines necessary for the safe descent. Team members were scattered throughout the mountainbs b dead zoneb with no possible chance of survival without a rescue attempt. Survivor Wilco Van Rooijen used a Thuraya Satellite Phone to contact his brother in desperation. Rooijenbs brother contacted Tom Sjogren of the mountaineering website ExplorersWeb. Tom then reached XSAT USA President Jan Rademaker on Friday, August 1 at 10:30 p.m. in need of Satellite GPS coordinates from Van Rooijenbs call history. XSAT employees in Dubai managed to access the information necessary to mount a rescue attempt through Thuraya, a satellite communication company based out of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. When Rooijen used his phone to call his brother, his GPS location was saved at the Thuraya ground station in Sharjah, UAE, giving Pakistani helicopters a chance to rescue two of the stranded climbers. The men were successfully rescued and taken to a Pakistani hospital for frostbite treatment." [2] http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20030424.aspx "April 24, 2003 During the Iraq war, the coalition unexpectedly ordered all civilians (mainly reporters) near coalition military units to immediately turn in their Thuraya satellite phones. These phones, made by Boeing, are satellite phones that also incorporate normal cell phone service and GPS capability. The phones were provided by a cell phone company in the United Arab Emirates. Thuraya recently announced that while the phones did transmit the GPS location periodically (to insure a good satellite signal), the information was sent in encrypted form and only someone with access to the codes, or with powerful decryption capabilities, could get the location information (of the phone broadcasting the information). Boeing is a major American defense contractor, and the U.S. has the most powerful decryption capabilities on the planet. It is suspected that the United States did use access to decrypted Thuraya GPS signals to make bombing attacks on known Iraqi government users of Thuraya satellite phones." [3] http://www.itp.net/561962-etisalats-blackberry-patch-designed-for-surveilla… "July 14, 2009 Etisalatbs BlackBerry patch designed for surveillance Expert says software developed by surveillance firm SS8 The battery-sapping "performance patch" that Etisalat sent to its BlackBerry subscribers over the last few days was designed to give the UAE operator the ability to read its customers emails and text messages, a Qatar-based software expert told CommsMEA yesterday." [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2G_spectrum_scam [5] http://opennet.net/research/profiles/uae "07/Aug/2009 United Arab Emirates" -- Gustaf BjC6rksten Technology Director Access https://www.accessnow.org GPG ID: 0xFEB3D12A GPG Fingerprint: C10F FC31 B92A 3A32 40A0 1A72 43AC A427 FEB3 D12A _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/28/2011 08:46 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > I'm also trying to determine whether iridium phones may be any > "better" than Inmarsat, and how much better, etc. it's clear thurayas > are no longer an acceptable option by any regard. I nearly forgot to mention this really great project by Harald and friends: http://gmr.osmocom.org/trac/ To quote his page entirely: "This is the homepage of the Osmocom sub-project GEO Mobile Radio. It is collecting information and software related to the ETSI GEO Mobile Radio specification and its practical implementations like the Thuraya satellite phone network GEO Mobile Radio is a set of specifications describing a satellite based mobile phone network. Radio aspects It uses the L-band frequencies 1634 to 1656 MHz (earth to space) and 1532.5 to 1554.5 MHz (space to earth) for communication between mobile phones and the respective satellites. The polarization is circular (left) and the modulation is pi/4 QPSK, using a channel spacing of 31.25 kHz" Here's a guide for doing your own Thuraya interception: http://gmr.osmocom.org/trac/wiki/Receiver_Setup All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Gustaf BjC6rksten 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/28/2011 05:42 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > Hi all, > > First of all, thanks Brett for that article about Area SpA, great news! > > Secondly, I'm in the middle of some research into how satellite > communications are being used by activists, as well as how they are being > used/intercepted by Syrian authorities in an attempt to quell the uprising. > I've read a number of articles in a disjointed fashion, and am just now > beginning to coordinate my efforts. I am working on a series of best > practices for being "most safe" as I'm not sure we can offer much better > than that with regard to satellite equipment, furthermore I'm hoping to > provide an educated understanding of just what the risks are and what might > be done to mitigate them. However my impression is that the guide will > primarily be about understanding the full extent of the risk you place > yourself in. > > I have heard rumors about Syria's capacity direct from Syrian activists, > including that some calls made with thuraya phones have been recorded, and > that a phone simply making a call, for the first time, in a distant > location was tracked by syrian authorities. unfortunately, as many of you > know, such anecdotes are not as helpful as they might seem, and that its > important to understand, as best we can, just why thuraya phones seem to be > "less safe" than inmarsat or iridium, and to ensure that syrians don't > become lax and begin to depend on an alternate tool to thuraya such as > inmarsat phones, only to find themselves equally targeted via that means, > though it may take the regime longer to establish practices. > > Anyhow, what I'm looking for are accounts of how satphones have been > used/tracked in syria, as well as articles about syria's capacity to > monitor satellite transmissions. Separately I'll be researching the > practical capabilities of various satphones to ensure that readers of the > guide have access to the best information available, though this will > obviously need to evolve over time. Hi Brian, Access has also heard a number of reports from Syria that Thuraya satellite devices have been giving away the location of the device operators as soon as the devices are used. Our reports suggest this is limited to Thuraya devices only, and that the use of satellite technology from other providers does not seem to have the consequence of position information leakage to the authorities at this time. We do know that Thuraya devices transmit their location periodically as part of their communications protocol[1][2]. While this information is encrypted there seems to be some doubt as to the strength of that encryption. The US military complex did not have much faith in it and seems to have been able to bypass or crack the encryption to access the location information of Thuraya devices used by Iraqi Government officials[2]. While it is not clear exactly how this was achieved we do know that Thuraya devices were manufactured by Boeing and this fact may have contributed to an easy decryption route for US forces. In addition to this the location information clearly appears in unencrypted form in server logs at Thuraya itself[1]. This is worrying as it turns out that Thuraya is predominantly owned by Etisalat, a telco from the UAE with a dark history regarding surveillance of their users[3]. Etisalat have telecommunications interests in places including Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Etisalat was also alleged to be involved in a $39 billion scam in 2010 in India[4], and they deployed and manage the internet censorship system under the direction of the authorities in the UAE[5]. Due to the above-mentioned technical and ownership issues we recommend civil society do not use Thuraya satellite devices in the MENA region. To our knowledge devices from other vendors do not seem to be affected at this time. Access is working to gather further evidence from the ground in Syria and elsewhere in the MENA region to shine further light on the possible misuse of Thuraya satellite device location information. We also welcome any further information from anyone on this mailing list. [1] http://americas.xsatglobal.com/news.php?ArticleID=13 "XSAT USA plays role in recent K2 mountain rescue Thursday, 14-Aug-08 XSAT USA played an intricate role in the survival of two climbers after the recent mountain disaster on K2. A team of twenty two explorers were attempting to successfully reach the summit and descend the deadly K2 when disaster struck. While descending the mountain, an ice wall collapsed upon the weary climbers and destroyed the ropes and lines necessary for the safe descent. Team members were scattered throughout the mountainbs b dead zoneb with no possible chance of survival without a rescue attempt. Survivor Wilco Van Rooijen used a Thuraya Satellite Phone to contact his brother in desperation. Rooijenbs brother contacted Tom Sjogren of the mountaineering website ExplorersWeb. Tom then reached XSAT USA President Jan Rademaker on Friday, August 1 at 10:30 p.m. in need of Satellite GPS coordinates from Van Rooijenbs call history. XSAT employees in Dubai managed to access the information necessary to mount a rescue attempt through Thuraya, a satellite communication company based out of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. When Rooijen used his phone to call his brother, his GPS location was saved at the Thuraya ground station in Sharjah, UAE, giving Pakistani helicopters a chance to rescue two of the stranded climbers. The men were successfully rescued and taken to a Pakistani hospital for frostbite treatment." [2] http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20030424.aspx "April 24, 2003 During the Iraq war, the coalition unexpectedly ordered all civilians (mainly reporters) near coalition military units to immediately turn in their Thuraya satellite phones. These phones, made by Boeing, are satellite phones that also incorporate normal cell phone service and GPS capability. The phones were provided by a cell phone company in the United Arab Emirates. Thuraya recently announced that while the phones did transmit the GPS location periodically (to insure a good satellite signal), the information was sent in encrypted form and only someone with access to the codes, or with powerful decryption capabilities, could get the location information (of the phone broadcasting the information). Boeing is a major American defense contractor, and the U.S. has the most powerful decryption capabilities on the planet. It is suspected that the United States did use access to decrypted Thuraya GPS signals to make bombing attacks on known Iraqi government users of Thuraya satellite phones." [3] http://www.itp.net/561962-etisalats-blackberry-patch-designed-for-surveilla… "July 14, 2009 Etisalatbs BlackBerry patch designed for surveillance Expert says software developed by surveillance firm SS8 The battery-sapping "performance patch" that Etisalat sent to its BlackBerry subscribers over the last few days was designed to give the UAE operator the ability to read its customers emails and text messages, a Qatar-based software expert told CommsMEA yesterday." [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2G_spectrum_scam [5] http://opennet.net/research/profiles/uae "07/Aug/2009 United Arab Emirates" -- Gustaf BjC6rksten Technology Director Access https://www.accessnow.org GPG ID: 0xFEB3D12A GPG Fingerprint: C10F FC31 B92A 3A32 40A0 1A72 43AC A427 FEB3 D12A _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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