July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[btns] RFC 5386 on Better-Than-Nothing Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec
by rfc-editor＠rfc-editor.org 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. RFC 5386 Title: Better-Than-Nothing Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec Author: N. Williams, M. Richardson Status: Standards Track Date: November 2008 Mailbox: Nicolas.Williams(a)sun.com, mcr(a)sandelman.ottawa.on.ca Pages: 11 Characters: 23103 Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso: None I-D Tag: draft-ietf-btns-core-07.txt URL: http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5386.txt This document specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup "unauthenticated" security associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH). No changes to IKEv2 bits-on-the-wire are required, but Peer Authorization Database (PAD) and Security Policy Database (SPD) extensions are specified. Unauthenticated IPsec is herein referred to by its popular acronym, "BTNS" (Better-Than-Nothing Security). [STANDARDS TRACK] This document is a product of the Better-Than-Nothing Security Working Group of the IETF. This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol. STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community,and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the Internet Official Protocol Standards (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. This announcement is sent to the IETF-Announce and rfc-dist lists. To subscribe or unsubscribe, see http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce http://mailman.rfc-editor.org/mailman/listinfo/rfc-dist For searching the RFC series, see http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html. For downloading RFCs, see http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc.html. Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the author of the RFC in question, or to rfc-editor(a)rfc-editor.org. Unless specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for unlimited distribution. The RFC Editor Team USC/Information Sciences Institute _______________________________________________ btns mailing list btns(a)ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/btns ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: What are email risks?
by Seth David Schoen 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Bjarni Rznar Einarsson writes: > Combine that sort of stuff with analysis of writing style, vocabulary, etc. > and you might be able to correlate two e-mails as originating from the same > person with some degree of accuracy. > > I'm not aware of any research into the trackability of such things, as > e-mail generally isn't considered anonymous anyway, but a lot of the work > that has gone into fighting spam would actually have implications here as > well. Hi Bjarni, There is a stylometry item in the anonbib where they do statistical analysis of features of writing style: http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec2000/full_papers/… I bet these techniques have gotten more powerful as the field of machine learning has developed, although I don't know if there are more recent studies of what this means for anonymity. -- Seth Schoen Senior Staff Technologist schoen(a)eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/ 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 +1 415 436 9333 x107 *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: What are email risks?
by Seth David Schoen 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Bjarni Rznar Einarsson writes: > Combine that sort of stuff with analysis of writing style, vocabulary, etc. > and you might be able to correlate two e-mails as originating from the same > person with some degree of accuracy. > > I'm not aware of any research into the trackability of such things, as > e-mail generally isn't considered anonymous anyway, but a lot of the work > that has gone into fighting spam would actually have implications here as > well. Hi Bjarni, There is a stylometry item in the anonbib where they do statistical analysis of features of writing style: http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec2000/full_papers/… I bet these techniques have gotten more powerful as the field of machine learning has developed, although I don't know if there are more recent studies of what this means for anonymity. -- Seth Schoen Senior Staff Technologist schoen(a)eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/ 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 +1 415 436 9333 x107 *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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CT-RSA 2003 -- preliminary call for papers
by marc.joye＠gemplus.com 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

=================================================================== Preliminary Call for Papers -- CT-RSA 2003 Submission deadline: Oct. 1, 2002 Cryptographers' Track, RSA Conference 2003 (CT-RSA 2003) April 13-17, 2003, Moscone Center, San Francisco, USA http://reg2.lke.com/rs3/rsa2003/crypto.html (see also http://www.rsaconference.net/) =================================================================== Following the success of the two previous editions, the Cryptographers' Track of RSA Conference 2003 (CT-RSA 2003) will be run as an anonymously refereed conference with proceedings. The proceedings of CT-RSA 2001 and CT-RSA 2002 were published in Springer-Verlag's Lecture Notes in Computer Science series as LNCS 2020 and LNCS 2271, respectively. Original research papers pertaining to all aspects of cryptography as well as tutorials are solicited. Submissions may present theory, techniques, applications and practical experience on topics including, but not limited to: fast implementations, secure electronic commerce, network security and intrusion detection, formal security models, comparison and assessment, tamper resistance, certification and time-stamping, cryptographic data formats and standards, encryption and signature schemes, public key infrastructure, protocols, elliptic curve cryptography, cryptographic algorithm design and cryptanalysis, discrete logarithms and factorization techniques, lattice reduction, and provable security. IMPORTANT DATES: Submission deadline: Oct. 1, 2002 Acceptance notification: Nov. 1, 2002 Proceedings version: Nov. 17, 2002 INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS: The program committee invites research contributions and tutorials in the broad area of applications and theory of cryptography. Correspondence, including submissions, will take place entirely via e-mail. All submissions will be blind refereed. To make a submission, please send two separate e-mail messages to marc.joye(a)gemplus.com (the first message should contain the paper's title, the names and affiliations of the authors and should identify the contact author, including e-mail and postal addresses; the second message should contain the submission itself in PostScript or in PDF). The paper must be anonymous, with no author names, affiliations, acknowledgements, or obvious references. It should begin with a title, a short abstract, and a list of keywords. The paper should be at most 12 pages (excluding the bibliography and clearly marked appendices), and at most 18 pages in total, using at least 11-point font and reasonable margins. Submissions not meeting these guidelines risk rejection without consideration of their merits. PROCEEDINGS For an accepted paper to be included in the proceedings, the authors of the paper must guarantee that at least one of the co-authors will attend the conference and deliver the talk (registration fees will be waived for the co-author delivering the talk). PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Giuseppe Ateniese Chi-Sung Laih John Black Tatsuaki Okamoto Daniel Bleichenbacher David Pointcheval Rosario Gennaro Bart Preneel Stuart Haber Jean-Jacques Quisquater Helena Handschuh Tsuyoshi Takagi Markus Jakobsson Gene Tsudik Antoine Joux Serge Vaudenay Marc Joye (Chair) Sung-Ming Yen Kwangjo Kim Moti Yung Seungjoo Kim Yuliang Zheng

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FC: White House draft plan wants new Internet role for Feds
by Declan McCullagh 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

I'm going to try to put part of the report online before I leave in about five hours for the Internet Law and Policy Forum conference in Seattle. (I'm speaking on Wednesday and will be in Seattle through Saturday.) See: http://www.ilpf.org/conference2002/ I don't have a great way to scan in and OCR large documents, so I may post efax files and ask for a volunteer to OCR 'em. -Declan --- http://news.com.com/2100-1023-958159.html?tag=politech White House preps cybersecurity plan By Declan McCullagh September 16, 2002, 6:58 PM PT WASHINGTON--The White House's cyberspace security plan, scheduled to be released Wednesday, envisions a broad new role for the federal government in maintaining Internet security. While couching many concepts as mere suggestions, a draft of the plan seen by CNET News.com says the government should improve the security of key Internet protocols and spend tens of millions of dollars on centers to recognize and respond to "cyber attacks." [...] It says the executive branch should consult with privacy groups and attempt to preserve civil liberties, but concludes that in some cases, privacy could be limited. "Allowing completely anonymous communications on a wide-scale basis, with no possibility of determining the source, could shelter criminal, or even terrorist communications," the draft says. [...]

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[tor-talk] almost success toward complete tor enforcement, need little help now
by Raviji 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Dear list, I wonder if I can setup a box which provides complete traffic enforcement through tor. The tails project has encouraged me to work in that direction. With the tails documentations and with some online guide like https://cryptoanarchy.org/wiki/Build_your_own_livething I am able to setup my running debian system almost a tor encrypted box, with some small hitches which I belief can easily be solved with your technical guidance. obfsproxy issue ================= I have installed tor,pdnsd,ttdnsd,obfsproxy,polipo,vidalia I have already collected the obfs IP address from a running tor bundle and then placed all those at /etc/tor/torrc. tor is running with obfs. [Q] How can I check online that obfs is functional ? https://check.torproject.org/ simply shows tor is running, but no obfs related information. polipo and firewall ===================== Browsers configured to use polopo ( tor as parent) and the online check is successful (https://check.torproject.org/) [Q] Is polipo really fast ? I hardly see any advantage comparing direct tor connection with out polipo. [Q] What is the iptables rule to redirect all 80 and 443 traffic through polipo 8118 port ? Then no configuration is required at browser level. DNS and firewall ================= I am using pdnsd (caching DNS proxy server) and ttdnsd ( udp to tcp converter ) /etc/pdnsd.conf content with this: global { perm_cache = 2048; cache_dir = "/var/cache/pdnsd"; run_as = "pdnsd"; server_ip = 127.0.0.1; status_ctl = on; min_ttl = 15m; max_ttl = 1w; timeout = 120; } # Tor DNS resolver server { label = "tor"; ip = 127.0.0.1; port = 8853; uptest = none; exclude=".invalid"; policy=included; proxy_only = on; lean_query = on; } # ttdnsd server { label = "ttdnsd"; ip = 127.0.0.2; port = 53; uptest = none; exclude=".invalid",".exit",".onion"; policy=included; proxy_only = on; lean_query = on; } /etc/tor/torrc has DNSPort 8853 AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 AutomapHostsSuffixes .exit,.onion So ttdnsd running at port 53 at 127.0.0.2 and tor dns at 127.0.0.1 port 8853. But nmap shows ( #nmap -p 1-65535 localhost ) PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 25/tcp open smtp 53/tcp open domain 111/tcp open rpcbind 631/tcp open ipp 8118/tcp open privoxy 9040/tcp open tor-trans 9050/tcp open tor-socks 9051/tcp open tor-control no open port for tor-dns [Q] How can I enforce all udp to go through local DNS port and which one 53 or 8853 ? <...> iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT ! -o lo -p udp -m udp --dport 53 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 53 iptables -t filter -A OUTPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT <...> is not working. Can't do any dns resolution, even ping failed to gmail.com iptables to route all traffic and blocked all non tor ====================================================== LAN and lo (localhost) don't need to go through tor port 80/443 should go through poliop port 8118, all dns query should go through local 53 ( or 8853 ? ) port And the rest of the traffic should go through tor 9050 port, anything left should be dropped. The example iptables given at tails site is not working for me. Could anyone kindly give such a rule sets please ? Many many thanks for designing tor :-) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Social Media Combatants
by Gregory Foster 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog "The Strategist" (Dec 13) - "Are social media users now legitimate targets?" by Chloe Diggins: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/are-social-media-users-now-legitimate-targ… Diggins is a Research and Analysis Officer in the Australian Army's Directorate of Army Research and Analysis (DARA) Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC): http://www.army.gov.au/our-future/DARA/LWSC In the blog post, which is qualified as Diggins' personal opinion rather than the established policy of her institution, Diggins reflects on what is characterized as "Israel and Hamas' recent social media war": > Whether social media is making an effective contribution or not remains > to be seen. However, by creating and perpetuating a narrative that > influences public opinion, social media is contributing to a defined > military operation and has become integral to the information and > communication space. As a legitimate part of the conflict, social media > (and its users) becomes a valid military objective. HT @MartinHume via @cencio4: http://twitter.com/cencio4/status/280420701599571970 gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Technorati: A New Public Utility
by Monty Solomon 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Technorati: A New Public Utility By Adam L. Penenberg 02:00 AM Jul. 14, 2005 PT When former Federal Communications Commission chairman Michael K. Powell watched television coverage of the London bombings last week, he noticed that most of the significant pictures didn't originate from professional photographers employed by news agencies. They came from witnesses at the scene using cell phones and digital cameras to document the tragedy. "Journalists are trained not to be emotional, like a doctor doesn't fall in love with his patients," Powell said. "But people experiencing a tragedy can convey what actually happened while at the same time express deep emotion and engage in spirited storytelling. A photo of someone climbing up through train wreckage is extremely powerful. A reporter rolling up to the scene behind a police line can rarely give you that." Before, blogging was largely fixated on the failure of mainstream media. Now it has become a necessary supplement, and in some cases, a substitute. But Powell takes this a step further. To him, London showed that blogging has morphed into the art of raw, personalized storytelling. "You really felt as if you were there," Powell said of the blog posts and Flickr photos he surveyed, "as opposed to watching CNN or reading MSNBC.com, which are fine for the facts but stale and a bit removed." Powell was far from the only one who turned to the blogosphere for perspectives on the London terror attacks. David Sifry, founder of Technorati, a real-time search engine for blog content, reports that traffic to the site in the hours after the attacks was so heavy that its servers had trouble handling the load, causing performance problems. The number of posts on blogs tracked by Technorati increased 30 percent, from about 850,000 a day in July to 1.2 million on the day of the attacks. Nine of the 10 most popular search requests involved the unfolding tragedy in London. If you think about it, Technorati has become a public utility on a global scale. ... http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,68204,00.html ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Technorati: A New Public Utility
by David Farber 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [serval-project-dev] Architecture questions
by Paul Gardner-Stephen 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hello, On Sun, Nov 27, 2011 at 6:21 PM, Ben Hughes <ben(a)benrhughes.com> wrote: > This is my basic understanding of the Serval architecture, please let me > know if it's misguided: > > - BATMAN is the underlying protocol that is used to connect nodes on the > mesh Correct at present. Ultimately DNA will include it's own custom mesh routing protocol that drives an overlay mesh so that operating system cooperation is not required, thus maximising portability. It will also support asynchronous and highly partitioned mesh networks. > - DNA is a layer on top of batman that lets you use claimed numbers (and a > public/private key pair) to identify nodes on the batman mesh Yes. > - when you make a mesh call, DNA resolves the number to a batman ip, and > then attempts to establish a SIP connection (via asterix) to that address That is right for now. The overlay mesh will change things a bit, but DNA will still do phone number to address resolution, it is just that the addresses will be 256 bit public keys instead of IPv4 based SIP addresses. SIP will go by the way side as well, to be replaced by something more suited to lossy wireless meshes. > I know that there's more to it than that (social verification of claimed > numbers, bridging networks, DID etc) but is that basically correct? > > If so, batman seems as though it's a vital (and complex) component in the > stack. And from what I can tell, it seems pretty tied to *nix. It is pretty tied to posix, not unix. Windows and practically every other operating system supports most of posix. There will be some OS specific code. > If I'm looking to port DNA to WP7, do I first need to port batman? Or put > another way: is there any value in a batman-less DNA? You do not need to first port BATMAN to produce something of value. In the long term, Serval will be based on the increasingly pluripotent Serval DNA daemon (which will probably get a rename from dna to servald or similar at some point), that will handle everything, and just need hooks to the audio and network channels on the host device. Thus a C# port of DNA is exceptionally valuable. It will also serve as a good basis for a port to Windows. Paul. > Cheers, > > Ben > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Serval Project Developers" group. > To post to this group, send email to > serval-project-developers(a)googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > serval-project-developers+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/serval-project-developers?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Serval Project Developers" group. To post to this group, send email to serval-project-developers(a)googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to serval-project-developers+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/serval-project-developers?hl=en. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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