July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

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by jim bell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

mail.com>; "akosba(a)cs.umd.edu" <akosba(a)cs.umd.edu>; Cpunks List <cypherpunk= s(a)cpunks.org> Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2015 10:14 AM Subject: Your paper on criminal contracts Dear Professors Juels (http://www.arijuels.com/) and Shi (runting(a)gmail.com= ), and Ahmed Kosba =C2=A0akosba(a)cs.umd.edu :=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I've found a refe= rence to your recent paper, http://www.initc3.org/publications.html.=C2=A0 = "The Ring of Gyges: Using Smart Contracts for Crime."=C2=A0=C2=A0 Perhaps y= ou are not aware, but 20 years ago (1995-6) I wrote an essay on a very simi= lar subject. =C2=A0I called it "Assassination Politics". =C2=A0cryptome.org= /ap.htm . =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jim Bell ------=_Part_755731_2063629305.1442829023083 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html><body><div style=3D"color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:He= lveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;fo= nt-size:13px"><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4959" dir=3D"ltr"><span= id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4958">Your paper:    <a href=3D= "https://www.google.com/url?sa=3Dt&rct=3Dj&q=3D&esrc=3Ds&so= urce=3Dweb&cd=3D3&cad=3Drja&uact=3D8&ved=3D0CCsQFjACahUKEwi= F_b_E7IfIAhWQmIgKHc_tAuY&url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.arijuels.com%2Fwp-conte= nt%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F09%2Fpublic_gyges.pdf&usg=3DAFQjCNHOBvCYwJ5Aq0CmH= TOY53sGdRs5Sw&sig2=3DL_lh-zCi016f7Y3jbKVKlQ&bvm=3Dbv.103073922,d.cG= U" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_8900">https://www.google.com/url?sa=3Dt= &rct=3Dj&q=3D&esrc=3Ds&source=3Dweb&cd=3D3&cad=3Drj= a&uact=3D8&ved=3D0CCsQFjACahUKEwiF_b_E7IfIAhWQmIgKHc_tAuY&url= =3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.arijuels.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F09%2Fpubli= c_gyges.pdf&usg=3DAFQjCNHOBvCYwJ5Aq0CmHTOY53sGdRs5Sw&sig2=3DL_lh-zC= i016f7Y3jbKVKlQ&bvm=3Dbv.103073922,d.cGU</a></span></div><div id=3D"yui= _3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4959" dir=3D"ltr"><span><br></span></div><div id=3D= "yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4959" dir=3D"ltr"><span id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442= 825109502_8941">Thank you for your reply, Dr. Juels, </span></div><div= id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5059"><span><br></span></div><div id=3D"y= ui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"><span id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144282= 5109502_5057">Once you read my essay, I think you will understand my concer= n about the motivation for your research, and its potential consequences. &= nbsp; Superficially, and certainly to someone unfamiliar with my idea (Assa= ssination Politics essay),  I'm sure it sounds useful and indeed benef= icial to try to prevent the construction and operation of "criminal contrac= ts".   One problem that I see, as a lifetime libertarian, is that "cri= minal" may mean no more than "what the government wants to ban" rather than= an actual victim crime.  Worse, governments are powerfully motivated = to prevent developments that will someday likely destroy them.</span></div>= <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id= =3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"><span id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1= 442825109502_5503" class=3D"">I suggest that you study the analyses of Bob = Vroman  <a href=3D"http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.t= cl?msg_id=3D009ape" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5754">http://www.green= spun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=3D009ape</a>    , &n= bsp;  <a href=3D"http://www.mail-archive.com/cypherpunks-moderated@min= der.net/msg02068.html" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6269">http://www.ma= il-archive.com/cypherpunks-moderated@minder.net/msg02068.html</a>   &n= bsp; and  of Bob Murphy,  </span><span style=3D"font-size: small;= font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 20.2222px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_= 1_1442825109502_5851" class=3D"">www.anti-state.</span><wbr style=3D"font-s= ize: small; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 20.2222px;" id=3D"= yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5853" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: small= ; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 20.2222px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0= _1_1442825109502_5855" class=3D"">com/murphy/</span><span style=3D"font-siz= e: small; font-weight: bold; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 2= 0.2222px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5857" class=3D"">murphy17</span= ><span style=3D"font-size: small; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-heig= ht: 20.2222px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5859" class=3D"">.</span><= span style=3D"font-size: small; font-weight: bold; font-family: arial, sans= -serif; line-height: 20.2222px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5861" cla= ss=3D"">html</span>   (although the Murphy essay might not be ava= ilable, except as an archive.)  as well as by R.  Sukumaran &nbsp= ; <a href=3D"http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/CryptologyDigitalAss= assinationandtheTerrorismFuturesMarket_rsukumaran_0404.html" id=3D"yui_3_16= _0_1_1442825109502_5597" style=3D"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" cl= ass=3D"">http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/CryptologyDigitalAssassinatio= nandtheTerrorismFuturesMarket_rsukumaran_0404.html</a>. </div><div id= =3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3= _16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr">Further, consider<br></div><div id= =3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3= _16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"> <a href=3D"https://github.com= /isislovecruft/patternsinthevoid/blob/master/content/anarchism/game-theory-= anarchism-ii-how-information-can-smash-the-state.md" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144= 2825109502_6139">https://github.com/isislovecruft/patternsinthevoid/blob/ma= ster/content/anarchism/game-theory-anarchism-ii-how-information-can-smash-t= he-state.md</a></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr= "><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr"><a href= =3D"https://c4ss.org/content/1157" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6418">h= ttps://c4ss.org/content/1157</a><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144282510= 9502_5058"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058" dir=3D"ltr= "><a href=3D"http://archive.is/zYH0e" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6562= " style=3D"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">series -- anti-state.com<= /a><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5058"><br></div><div id= =3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6595" dir=3D"ltr"><a href=3D"https://www.red= dit.com/r/Anarcho_Capitalism/comments/2jo578/arguments_for_against_insurrec= tionist_ancapism/" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6678">https://www.reddi= t.com/r/Anarcho_Capitalism/comments/2jo578/arguments_for_against_insurrecti= onist_ancapism/</a><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6595" di= r=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6595" dir=3D"ltr"= ><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6595" dir=3D"ltr">There is= a lot more where this comes from.<br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825= 109502_6595" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_65= 95" dir=3D"ltr">Keep in mind that when I wrote the AP essay, technologies s= uch as Tor, Bitcoin, and especially Ethereum and Augur simply did not exist= . But today they do, or at least they soon will.  And that, I consider= to be an extremely good thing.</div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_= 6595" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6595" dir= =3D"ltr">So perhaps you will understand that I consider that trying to prev= ent _all_ "criminal contracts" from being formed is a major, and indeed dan= gerous mistake.  While I do not believe that such an effort can ever s= ucceed, I think it would be best not to try.</div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1= 442825109502_6595" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109= 502_6595" dir=3D"ltr">          Jim Bell</div><div= id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6680"><br></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1= 442825109502_6738"><br></div> <div style=3D"font-family: HelveticaNeue, He= lvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;= " id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4963"> <div style=3D"font-family: Helvet= icaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-= size: 16px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4962"> <div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D= "yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4961"> <hr size=3D"1" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144282= 5109502_5198"> <font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_14428251= 09502_4964"> <b id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6555"><span style=3D"font-= weight:bold;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_6554">From:</span></b> Ari J= uels <juels(a)cornell.edu><br> <b><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">To= :</span></b> jim bell <jdb10987(a)yahoo.com> <br><b><span style=3D"font= -weight: bold;">Cc:</span></b> "runting(a)gmail.com" <runting(a)gmail.com&gt= ;; "akosba(a)cs.umd.edu" <akosba(a)cs.umd.edu> <br> <b><span style=3D"fon= t-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, September 16, 2015 2:32 PM<br>= <b id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5055"><span style=3D"font-weight: bold= ;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5054">Subject:</span></b> Re: Your pape= r on criminal contracts<br> </font> </div> <div class=3D"y_msg_container" i= d=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4965"><br><div id=3D"yiv5844945283"><div id= =3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4968"> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4967"> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4966">Dear Mr. Bell,</div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4969"><br clear=3D"none"> </div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4970">Thank you for your original not= e and follow-up. We=E2=80=99re indeed planning to read your essay and cite = it as appropriate in our next paper revision (slated to come out in January= ).</div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4972"> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4971"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283App= le-style-span" color=3D"#000000"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283Apple-style-sp= an" face=3D"Calibri"><br clear=3D"none"> </font></font></div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4973"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283App= le-style-span" color=3D"#000000"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283Apple-style-sp= an" face=3D"Calibri">Yours,</font></font></div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4974"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283App= le-style-span" color=3D"#000000"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283Apple-style-sp= an" face=3D"Calibri"><br clear=3D"none"> </font></font></div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4975"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283App= le-style-span" color=3D"#000000"><font class=3D"yiv5844945283Apple-style-sp= an" face=3D"Calibri">AJ</font></font></div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4976"><br clear=3D"none"> </div> </div> </div> <div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4977"><br clear=3D"none"> </div> <span id=3D"yiv5844945283OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"> </span><div class=3D"qtdSeparateBR"><br><br></div><div class=3D"yiv58449452= 83yqt8434586631" id=3D"yiv5844945283yqt23677"><div style=3D"font-family:Cal= ibri;font-size:11pt;text-align:left;color:black;BORDER-BOTTOM:medium none;B= ORDER-LEFT:medium none;PADDING-BOTTOM:0in;PADDING-LEFT:0in;PADDING-RIGHT:0i= n;BORDER-TOP:#b5c4df 1pt solid;BORDER-RIGHT:medium none;PADDING-TOP:3pt;" i= d=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4979"></div><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825= 109502_4984"><div id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_4983"><div style=3D"colo= r:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Hel= vetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:13px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_= 1_1442825109502_4982"><div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1442033498384_35= 18" style=3D"font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, L= ucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"><div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_= 0_1_1442033498384_3517" style=3D"font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue,= Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px;"><div class=3D= "yiv5844945283y_msg_container" id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_144203349838= 4_3516"><div id=3D"yiv5844945283"><div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1442= 033498384_3515"><div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1442033498384_3514" st= yle=3D"color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetic= a Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px;"><div c= lass=3D"yiv5844945283yqt0142132509" id=3D"yiv5844945283yqt48324"><div id=3D= "yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3903" style=3D"font-family:Helveti= caNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-si= ze:16px;"><div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3902" style=3D= "font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande= , sans-serif;font-size:16px;"><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_= 0_1_1440878565794_3901"> <font id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3908" size=3D"2" face= =3D"Arial"><b id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3912"><span id= =3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3911" style=3D"font-weight:bold= ;">From:</span></b> jim bell <<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto= =3D"mailto:jdb10987@yahoo.com" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:jdb10987@ya= hoo.com">jdb10987(a)yahoo.com</a>><br clear=3D"none"> <b id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1442033498384_3520"><span id=3D"yiv58449= 45283yui_3_16_0_1_1442033498384_3519" style=3D"font-weight:bold;">To:</span= ></b> "<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:juels@cornell.e= du" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:juels@cornell.edu">juels(a)cornell.edu</= a>" <<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:juels@cornell.= edu" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:juels@cornell.edu" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1= _1442825109502_4991">juels(a)cornell.edu</a>>; "<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape= =3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:runting@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"ma= ilto:runting@gmail.com">runting(a)gmail.com</a>" <<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:runting@gmail.com= " target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:runting@gmail.com">runting(a)gmail.com</a>= >; "<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:akosba@cs.umd.e= du" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:akosba@cs.umd.edu">akosba(a)cs.umd.edu</= a>" <<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:akosba@cs.umd.= edu" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:akosba@cs.umd.edu">akosba(a)cs.umd.edu<= /a>>; Cpunks List <<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mail= to:cypherpunks@cpunks.org" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@cpu= nks.org">cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org</a>> <br clear=3D"none"> <b id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1442033498384_3522"><span id=3D"yiv58449= 45283yui_3_16_0_1_1442033498384_3521" style=3D"font-weight:bold;">Sent:</sp= an></b> Tuesday, August 25, 2015 10:14 AM<br clear=3D"none"> <b id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3914"><span id=3D"yiv58449= 45283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3913" style=3D"font-weight:bold;">Subject:<= /span></b> Your paper on criminal contracts<br clear=3D"none"> </font></div> <div class=3D"yiv5844945283y_msg_container" id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1= _1440878565794_3904"> <br clear=3D"none"> <div id=3D"yiv5844945283"> <div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3906"> <div id=3D"yiv5844945283yui_3_16_0_1_1440878565794_3905" style=3D"color:#00= 0;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetic= a, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px;"> Dear Professors Juels (<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" target=3D"_blank"= href=3D"http://www.arijuels.com/" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1442825109502_5046">h= ttp://www.arijuels.com/</a>) and Shi (<a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" ym= ailto=3D"mailto:runting@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:runting= @gmail.com">runting(a)gmail.com</a>), and Ahmed Kosba  <a rel=3D"nofollo= w" shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:akosba@cs.umd.edu" target=3D"_blank" hr= ef=3D"mailto:akosba@cs.umd.edu">akosba(a)cs.umd.edu</a> :    I've f= ound a reference to your recent paper, <a rel=3D"nofollow" shape=3D"rect" target=3D"_blank"= href=3D"http://www.initc3.org/publications.html" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144282= 5109502_5047">http://www.initc3.org/publications.html</a>.  "The Ring = of Gyges: Using Smart Contracts for Crime."   Perhaps you are not= aware, but 20 years ago (1995-6) I wrote an essay on a very similar subject.  I called it "Assassination Politics".  cryptome.org/ap= .htm .                 Jim Bell</di= v> </div> </div> <br clear=3D"none"> <br clear=3D"none"> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <br clear=3D"none"> <br clear=3D"none"> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div></div> </div></div><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></body></html> ------=_Part_755731_2063629305.1442829023083--

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[IP] NJ Bill Would Prohibit Anonymous Posts on Forums]
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: NJ Bill Would Prohibit Anonymous Posts on Forums Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2006 15:22:15 -0500 (EST) From: Lynn <lynn(a)ecgincc.com> To: dave(a)farber.net http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/06/03/06/1736234.shtml NJ Bill Would Prohibit Anonymous Posts on Forums Posted by ScuttleMonkey on Monday March 06, @02:06PM from the glad-we're-not-in-nj dept. Privacy The Internet An anonymous reader writes "The New Jersey legislature is considering a bill that would require operators of public forums to collect users' legal names and addresses, and effectively disallow anonymous speech on online forums. This raises some serious issues, such as to what extent local and state governments can go in enacting and enforcing Internet legislation." link to proposed bill: http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A1500/1327_I1.HTM ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: William was raided for running a Tor exit node. Please help if you can.
by Jimmy Hess 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 12/18/12, Henry Yen <henry(a)aegisinfosys.com> wrote: > On Mon, Dec 17, 2012 at 20:45:04AM -0600, Jimmy Hess wrote: > Physical threat is somewhat different than seizure by law enforcement, > though. I'm not so sure about that. It's a kind of physical threat; the set of all physical threats includes a subset of threats that are LEO threats involving authorities and are related to (quasi-)legal threats. The law enforcement personnel may have been paid off by a rogue party in the first place, to seize and "misplace" the data (E.g. deny the legitimate principal access to it for the purposes of competitive advantage), or to seize and "accidentally" leak the data to overseas entity attempting to gain the data for economic advantage, by taking advantage of insufficient security controls of the law enforcement entity. > the idea of encryption as a shield against law enforcement is not yet a > settled issue in the US; see the "Fricosu" case. A nice explanation: > https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/tale-two-encryption-cases It obviously wouldn't work for all kinds of data, but; even if it's not a 5th amendment issue; E.g. "required to reveal your keys and allow the data to be decrypted"; the POSSIBILITY has to exist that that you can in fact know or recover the keys. You can't testify against yourself, if you had your memory permanently wiped in some manner, so that you are incapable of ever recalling, because "there's nothing there to present" --- it doesn't matter if there was no 5th amendment, the fact your memory was wiped, erased the possibility of ever testifying. If an automatic response to the security breach results in complete reliable destruction of physical and logical devices absolutely required to be fully intact to recover the keys and execute decryption activity, then "there is inherently nothing to provide", once that occured; the remaining option would be for the LEO to dedicate massive computing resources over a sufficient hundred years, to discover the key through brute force key space search of 10^77+ keys. That's assuming no backups of the key devices. > -- > Henry Yen Aegis Information Systems, -- -JH ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [cryptography] [OT] Reworked Version of Stuxnet Relative Duqu Found in Iran
by Marsh Ray 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 03/28/2012 10:39 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > Hi Guys, > > From "Reworked Version of Stuxnet Relative Duqu Found in Iran," > http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/1642-stuxnet-duqu-iran.html: > > Duqu's builders also changed its encryption algorithm and > rigged the malware loader to pose as a Microsoft driver. > (The old driver was signed with a stolen Microsoft certificate.) I hadn't heard about a driver signed with a "stolen Microsoft certificate. I suspect it's imperfect reporting. That article links to http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-duqu-sample-found-wild Which says: "Another difference is the old driver file was signed with a stolen certificateband this one is not." > Is the stolen certificate related to Diginotar or some other incident? > Microsoft claims Diginotar issued certificates are inert > (http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9219729/Microsoft_Stolen_SSL_certs_c…) Right. The legitimate Windows Update system application won't recognize certs from random CAs like DigiNotar. (Code signing PKI appears good enough for everyone except the vendors themselves.) But it might be possible to silently pwn MSIE users who checked the box "Always trust ActiveX controls from microsoft.com" and the sky's the limit on how you might use something like that for social engineering. > Perhaps "Stolen encryption key the source of compromised certificate > problem, Symantec says," > http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/security/stolen-encryption-key-the-sour… Anyone can sign up to get a code signing cert for basic driver signing, there is no test of purity of heart involved. Probably the only reason the bad guys used a stolen one is that it was easier to steal or buy a private key than to set up a temporary identity and pay a few hundred bucks for an official one. - Marsh _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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None
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SCO Security Advisory Subject: OpenLinux: Key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier Advisory number: CSSA-2003-034.0 Issue date: 2003 November 17 Cross reference: sr883602 fz528211 erg712405 CAN-2003-0255 ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Problem Description As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. CAN-2003-0255 The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greatest validity of the most valid user ID, which prevents GnuPG from warning the encrypting user when a user ID does not have a trusted path. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0255 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org) which standardizes names for security problems. 2. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Package ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. Many customers find it easier to use the Caldera System Updater, called cupdate (or kcupdate under the KDE environment), to update these packages rather than downloading and installing them by hand. 4. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server 4.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/RPMS 4.2 Packages d6da27be5c407641dc29f753d96e41fc gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/SRPMS 4.5 Source Packages b1ab55790186abd7997af751b3032721 gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 5. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation 5.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/R… 5.2 Packages 5469dcefe0be50d4d99d4b925a58d453 gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/S… 5.5 Source Packages be6338d319f84f139e8363f64bc6673a gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 6. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0255 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr883602 fz528211 erg712405. 7. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. 8. Acknowledgements SCO would like to thank The GnuPG Team (David, Stefan, Timo and Werner) ______________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj+5JjYACgkQbluZssSXDTGX9gCg++EK6pUrwQRfZl54wqUCinB8 itcAniMWmXByl7LyjfSP4chsEK2RcfXa =nik3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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None
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SCO Security Advisory Subject: OpenLinux: Key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier Advisory number: CSSA-2003-034.0 Issue date: 2003 November 17 Cross reference: sr883602 fz528211 erg712405 CAN-2003-0255 ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Problem Description As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. CAN-2003-0255 The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greatest validity of the most valid user ID, which prevents GnuPG from warning the encrypting user when a user ID does not have a trusted path. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0255 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org) which standardizes names for security problems. 2. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Package ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. Many customers find it easier to use the Caldera System Updater, called cupdate (or kcupdate under the KDE environment), to update these packages rather than downloading and installing them by hand. 4. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server 4.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/RPMS 4.2 Packages d6da27be5c407641dc29f753d96e41fc gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/SRPMS 4.5 Source Packages b1ab55790186abd7997af751b3032721 gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 5. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation 5.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/R… 5.2 Packages 5469dcefe0be50d4d99d4b925a58d453 gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/S… 5.5 Source Packages be6338d319f84f139e8363f64bc6673a gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 6. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0255 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr883602 fz528211 erg712405. 7. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. 8. Acknowledgements SCO would like to thank The GnuPG Team (David, Stefan, Timo and Werner) ______________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj+5JjYACgkQbluZssSXDTGX9gCg++EK6pUrwQRfZl54wqUCinB8 itcAniMWmXByl7LyjfSP4chsEK2RcfXa =nik3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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None
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SCO Security Advisory Subject: OpenLinux: Key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier Advisory number: CSSA-2003-034.0 Issue date: 2003 November 17 Cross reference: sr883602 fz528211 erg712405 CAN-2003-0255 ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Problem Description As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. CAN-2003-0255 The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greatest validity of the most valid user ID, which prevents GnuPG from warning the encrypting user when a user ID does not have a trusted path. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0255 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org) which standardizes names for security problems. 2. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Package ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. Many customers find it easier to use the Caldera System Updater, called cupdate (or kcupdate under the KDE environment), to update these packages rather than downloading and installing them by hand. 4. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server 4.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/RPMS 4.2 Packages d6da27be5c407641dc29f753d96e41fc gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/SRPMS 4.5 Source Packages b1ab55790186abd7997af751b3032721 gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 5. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation 5.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/R… 5.2 Packages 5469dcefe0be50d4d99d4b925a58d453 gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/S… 5.5 Source Packages be6338d319f84f139e8363f64bc6673a gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 6. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0255 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr883602 fz528211 erg712405. 7. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. 8. Acknowledgements SCO would like to thank The GnuPG Team (David, Stefan, Timo and Werner) ______________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj+5JjYACgkQbluZssSXDTGX9gCg++EK6pUrwQRfZl54wqUCinB8 itcAniMWmXByl7LyjfSP4chsEK2RcfXa =nik3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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None
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SCO Security Advisory Subject: OpenLinux: Key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier Advisory number: CSSA-2003-034.0 Issue date: 2003 November 17 Cross reference: sr883602 fz528211 erg712405 CAN-2003-0255 ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Problem Description As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. CAN-2003-0255 The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greatest validity of the most valid user ID, which prevents GnuPG from warning the encrypting user when a user ID does not have a trusted path. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0255 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org) which standardizes names for security problems. 2. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Package ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. Many customers find it easier to use the Caldera System Updater, called cupdate (or kcupdate under the KDE environment), to update these packages rather than downloading and installing them by hand. 4. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server 4.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/RPMS 4.2 Packages d6da27be5c407641dc29f753d96e41fc gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/SRPMS 4.5 Source Packages b1ab55790186abd7997af751b3032721 gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 5. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation 5.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/R… 5.2 Packages 5469dcefe0be50d4d99d4b925a58d453 gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/S… 5.5 Source Packages be6338d319f84f139e8363f64bc6673a gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 6. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0255 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr883602 fz528211 erg712405. 7. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. 8. Acknowledgements SCO would like to thank The GnuPG Team (David, Stefan, Timo and Werner) ______________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj+5JjYACgkQbluZssSXDTGX9gCg++EK6pUrwQRfZl54wqUCinB8 itcAniMWmXByl7LyjfSP4chsEK2RcfXa =nik3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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None
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SCO Security Advisory Subject: OpenLinux: Key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier Advisory number: CSSA-2003-034.0 Issue date: 2003 November 17 Cross reference: sr883602 fz528211 erg712405 CAN-2003-0255 ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Problem Description As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. CAN-2003-0255 The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greatest validity of the most valid user ID, which prevents GnuPG from warning the encrypting user when a user ID does not have a trusted path. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0255 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org) which standardizes names for security problems. 2. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Package ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. Many customers find it easier to use the Caldera System Updater, called cupdate (or kcupdate under the KDE environment), to update these packages rather than downloading and installing them by hand. 4. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server 4.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/RPMS 4.2 Packages d6da27be5c407641dc29f753d96e41fc gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/SRPMS 4.5 Source Packages b1ab55790186abd7997af751b3032721 gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 5. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation 5.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/R… 5.2 Packages 5469dcefe0be50d4d99d4b925a58d453 gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/S… 5.5 Source Packages be6338d319f84f139e8363f64bc6673a gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 6. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0255 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr883602 fz528211 erg712405. 7. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. 8. Acknowledgements SCO would like to thank The GnuPG Team (David, Stefan, Timo and Werner) ______________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj+5JjYACgkQbluZssSXDTGX9gCg++EK6pUrwQRfZl54wqUCinB8 itcAniMWmXByl7LyjfSP4chsEK2RcfXa =nik3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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None
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SCO Security Advisory Subject: OpenLinux: Key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier Advisory number: CSSA-2003-034.0 Issue date: 2003 November 17 Cross reference: sr883602 fz528211 erg712405 CAN-2003-0255 ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Problem Description As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. CAN-2003-0255 The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greatest validity of the most valid user ID, which prevents GnuPG from warning the encrypting user when a user ID does not have a trusted path. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0255 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org) which standardizes names for security problems. 2. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Package ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation prior to gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. Many customers find it easier to use the Caldera System Updater, called cupdate (or kcupdate under the KDE environment), to update these packages rather than downloading and installing them by hand. 4. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Server 4.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/RPMS 4.2 Packages d6da27be5c407641dc29f753d96e41fc gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 4.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Server/CSSA-2003-034.0/SRPMS 4.5 Source Packages b1ab55790186abd7997af751b3032721 gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 5. OpenLinux 3.1.1 Workstation 5.1 Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/R… 5.2 Packages 5469dcefe0be50d4d99d4b925a58d453 gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.3 Installation rpm -Fvh gnupg-1.2.2-1.i386.rpm 5.4 Source Package Location ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/3.1.1/Workstation/CSSA-2003-034.0/S… 5.5 Source Packages be6338d319f84f139e8363f64bc6673a gnupg-1.2.2-1.src.rpm 6. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0255 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr883602 fz528211 erg712405. 7. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. 8. Acknowledgements SCO would like to thank The GnuPG Team (David, Stefan, Timo and Werner) ______________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj+5JjYACgkQbluZssSXDTGX9gCg++EK6pUrwQRfZl54wqUCinB8 itcAniMWmXByl7LyjfSP4chsEK2RcfXa =nik3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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