July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[WIKILEAKS] Friends of WikiLeaks
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

You have been invited to join Friends of WikiLeaks https://wlfriends.org/ MANIFESTO We, Friends of Wikileaks, support WikiLeaks, its people, its principles and its goals. We are committed to these broad ideals: 1. The right to communicate, including the right to speak, and the right to listen, the freedom of thought, the right to communicate privately, and the right to communicate anonymously. 2. The inviolability of history. 3. Privacy for the weak. 4. Transparency for the powerful. 5. The pursuit of truth, as the primary prerequisite for a more just civilization. Friends of WikiLeaks aim to do the following: 1. To defend WikiLeaks against attacks by, - becoming informed and informing each other, - promoting public awareness in the wider population, - counteracting misinformation, online and offline, - helping to raise funds, - addressing new and unforeseeable threats to WikiLeaks' continued functioning. 2. To vindicate the sources of WikiLeaks, whoever they may be, by, - defending through speech the good name of anyone alleged to have risked life and comfort to inform the public, - keeping WikiLeaks strong so that it is able to defend its sources, - ensuring through advocacy that the information they sought to bring to the world does not fall on deaf ears. 3. To defend the alleged sources of WikiLeaks, by, - organizing legal defense funding and support groups for them, - defending the motives of whistleblowers, - exercising care not to prejudice their rights by assuming legal culpability for the actions they are accused of. 4. To aid organizations and individuals who share the principles and goals of WikiLeaks. How is FoWL different? FoWL gives you new friends to instantly build a mass global movement. Unlike traditional social networks, FoWL is hardened against surveillance and attack. The primary spaces for online activism are watched by private and state intelligence agencies. FoWL is built to counter this. By design your details are encrypted, and hidden from everyone except your immediate contacts. Even we can't access them. Connected by FoWL, friends of WikiLeaks will communicate how ever they like, including using secure person-to-person methods. As the network grows away from the site infrastructure, it becomes autonomous and decentralized, opaque to observers and impossible to compromise. Why FoWL? Our attackers are wealthy and powerful organizations and governments. Their attacks - legal, financial and reputational - are sophisticated, and well resourced. For example: In late 2010, an informal consortium of banking institutions including VISA, Mastercard, Bank of America, Paypal and Western Union, moved to illegally blockade donations sent to WikiLeaks from its supporters. This blockade is ongoing. [More... http://wikileaks.org/Banking-Blockade.html] In 2011, a private security firm, HBGary Federal, contracted with US government agencies to marginalize WikiLeaks by spying on supporters and attacking the reputation of supportive journalists, such as Glenn Greenwald. http://www.salon.com/2011/02/15/palantir/singleton/ +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Politech] John Gilmore's horrific, dystopian view of an RFID world [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[I always learn something from John Gilmore, and this is no exception. Although parts of his dystopia are already true: I travel with a cell phone, 802.1x devices, and Bluetooth devices that broadcast my identity (to a sufficiently savvy adversary) even more efficiently than an RFID tag would... --Declan] -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] Computerworld falls for RFID "sniper rifle" hoax? Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2004 13:21:35 -0700 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> CC: politech(a)politechbot.com References: <408F2D74.8040301(a)well.com> Nice hoax. But the opposite is more likely to come true. Rather than shooting RFID chips into people, people with RFID chips already in or on them will be shot. People with RFID chips in their clothing, books, bags, or bodies could be targeted by "smart projectiles" that will zero in on that particular Smart. Today's "smart bombs" already self-guide toward laser-identified or RF-identified or heat-identified targets. The technical challenges involved in guiding a missile toward an RFID chip would probably relate to the speed of the missile compared to the range at which the RFID chip can be made to respond and the agility with which the missile can change course. Such a missile could probably more easily be designed to *arm* or *trigger* its explosion when a particular RFID chip is in range. That way, if fired at innocents, it would be a dud that would only cause minimal damage, but if fired at the right person, it would blow up. But we need not get so science-fiction about it. Rather than bring the mountain to Mohammed, let's let Mohammed come to the mountain. Let's see what this technology would do for an everyday practice of today's freedom fighters who are defending their country by opposing one of the US Government's current wars of occupation. In order to comply with government labeling mandates resulting from the huge Firestone tire recall, Michelin has announced that it plans to put RFID chips in every tire it sells to car makers (and eventually in every tire they sell). Similar plans are afoot for many other automotive and personal products. Imagine being able to bury an explosive in a roadway -- that would only go off when a particular car drove over it. You could bury these bombs months in advance, in any or every major or minor roadway. You could change the targeting whenever you liked (e.g. via driving a radio-equipped car over it and transmitting new instructions to it). You could give it a whole list of cars that it would explode for, or a set of cars and dates. If you put such bombs throughout a metropolitan area, a car could drive through the area for months without triggering anything -- taking evasive routes, etc. But on the appointed day, each the bombs surrounding the area would know to go off when that same car passed. Without the responsible parties having to visit the sites later than days or weeks beforehand (making them hard to catch or deter). Such explosives would be detectable by their radio emissions -- RFID pings. But in a world where RFID pings are being transmitted by everything around you, including every cellphone and doorframe and cash register and ATM machine and camera and car and computer and palmtop and parking meter and cop car ... you won't even notice. Places with "congestion pricing" like central London, or any toll road anywhere, would even have plenty of active RFID readers buried in the roadway already. And I'm sure the cops anywhere would love to have them for tracking where everybody is driving -- individually. Welcome to automated personal death. Courtesy of RFID and leading shortsighted global corporations, with government encouragement. John _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[WIKILEAKS] Friends of WikiLeaks
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

You have been invited to join Friends of WikiLeaks https://wlfriends.org/ MANIFESTO We, Friends of Wikileaks, support WikiLeaks, its people, its principles and its goals. We are committed to these broad ideals: 1. The right to communicate, including the right to speak, and the right to listen, the freedom of thought, the right to communicate privately, and the right to communicate anonymously. 2. The inviolability of history. 3. Privacy for the weak. 4. Transparency for the powerful. 5. The pursuit of truth, as the primary prerequisite for a more just civilization. Friends of WikiLeaks aim to do the following: 1. To defend WikiLeaks against attacks by, - becoming informed and informing each other, - promoting public awareness in the wider population, - counteracting misinformation, online and offline, - helping to raise funds, - addressing new and unforeseeable threats to WikiLeaks' continued functioning. 2. To vindicate the sources of WikiLeaks, whoever they may be, by, - defending through speech the good name of anyone alleged to have risked life and comfort to inform the public, - keeping WikiLeaks strong so that it is able to defend its sources, - ensuring through advocacy that the information they sought to bring to the world does not fall on deaf ears. 3. To defend the alleged sources of WikiLeaks, by, - organizing legal defense funding and support groups for them, - defending the motives of whistleblowers, - exercising care not to prejudice their rights by assuming legal culpability for the actions they are accused of. 4. To aid organizations and individuals who share the principles and goals of WikiLeaks. How is FoWL different? FoWL gives you new friends to instantly build a mass global movement. Unlike traditional social networks, FoWL is hardened against surveillance and attack. The primary spaces for online activism are watched by private and state intelligence agencies. FoWL is built to counter this. By design your details are encrypted, and hidden from everyone except your immediate contacts. Even we can't access them. Connected by FoWL, friends of WikiLeaks will communicate how ever they like, including using secure person-to-person methods. As the network grows away from the site infrastructure, it becomes autonomous and decentralized, opaque to observers and impossible to compromise. Why FoWL? Our attackers are wealthy and powerful organizations and governments. Their attacks - legal, financial and reputational - are sophisticated, and well resourced. For example: In late 2010, an informal consortium of banking institutions including VISA, Mastercard, Bank of America, Paypal and Western Union, moved to illegally blockade donations sent to WikiLeaks from its supporters. This blockade is ongoing. [More... http://wikileaks.org/Banking-Blockade.html] In 2011, a private security firm, HBGary Federal, contracted with US government agencies to marginalize WikiLeaks by spying on supporters and attacking the reputation of supportive journalists, such as Glenn Greenwald. http://www.salon.com/2011/02/15/palantir/singleton/ +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Politech] John Gilmore's horrific, dystopian view of an RFID world [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[I always learn something from John Gilmore, and this is no exception. Although parts of his dystopia are already true: I travel with a cell phone, 802.1x devices, and Bluetooth devices that broadcast my identity (to a sufficiently savvy adversary) even more efficiently than an RFID tag would... --Declan] -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] Computerworld falls for RFID "sniper rifle" hoax? Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2004 13:21:35 -0700 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> CC: politech(a)politechbot.com References: <408F2D74.8040301(a)well.com> Nice hoax. But the opposite is more likely to come true. Rather than shooting RFID chips into people, people with RFID chips already in or on them will be shot. People with RFID chips in their clothing, books, bags, or bodies could be targeted by "smart projectiles" that will zero in on that particular Smart. Today's "smart bombs" already self-guide toward laser-identified or RF-identified or heat-identified targets. The technical challenges involved in guiding a missile toward an RFID chip would probably relate to the speed of the missile compared to the range at which the RFID chip can be made to respond and the agility with which the missile can change course. Such a missile could probably more easily be designed to *arm* or *trigger* its explosion when a particular RFID chip is in range. That way, if fired at innocents, it would be a dud that would only cause minimal damage, but if fired at the right person, it would blow up. But we need not get so science-fiction about it. Rather than bring the mountain to Mohammed, let's let Mohammed come to the mountain. Let's see what this technology would do for an everyday practice of today's freedom fighters who are defending their country by opposing one of the US Government's current wars of occupation. In order to comply with government labeling mandates resulting from the huge Firestone tire recall, Michelin has announced that it plans to put RFID chips in every tire it sells to car makers (and eventually in every tire they sell). Similar plans are afoot for many other automotive and personal products. Imagine being able to bury an explosive in a roadway -- that would only go off when a particular car drove over it. You could bury these bombs months in advance, in any or every major or minor roadway. You could change the targeting whenever you liked (e.g. via driving a radio-equipped car over it and transmitting new instructions to it). You could give it a whole list of cars that it would explode for, or a set of cars and dates. If you put such bombs throughout a metropolitan area, a car could drive through the area for months without triggering anything -- taking evasive routes, etc. But on the appointed day, each the bombs surrounding the area would know to go off when that same car passed. Without the responsible parties having to visit the sites later than days or weeks beforehand (making them hard to catch or deter). Such explosives would be detectable by their radio emissions -- RFID pings. But in a world where RFID pings are being transmitted by everything around you, including every cellphone and doorframe and cash register and ATM machine and camera and car and computer and palmtop and parking meter and cop car ... you won't even notice. Places with "congestion pricing" like central London, or any toll road anywhere, would even have plenty of active RFID readers buried in the roadway already. And I'm sure the cops anywhere would love to have them for tracking where everybody is driving -- individually. Welcome to automated personal death. Courtesy of RFID and leading shortsighted global corporations, with government encouragement. John _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [ZS] IMPORTANT: Delegation, decentralization, personal initiative & flying the ZS flag
by Bryce Lynch 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Aug 7, 2012 at 12:16 PM, Dirk Bruere <dirk.bruere(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Then it has got to be seriously dumbed down and reduced to (at most) > two mouse clicks. Here I have to politely disagree with you: By double-clicking on the "Start Tor" icon not only was the Tor control panel started up, but a fully configured instance of Tor and a fully configured and hardened web browser ready for use. That's hard to beat. > If it's harder than installing a game it will not be used by most people. What was the last game you installed? People routinely go to much farther lengths to conceal their points of origin just to access Etherpad or search for a .torrent file. Much farther lengths, and they're a lot more strict about maintaining their OPSEC than most of us on this 'list are, I have a feeling. -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "I am everywhere." -- -- Zero State mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Riseup had a server seized by the US Federal Authorities
by Anne Roth 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april Server Seizure, April 2012 April 18th, 2012, Riseup had a server seized by the US Federal Authorities. This is our press release. FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FBI seizes server providing anonymous remailer and many other services from colocation facility. Contacts:B6 - Riseup Networks, Devin Theriot-Orr, 206-708-8740, sunbird(a)riseup.net - May First/People Link, Jamie McClelland, 917-509-5734, jm(a)mayfirst.org - ECN: Isole Nella Rete, inr(a)riseup.net Attack on Anonymous SpeechB6 On Wednesday, April 18, at approximately 16:00 Eastern Time, U.S. Federal authorities removed a server from a colocation facility shared by Riseup Networks and May First/People Link in New York City. The seized server was operated by the European Counter Network (b ECNb), the oldest independent internet service provider in Europe, who, among many other things, provided an anonymous remailer service, Mixmaster, that was the target of an FBI investigation into the bomb threats against the University of Pittsburgh. b The company running the facility has confirmed that the server was removed in conjunction with a search warrant issued by the FBI,b said May First/People Link director Jamie McClelland. b The server seizure is not only an attack against us, but an attack against all users of the Internet who depend on anonymous communication.b Disrupted in this seizure were academics, artists, historians, feminist groups, gay rights groups, community centers, documentation and software archives and free speech groups. The server included the mailing list b cyber rightsb (the oldest discussion list in Italy to discuss this topic), a Mexican migrant solidarity group, and other groups working to support indigenous groups and workers in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. In total, over 300 email accounts, between 50-80 email lists, and several other websites have been taken off the Internet by this action. None are alleged to be involved in the anonymous bomb threats. b The FBI is using a sledgehammer approach, shutting down service to hundreds of users due to the actions of one anonymous person,b said Devin Theriot-Orr, a spokesperson for Riseup. b This is particularly misguided because there is unlikely to be any information on the server regarding the source of the threatening emails.b b We sympathize with the University of Pittsburgh community who have had to deal with this frightening disruption for weeks. We oppose such threatening actions. However, taking this server wonbt stop these bomb threats. The only effect it has is to also disrupt e-mail and websites for thousands of unrelated people,b continues Mr. Theriot-Orr. b Furthermore, the network of anonymous remailers that exists is not harmed by taking this machine. So we cannot help but wonder why such drastic action was taken when authorities knew that the server contained no useful information that would help in their investigation.b The FBI purportedly seized the server because it was hosting an anonymous remailer called Mixmaster. Anonymous remailers are used to send email anonymously, or pseudonymously. Like other anonymizing services such as the Tor network, these remailers are widely used to protect the identity of human rights activists who place themselves and their families in grave danger by reporting information about abuses. Remailers are also important for corporate whistle blowers, democracy activists working under repressive regimes, and others to communicate vital information that would otherwise go un-reported. The Mixmaster software is specifically designed to make it impossible for anyone to trace the emails. The system does not record logs of connections, details of who sent messages, or how they were routed. This is because the Mixmaster network is specifically designed to resist censorship, and support privacy and anonymity. Unfortunately, some people misuse the network. However, compared to the rate of legitimate use, the abuse rate is very low. There is therefore no legitimate purpose for the FBI to seize this server because they will not be able to obtain any information about the sender. This is plainly extra-judicial punishment and an attack on free speech and anonymity on the internet and serves as a chilling effect on others providers of anonymous remailers or other anonymous services. In absence of any other leads, the FBI needs to show that they are making progress in this case, and this has meant seizing a server so they can proudly demonstrate they are taking some action. But what this incident shows is they are grasping at straws and are willing to destroy innocent bystanders for the sake of protecting their careers. About the organizations involvedB6 MayFirst/People Link (mayfirst.org) is a politically-progressive member-run and controlled organization that redefines the concept of b Internet Service Providerb in a collective and collaborative way. May First/People Linkbs members are organizers and activists who elect a Leadership Committee to direct the organization. Like a coop, members pay dues, buy equipment and then share that equipment for websites, email, email lists, and other Internet purposes. Riseup Networks (riseup.net) provides online communication tools for people and groups working on liberatory social change. Riseup creates democratic alternatives and practices self-determination by controlling our own secure means of communications. ECN (European Counter Network b ecn.org) is the oldest independent service provider in Europe providing free email accounts, mailing lists, and websites to organizations, activists, and movements that are involved in human rights, freedom of speech and information in Italy and Europe. ECN is anti-fascist and works towards a just and equal society. Years ago, before sites like Youtube and Vimeo existed, ECN created a platform called NGV where people could upload and share independent video of human rights violations. Nowadays ECN works primarily with anti-fascist and anti-Nazi movements in all of Europe, providing space and resources to political and social centers. Questions / further readingB6 Q: Doesnbt Mixmaster/anonymous remailers enable criminals to do bad things? A: Criminals can already do bad things. Since theybre willing to break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than mixmaster provides. They can steal cell phones, use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of literally millions of Windows machines around the world. Mixmaster aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that. Some advocates of anonymity explain that itbs just a tradeoff b accepting the bad uses for the good ones b but therebs more to it than that. Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims (identify theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand, donbt have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds. So yes, criminals could in theory use mixmaster, but they already have better options, and it seems unlikely that taking mixmaster away from the world will stop them from doing bad things. At the same time, mixmaster and other privacy measures can fight identity theft, physical crimes like stalking, and so on. (www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html) Q: How does Mixmaster / Anonymous remailers work? A: Anonymous remailers work by connecting to other anonymous remailers in a chain, and every one in that chain removes the mail header information making it impossible to find the real sender. The Tor project maintains a list of typical users of this and other anonymity systems, and the Mixmaster home page _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tor-talk] Installer for obfsproxy as a Windows service available
by awgh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<cross-post from openvpn-devel> Hello, I have spent the last couple of days preparing a bundled installer for the Tor Obfuscation Proxy combined with OpenVPN. The installer currently works on 32-bit and 64-bit Windows. It simply installs obfsproxy in SOCKS proxy mode and sets it up as a Windows service, so it starts at boot. The goal is to make this an automatic install for both clients and servers. To convert an existing OpenVPN profile to use the obfsproxy, you simply change the destination port of your remote line to point at the obfuscated server port instead of the regular OpenVPN server port: BEFORE: remote my.server.com 443 AFTER: remote my.server.com 80 (assuming obfsproxy server is listening on 80) Then, you just set OpenVPN to use a socks proxy by adding these lines to you config file: socks-proxy-retry socks-proxy 127.0.0.1 1050 After this, when you initiate the OpenVPN connection, it will use obfsproxy as a SOCKS proxy. Just remember to connect to the obfsproxy port on the server, not the OpenVPN port, in your client config and it works great! A couple of important notes: 1) I have only tested this with TCP mode. I don't expect UDP to work through Socks proxy, but haven't yet tried it. 2) Once, obfsproxy died on me and I had to go to Control Panel->Administrative Tools->Services and restart the obfsproxy service. This seems to be a one-time crash, though. The Windows Installer is available here: http://awgh.org/files/obfsvpn-installer-0_0_1.exe You can build it yourself by checking out the project on bitbucket here: https://bitbucket.org/awgh/obfsproxy-windows-installer I am also working on init scripts and packages for Linux distros, which can be used for both the client side and server side of an obfsproxy connection. So far, I just have CentOS RPMs and init scripts, which are available in this project: https://bitbucket.org/awgh/obfsproxy-rpm-build I am planning on adding some additional features to the installer bundle, to allow the configuration of shared secrets and the importation of existing config files. Please feel free to either email me with bugs/feature requests or to use the issue tracking on bitbucket! Hope this will be useful to some of you. Best Regards, - Ben _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Lucrative update
by Patrick 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Lucrative release 4 is out. I know many people are used to seeing releases numbered like "0.000001", "0.000002", "2.0.3.0.14.657" etc. but release numbering systems are essentially arbitrary in nature so don't get excited as Lucrative goes toward version 50+. This release is a fairly minor one, but included some changes such as the client name that I wanted to get out as soon as possible. There is also a new development weblog at http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/weblog/. I went through an install with someone over IRC last night and made a blog entry summarizing the install notes. I recommend reading the notes before attempting an install. I am glad to help with an install, drop me a note at patrick(a)lfcgate.com if you have trouble. Some documentation on the various entities in the Lucrative system is now available on the website, http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/documentation.php but more is needed and coming. If Lucrative is interesting to you, please consider helping in any way you can: Feedback Installation reports Suggestions Comments Criticism Feature requests Source code patches Donations Are all very much welcomed. And criticism is more useful to me than praise. My sincere thanks to everyone who has participated so far by installing, testing, providing feedback, spreading the word, and donating. And finally I just received word from SourceForge that the project registration for Lucrative has been approved. Regards, Patrick -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBD5ECKcRBADUvjXHwLtxIyS4AyjBs/dFtN6rdeP18Fhzh1hD5fJwkFevqY9Z I1ASROTh6eXYF7pU5sEvbcPshHyTB41ZtTqZvQvpwWN0fUzOuutuI0mtC5UPp9Rz j47SdWLdEXNHjwnHDCYSyqtqZu8GujGRQybR0eP3NIh/NwbSDUKdgz7IjwCg//Jo UtjP3zUFobm/0UYA+CJ5krED/091x9Js0gwNwvjbzM8DqO+r8qNz0kXI13FkrPRk QNd37lxt6m2m8HZD1WYM2wKwtMzHSwJcWzaDZ/tNc+ppYjzpw0EQCh9FqjGs8Vau guF6PA1M8lJTCcLKaL4e7ynic+PAw5Xa/tdOYgFCG+eLMU5RLvzRCYoOLIjgMJLJ yG98BACAMlDmFVYgC/UKvzZmHfZ5CtCKd8sPfCXrYLu5NeFRE0LR6D6zjzmhi1xX okfreR5o3T/y78VBM98js+m2/+7Z0AElqydeW/RnV1zqwDGjDr9z2MgARf3yLAbs n3BU8Fz61RwvHy6cRkT+2dR2f69QQUSpkupvLwZIGX/iwm4uKLQdUGF0cmljayA8 cGF0cmlja0BsZmNnYXRlLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAj5ECKcECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBb mvb9yuOVfaA2AKDAu5tDj9F2KI8cJMrKKkQRAcUyxACg6/bei7lUJH+E5igJqGRx SjKrRA65BA0EPkQIpxAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICD/wKwtF7Y4NKBe8PQ6jDbjWziiTv9Ac/EnRTJDQEoqgLa2LyE+6Ahw/VPGvp mfxkD2MKxC9E7kYVmasn6sHnSpvAv3e7O1Bqbo/qLzzCcJQ5VCurZ+elRM1GZ4Oc fM19FPKutb0/JFEv0nrqS4BGkF7WFBbu5dKYl/GIO7Co1mAerFIb719dOwMPVEIz OT08u8uB9jyR8gEElf+CVuNfOUkrUGg4HS4SbmTTrCSz3/8n5PkquSuAyjCB/dwM ZsZwA0/TTR8sDYlmlf9xPj5PGpGnV9OUwfig6eE0eWtRFeasmz0uiX+yp45ABtNh 6EXP/PFaBgXi9omXXjeeFYfpDvmfA6izvTIQfXTV6V9ZWrBfXarM+GQ+6guXWVbd 9fXvmCr982LkzuKQrK1OpRXBMUapXL+tOy/LYzz91InqKKhgPNGa12fvotZ4LzlM iqoM+Hpz5L9B5We1Ph0lD6RBVXDCqd+P8extnY/7AaDy7tC0UghaAaUuEZXJQPIc oQ3QGbpjM0nGe/VZN5EZhljau0NNENFaU56cOpvOhcO04gLGNNc2NS+rIpTMsaHh o1CG90c5zZZJuUbyx0mIHriNQXDgEwunSZPQorKK9KSppyyjeuOyi5F/mBBPXeyT weLhLqLvAr9se/+Z3aQvMADJi8zUZtGggLTw+N9R5XSwtSh2R4kARgQYEQIABgUC PkQIpwAKCRBbmvb9yuOVfWayAKC+mBhHdn1XZ5uH0RocAyJ32hx2kgCePyhB+IqM TjWLDLarQxcPYhbkFi4= =nx1M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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[tor-talk] Installer for obfsproxy as a Windows service available
by awgh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<cross-post from openvpn-devel> Hello, I have spent the last couple of days preparing a bundled installer for the Tor Obfuscation Proxy combined with OpenVPN. The installer currently works on 32-bit and 64-bit Windows. It simply installs obfsproxy in SOCKS proxy mode and sets it up as a Windows service, so it starts at boot. The goal is to make this an automatic install for both clients and servers. To convert an existing OpenVPN profile to use the obfsproxy, you simply change the destination port of your remote line to point at the obfuscated server port instead of the regular OpenVPN server port: BEFORE: remote my.server.com 443 AFTER: remote my.server.com 80 (assuming obfsproxy server is listening on 80) Then, you just set OpenVPN to use a socks proxy by adding these lines to you config file: socks-proxy-retry socks-proxy 127.0.0.1 1050 After this, when you initiate the OpenVPN connection, it will use obfsproxy as a SOCKS proxy. Just remember to connect to the obfsproxy port on the server, not the OpenVPN port, in your client config and it works great! A couple of important notes: 1) I have only tested this with TCP mode. I don't expect UDP to work through Socks proxy, but haven't yet tried it. 2) Once, obfsproxy died on me and I had to go to Control Panel->Administrative Tools->Services and restart the obfsproxy service. This seems to be a one-time crash, though. The Windows Installer is available here: http://awgh.org/files/obfsvpn-installer-0_0_1.exe You can build it yourself by checking out the project on bitbucket here: https://bitbucket.org/awgh/obfsproxy-windows-installer I am also working on init scripts and packages for Linux distros, which can be used for both the client side and server side of an obfsproxy connection. So far, I just have CentOS RPMs and init scripts, which are available in this project: https://bitbucket.org/awgh/obfsproxy-rpm-build I am planning on adding some additional features to the installer bundle, to allow the configuration of shared secrets and the importation of existing config files. Please feel free to either email me with bugs/feature requests or to use the issue tracking on bitbucket! Hope this will be useful to some of you. Best Regards, - Ben _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Riseup had a server seized by the US Federal Authorities
by Anne Roth 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april Server Seizure, April 2012 April 18th, 2012, Riseup had a server seized by the US Federal Authorities. This is our press release. FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FBI seizes server providing anonymous remailer and many other services from colocation facility. Contacts:B6 - Riseup Networks, Devin Theriot-Orr, 206-708-8740, sunbird(a)riseup.net - May First/People Link, Jamie McClelland, 917-509-5734, jm(a)mayfirst.org - ECN: Isole Nella Rete, inr(a)riseup.net Attack on Anonymous SpeechB6 On Wednesday, April 18, at approximately 16:00 Eastern Time, U.S. Federal authorities removed a server from a colocation facility shared by Riseup Networks and May First/People Link in New York City. The seized server was operated by the European Counter Network (b ECNb), the oldest independent internet service provider in Europe, who, among many other things, provided an anonymous remailer service, Mixmaster, that was the target of an FBI investigation into the bomb threats against the University of Pittsburgh. b The company running the facility has confirmed that the server was removed in conjunction with a search warrant issued by the FBI,b said May First/People Link director Jamie McClelland. b The server seizure is not only an attack against us, but an attack against all users of the Internet who depend on anonymous communication.b Disrupted in this seizure were academics, artists, historians, feminist groups, gay rights groups, community centers, documentation and software archives and free speech groups. The server included the mailing list b cyber rightsb (the oldest discussion list in Italy to discuss this topic), a Mexican migrant solidarity group, and other groups working to support indigenous groups and workers in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. In total, over 300 email accounts, between 50-80 email lists, and several other websites have been taken off the Internet by this action. None are alleged to be involved in the anonymous bomb threats. b The FBI is using a sledgehammer approach, shutting down service to hundreds of users due to the actions of one anonymous person,b said Devin Theriot-Orr, a spokesperson for Riseup. b This is particularly misguided because there is unlikely to be any information on the server regarding the source of the threatening emails.b b We sympathize with the University of Pittsburgh community who have had to deal with this frightening disruption for weeks. We oppose such threatening actions. However, taking this server wonbt stop these bomb threats. The only effect it has is to also disrupt e-mail and websites for thousands of unrelated people,b continues Mr. Theriot-Orr. b Furthermore, the network of anonymous remailers that exists is not harmed by taking this machine. So we cannot help but wonder why such drastic action was taken when authorities knew that the server contained no useful information that would help in their investigation.b The FBI purportedly seized the server because it was hosting an anonymous remailer called Mixmaster. Anonymous remailers are used to send email anonymously, or pseudonymously. Like other anonymizing services such as the Tor network, these remailers are widely used to protect the identity of human rights activists who place themselves and their families in grave danger by reporting information about abuses. Remailers are also important for corporate whistle blowers, democracy activists working under repressive regimes, and others to communicate vital information that would otherwise go un-reported. The Mixmaster software is specifically designed to make it impossible for anyone to trace the emails. The system does not record logs of connections, details of who sent messages, or how they were routed. This is because the Mixmaster network is specifically designed to resist censorship, and support privacy and anonymity. Unfortunately, some people misuse the network. However, compared to the rate of legitimate use, the abuse rate is very low. There is therefore no legitimate purpose for the FBI to seize this server because they will not be able to obtain any information about the sender. This is plainly extra-judicial punishment and an attack on free speech and anonymity on the internet and serves as a chilling effect on others providers of anonymous remailers or other anonymous services. In absence of any other leads, the FBI needs to show that they are making progress in this case, and this has meant seizing a server so they can proudly demonstrate they are taking some action. But what this incident shows is they are grasping at straws and are willing to destroy innocent bystanders for the sake of protecting their careers. About the organizations involvedB6 MayFirst/People Link (mayfirst.org) is a politically-progressive member-run and controlled organization that redefines the concept of b Internet Service Providerb in a collective and collaborative way. May First/People Linkbs members are organizers and activists who elect a Leadership Committee to direct the organization. Like a coop, members pay dues, buy equipment and then share that equipment for websites, email, email lists, and other Internet purposes. Riseup Networks (riseup.net) provides online communication tools for people and groups working on liberatory social change. Riseup creates democratic alternatives and practices self-determination by controlling our own secure means of communications. ECN (European Counter Network b ecn.org) is the oldest independent service provider in Europe providing free email accounts, mailing lists, and websites to organizations, activists, and movements that are involved in human rights, freedom of speech and information in Italy and Europe. ECN is anti-fascist and works towards a just and equal society. Years ago, before sites like Youtube and Vimeo existed, ECN created a platform called NGV where people could upload and share independent video of human rights violations. Nowadays ECN works primarily with anti-fascist and anti-Nazi movements in all of Europe, providing space and resources to political and social centers. Questions / further readingB6 Q: Doesnbt Mixmaster/anonymous remailers enable criminals to do bad things? A: Criminals can already do bad things. Since theybre willing to break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than mixmaster provides. They can steal cell phones, use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of literally millions of Windows machines around the world. Mixmaster aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that. Some advocates of anonymity explain that itbs just a tradeoff b accepting the bad uses for the good ones b but therebs more to it than that. Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims (identify theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand, donbt have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds. So yes, criminals could in theory use mixmaster, but they already have better options, and it seems unlikely that taking mixmaster away from the world will stop them from doing bad things. At the same time, mixmaster and other privacy measures can fight identity theft, physical crimes like stalking, and so on. (www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html) Q: How does Mixmaster / Anonymous remailers work? A: Anonymous remailers work by connecting to other anonymous remailers in a chain, and every one in that chain removes the mail header information making it impossible to find the real sender. The Tor project maintains a list of typical users of this and other anonymity systems, and the Mixmaster home page _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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