July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Dewayne-Net] File-sharing 'darknet' unveiled
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: Here's the BBC's take on Sweden's Pirate Party's Darknet service item that I posted earlier this week. This article adds a lot of additional info to the story. DLH] File-sharing 'darknet' unveiled A "darknet" service that allows users to share music files anonymously on the web has been launched in Sweden. Relakks, as the service is known, allows users to send and receive files through a heavily-encrypted connection. It is the first commercial example of a darknet, a virtual network set up to share files between trusted users. The service is endorsed by political group the Pirate Party which is running for election in Sweden under a banner to reform the country's copyright laws. "There are many legitimate reasons to want to be completely anonymous on the internet," said Rickard Falkvinge, chairman of the Pirate Party. "The right to exchange information in private is fundamental to the democratic society. Without a safe and convenient way of accessing the internet anonymously, this right is rendered null and void." Closed groups A darknet is a cordoned-off, anonymised section of the net where users can meet, chat and swap data. Usually darknets are confined to small tight-knit groups such as hackers who use the secure connections to distribute information and hacking tools. They have also been used by paedophiles to distribute images of child abuse. Many are invitation-only services where potential members have to upload material to prove themselves to the group before they are granted full access. Similar identity-hiding tools such as Tor are used by net dissidents in countries like China to avoid persecution for their activities on the web. Previous attempts to launch large scale anonymous networks, such as Nullsoft's Waste program have been unsuccessful. After its release in 2003, Waste was removed form distribution by Nullsoft's parent company AOL. Unique service The new system claims to be the world's first commercial darknet. It is provided by Swedish company Relakks and is endorsed by the Pirate Party. It works by giving a user's computer a new IP address, the unique number the machine uses to identify itself and communicate with other machines over the net. IP numbers allocated by your internet service provider (ISP) can be used to trace and identify a specific computer on a network. Computers using the Relakks system look like they have a Swedish IP address, no matter where they are in the world. Users can then share files, such as music or films, with any other users. In theory anyone monitoring user's online activities will not be able to trace their geographical location. The Pirate Party acknowledge that the service could be used to distribute copyright material or other content such as images of child abuse. "We hear the argument a lot," Mr Falkvinge told the BBC News website. "No, we don't have any control over what is being sent over the network but that's the point. "People who want to hide their activities online already have the means to do so. We're just giving those tools to the general public." Democratic rights File sharing and copyright law is a divisive topic in Sweden. Until recently the country was a hotbed of piracy where films, music and software were readily swapped online. Last year, it outlawed the unauthorised downloading of copyrighted movies and music in an attempt to curb piracy, after criticism from Hollywood. [snip] Story from BBC NEWS: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/technology/4798059.stm> Published: 2006/08/16 14:00:26 GMT Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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PBS Frontline 5/15: Domestic Surveillance
by Richard Forno 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Spying on the Home Front coming May. 15, 2007 at 9pm (check local listings) (60 minutes) FRONTLINE addresses an issue of major consequence for all Americans: Is the Bush administration's domestic war on terrorism jeopardizing our civil liberties? Reporter Hedrick Smith presents new material on how the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program works and examines clashing viewpoints on whether the president has violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and infringed on constitutional protections. In another dramatic story, the program shows how the FBI vacuumed up records on 250,000 ordinary Americans who chose Las Vegas as the destination for their Christmas-New Year's holiday, and the subsequent revelation that the FBI has misused National Security Letters to gather information. Probing such projects as Total Information Awareness, and its little known successors, Smith discloses that even former government intelligence officials now worry that the combination of new security threats, advances in communications technologies, and radical interpretations of presidential authority may be threatening the privacy of Americans. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/homefront/ ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] PBS Frontline 5/15: Domestic Surveillance
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[Dewayne-Net] File-sharing 'darknet' unveiled
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: Here's the BBC's take on Sweden's Pirate Party's Darknet service item that I posted earlier this week. This article adds a lot of additional info to the story. DLH] File-sharing 'darknet' unveiled A "darknet" service that allows users to share music files anonymously on the web has been launched in Sweden. Relakks, as the service is known, allows users to send and receive files through a heavily-encrypted connection. It is the first commercial example of a darknet, a virtual network set up to share files between trusted users. The service is endorsed by political group the Pirate Party which is running for election in Sweden under a banner to reform the country's copyright laws. "There are many legitimate reasons to want to be completely anonymous on the internet," said Rickard Falkvinge, chairman of the Pirate Party. "The right to exchange information in private is fundamental to the democratic society. Without a safe and convenient way of accessing the internet anonymously, this right is rendered null and void." Closed groups A darknet is a cordoned-off, anonymised section of the net where users can meet, chat and swap data. Usually darknets are confined to small tight-knit groups such as hackers who use the secure connections to distribute information and hacking tools. They have also been used by paedophiles to distribute images of child abuse. Many are invitation-only services where potential members have to upload material to prove themselves to the group before they are granted full access. Similar identity-hiding tools such as Tor are used by net dissidents in countries like China to avoid persecution for their activities on the web. Previous attempts to launch large scale anonymous networks, such as Nullsoft's Waste program have been unsuccessful. After its release in 2003, Waste was removed form distribution by Nullsoft's parent company AOL. Unique service The new system claims to be the world's first commercial darknet. It is provided by Swedish company Relakks and is endorsed by the Pirate Party. It works by giving a user's computer a new IP address, the unique number the machine uses to identify itself and communicate with other machines over the net. IP numbers allocated by your internet service provider (ISP) can be used to trace and identify a specific computer on a network. Computers using the Relakks system look like they have a Swedish IP address, no matter where they are in the world. Users can then share files, such as music or films, with any other users. In theory anyone monitoring user's online activities will not be able to trace their geographical location. The Pirate Party acknowledge that the service could be used to distribute copyright material or other content such as images of child abuse. "We hear the argument a lot," Mr Falkvinge told the BBC News website. "No, we don't have any control over what is being sent over the network but that's the point. "People who want to hide their activities online already have the means to do so. We're just giving those tools to the general public." Democratic rights File sharing and copyright law is a divisive topic in Sweden. Until recently the country was a hotbed of piracy where films, music and software were readily swapped online. Last year, it outlawed the unauthorised downloading of copyrighted movies and music in an attempt to curb piracy, after criticism from Hollywood. [snip] Story from BBC NEWS: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/technology/4798059.stm> Published: 2006/08/16 14:00:26 GMT Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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PBS Frontline 5/15: Domestic Surveillance
by Richard Forno 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Spying on the Home Front coming May. 15, 2007 at 9pm (check local listings) (60 minutes) FRONTLINE addresses an issue of major consequence for all Americans: Is the Bush administration's domestic war on terrorism jeopardizing our civil liberties? Reporter Hedrick Smith presents new material on how the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program works and examines clashing viewpoints on whether the president has violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and infringed on constitutional protections. In another dramatic story, the program shows how the FBI vacuumed up records on 250,000 ordinary Americans who chose Las Vegas as the destination for their Christmas-New Year's holiday, and the subsequent revelation that the FBI has misused National Security Letters to gather information. Probing such projects as Total Information Awareness, and its little known successors, Smith discloses that even former government intelligence officials now worry that the combination of new security threats, advances in communications technologies, and radical interpretations of presidential authority may be threatening the privacy of Americans. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/homefront/ ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] PBS Frontline 5/15: Domestic Surveillance
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [liberationtech] was: Forbes recommends tools for journalist; is now: depressing realities
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Danny O'Brien: > On Wed, Dec 19, 2012 at 05:26:05AM +0000, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: >> Hi, >> >> frank(a)journalistsecurity.net: >>> But if >>>> you're getting information security advice from a Forbes blog, that >>>> will be the least of your worries. >>> >>> Where would you suggest we get information security advice from? >> >> This is an interesting question and I admit, I feel like it leaves a bad >> ring in my ears... >> >> What kind of security advice? Who is following the advice? Does their >> context change while they follow this advice? Do they have resources of >> a user without more than a casual interest or are they well funded and >> dedicated? What are their requirements? What are their temporal >> tolerances? Do they understand safety plan or threat model without >> further explanation? What are the stakes for failure? >> >> The answer to each of those questions would shift my answers to >> subsequent questions around, I guess. >> > > Just to add some notes to Jake's excellent points to broaden the > discussion. I hope I'm not thread-jacking, but it's Jake's comments > unlocked a lot of points that I've been thinking about recently. I'm glad to hear it. :) > > Protecting Sources -- changing the relationship between reporter and source > > One social act that journalists can adopt which has nothing to do with > technology, but everything to do with how technology has changed both > the threats and the opportunities of journalism, is to consider what > *has* to be known about a source. Traditionally, the role between a > source and a journalist has been that there's an inner sanctum of shared > information, and then a set of carefuly managed publically released > data. > There is also a potential notion about the relationship itself being part of that inner sanctum. That is a rather unrealistic expectation without serious care. > For certain beats, there's all kinds of problems with this model at this > point. One is that technically and politically, it's getting harder to > protect the data in the inner sanctum, even within supposedly stable > open societies. Without exaggeration, we've accidentally built a > data-collection system that the Stasi would marvelled at, and then put > all the pressure against its misuse on statutory protections that have > little oversight, poor incentives and almost no track record of punitive > action. > To make matters worse, we've created secret law, secret interpretation and have essentially zero accountability, except to bust up the people talking about it so that the public may learn about it. John Kiriakou, Bill Binney, Thomas Drake and Jesselyn Radack come to mind here. > Second, the management of the released information in order to protect > an identity is now practically a full-time security job in itself. > Forget protecting data that source and journalist agree is confidential; > even the information that has been agreed to be made public can be > compromising in ways that neither party could anticipate. This isn't a > question of ignorance, this is a question of how skillful we can now > collectively pool open source[1] info to deduce hidden data. I think it is more than one thing - so in some cases, it is a matter of simply ignoring the facts; try talking to people about NSA Warrantless wiretaping program and the data (which by the way, I'm confident has been used in the WikiLeaks investigation) produced by it of US citizens on US soil. Eyes will glaze over and people will simply refuse to discuss it. Quite depressing. In some cases, I agree that even if we know that is/has/will/etc happen - some people don't really understand the magnitude of the surveillance state. > It's a > precept of the security professionals I know that you simply can't > de-anonymise mass databases of information; what's unknown is how little > you can add to the wealth of already public information before a single > identity is uncovered. I think you need to come to PETS and the CCC Congress more often Danny! :) > In that sense, I'd welcome this Forbes piece, > because it's the first time that I've seen wide public discussion of > this problem -- that this journalist revealed information about their > source through what both agreed should be made public. I'm pretty sure > McAfee didn't even realise that this was a threat, let alone the editors > and writers at Vice. I'm not sure that I agree that it is the first time that this has happened. I think that it is also a stretch to say that Vice was totally clueless. WikiLeaks discussed these kinds of document issues long long ago - see some of the early CCC talks. Perhaps that doesn't count as wide? I'd say that all of the hubub about redacted PDFs in the last ten years is perhaps more important and has received wider attention. > > My point here is that among all of these threats, there's also > opportunity. Some of the Net-savvier journalists I know now take a > minimal-knowledge approach to sources; you don't need to know who the > source is in order to verify the information you've been provided. This > is a situation that is I think historically unusual, but is increasingly > common. You work with the data itself to confirm its veracity. You don't > need to know whether quarter of a million diplomatic cables were leaked > by a particular security analyst, because you can externally verify the > accuracy of the data. Indeed. Scientific Journalism. > > There are a lot of challenges to this approach, but there advantages > too. It apparently increases the risk of being fed false flag info: but > it also prevents accepting false information through simply believing > authorities. It decreases the value of personal contacts in journalism, > but it increases the value of data analysis. But most importantly, it > helps both of the major problems in journalist-source protection. It > eliminates the requirement to preserve the inner sanctum, and aligns the > incentives of the journalist with the source to test and validate the > safety of revealing data to the public. > I think that it changes the relationship to the so-called authorities; now they're perhaps just an anonymous person, where previously, they were a specific person. Or they're an unknown person and a special person is quoted as interpreting what it means. The latter is quite common and historically quite common, I think. > [1] in the old fashioned sense of open source intelligence > [2] speaking as someone who was asked by McAfee about how cellphones > triangulate location (I didn't answer) -- even if you have your name on > a security product doesn't mean you're an expert in all security. > "Very carefully Mr. McAfee, very carefully." > Revealing our methods > > I'm really really happy that Jake has talked a little about his own > procedures, because we're really bad at this as a community. There are a > couple of reasons for this, I think. The first is that despite all of > our talk about the dangers of security through obscurity, we're all > scared that revealing public information about our setup exposes us to > increased risk. Second, we're scared of looking stupid, or being exposed > to condemnation. > I'm not sure that I agree strongly with the first part - when someone suggests that they use Tails, that is pretty specific! The second is certainly true - and often - reasonable! Lots of people make really bad choices and they hardly understand why they made those choices. Certainly from a technology standpoint but also from a social standpoint. > I think both of these concerns are valid. If I told you that I used > FreeBSD 7.4 on my server, say, and that I'm a big fan of > libpurple-driven OTR clients, it's possibly made it somewhat more > convenient to find out a way of attacking me, even though there's at > least a couple of ways that I'm emitting those facts almost constantly. > Sure, I generally agree on all counts: user-agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) > Second, if I *did* tell everyone I use libpurple, or that I have Skype > on my machine, I'd be extremely vulnerable to people pointing out that > libpurple is not exploit-free and that Skype is used as a vulnerabilty > distribution vector. > That I think is exactly the right discussion to have - specifically because there is a reason to use libpurple (ahem, pidgin-otr) and a reason to use Skype (ahem, fuck, what was it again?). > I don't know what to do about this. As a community, we jump on people > who publically reveal less-than-perfect security practices. But we've > all -- even if it is in retrospect -- realised risky things we've done > in the past. We can't learn from our mistakes, and worse, others can't > learn from our mistakes, unless we admit to them. We can't berate coders > for not exposing their programs to security audits, unless we have a > better way of sharing the practical knowledge we ourselves use every > day, and we're not going to do that if we just spend our time pretending > we anticipated the latest zeroday years before it actually came about. > -- I'm not entirely sure but I think one answer is not to assume things secure by default. Another is probably to understand that things written in C are likely to have lots of specific memory corruption issues - regardless of *which* codebase is in use. Lots of the zeroday in use today is really lame - not just buffer overflows that are known to exist or are patched but not shipping (ahem, pidgin on Windows) - rather, simply not caring about metadata, location privacy, or stuff said over phones, or sent over HTTP... All the best, Jake -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[fc] FC'03 submission deadline - final reminder
by Rebecca N. Wright 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Today is the submission deadline for Financial Cryptography '03. For more information about submitting a paper, see www.ifca.ai/fc03. Note that we have fixed a few technical glitches: the submission server now accepts pdf, and problems with the e-mail address for the program chairs have been fixed. If you have any questions about submitting a paper or a panel proposal, please contact the program chairs at fc03-submissions(a)ifca.ai. _______________________________________________ fc mailing list fc(a)ifca.ai http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Fwd: E-Surveillance Analyses Needed for Internet Caucus Compendium
by SImparl＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Matt, I am on the Internet Caucus Advisory Committee. Please help, if you can provide the requested information. Please contact Tim Lordan with any questions. (His contact information appears at the end of the e-mail. message.) Please post this to Freematt's Alerts, if you think your readers will be interested in this. Thanks, Steve Imparl

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Fwd: E-Surveillance Analyses Needed for Internet Caucus Compendium
by SImparl＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Matt, I am on the Internet Caucus Advisory Committee. Please help, if you can provide the requested information. Please contact Tim Lordan with any questions. (His contact information appears at the end of the e-mail. message.) Please post this to Freematt's Alerts, if you think your readers will be interested in this. Thanks, Steve Imparl

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