July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Save the date! Computers, Freedom, and Privacy: June 15-18,
by CFP Announcements 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

2010 Smart phones, social networking, and the "internet of things" let us integrate the online world and computers more deeply into our lives. Should we have to give up our freedom and privacy in to reap the benefits of a constant connection to friends and information? How are attitudes towards freedom and privacy changing for those who have grown up so accustomed to an always-connected environment? What about those who aren't participating because they lack access to technology and knowledge -- or who simply prefer more traditional forms of connection? How do we take advantage of the power of computers to improve freedom and privacy online and off? To address those critical questions and more, the 20th annual ACM Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference converges for the first time ever in Silicon Valley. *CFP 2010. June 15-18, 2010, in San Jose California and cyberspace.* Please save the date -- and pass the word. CFP has spent the last ten years describing itself as "the best conference you've never heard of." We'd much rather be "the best conference everybody's talking about!" We're still discussing potential themes and speakers for CFP 2010. If you've got ideas, or would like to help with the planning, please share them on the CFP blog at http://cfp.acm.org/wordpress/?p=6 Once we nail down the theme, we'll get the official call for participation out ... stay tuned! Jon Pincus and Dorothy Glancy, CFP 2010 co-chairs http://www.cfp2010.org/

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Save the date! Computers, Freedom, and Privacy: June 15-18,
by CFP Announcements 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

2010 Smart phones, social networking, and the "internet of things" let us integrate the online world and computers more deeply into our lives. Should we have to give up our freedom and privacy in to reap the benefits of a constant connection to friends and information? How are attitudes towards freedom and privacy changing for those who have grown up so accustomed to an always-connected environment? What about those who aren't participating because they lack access to technology and knowledge -- or who simply prefer more traditional forms of connection? How do we take advantage of the power of computers to improve freedom and privacy online and off? To address those critical questions and more, the 20th annual ACM Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference converges for the first time ever in Silicon Valley. *CFP 2010. June 15-18, 2010, in San Jose California and cyberspace.* Please save the date -- and pass the word. CFP has spent the last ten years describing itself as "the best conference you've never heard of." We'd much rather be "the best conference everybody's talking about!" We're still discussing potential themes and speakers for CFP 2010. If you've got ideas, or would like to help with the planning, please share them on the CFP blog at http://cfp.acm.org/wordpress/?p=6 Once we nail down the theme, we'll get the official call for participation out ... stay tuned! Jon Pincus and Dorothy Glancy, CFP 2010 co-chairs http://www.cfp2010.org/

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Re: [liberationtech] Syria Crackdown Aided by U.S.-Europe Spy Gear
by Brett Solomon 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Thanks for sending this through Aaron At the same I was reading this Bloomberg piece, I received an email from my colleague saying that the residential neighborhoods of Homs (Syria) were being raided at 3am that morning by death squads, who were "targeting houses searching for activists." One can only imagine how better informed the death squads will be about the identity and location of activists once the new Syrian surveillance regime is properly activated. This most recent report of 4 western technology companies (*Area SpA, NetApp Inc., Qosmos SA and Utimaco Safeware AG*) selling their goods and services directly and/or indirectly to the Syrian regime is clearly a life and death matter. We are told it's only a matter of weeks till they flick the 'on' switch. It demonstrates a number of issues, including: - *Surveillance is about systems.* What we see being developed in Syria (and previously in Tunisia, Egypt and others) is an intricate ecosystem of companies, each of which provide a component, and each reliant upon each other to enable the entire surveillance capability to properly operate. I'd argue that each company is therefore responsible (to a lesser or greater degree) for the whole. - *Surveillance is not a helicopter operation*. It is an endeavor that requires upgrades, tech support, loading of new rules to detect new malware/viruses, training and ongoing implementation. That is, we are not just talking about the sale of a product, we are also talking about Western companies providing ongoing services to regimes in order to make the surveillance, storage and tracking of opponents more effective. - *Liability is attached to the technology*. Laws need to move on from the current 'dump and devolve' approach. Having sold off its surveillance business to another company (Trovicor) following its sale of equipment to the Iranian regime, Nokia Siemen's clearly believes it's no longer responsible for the technology or its impacts (including the documented detention and torture of activists). It's like building a cluster bomb, and then pretending that is has nothing to do with you when it detonates. - *The detail is in the sales agreements*. Doing business with regimes, like any other customer, requires formal negotiation and contractual arrangements - as seen with Qosmos and Area in Syria. Is there a good reason why suppliers of dual-use technology shouldn't include clauses in such agreements which enable a seller to rescind the contract without damages if the product is used to abuse people's basic rights? Western governments should create a no-damages environment so that companies can no longer argue that they cant extract themselves from a contract when human rights intelligence becomes available. - *Technology platforms should include a kill switch*. High risk technology should include a set of enabling keys that are required by the operator to enable the use of that technology. The technology company should retain control of the keys, which can be switched off from 'home base' if it becomes clear that a technology is being used or re-sold to breach user's rights. Such technologies should include automated usage reports sent back to the producer that give the company aggregated knowledge of how their product is being used. Again, this case demonstrates that the sale of technology to regimes is not an isolated incident. Regimes have very few domestic or indigenous suppliers. Instead, they are almost entirely reliant on western companies to supply them. It is true that certain Western developed technologies have legitimate purpose to stop spam or malware, which is why its difficult to ban such technology. But clearly self regulation is not sufficient. We need a government and inter-government regulatory environment - that includes export licenses, a presumption against granting against such licenses for dual use technologies, and ongoing impact assessments before and if such technology is sold. The European Parliament's resolution from last month is a step in the right direction though it needs to broaden the concept of dual use technology, provide for ex ante controls and enable pan-Europe enforcement. In the US, there should be an impact assessment of why certain other technologies are banned (eg encryption, Google Chrome etc) which would benefit the people and not the regimes. This raises the broader issue of what we are calling 'human rights by design' - there are human rights decision points all along the ITC line - from the contract, to the design of the chip, to the operation of the network - and human rights need to be embedded into the very design of the project. Those interested should read the Silicon Valley Standard<https://www.accessnow.org/policy-activism/press-blog/the-silicon-valley-sta…>which came out of the Silicon Valley Human Rights Conference ( rightscon.org) and sets out some of the broader principles for technology companies. Needless to say companies should also join the GNI! If the Bloomberg report is accurate, the period of plausible deniability is over. The CEOs of all four companies should therefore withdraw their companies from these contracts. If they do not they are very likely be complicit in the abuses that Assad's regime is set to perpetrate once the new surveillance infrastructure is operational. Brett -- Brett Solomon Executive Director | Access accessnow.org | rightscon.org +1 917 969 6077 | skype: brettsolomon | @accessnow On Fri, Nov 4, 2011 at 10:43 AM, Aaron Swartz <me(a)aaronsw.com> wrote: > > http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/syria-crackdown-gets-italy-firm-s-… > > As Syriabs crackdown on protests has claimed more than 3,000 lives > since March, Italian technicians in telecom offices from Damascus to > Aleppo have been busy equipping President Bashar al-Assadbs regime > with the power to intercept, scan and catalog virtually every e-mail > that flows through the country. > > Employees of Area SpA, a surveillance company based outside Milan, are > installing the system under the direction of Syrian intelligence > agents, whobve pushed the Italians to finish, saying they urgently > need to track people, a person familiar with the project says. The > Area employees have flown into Damascus in shifts this year as the > violence has escalated, says the person, who has worked on the system > for Area. > > > Area is using equipment from American and European companies, > according to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloomberg News > and the person familiar with the job. The project includes Sunnyvale, > California-based NetApp Inc. (NTAP) storage hardware and software for > archiving e-mails; probes to scan Syriabs communications network from > Paris-based Qosmos SA; and gear from Germanybs Utimaco Safeware AG > (USA) that connects tapped telecom lines to Areabs monitoring-center > computers. > > The suppliers didnbt directly furnish Syria with the gear, which Area > exported from Italy, the person says. > > The Italians bunk in a three-bedroom rental apartment in a residential > Damascus neighborhood near a sports stadium when they work on the > system, which is in a test phase, according to the person, who > requested anonymity because Area employees sign non-disclosure > agreements with the company. > > Mapping Connections > > > When the system is complete, Syrian security agents will be able to > follow targets on flat-screen workstations that display communications > and Web use in near-real time alongside graphics that map citizensb > networks of electronic contacts, according to the documents and two > people familiar with the plans. > > [...] The price tag is more than 13 million euros ($17.9 million), two > people familiar with the deal say. > > [...] b You may consider that any lawful interception system has a very > long sales process, and things happen very quickly,b [the CEO] says, > citing the velocity of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafibs fall, only a > year after pitching his Bedouin tent in a Rome park on a visit to > Italy. b Qaddafi was a big friend of our prime minister until not long > ago.b > > > When Bloomberg News contacted Qosmos, CEO Thibaut Bechetoille said he > would pull out of the project. b It was not right to keep supporting > this regime,b he says. The companybs board decided about four weeks > ago to exit and is still figuring out how to unwind its involvement, > he says. The companybs deep- packet inspection probes can peer into > e-mail and reconstruct everything that happens on an Internet userbs > screen, says Qosmosbs head of marketing, Erik Larsson. > > [...] Area is installing the system, which includes the companybs > b Captorb monitoring-center computers, through a contract with > state-owned Syrian Telecommunication Establishment, or STE, the two > people familiar with the project say. Also known as Syrian Telecom, > the company is the nationbs main fixed-line operator. > > [...] > > > Schematics for the system show it includes probes in the traffic of > mobile phone companies and Internet service providers, capturing both > domestic and international traffic. NetApp storage will allow agents > to archive communications for future searches or mapping of peoplesb > contacts, according to the documents and the person familiar with the > system. > > [...] Two people familiar with terms of the deal say that as a final > stage of the installation, the contract stipulates Area employees will > train the Syrian security agents who will man those workstations -- > teaching them how to track citizens. > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?language=e…> _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [FoRK] Why We Are Losing The War on Terrorism
by J.Andrew Rogers 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

On May 3, 2004, at 9:14 AM, Contempt for Meatheads forwarded: >We desperately need adult supervision and high quality minds in the >intelligence business! I am growing more convince that the security >clearance process, the government hiring/promotion process, and >information silos are overwhelming our ability to get even a >marginally adequate level of intelligence needed to fight terrorism. >Wow, this is depressing. > >My confident belief (100%): we will continue to lose the war on >terrorism until we fix our intelligence system. I think this analysis is correct, but also a bit too shallow to be really insightful. While there are some significant institutional problems and byzantine self-defeating regulations, these things are masking a much bigger technical problem that desperately needs to be tackled from their perspective. The volume of data they collect has reached the point where good analysis is no longer tractable in a theoretical algorithmic sense with the best tools they currently have at their disposal, particularly when you have a data space as broad and diffuse as "terrorism" to sift. Institutional procedures and problems aggravate this, but the underlying issues are deeper. One of the ways I keep track of what the US DoD is up to is by analysis of the open research programs, contracts, and grants that they publish. By threading the many, many programs together over time, you can see how fast different technologies are progressing and you can chain inferences to make an intelligent estimate as to when specific capabilities (which may require the intersection of multiple research tracks) could theoretically be available to the DoD. Furthermore, the program managers have a habit of mildly editorializing their program descriptions in response to some of the proposals they have received and the success of the proposals they have actually funded, which also gives some added insight. One thing that I have noticed for several years is that the advanced data mining and automated intelligence analysis research programs have been essentially stalled for many years now despite aggressive marketing and a large number of agencies willing to liberally fund proposals. And the editorializing of the program managers on this research track makes it clear that they are quite frustrated both with the lack of progress in this area and with the fact that research proposals keep trying to beat the same dead horse over and over. Furthermore, while most programs have a shelf-life after which they are either closed (both on good progress or no progress), these particular programs keep getting extended and re-funded over and over, sometimes under a different name but always with roughly the same parameters. As long as this program track is stuck in neutral, the intelligence agencies will have serious problems that will be all but insurmountable. The US intelligence service is a victim of its own ability to acquire data. This isn't a problem that they can simply throw money at in the sense that it requires pretty substantial algorithm breakthroughs to even be tractable for high-quality analysis. To date, private research organizations have clearly been unable to solve this problem in any meaningful way, and there is substantial evidence of this fact. In the mean time, they are left using narrow brittle algorithms to sift and analyze the data, with holes you could drive a truck (bomb) through. Someone who fully understood the theoretical limitations and likely implementation parameters of the current state-of-the-art could likely defeat the automated analysis. Fortunately for the intelligence agencies, few people have those skills and they get by on a pretty broken system hampered further by institutional problems. j. andrew rogers _______________________________________________ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: [liberationtech] Syria Crackdown Aided by U.S.-Europe Spy Gear
by Brett Solomon 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Thanks for sending this through Aaron At the same I was reading this Bloomberg piece, I received an email from my colleague saying that the residential neighborhoods of Homs (Syria) were being raided at 3am that morning by death squads, who were "targeting houses searching for activists." One can only imagine how better informed the death squads will be about the identity and location of activists once the new Syrian surveillance regime is properly activated. This most recent report of 4 western technology companies (*Area SpA, NetApp Inc., Qosmos SA and Utimaco Safeware AG*) selling their goods and services directly and/or indirectly to the Syrian regime is clearly a life and death matter. We are told it's only a matter of weeks till they flick the 'on' switch. It demonstrates a number of issues, including: - *Surveillance is about systems.* What we see being developed in Syria (and previously in Tunisia, Egypt and others) is an intricate ecosystem of companies, each of which provide a component, and each reliant upon each other to enable the entire surveillance capability to properly operate. I'd argue that each company is therefore responsible (to a lesser or greater degree) for the whole. - *Surveillance is not a helicopter operation*. It is an endeavor that requires upgrades, tech support, loading of new rules to detect new malware/viruses, training and ongoing implementation. That is, we are not just talking about the sale of a product, we are also talking about Western companies providing ongoing services to regimes in order to make the surveillance, storage and tracking of opponents more effective. - *Liability is attached to the technology*. Laws need to move on from the current 'dump and devolve' approach. Having sold off its surveillance business to another company (Trovicor) following its sale of equipment to the Iranian regime, Nokia Siemen's clearly believes it's no longer responsible for the technology or its impacts (including the documented detention and torture of activists). It's like building a cluster bomb, and then pretending that is has nothing to do with you when it detonates. - *The detail is in the sales agreements*. Doing business with regimes, like any other customer, requires formal negotiation and contractual arrangements - as seen with Qosmos and Area in Syria. Is there a good reason why suppliers of dual-use technology shouldn't include clauses in such agreements which enable a seller to rescind the contract without damages if the product is used to abuse people's basic rights? Western governments should create a no-damages environment so that companies can no longer argue that they cant extract themselves from a contract when human rights intelligence becomes available. - *Technology platforms should include a kill switch*. High risk technology should include a set of enabling keys that are required by the operator to enable the use of that technology. The technology company should retain control of the keys, which can be switched off from 'home base' if it becomes clear that a technology is being used or re-sold to breach user's rights. Such technologies should include automated usage reports sent back to the producer that give the company aggregated knowledge of how their product is being used. Again, this case demonstrates that the sale of technology to regimes is not an isolated incident. Regimes have very few domestic or indigenous suppliers. Instead, they are almost entirely reliant on western companies to supply them. It is true that certain Western developed technologies have legitimate purpose to stop spam or malware, which is why its difficult to ban such technology. But clearly self regulation is not sufficient. We need a government and inter-government regulatory environment - that includes export licenses, a presumption against granting against such licenses for dual use technologies, and ongoing impact assessments before and if such technology is sold. The European Parliament's resolution from last month is a step in the right direction though it needs to broaden the concept of dual use technology, provide for ex ante controls and enable pan-Europe enforcement. In the US, there should be an impact assessment of why certain other technologies are banned (eg encryption, Google Chrome etc) which would benefit the people and not the regimes. This raises the broader issue of what we are calling 'human rights by design' - there are human rights decision points all along the ITC line - from the contract, to the design of the chip, to the operation of the network - and human rights need to be embedded into the very design of the project. Those interested should read the Silicon Valley Standard<https://www.accessnow.org/policy-activism/press-blog/the-silicon-valley-sta…>which came out of the Silicon Valley Human Rights Conference ( rightscon.org) and sets out some of the broader principles for technology companies. Needless to say companies should also join the GNI! If the Bloomberg report is accurate, the period of plausible deniability is over. The CEOs of all four companies should therefore withdraw their companies from these contracts. If they do not they are very likely be complicit in the abuses that Assad's regime is set to perpetrate once the new surveillance infrastructure is operational. Brett -- Brett Solomon Executive Director | Access accessnow.org | rightscon.org +1 917 969 6077 | skype: brettsolomon | @accessnow On Fri, Nov 4, 2011 at 10:43 AM, Aaron Swartz <me(a)aaronsw.com> wrote: > > http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/syria-crackdown-gets-italy-firm-s-… > > As Syriabs crackdown on protests has claimed more than 3,000 lives > since March, Italian technicians in telecom offices from Damascus to > Aleppo have been busy equipping President Bashar al-Assadbs regime > with the power to intercept, scan and catalog virtually every e-mail > that flows through the country. > > Employees of Area SpA, a surveillance company based outside Milan, are > installing the system under the direction of Syrian intelligence > agents, whobve pushed the Italians to finish, saying they urgently > need to track people, a person familiar with the project says. The > Area employees have flown into Damascus in shifts this year as the > violence has escalated, says the person, who has worked on the system > for Area. > > > Area is using equipment from American and European companies, > according to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloomberg News > and the person familiar with the job. The project includes Sunnyvale, > California-based NetApp Inc. (NTAP) storage hardware and software for > archiving e-mails; probes to scan Syriabs communications network from > Paris-based Qosmos SA; and gear from Germanybs Utimaco Safeware AG > (USA) that connects tapped telecom lines to Areabs monitoring-center > computers. > > The suppliers didnbt directly furnish Syria with the gear, which Area > exported from Italy, the person says. > > The Italians bunk in a three-bedroom rental apartment in a residential > Damascus neighborhood near a sports stadium when they work on the > system, which is in a test phase, according to the person, who > requested anonymity because Area employees sign non-disclosure > agreements with the company. > > Mapping Connections > > > When the system is complete, Syrian security agents will be able to > follow targets on flat-screen workstations that display communications > and Web use in near-real time alongside graphics that map citizensb > networks of electronic contacts, according to the documents and two > people familiar with the plans. > > [...] The price tag is more than 13 million euros ($17.9 million), two > people familiar with the deal say. > > [...] b You may consider that any lawful interception system has a very > long sales process, and things happen very quickly,b [the CEO] says, > citing the velocity of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafibs fall, only a > year after pitching his Bedouin tent in a Rome park on a visit to > Italy. b Qaddafi was a big friend of our prime minister until not long > ago.b > > > When Bloomberg News contacted Qosmos, CEO Thibaut Bechetoille said he > would pull out of the project. b It was not right to keep supporting > this regime,b he says. The companybs board decided about four weeks > ago to exit and is still figuring out how to unwind its involvement, > he says. The companybs deep- packet inspection probes can peer into > e-mail and reconstruct everything that happens on an Internet userbs > screen, says Qosmosbs head of marketing, Erik Larsson. > > [...] Area is installing the system, which includes the companybs > b Captorb monitoring-center computers, through a contract with > state-owned Syrian Telecommunication Establishment, or STE, the two > people familiar with the project say. Also known as Syrian Telecom, > the company is the nationbs main fixed-line operator. > > [...] > > > Schematics for the system show it includes probes in the traffic of > mobile phone companies and Internet service providers, capturing both > domestic and international traffic. NetApp storage will allow agents > to archive communications for future searches or mapping of peoplesb > contacts, according to the documents and the person familiar with the > system. > > [...] Two people familiar with terms of the deal say that as a final > stage of the installation, the contract stipulates Area employees will > train the Syrian security agents who will man those workstations -- > teaching them how to track citizens. > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?language=e…> _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Lucrative update
by Patrick 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Lucrative release 4 is out. I know many people are used to seeing releases numbered like "0.000001", "0.000002", "2.0.3.0.14.657" etc. but release numbering systems are essentially arbitrary in nature so don't get excited as Lucrative goes toward version 50+. This release is a fairly minor one, but included some changes such as the client name that I wanted to get out as soon as possible. There is also a new development weblog at http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/weblog/. I went through an install with someone over IRC last night and made a blog entry summarizing the install notes. I recommend reading the notes before attempting an install. I am glad to help with an install, drop me a note at patrick(a)lfcgate.com if you have trouble. Some documentation on the various entities in the Lucrative system is now available on the website, http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/documentation.php but more is needed and coming. If Lucrative is interesting to you, please consider helping in any way you can: Feedback Installation reports Suggestions Comments Criticism Feature requests Source code patches Donations Are all very much welcomed. And criticism is more useful to me than praise. My sincere thanks to everyone who has participated so far by installing, testing, providing feedback, spreading the word, and donating. And finally I just received word from SourceForge that the project registration for Lucrative has been approved. Regards, Patrick -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBD5ECKcRBADUvjXHwLtxIyS4AyjBs/dFtN6rdeP18Fhzh1hD5fJwkFevqY9Z I1ASROTh6eXYF7pU5sEvbcPshHyTB41ZtTqZvQvpwWN0fUzOuutuI0mtC5UPp9Rz j47SdWLdEXNHjwnHDCYSyqtqZu8GujGRQybR0eP3NIh/NwbSDUKdgz7IjwCg//Jo UtjP3zUFobm/0UYA+CJ5krED/091x9Js0gwNwvjbzM8DqO+r8qNz0kXI13FkrPRk QNd37lxt6m2m8HZD1WYM2wKwtMzHSwJcWzaDZ/tNc+ppYjzpw0EQCh9FqjGs8Vau guF6PA1M8lJTCcLKaL4e7ynic+PAw5Xa/tdOYgFCG+eLMU5RLvzRCYoOLIjgMJLJ yG98BACAMlDmFVYgC/UKvzZmHfZ5CtCKd8sPfCXrYLu5NeFRE0LR6D6zjzmhi1xX okfreR5o3T/y78VBM98js+m2/+7Z0AElqydeW/RnV1zqwDGjDr9z2MgARf3yLAbs n3BU8Fz61RwvHy6cRkT+2dR2f69QQUSpkupvLwZIGX/iwm4uKLQdUGF0cmljayA8 cGF0cmlja0BsZmNnYXRlLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAj5ECKcECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBb mvb9yuOVfaA2AKDAu5tDj9F2KI8cJMrKKkQRAcUyxACg6/bei7lUJH+E5igJqGRx SjKrRA65BA0EPkQIpxAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICD/wKwtF7Y4NKBe8PQ6jDbjWziiTv9Ac/EnRTJDQEoqgLa2LyE+6Ahw/VPGvp mfxkD2MKxC9E7kYVmasn6sHnSpvAv3e7O1Bqbo/qLzzCcJQ5VCurZ+elRM1GZ4Oc fM19FPKutb0/JFEv0nrqS4BGkF7WFBbu5dKYl/GIO7Co1mAerFIb719dOwMPVEIz OT08u8uB9jyR8gEElf+CVuNfOUkrUGg4HS4SbmTTrCSz3/8n5PkquSuAyjCB/dwM ZsZwA0/TTR8sDYlmlf9xPj5PGpGnV9OUwfig6eE0eWtRFeasmz0uiX+yp45ABtNh 6EXP/PFaBgXi9omXXjeeFYfpDvmfA6izvTIQfXTV6V9ZWrBfXarM+GQ+6guXWVbd 9fXvmCr982LkzuKQrK1OpRXBMUapXL+tOy/LYzz91InqKKhgPNGa12fvotZ4LzlM iqoM+Hpz5L9B5We1Ph0lD6RBVXDCqd+P8extnY/7AaDy7tC0UghaAaUuEZXJQPIc oQ3QGbpjM0nGe/VZN5EZhljau0NNENFaU56cOpvOhcO04gLGNNc2NS+rIpTMsaHh o1CG90c5zZZJuUbyx0mIHriNQXDgEwunSZPQorKK9KSppyyjeuOyi5F/mBBPXeyT weLhLqLvAr9se/+Z3aQvMADJi8zUZtGggLTw+N9R5XSwtSh2R4kARgQYEQIABgUC PkQIpwAKCRBbmvb9yuOVfWayAKC+mBhHdn1XZ5uH0RocAyJ32hx2kgCePyhB+IqM TjWLDLarQxcPYhbkFi4= =nx1M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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[IP] Markle Report -- Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security
by Dave Farber 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

[ For the record, I am a member of the Markle Taskforce djf]'' TASK FORCE SAYS GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF AMERICA'S TECHNOLOGY EXPERTISE TO COMBAT TERRORISM Markle Task Force Addresses Actions Needed to Create Information Network to Enhance Security while Preserving Civil Liberties To download a copy of Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security or for more information on the Task Force, please visit www.markletaskforce.org <http://www.markletaskforce.org> Washington, D.C. (December 2, 2003) - The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age today released its second report, concluding that the U.S. government has not yet taken advantage of America's technology expertise to fight the war on terrorism. In its report, Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security, the Task Force catalogs current gaps in the nation's system for analyzing and sharing intelligence. It details the elements of a proposed System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network that would more effectively combat terrorism while protecting privacy and other civil liberties. In its first report in October 2002, the Markle Task Force identified the ability to share information as the most urgent task facing government in protecting the homeland. It laid out a plan for a distributed information technology network to share terrorism-related information among federal, state and local government agencies and the private sector so that threats could be identified and prevented. In it second report, the Task Force finds that the government's progress since September 11, 2001, toward building an adequate network has been slow and is not guided by an overall vision of how information should be shared and analyzed in keeping with adequate guidelines to protect privacy and other civil liberties. Good work is being done in some agencies, but isolated projects cannot reach scale or break through cultural barriers fast enough to prevent another attack. "Using currently available technology, the government can set up a network that substantially improves our ability to prevent terrorism and protect civil liberties," said Zoe Baird, president of the Markle Foundation and co-chair with James Barksdale of the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. "Public trust in a network that uses information about people in the U.S. can only be achieved if government-wide guidelines for information sharing and privacy protection are established after open public debate." The Task Force -- whose members include some of the nation's leading experts on national security who served in the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations, as well as leading experts on information technology and civil liberties -- calls on the President to: * Set the goal of creating the network; * issue clear government-wide policy guidelines for the government's collection and use of domestic information, including private sector information about U.S. persons; * clarify the respective roles of DHS, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the FBI and other federal agencies involved with collection and analysis of domestic terrorism information. The Task Force concluded that until the government gives priority to breaking down its institutional barriers to cooperation and presents the public with a cohesive plan for the network, the public will not understand how private sector information is a critical part of the network. Further, government-wide guidelines are needed that clearly define the security interests in research into data mining of private sector information and that provide controls to address the privacy implications of such programs in order to establish public trust in these programs. In its report, the Task Force notes that it is essential that the government shed its Cold War culture in order to properly address the threat the nation faces from terrorism. During the Cold War, the use of information was dominated by a culture of classification and tight limitations on access, in which information was shared only on a "need to know" basis. However, the events of September 11 have starkly demonstrated the dangers associated with the failure to share information, not only within the federal government, but also between the federal government, on the one hand, and state and local governments and the private sector on the other. The threat today requires unprecedented speed in the way the government collects, shares, and acts on information. To deal with this threat, information needs to be tailored to facilitate decision-making and action at all levels-not only by the President, but also the police officers on the street. "Our Task Force's fundamental objective was to identify the technological tools and infrastructure, the policies, and the processes necessary to link different levels of government and the private sector, so that important information can be shared among the people who need it as rapidly as possible, within a system of guidelines and technologies designed to protect civil liberties," said Michael Vatis, executive director of the Task Force. "The government has caused confusion by creating multiple new agencies without clearly defining their respective roles and responsibilities." The SHARE network that the Task Force has proposed - which it recommends be overseen by DHS -- in the first stage could be built using existing technology. Technology products that are currently available would allow information to be both protected and shared through the use of published directories, listing who has relevant information, and permissioning rules to determine whom can access the information. Currently available technology would also allow for the authentication for subscribers to the directories and the anonymization of personally identifiable information where appropriate in order to share the necessary information while protecting privacy. As the recent controversies surrounding DARPA's Terrorist Information Awareness program and an Army contractor's use of Jet Blue passenger data demonstrate, government access to, and use of, privately held data remains a vexing problem. In its report, the Task Force notes that the government should effectively utilize the valuable information that is held in private hands, but only within a system of rules and guidelines designed to protect civil liberties. Since it is not possible for the nation to harden all potential targets against terrorist attack, the Task Force concludes that the government must rely on information to detect, prevent, and effectively respond to attacks. The travel, hotel, financial, immigration, health, or educational records of a person suspected by the government to be a terrorist may hold information that is vital to unveiling both his intentions and those of other terrorists. However, the Task Force also concludes that the government should not have routine access to personally identifying information even if it is widely available to the public. If government is to sustain public support for its efforts, it must demonstrate that the information it seeks to acquire is genuinely important to the security mission and is obtained and used in a way that minimizes its impact on privacy and civil liberties. Until government-wide guidelines that achieve this are developed, public concern over potential privacy infringements will continue to hamper the necessary development of new technologies and new operational programs necessary to use that information. Policy guidelines like these are meant to empower government officials as well as limit them, and Congress and the Executive Branch should share a common commitment to both objectives. The Task Force also calls on the President to issue guidelines governing the authority of intelligence and security agencies to receive, retain and disseminate government information gathered in the U.S. about U.S. persons and guidelines governing their ability to task the domestic collection of information. New guidelines in this area are particularly important since the creation of TTIC as an all-source intelligence and analysis center raises the question of what will replace the previous "line at the border" that largely defined the distinctive rules for foreign and domestic intelligence. It is critically important that the President issue this guidance before another major terrorist incident occurs. If public debate were to take place in the shadow of another major national tragedy, it could lead to rushed and poorly conceived initiatives that not only fail to solve the underlying problems, but also have a detrimental impact on civil liberties. Finally, the Task Force recommends that in one year, the Executive Branch and Congress evaluate the progress of federal, state, local, and private sector entities in improving information sharing and analysis and in utilizing private sector data while protecting civil liberties. To help with this evaluation, the Task Force issued detailed sets of questions than can be asked to determine whether adequate progress has been made. To download a copy of Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security or for more information on the Task Force, please visit www.markletaskforce.org ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Lucrative update
by Patrick 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Lucrative release 4 is out. I know many people are used to seeing releases numbered like "0.000001", "0.000002", "2.0.3.0.14.657" etc. but release numbering systems are essentially arbitrary in nature so don't get excited as Lucrative goes toward version 50+. This release is a fairly minor one, but included some changes such as the client name that I wanted to get out as soon as possible. There is also a new development weblog at http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/weblog/. I went through an install with someone over IRC last night and made a blog entry summarizing the install notes. I recommend reading the notes before attempting an install. I am glad to help with an install, drop me a note at patrick(a)lfcgate.com if you have trouble. Some documentation on the various entities in the Lucrative system is now available on the website, http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/documentation.php but more is needed and coming. If Lucrative is interesting to you, please consider helping in any way you can: Feedback Installation reports Suggestions Comments Criticism Feature requests Source code patches Donations Are all very much welcomed. And criticism is more useful to me than praise. My sincere thanks to everyone who has participated so far by installing, testing, providing feedback, spreading the word, and donating. And finally I just received word from SourceForge that the project registration for Lucrative has been approved. Regards, Patrick -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBD5ECKcRBADUvjXHwLtxIyS4AyjBs/dFtN6rdeP18Fhzh1hD5fJwkFevqY9Z I1ASROTh6eXYF7pU5sEvbcPshHyTB41ZtTqZvQvpwWN0fUzOuutuI0mtC5UPp9Rz j47SdWLdEXNHjwnHDCYSyqtqZu8GujGRQybR0eP3NIh/NwbSDUKdgz7IjwCg//Jo UtjP3zUFobm/0UYA+CJ5krED/091x9Js0gwNwvjbzM8DqO+r8qNz0kXI13FkrPRk QNd37lxt6m2m8HZD1WYM2wKwtMzHSwJcWzaDZ/tNc+ppYjzpw0EQCh9FqjGs8Vau guF6PA1M8lJTCcLKaL4e7ynic+PAw5Xa/tdOYgFCG+eLMU5RLvzRCYoOLIjgMJLJ yG98BACAMlDmFVYgC/UKvzZmHfZ5CtCKd8sPfCXrYLu5NeFRE0LR6D6zjzmhi1xX okfreR5o3T/y78VBM98js+m2/+7Z0AElqydeW/RnV1zqwDGjDr9z2MgARf3yLAbs n3BU8Fz61RwvHy6cRkT+2dR2f69QQUSpkupvLwZIGX/iwm4uKLQdUGF0cmljayA8 cGF0cmlja0BsZmNnYXRlLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAj5ECKcECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBb mvb9yuOVfaA2AKDAu5tDj9F2KI8cJMrKKkQRAcUyxACg6/bei7lUJH+E5igJqGRx SjKrRA65BA0EPkQIpxAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICD/wKwtF7Y4NKBe8PQ6jDbjWziiTv9Ac/EnRTJDQEoqgLa2LyE+6Ahw/VPGvp mfxkD2MKxC9E7kYVmasn6sHnSpvAv3e7O1Bqbo/qLzzCcJQ5VCurZ+elRM1GZ4Oc fM19FPKutb0/JFEv0nrqS4BGkF7WFBbu5dKYl/GIO7Co1mAerFIb719dOwMPVEIz OT08u8uB9jyR8gEElf+CVuNfOUkrUGg4HS4SbmTTrCSz3/8n5PkquSuAyjCB/dwM ZsZwA0/TTR8sDYlmlf9xPj5PGpGnV9OUwfig6eE0eWtRFeasmz0uiX+yp45ABtNh 6EXP/PFaBgXi9omXXjeeFYfpDvmfA6izvTIQfXTV6V9ZWrBfXarM+GQ+6guXWVbd 9fXvmCr982LkzuKQrK1OpRXBMUapXL+tOy/LYzz91InqKKhgPNGa12fvotZ4LzlM iqoM+Hpz5L9B5We1Ph0lD6RBVXDCqd+P8extnY/7AaDy7tC0UghaAaUuEZXJQPIc oQ3QGbpjM0nGe/VZN5EZhljau0NNENFaU56cOpvOhcO04gLGNNc2NS+rIpTMsaHh o1CG90c5zZZJuUbyx0mIHriNQXDgEwunSZPQorKK9KSppyyjeuOyi5F/mBBPXeyT weLhLqLvAr9se/+Z3aQvMADJi8zUZtGggLTw+N9R5XSwtSh2R4kARgQYEQIABgUC PkQIpwAKCRBbmvb9yuOVfWayAKC+mBhHdn1XZ5uH0RocAyJ32hx2kgCePyhB+IqM TjWLDLarQxcPYhbkFi4= =nx1M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

1 0

[IP] Markle Report -- Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security
by Dave Farber 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

[ For the record, I am a member of the Markle Taskforce djf]'' TASK FORCE SAYS GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF AMERICA'S TECHNOLOGY EXPERTISE TO COMBAT TERRORISM Markle Task Force Addresses Actions Needed to Create Information Network to Enhance Security while Preserving Civil Liberties To download a copy of Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security or for more information on the Task Force, please visit www.markletaskforce.org <http://www.markletaskforce.org> Washington, D.C. (December 2, 2003) - The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age today released its second report, concluding that the U.S. government has not yet taken advantage of America's technology expertise to fight the war on terrorism. In its report, Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security, the Task Force catalogs current gaps in the nation's system for analyzing and sharing intelligence. It details the elements of a proposed System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network that would more effectively combat terrorism while protecting privacy and other civil liberties. In its first report in October 2002, the Markle Task Force identified the ability to share information as the most urgent task facing government in protecting the homeland. It laid out a plan for a distributed information technology network to share terrorism-related information among federal, state and local government agencies and the private sector so that threats could be identified and prevented. In it second report, the Task Force finds that the government's progress since September 11, 2001, toward building an adequate network has been slow and is not guided by an overall vision of how information should be shared and analyzed in keeping with adequate guidelines to protect privacy and other civil liberties. Good work is being done in some agencies, but isolated projects cannot reach scale or break through cultural barriers fast enough to prevent another attack. "Using currently available technology, the government can set up a network that substantially improves our ability to prevent terrorism and protect civil liberties," said Zoe Baird, president of the Markle Foundation and co-chair with James Barksdale of the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. "Public trust in a network that uses information about people in the U.S. can only be achieved if government-wide guidelines for information sharing and privacy protection are established after open public debate." The Task Force -- whose members include some of the nation's leading experts on national security who served in the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations, as well as leading experts on information technology and civil liberties -- calls on the President to: * Set the goal of creating the network; * issue clear government-wide policy guidelines for the government's collection and use of domestic information, including private sector information about U.S. persons; * clarify the respective roles of DHS, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the FBI and other federal agencies involved with collection and analysis of domestic terrorism information. The Task Force concluded that until the government gives priority to breaking down its institutional barriers to cooperation and presents the public with a cohesive plan for the network, the public will not understand how private sector information is a critical part of the network. Further, government-wide guidelines are needed that clearly define the security interests in research into data mining of private sector information and that provide controls to address the privacy implications of such programs in order to establish public trust in these programs. In its report, the Task Force notes that it is essential that the government shed its Cold War culture in order to properly address the threat the nation faces from terrorism. During the Cold War, the use of information was dominated by a culture of classification and tight limitations on access, in which information was shared only on a "need to know" basis. However, the events of September 11 have starkly demonstrated the dangers associated with the failure to share information, not only within the federal government, but also between the federal government, on the one hand, and state and local governments and the private sector on the other. The threat today requires unprecedented speed in the way the government collects, shares, and acts on information. To deal with this threat, information needs to be tailored to facilitate decision-making and action at all levels-not only by the President, but also the police officers on the street. "Our Task Force's fundamental objective was to identify the technological tools and infrastructure, the policies, and the processes necessary to link different levels of government and the private sector, so that important information can be shared among the people who need it as rapidly as possible, within a system of guidelines and technologies designed to protect civil liberties," said Michael Vatis, executive director of the Task Force. "The government has caused confusion by creating multiple new agencies without clearly defining their respective roles and responsibilities." The SHARE network that the Task Force has proposed - which it recommends be overseen by DHS -- in the first stage could be built using existing technology. Technology products that are currently available would allow information to be both protected and shared through the use of published directories, listing who has relevant information, and permissioning rules to determine whom can access the information. Currently available technology would also allow for the authentication for subscribers to the directories and the anonymization of personally identifiable information where appropriate in order to share the necessary information while protecting privacy. As the recent controversies surrounding DARPA's Terrorist Information Awareness program and an Army contractor's use of Jet Blue passenger data demonstrate, government access to, and use of, privately held data remains a vexing problem. In its report, the Task Force notes that the government should effectively utilize the valuable information that is held in private hands, but only within a system of rules and guidelines designed to protect civil liberties. Since it is not possible for the nation to harden all potential targets against terrorist attack, the Task Force concludes that the government must rely on information to detect, prevent, and effectively respond to attacks. The travel, hotel, financial, immigration, health, or educational records of a person suspected by the government to be a terrorist may hold information that is vital to unveiling both his intentions and those of other terrorists. However, the Task Force also concludes that the government should not have routine access to personally identifying information even if it is widely available to the public. If government is to sustain public support for its efforts, it must demonstrate that the information it seeks to acquire is genuinely important to the security mission and is obtained and used in a way that minimizes its impact on privacy and civil liberties. Until government-wide guidelines that achieve this are developed, public concern over potential privacy infringements will continue to hamper the necessary development of new technologies and new operational programs necessary to use that information. Policy guidelines like these are meant to empower government officials as well as limit them, and Congress and the Executive Branch should share a common commitment to both objectives. The Task Force also calls on the President to issue guidelines governing the authority of intelligence and security agencies to receive, retain and disseminate government information gathered in the U.S. about U.S. persons and guidelines governing their ability to task the domestic collection of information. New guidelines in this area are particularly important since the creation of TTIC as an all-source intelligence and analysis center raises the question of what will replace the previous "line at the border" that largely defined the distinctive rules for foreign and domestic intelligence. It is critically important that the President issue this guidance before another major terrorist incident occurs. If public debate were to take place in the shadow of another major national tragedy, it could lead to rushed and poorly conceived initiatives that not only fail to solve the underlying problems, but also have a detrimental impact on civil liberties. Finally, the Task Force recommends that in one year, the Executive Branch and Congress evaluate the progress of federal, state, local, and private sector entities in improving information sharing and analysis and in utilizing private sector data while protecting civil liberties. To help with this evaluation, the Task Force issued detailed sets of questions than can be asked to determine whether adequate progress has been made. To download a copy of Creating A Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security or for more information on the Task Force, please visit www.markletaskforce.org ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[liberationtech] Another CA Compromise: TurkTrust
by Nadim Kobeissi 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Another CA has been found issuing SSL certificates for Google services. Mozilla has acted on the issue: https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/01/03/revoking-trust-in-two-turktrus… The weird thing is that it's starting to appear less and less crazy to just get rid of the CA system and replace it withb& nothing. What do you guys think? NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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