July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [i2p] I2P Consumer Caveat
by David McNab 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

jrandom wrote: >A while back, most people were pushing 1-2KBps lifetime, >and at another release, people were pushing 8-12KBps. >Right now it seems 3-6KBps is the norm. IMHO, the fate of I2P as a mass-deployable p2p framework, depends critically on getting it back down to 1-2kB/s. This, or ensuring that if a user sets a 1-2kB/s throttle, then s/he can enjoy reliable connections between local and remote endpoints. 3-6kB/s translates to 15-30GB/month. 1kB/s translates to 5GB/month. I might suggest that we set a goal that any given I2P router should be (reluctantly) capable of delivering reliable connections between local and remote endpoints with no more than 2-5GB/month overhead (plus of course, any payload data). Imagine the scenario of human rights activist Zahid Saleam, running an eepsite exposing major high-level corruption within Saudi Arabia. I2P is ideal for him, since he can run n servers all listening on the same dest, and mirroring the same content. Additionally, each server could be listening on its own unique additional dest. Then, everyone browsing over eeproxy to the common dest will hit whatever server is available. Also, Zahid can keep all servers up to date via their unique dests (and thus know if any of the servers have been compromised). Unmonitored bandwidth (contrabandwidth) in Saudio Arabia is only available from the black market, and in many cases may be throttled to 33k6b/s or even 19k2. I2P's ability to work reliably in such a situation is in my mind a deal maker/breaker. If the guarantee of basic endpoint reliability in low-bandwidth scenarios requires deep architectural surgery to the I2P router, then in my mind it's well justified. Apologies that I'm just a client hacker, and haven't yet built any skills with I2P router internals. >Our anonymity goals have us aiming at state level adversaries, but >to pull that off, we've got to get it working and kicking ass in >less hostile regimes first. Trivial in less hostile regimes to simulate the bandwidth scarcity likely to be encountered in 'hotter' deployment areas. Please, let's not allow I2P to suffer the fate of Freenet. -- Cheers David _______________________________________________ i2p mailing list i2p(a)i2p.net http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

1 0

Certicom Sells Licensing Rights to NSA
by R. A. Hettinga 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<http://www.newswire.ca/releases/October2003/24/c4428.html> Canada NewsWire CERTICOM CORP. Quotes and Charts CIC. (TSX) Attention Business Editors: Certicom Sells Licensing Rights to NSA MISSISSAUGA, ON, Oct. 24 /CNW/ - Certicom Corp. (TSX: CIC), a leading provider of wireless security solutions, today announced that the National Security Agency (NSA) in Maryland has purchased extensive licensing rights to Certicom's MQV-based Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) intellectual property. ECC is becoming a crucial technology for protecting national security information. This agreement will give the NSA a nonexclusive, worldwide license with the right to grant sublicenses of MQV-based ECC covered by many of Certicom's US patents and applications and corresponding foreign rights in a limited field of use. The field of use is restricted to implementations of ECC that are over GF(p), where p is a prime greater than 2(256). Outside the field of use, Certicom will retain all rights to the technology for other industries that require the same levels of security, including state and local government agencies. Certicom will continue its policy of making its intellectual property available to implementers of ECC under normal commercial terms on a non discriminatory basis. Researchers have been studying ECC for almost 20 years as the next generation of public-key technology. ECC is a computationally efficient form of cryptography that offers equivalent security to other competing technologies but with much smaller key sizes. This results in faster computations, lower power consumption, as well as memory and bandwidth savings. "Certicom is a pioneer in researching and developing ECC," says Scott Vanstone, founder and executive vice-president, strategic technology at Certicom. "Over 15 years ago, Certicom was founded to research and develop the strongest security possible. This makes us ideally positioned to provide manufacturers, that build government communications equipment and applications, with the tools they need to deliver ECC-based security solutions to the government market. Certicom is committed to work with the commercial sector in making our intellectual property and technology available to the security industry at large." In 1997, Certicom developed the industry's first toolkit to include ECC which has since been adopted by over 300 organizations. Security Builder Crypto, a cross-platform cryptographic toolkit, includes standards-based ECC implementations that are optimized for size and performance on over 30 platforms. "Certicom is committed to providing technology that meets the U.S. Government's highest standards to secure and protect its most sensitive information," said Ian McKinnon, president and CEO of Certicom. "With NSA's decision to purchase a license from Certicom for MQV-based ECC, Certicom is well-positioned to drive the adoption of our technologies and intellectual property in new markets that need strong security. This contract, valued at US$25 million, has been facilitated through the CCC (Canadian Commercial Corporation), Canada's export contracting agency." Companies and Government Departments or Agencies wishing to develop security products implementing ECC to protect national security related systems and/or information or other mission critical information related to national security under this licensing agreement should submit the details of their requirements to the Director, National Security Agency (Attn: IA Directorate, V1). NSA will employ established development programs (e.g. NSA sponsored developments, the Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP), or User Partnership Programs) to develop and certify ECC for these requirements. About Certicom Certicom is a leading provider of wireless security solutions, enabling developers, governments and enterprises to add strong security to their devices, networks and applications. Designed for constrained devices, Certicom's patented technologies are unsurpassed in delivering the strongest cryptography with the smallest impact on performance and usability. Certicom products are currently licensed to more than 300 customers including Texas Instruments, Palm, Research In Motion, Cisco Systems, Oracle and Motorola. Founded in 1985, Certicom is headquartered in Mississauga, ON, Canada, with offices in Ottawa, ON; Herndon, VA; San Mateo, CA; and London, England. Visit www.certicom.com. About CCC CCC (Canadian Commercial Corporation) is a Crown Corporation mandated to facilitate international trade, particularly in government markets. CCC's approach is based on 'three Cs': credibility, confidence, contracts. CCC builds confidence in Canadian exports by giving them the credibility of a government-backed performance guarantee that opens doors and leads to contracts with improved terms. Normally CCC acts as a Prime Contractor, signing a contract with the foreign buyer and a matching contract with the exporter. CCC also assists exporters to increase their pre-shipment working capital from commercial sources, and offers a range of procurement, pre- contract, contract advisory and post-contract services on a fee for service basis. Visit www.ccc.ca. Certicom, Security Builder, Security Builder Crypto, Security Builder SSL, Security Builder PKI, Security Builder GSE, movianVPN, movianCrypt and movianMail are trademarks or registered trademarks of Certicom Corp. All other companies and products listed herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders. Except for historical information contained herein, this news release contains forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially. Factors that might cause a difference include, but are not limited to, those relating to the acceptance of mobile and wireless devices and the continued growth of e-commerce and m-commerce, the increase of the demand for mutual authentication in m-commerce transactions, the acceptance of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) technology as an industry standard, the market acceptance of our principal products and sales of our customer's products, the impact of competitive products and technologies, the possibility of our products infringing patents and other intellectual property of fourth parties, and costs of product development. Certicom will not update these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date hereof. More detailed information about potential factors that could affect Certicom's financial results is included in the documents Certicom files from time to time with the Canadian securities regulatory authorities. %SEDAR: 00003865E -30- For further information: Tim Cox, ZingPR, (650) 369-7784, tim(a)zingpr.com; Brendan Ziolo, Certicom Corp., (613) 254-9267, bziolo(a)certicom.com CERTICOM CORP. has 84 releases in this database. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

1 0

Timing attacks from a user's point of view
by Just A. User 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hello, As the recent (and not so recent) research shows [1, 2], it is quite possible for a low-bandwidth adversary controlling the exit node or destination server to identify all the nodes in a circuit. If the victim is unlucky, the further deanonymization may use a malicious entry node. Otherwise, the attacker can measure the RTT distance between the victim and entry node and benefit from that somehow [3]. One of the obvious methods (of yet unclear efficiency) to mitigate the issue is introducing of high variance random delays at the routers. As I can understand, however, the Developers want to keep net delays low. They have their reasons (the lower the delays, the larger the net and the stronger anonymity). Nevertheless, a user is able to randomly delay her traffic before the first router of a circuit. Does this make any sense? PROS: a. the user tries to decrease the reliability of the attack from [2]; she hopes that there will be more false positives and all the measurements become less significant or take more time. CONS: b. using the attack from [2], the adversary can make a chosen router delay some cells for quite a long time (tens of seconds). Since such delay variances are hardly tolerable, e.g. for web surfing, the user is very limited in her ability to simulate a false positive. c. the user will have an unusual delay pattern, which could suffice for pseudonymity requirements only. [1] Murdoch, Danezis. Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor. [2] Evans, Dingledine, Grothoff. A practical congestion attack on Tor using long paths. [3] Hopper, Vasserman, Chan-Tin. How much anonymity does network latency leak? Thanks in advance. -- http://www.fastmail.fm - A no graphics, no pop-ups email service *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Timing attacks from a user's point of view
by Just A. User 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hello, As the recent (and not so recent) research shows [1, 2], it is quite possible for a low-bandwidth adversary controlling the exit node or destination server to identify all the nodes in a circuit. If the victim is unlucky, the further deanonymization may use a malicious entry node. Otherwise, the attacker can measure the RTT distance between the victim and entry node and benefit from that somehow [3]. One of the obvious methods (of yet unclear efficiency) to mitigate the issue is introducing of high variance random delays at the routers. As I can understand, however, the Developers want to keep net delays low. They have their reasons (the lower the delays, the larger the net and the stronger anonymity). Nevertheless, a user is able to randomly delay her traffic before the first router of a circuit. Does this make any sense? PROS: a. the user tries to decrease the reliability of the attack from [2]; she hopes that there will be more false positives and all the measurements become less significant or take more time. CONS: b. using the attack from [2], the adversary can make a chosen router delay some cells for quite a long time (tens of seconds). Since such delay variances are hardly tolerable, e.g. for web surfing, the user is very limited in her ability to simulate a false positive. c. the user will have an unusual delay pattern, which could suffice for pseudonymity requirements only. [1] Murdoch, Danezis. Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor. [2] Evans, Dingledine, Grothoff. A practical congestion attack on Tor using long paths. [3] Hopper, Vasserman, Chan-Tin. How much anonymity does network latency leak? Thanks in advance. -- http://www.fastmail.fm - A no graphics, no pop-ups email service *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Certicom Sells Licensing Rights to NSA
by R. A. Hettinga 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<http://www.newswire.ca/releases/October2003/24/c4428.html> Canada NewsWire CERTICOM CORP. Quotes and Charts CIC. (TSX) Attention Business Editors: Certicom Sells Licensing Rights to NSA MISSISSAUGA, ON, Oct. 24 /CNW/ - Certicom Corp. (TSX: CIC), a leading provider of wireless security solutions, today announced that the National Security Agency (NSA) in Maryland has purchased extensive licensing rights to Certicom's MQV-based Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) intellectual property. ECC is becoming a crucial technology for protecting national security information. This agreement will give the NSA a nonexclusive, worldwide license with the right to grant sublicenses of MQV-based ECC covered by many of Certicom's US patents and applications and corresponding foreign rights in a limited field of use. The field of use is restricted to implementations of ECC that are over GF(p), where p is a prime greater than 2(256). Outside the field of use, Certicom will retain all rights to the technology for other industries that require the same levels of security, including state and local government agencies. Certicom will continue its policy of making its intellectual property available to implementers of ECC under normal commercial terms on a non discriminatory basis. Researchers have been studying ECC for almost 20 years as the next generation of public-key technology. ECC is a computationally efficient form of cryptography that offers equivalent security to other competing technologies but with much smaller key sizes. This results in faster computations, lower power consumption, as well as memory and bandwidth savings. "Certicom is a pioneer in researching and developing ECC," says Scott Vanstone, founder and executive vice-president, strategic technology at Certicom. "Over 15 years ago, Certicom was founded to research and develop the strongest security possible. This makes us ideally positioned to provide manufacturers, that build government communications equipment and applications, with the tools they need to deliver ECC-based security solutions to the government market. Certicom is committed to work with the commercial sector in making our intellectual property and technology available to the security industry at large." In 1997, Certicom developed the industry's first toolkit to include ECC which has since been adopted by over 300 organizations. Security Builder Crypto, a cross-platform cryptographic toolkit, includes standards-based ECC implementations that are optimized for size and performance on over 30 platforms. "Certicom is committed to providing technology that meets the U.S. Government's highest standards to secure and protect its most sensitive information," said Ian McKinnon, president and CEO of Certicom. "With NSA's decision to purchase a license from Certicom for MQV-based ECC, Certicom is well-positioned to drive the adoption of our technologies and intellectual property in new markets that need strong security. This contract, valued at US$25 million, has been facilitated through the CCC (Canadian Commercial Corporation), Canada's export contracting agency." Companies and Government Departments or Agencies wishing to develop security products implementing ECC to protect national security related systems and/or information or other mission critical information related to national security under this licensing agreement should submit the details of their requirements to the Director, National Security Agency (Attn: IA Directorate, V1). NSA will employ established development programs (e.g. NSA sponsored developments, the Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP), or User Partnership Programs) to develop and certify ECC for these requirements. About Certicom Certicom is a leading provider of wireless security solutions, enabling developers, governments and enterprises to add strong security to their devices, networks and applications. Designed for constrained devices, Certicom's patented technologies are unsurpassed in delivering the strongest cryptography with the smallest impact on performance and usability. Certicom products are currently licensed to more than 300 customers including Texas Instruments, Palm, Research In Motion, Cisco Systems, Oracle and Motorola. Founded in 1985, Certicom is headquartered in Mississauga, ON, Canada, with offices in Ottawa, ON; Herndon, VA; San Mateo, CA; and London, England. Visit www.certicom.com. About CCC CCC (Canadian Commercial Corporation) is a Crown Corporation mandated to facilitate international trade, particularly in government markets. CCC's approach is based on 'three Cs': credibility, confidence, contracts. CCC builds confidence in Canadian exports by giving them the credibility of a government-backed performance guarantee that opens doors and leads to contracts with improved terms. Normally CCC acts as a Prime Contractor, signing a contract with the foreign buyer and a matching contract with the exporter. CCC also assists exporters to increase their pre-shipment working capital from commercial sources, and offers a range of procurement, pre- contract, contract advisory and post-contract services on a fee for service basis. Visit www.ccc.ca. Certicom, Security Builder, Security Builder Crypto, Security Builder SSL, Security Builder PKI, Security Builder GSE, movianVPN, movianCrypt and movianMail are trademarks or registered trademarks of Certicom Corp. All other companies and products listed herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders. Except for historical information contained herein, this news release contains forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially. Factors that might cause a difference include, but are not limited to, those relating to the acceptance of mobile and wireless devices and the continued growth of e-commerce and m-commerce, the increase of the demand for mutual authentication in m-commerce transactions, the acceptance of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) technology as an industry standard, the market acceptance of our principal products and sales of our customer's products, the impact of competitive products and technologies, the possibility of our products infringing patents and other intellectual property of fourth parties, and costs of product development. Certicom will not update these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date hereof. More detailed information about potential factors that could affect Certicom's financial results is included in the documents Certicom files from time to time with the Canadian securities regulatory authorities. %SEDAR: 00003865E -30- For further information: Tim Cox, ZingPR, (650) 369-7784, tim(a)zingpr.com; Brendan Ziolo, Certicom Corp., (613) 254-9267, bziolo(a)certicom.com CERTICOM CORP. has 84 releases in this database. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

1 0

[Politech] Feds begin "behavior monitoring" of air travelers this year [econ]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Via the Independent Institute. Another reason to get your own pilot's license for shorter flights. It's not that expensive. See http://www.aopa.org/learntofly/ and, for a $59 introductory flight: http://www.beapilot.com/ --Declan] --- AIRPORT SCREENING TO BECOME MORE INTRUSIVE, BUT NOT MORE EFFECTIVE This year the U.S. Transportation Security Agency will begin behavior monitoring of airplane passengers at 40 major American airport, reports Ivan Eland, director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty. "The screeners," writes Eland in his latest op-ed, "will look for 'suspicious' signs that might indicate a passenger could be a terrorist: having dry lips or a throbbing carotid artery (I'm not kidding), failure to make eye contact with or say hello to the screener, or evasive or slow answers to casual questions asked by the screener." Eland notes several flaws with this approach: It hasn't been field-tested for real-world effectiveness. It could easily transform into racial profiling. It fails to reduce the underlying causes of anti-U.S. terrorism. Terrorists who have practiced looking innocent could circumvent it easily. What, then, is the program good for? "Since the behavior detection program is unlikely to catch many professional terrorists, perhaps its real goal is to improve the morale of the unloved screeners by giving the public some incentive to be nice to them," writes Eland. "So next time you travel by air, don't forget your fake smile and ChapStick." Will it last? Independent Institute Senior Fellow Robert Higgs suggests that the public probably will tolerate greater intrusions by TSA airport screeners. "Strange as it might seem, most people get used to being treated as criminals or inmates in a concentration camp," Higgs wrote last month. "Americans are no exception. Keep beating them down, and eventually you will produce a thoroughly cowed and compliant herd, a mass of pliant raw material in the hands of their political masters, perfectly willing to sacrifice their dignity rather than irritate an airport-security thug and be made to miss a flight. And heaven forbid that they write their congressional representative to complain. Such impudence might get them placed on some black list at the TSA or even at the FBI. Best to keep quiet, stay in line, act as they are ordered to act." See "Chatting Up the TSA," by Ivan Eland (12/30/05) http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1644 SPANISH TRANSLATION: "Adulando a la Administraci?n de la Seguridad del Transporte" http://www.elindependent.org/articulos/article.asp?id=1644 Also see "Traveling Sheep," by Robert Higgs (12/14/05) http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1636 "Oveja Viajera" http://www.elindependent.org/articulos/article.asp?id=1636 To purchase THE EMPIRE HAS NO CLOTHES: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, by Ivan Eland, see http://www.independent.org/store/book_detail.asp?bookID=54 To purchase PUTTING "DEFENSE" BACK IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY, by Ivan Eland, see http://www.independent.org/store/book_detail.asp?bookID=19 Center on Peace & Liberty (Ivan Eland, director) http://www.independent.org/research/copal/ _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

Illegal to Photo Cops?
by Brad Malin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.freemarketnews.com/WorldNews.asp?nid=17667 STUDENT BUSTED FOR TAKING COP PICTURES Friday, July 28, 2006 - FreeMarketNews.com A Penn State college senior was arrested after he pointed his camera cell phone at police activity in his neighborhood. A Philadelphia NBC News Channel 10 report says the family of Neftaly Cruz, 21, is claiming the cops had "no right to come onto their property and arrest their 21-year- old son simply because he was using his cell phone's camera." <snip> The charge against Cruz was based on a new law, allegedly prohibiting people from taking pictures of police officers with cell phones. Cruz is quoted as saying, "They threatened to charge me with conspiracy, impeding an investigation, obstruction of a investigation..." Larry Frankel of the local ACLU chapter, reportedly said, "There is no law that prevents people from taking pictures of what anybody can see on the street," adding that, "it's rather scary that in this country you could actually be taken down to police headquarters for taking a picture on your cell phone of activities that are clearly visible on the street." - ST ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

[IP] Illegal to Photo Cops?
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

1 0

[Politech] Feds begin "behavior monitoring" of air travelers this year [econ]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Via the Independent Institute. Another reason to get your own pilot's license for shorter flights. It's not that expensive. See http://www.aopa.org/learntofly/ and, for a $59 introductory flight: http://www.beapilot.com/ --Declan] --- AIRPORT SCREENING TO BECOME MORE INTRUSIVE, BUT NOT MORE EFFECTIVE This year the U.S. Transportation Security Agency will begin behavior monitoring of airplane passengers at 40 major American airport, reports Ivan Eland, director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty. "The screeners," writes Eland in his latest op-ed, "will look for 'suspicious' signs that might indicate a passenger could be a terrorist: having dry lips or a throbbing carotid artery (I'm not kidding), failure to make eye contact with or say hello to the screener, or evasive or slow answers to casual questions asked by the screener." Eland notes several flaws with this approach: It hasn't been field-tested for real-world effectiveness. It could easily transform into racial profiling. It fails to reduce the underlying causes of anti-U.S. terrorism. Terrorists who have practiced looking innocent could circumvent it easily. What, then, is the program good for? "Since the behavior detection program is unlikely to catch many professional terrorists, perhaps its real goal is to improve the morale of the unloved screeners by giving the public some incentive to be nice to them," writes Eland. "So next time you travel by air, don't forget your fake smile and ChapStick." Will it last? Independent Institute Senior Fellow Robert Higgs suggests that the public probably will tolerate greater intrusions by TSA airport screeners. "Strange as it might seem, most people get used to being treated as criminals or inmates in a concentration camp," Higgs wrote last month. "Americans are no exception. Keep beating them down, and eventually you will produce a thoroughly cowed and compliant herd, a mass of pliant raw material in the hands of their political masters, perfectly willing to sacrifice their dignity rather than irritate an airport-security thug and be made to miss a flight. And heaven forbid that they write their congressional representative to complain. Such impudence might get them placed on some black list at the TSA or even at the FBI. Best to keep quiet, stay in line, act as they are ordered to act." See "Chatting Up the TSA," by Ivan Eland (12/30/05) http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1644 SPANISH TRANSLATION: "Adulando a la Administraci?n de la Seguridad del Transporte" http://www.elindependent.org/articulos/article.asp?id=1644 Also see "Traveling Sheep," by Robert Higgs (12/14/05) http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1636 "Oveja Viajera" http://www.elindependent.org/articulos/article.asp?id=1636 To purchase THE EMPIRE HAS NO CLOTHES: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, by Ivan Eland, see http://www.independent.org/store/book_detail.asp?bookID=54 To purchase PUTTING "DEFENSE" BACK IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY, by Ivan Eland, see http://www.independent.org/store/book_detail.asp?bookID=19 Center on Peace & Liberty (Ivan Eland, director) http://www.independent.org/research/copal/ _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

Illegal to Photo Cops?
by Brad Malin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.freemarketnews.com/WorldNews.asp?nid=17667 STUDENT BUSTED FOR TAKING COP PICTURES Friday, July 28, 2006 - FreeMarketNews.com A Penn State college senior was arrested after he pointed his camera cell phone at police activity in his neighborhood. A Philadelphia NBC News Channel 10 report says the family of Neftaly Cruz, 21, is claiming the cops had "no right to come onto their property and arrest their 21-year- old son simply because he was using his cell phone's camera." <snip> The charge against Cruz was based on a new law, allegedly prohibiting people from taking pictures of police officers with cell phones. Cruz is quoted as saying, "They threatened to charge me with conspiracy, impeding an investigation, obstruction of a investigation..." Larry Frankel of the local ACLU chapter, reportedly said, "There is no law that prevents people from taking pictures of what anybody can see on the street," adding that, "it's rather scary that in this country you could actually be taken down to police headquarters for taking a picture on your cell phone of activities that are clearly visible on the street." - ST ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0