July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

ip: Soldiers test `Digital MP System'
by believer＠telepath.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Nov2000/a20001113digitalmp.html> Soldiers test `Digital MP System' by Trish Warrick FORT POLK, La. (Army News Service, Nov. 13, 2000) Military Police could see around corners, through trees and in the dark as they tested the Army's new "Digital MP System" this month at Fort Polk, La. Patrolmen wore eyeglass-mounted miniature cameras providing "streaming video" to their partners. Viewing screens in the eyeglasses also allowed the MPs to check the faces of suspects they stopped against digital mug shots of known offenders. Fort Polk's 91st Military Police Detachment soldiers became the first MPs to test the system Oct. 30 to Nov. 3. Representatives of the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center in Natick, Mass., brought the Digital MP System to Fort Polk. They were joined by members of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and a number of contractor teams wanting to see how the system would work on real soldiers. The Digital MP is a durable, lightweight, wearable communications and information management system designed to help carry out reconnaissance, checkpoint security, anti-terrorism operations and other MP missions, said program manager Henry Girolamo, Natick Soldiers Center. The backbone of the Digital MP is a wearable computer developed by ViA Inc., MicroOptical Corp and Honeywell Inc. and tailored to the mission requirements of the MP soldier, Girolamo said. The Digital MP's support features include a hands-free, voice-operated interface and a battery that provides day-long power on a single charge. It features peripherals such as: * An audiovisual system with built-in miniature camera for face recognition and image display plus a noise-cancelling microphone and bone-conduction microphone/earphone for voice recognition, all incorporated in a pair of normal-size eyeglass frames * A BDU-pocket-sized "military e-book" readable even in strong sunlight or pale starlight (with night vision goggles) that emits no light to give away a soldier's position * An electronic glove that can function like a computer mouse with the e-book and translate hand signals into words on other soldiers' eyeglass-mounted viewers The Digital MP system can connect a military police team wirelessly and in ways never before possible, officials said. The eyeglass-mounted camera provides streaming video, which means "it can transmit to me what another MP is looking at even though I can't see him," said Sgt. Michael Sauer, Special Reaction Team noncommissioned officer in charge, 91st MP Det. An MP making a traffic stop or manning a checkpoint can take live videos which are checked against digital mug shots stored in the National Crime Interdiction Center database, Sauer said, so he's quickly alerted if the person stopped has a criminal record. On deployment, the system can warn him that he's dealing with a suspected terrorist or war criminal. An MP on patrol can use the e-book to quickly help others locate what he sees. "Say he's on recon, looking at the terrain," said Sauer. "He sees enemy tanks." Using traditional methods, the soldier plots coordinates on a paper map, calls the TOC on the radio and another soldier plots the coordinates on another map. With Digital MP, "He puts the icon on the map and sends it to the operations center," Sauer said. With the electronic glove, MPs separated by thick woods, buildings or darkness can still communicate silently with the familiar hand signals for "Suspect armed!" and other vital information. The adapted Nomex flight glove, with bend sensors in each finger and in the wrist, pressure sensors in the index and middle fingertips and 2-degree tilt sensors, renders preprogrammed gestures as words in fellow MPs' eyeglass display monitors. The glove works when the signaler doesn't have line of sight communication with the others and doesn't want to give away his position by speaking, said Sauer. The glove also functions like a mouse with the e-book, guiding the cursor with the tilt sensor and using the pressure sensors as right and left clicks. When silence is necessary, as on patrol, the glove can override the voice-operated system. The Digital MP can be programmed to continuously translate speech from English to another language and vice versa with only a five-second lag. Presently it can handle Spanish, Korean, Arabic, German, French, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Thai and Turkish, and officials said they plan to add "militarese" -- translating the soldier's "clicks" into the civilian's "kilometers," for instance. (Editor's note: Trish Warrick is editor of the Fort Polk Guardian.) --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DARPA markets on MidEast
by Robin Hanson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I've been involved for several years in helping DARPA to create some markets to help aggregate info on political, military, and economic changes in the Middle East, and the effect of US policy on such changes. For those interested, we are finally going public with some info on these markets: www.PolicyAnalysisMarket.org Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323 -----

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[IP] Markle Task Force Report | July 13, 2006
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age Releases Third Report "Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism: Accelerating Development of a Trusted Information Sharing Environment" July 13, 2006 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age today released its third report with recommendations on how to reconcile national security needs with civil liberties requirements. The report offers a new "authorized use" standard for government handling of legally collected information that bases authorization to view information on how the information is going to be used, rather than on the nationality of the subject or the location of collection. The report also proposes a new risk management approach to sharing classified information that balances the risk of leaks of classified information with the security risk that can come from failing to share information with those who need it to understand the threats to national security. Further, the report identifies examples of technology that can be used effectively to provide appropriate oversight and accountability. For a copy of the report, please visit our website at: http:// www.markle.org To read the Markle Foundation press release, click here. Web Policies | Copyright ) 2006 The Markle Foundation ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[cryptography] Application Layer Encryption Protocols Tuned for Cellular?
by Jeffrey Walton 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi All, Is anyone aware of of application layer encryption protocols with session management tuned for use on cellular networks? I need FIPS compliant ciphers, but that should be an implementation detail (I mention it because of setup and cipher text expansions). I have an application that performs classic Diffie-Hellman to key an channel using AES/CBC (or AES/CTR) with an HMAC, providing message level security. (it was written some time ago, before OpenSSL had Authenticated Encryption modes). The channel includes a counter for playbacks and insertions. So far, so good - its Crypto 101 stuff. The problem in practice is TCP/IP and later generation cellular networks (especially 4G and the "All IP" implementations). All appears OK when moving among cells if the IP address is forwarded and the device remains connected. All hell breaks loose when a device looses connectivity or gets a new IP. A device could get a new IP as users move between service providers. It appears the TCP/IP stack on both sides (device and server within the carriers network) will queue messages when device connectivity is lost. But the TCP/IP stack continues to operate as if all is succeeding. So neither the client nor server realize there are problems with underlying the socket. Its leading to a lot of session management problems, including excessive resource usage. In addition, I have an option to allow only one session per user (for paranoid folks). When the previous session does not die as expected, a new session cannot be started. Here, the device might realize the socket is really dead, but the server has not realized it yet because of the tricks that are being played in the TCP/IP stack on the server side. So the client tries to reconnect but the server refuses due to the "one session" rule. The problem is not isolated to my application. On the train from Washington to New York, it wreaks havoc on the VPN software I use. I often get my account suspended due to fraud triggers (reconnects and changing IPs). Ditto when using Acela's onboard WifFi and trying to maintain an SSL/TLS connection to GMail. TLDR: Is anyone aware of of application layer encryption protocols with session management tuned for use on cellular networks? Jeff _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] What's written to HD?
by Julian Yon 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sat, 17 Nov 2012 08:24:35 +0000 (GMT) Dan Hughes <danhughes146(a)yahoo.co.uk> wrote: > The question of swap files and hibernation raised by someone else is > pretty fundamental. It's pointless and misleading just talking > pedantically about disk cache as it doesn't matter to the user > exactly what blows the gaff. > > As far as I can tell: if you want to keep the computer clean, then > use Tails. If you want to be anonymous, best bet is latest TBB. If > you want both...then who knows ... > > Some of you guys need a bit more understanding for us noobs who don't > know what we're talking about. You asked a technical question and got several technical answers. But if you are asking to be patronised, here goes: Nobody on this list can give you any guarantees about software they have neither written nor audited. Nor can they give you any guarantees about a computer system they don't administer, including yours. This isn't a pedantic technicality, it's just fact. Having got that out of the way, here are some things to consider: Tor Browser doesn't write anything sensitive to permanent storage. What your OS does is not under the control of the Tor Browser. Tor Browser doesn't include Flash, so Flash concerns are irrelevant. What standard Firefox (or any other browser) does is not under the control of the Tor Browser. What your OS chooses to write to its swap file(s) is not under the control of the Tor Browser. If you don't want your OS to use swap, then turn off swap. Most modern systems have enough RAM to run perfectly well without it. How to achieve this depends on what OS you're running. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser. On some systems it is possible to use encrypted swap, which is generally a good idea. It does reduce performance under load, but if you're swapping heavily already that's probably not your first concern. If you don't want to write hibernation data, don't hibernate. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser. If you don't trust your proprietary OS (e.g. Windows, OS X), run a free/open source one such as GNU/Linux or FreeBSD. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser. It's not wise to trust proprietary software with your anonymity. Many of the b open questionsb about what is, or isn't, written to disk will be related to this point, and you should take it seriously. You should assume that, given sufficient incentive, Microsoft or Apple will implement any back door that Big Brother desires. Again, this is not under the control of the Tor Browser. If you feel you would be safer running in a VM and deleting the entire VM afterwards, you are free to do so. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser. Please note that in general deleting a file does not remove its contents from the underlying storage immediately. The standard technique to compensate for this is to overwrite the file in-place at least once before deleting (and many authorities will tell you that once is not enough). Note that if you're running a log structured or versioning file system (unlikely, but you haven't said that you're not) then this trick just won't work. Related to the above, secure deletion is near impossible to ensure on an SSD (flash based main storage, as found in some high end laptops but also in netbooks, tablets etc). If this bothers you (and if you're using the above technique, it probably does), don't use an SSD; use a traditional hard disk. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser. If after considering all of the above you are still feeling paranoid, remove all the writeable storage from your computer and run entirely from a live CD/DVD (*not* a USB key; if you don't trust TBB not to write to your main storage, you shouldn't trust it not to write to anything; similarly, you will want to use a write-once medium, i.e. not CD/DVDB1RW). This *does not have to be TAILS*. You can run many GNU/Linux based OSes straight from their install DVDs (I recommend Xubuntu for ease of use), install TBB into its ramdisk, and run from there. The one TAILS feature you may miss is the cold-boot attack mitigation. Therefore you'll want to remove the main memory chips from the computer after you finish and incinerate them. Ok, that's a bit extreme. You're probably fine if you just reboot and run something that uses a lot of memory. Unless you think a cold-boot attack is likely (i.e. you're actively being watched by a well prepared government agency sitting outside your front door) then you probably don't need to worry about that. In any case, this is not under the control of the Tor Browser. If your computer has been physically compromised, then even these precautions may not save you. Have you ever let it out of sight at airport security? Been arrested while carrying it? Found an intruder in your home/office? Then all bets are off. Big Brother could have discreetly installed some hardware which monitors what you're doing, regardless of what's written to disk. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser. If all this is still too technical, then you may be putting yourself at risk by using the Internet, ever. This really isn't something that the Tor Browser, or any other software, can help with. If you're concerned by your own lack of knowledge then book yourself into a computer science course at your local college or university and take modules related to operating systems, networks, security, cryptography and semantics. Unfortunately this is an advanced field and declaring yourself to be a bnoobb doesn't change that. By all means if you have more questions then ask them, but some things need an understanding of more fundamental concepts before they make sense. Regards, Julian -- 3072D/F3A66B3A Julian Yon (2012 General Use) <pgp.2012(a)jry.me> _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FYI: New US/EU passenger name records treaty leaked
by Erich M. 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave, The new passenger name record agreement between the US and the EU has been leaked. The draft treaty text looks ready for a closing. A foreign office spokesperson here in Vienna confirmed that, so this should be more or less identical to the final version. The letter from the EU presidency to COREPER dated june 28 includes the draft agreement on PNR plus the US position in ANNEX2. Full text [English] http://quintessenz.org/d/000100003891 Analysis of the new treaty in German [from today] http://futurezone.orf.at/it/stories/204742/ The gist: The new "push" system demands even more data from EU passenger databases. What Mr. Frattini told the public about "reduction" is a blatant swindle: more has been packed into the 19 points of the new PNR agreement than the previously equired 34 datafields contained. The withdrawal of the US from the Amadeus pnr data base comes at a dear price to the Europeans: They have to deliver more and better pre-structured data, fitting to the technical requirements of the DHS. So data mining will much easier for DHS, as correct data extraction is the first critical step to get the results desired. Credits go to Tony Bunyan from statewatch.org who dug out that draft agreement. cu Erich -- pgp-Key http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xE386BAA1 -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] New US/EU passenger name records treaty leaked
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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FYI: New US/EU passenger name records treaty leaked
by Erich M. 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave, The new passenger name record agreement between the US and the EU has been leaked. The draft treaty text looks ready for a closing. A foreign office spokesperson here in Vienna confirmed that, so this should be more or less identical to the final version. The letter from the EU presidency to COREPER dated june 28 includes the draft agreement on PNR plus the US position in ANNEX2. Full text [English] http://quintessenz.org/d/000100003891 Analysis of the new treaty in German [from today] http://futurezone.orf.at/it/stories/204742/ The gist: The new "push" system demands even more data from EU passenger databases. What Mr. Frattini told the public about "reduction" is a blatant swindle: more has been packed into the 19 points of the new PNR agreement than the previously equired 34 datafields contained. The withdrawal of the US from the Amadeus pnr data base comes at a dear price to the Europeans: They have to deliver more and better pre-structured data, fitting to the technical requirements of the DHS. So data mining will much easier for DHS, as correct data extraction is the first critical step to get the results desired. Credits go to Tony Bunyan from statewatch.org who dug out that draft agreement. cu Erich -- pgp-Key http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xE386BAA1 -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] New US/EU passenger name records treaty leaked
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [p2p-hackers] MixMinion vs. onion routing & GNUnet question
by seberino＠spawar.navy.mil 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> These may be naive questions (I don't know GNUnet too well), but > hopefully I am about to learn something: GNUnet tries to achieve at > least three goals at the same time that are not perfectly understood > and should rather be treated individually: > > - anonymity > - censor resistance > - high-performance document distribution Performance is a secondary goal to the first 2 in GNUnet. The first 2 are related so I'm not sure how or why they need to be treated separately. > Also, don't the shortcomings of mix networks also apply to Freenet- / > GNUnet-style anonymization schemes? > I suspect that no matter what (existing) adversary > model you pick, plugging a good mix network into your design on the > transport layer gives you the highest anonymity possible. I don't know how GNUnet's architecture compares to mix networks. I *do* know that GNUnet attempts to protect against traffic analysis. If you think mix networks are better, they better have good protection against traffic analysis. Can you point us to any good URLs or papers on how mix networks protect against traffic analysis? Chris _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)zgp.org http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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