July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Papester Collective - nearly-automatic paper request fulfillment over twitter
by Bryan Bishop 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://neuroconscience.com/2013/01/16/join-papester-collective-1-0-how-to-r… https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B038j0_3PmP9RYOM6LkFG7NHBiy6Y9ShurmewaG… """ Yesterday my friend Hauke and I theorized about a kind of dream scenario- a totally distributed, easy to use, publication liberation system. This is perhaps not feasible at this point [1]. Today webre going to present something that will be useful right now. The essential goal here is to make it so that anyone, anywhere, can access the papers they need in a timely manner. The idea is to take advantage of existing strategies and tools to streamline paper sharing as much as possible. Folks already do this- every day on twitter or in private, requests for papers are made and fulfilled. Our goal is to completely streamline this process down to a few clicks of your mouse. That way a small but dedicated group of folks b the Papester Collective b can ensure that #icanhazpdf requests are fulfilled almost instantly. This is a work in progress. Leave comments on how to improve and further streamline this system and join the collective! SHORT VERSION: HOW TO GET A PAPER BEHIND A PAYWALL QUICKLY Tweet (for example): b #icanhazpdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4568-12.2013b Show your support for the papester collective by tweeting: b Thanks to #papester, my #icanhazpdf request was fufilled in seconds! Join: http://bit.ly/W7fa2T #pdftributeb Click: Here you can find more detailed instructions. HOW TO JOIN THE COLLECTIVE AND START SERVING REQUESTS SHORT INSTRUCTIONS AND REQUIRED SOFTWARE: Twitter: Monitor #icanhazpdf #requests Zotero and zotero browser plugin: after clicking on DOI link or abstract page just click on bSave to Zoterob button to auto-grabs PDFs http://zotero.org/ Zotfile: automatically copies new Zotero pdfs files saved to public Dropbox folder http://www.jlegewie.com/zotfile.html Dropbox: Cloud storage system to seamlessly share files with anyone without login. Dropbox linker: automatically adds links from public folder to your clipboard http://dropboxlinker.codeplex.com/ Reply to request tweets: paste URL from clipboard and if you want #papester Thatbs it! Now you can just click request links, click the Zotero get PDF button, and CTRL+V a dropbox direct download link in response! Click: Here you can find more detailed instructions. 1.The fundamental problem: uploading huge repositories of scientific papers is not sensible for now. Itbs too much data (50 million papers * 0.5-1.5 megabytes together make up ~ 25-75 Terrabytes) and the likelihood for every paper to be downloaded is more uniformly distributed than with files traditionally shared like music. For instance, there are 100 million songs x 3.5 mb songs, and it is difficult to find exotic songs online b some songs have decent availability now because there are only a few favourites b not so with favourite papers. Also, fewer people will share papers than songs, so this makes it more even more difficult to sustain a complete repository. Thus, we need a system that fufills requests individually. Disclaimer: Please make sure you only share papers with friends who also have the copyrights to the papers you share. """ Instead of forcing the user to manually monitor twitter, you could just have a simple client that reads a twitter feed, passes the urls through zotero (after resolving them from the t.co shortlink), download the pdf and upload to dropbox. Zotero already has a Google Scholar search feature and auto-save-pdf feature, so I'm not sure about those steps as written. - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "science-liberation-front" group. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to science-liberation-front+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Med-privacy] National Individual Identifier
by peter marshall 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

National Individual Identifier http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/natindivid/index.htm _______________________________________________ Med-privacy mailing list Med-privacy(a)lists.essential.org http://lists.essential.org/mailman/listinfo/med-privacy ----- End forwarded message ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: Collage
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 08/18/2010 05:21 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote: > Yesterday I asked about Haystack, an anti-censorship system that appears > to exist mainly as newspaper articles. So today I ran across another > system, which appears to be real: Collage > (http://gigaom.com/2010/07/12/software-uses-twitter-flickr-to-let-dissidents…) > developed by a group at Georgia Tech and to be presented at Usenix. On > a crypto level, unlike Haystack, Collage is nothing new: It uses > steganographic techniques to hide text in photos. What it contributes > is easy to use software for both embedding and extracting the data, > integrated with Flickr. > Unlike haystack - this software appears to be real and to have contributed something useful to the field of anti-censorship. Impressive research! All the best, Jacob --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Collage
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 08/18/2010 05:21 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote: > Yesterday I asked about Haystack, an anti-censorship system that appears > to exist mainly as newspaper articles. So today I ran across another > system, which appears to be real: Collage > (http://gigaom.com/2010/07/12/software-uses-twitter-flickr-to-let-dissidents…) > developed by a group at Georgia Tech and to be presented at Usenix. On > a crypto level, unlike Haystack, Collage is nothing new: It uses > steganographic techniques to hide text in photos. What it contributes > is easy to use software for both embedding and extracting the data, > integrated with Flickr. > Unlike haystack - this software appears to be real and to have contributed something useful to the field of anti-censorship. Impressive research! All the best, Jacob --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[cryptography] preventing protocol failings
by Sampo Syreeni 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

(I'm not sure whether I should write anything anytime soon, because of Len Sassaman's untimely demise. He was an idol of sorts to me, as a guy who Got Things Done, while being of comparable age to me. But perhaps it's equally valid to carry on the ideas, as a sort of a nerd eulogy?) Personally I've slowly come to believe that options within crypto protocols are a *very* bad idea. Overall. I mean, it seems that pretty much all of the effective, real-life security breaches over the past decade have come from protocol failings, if not trivial password ones. Not from anything that has to do with hard crypto per se. So why don't we make our crypto protocols and encodings *very* simple, so as to resist protocol attacks? X.509 is a total mess already, as Peter Gutmann has already elaborated in the far past. Yet OpenPGP's packet format fares not much better; it might not have many cracks as of yet, but it still has a very convoluted packet structure, which makes it amenable to protocol attacks. Why not fix it into the simplest, upgradeable structure: a tag and a binary blob following it? Not to mention those interactive protocols, which are even more difficult to model, analyze, attack, and then formally verify. In Len's and his spouse's formalistic vein, I'd very much like to simplify them into a level which is amenable to formal verification. Could we perhaps do it? I mean, that would not only lead to more easily attacked protocols, it would also lead to more security...and a eulogy to one of the new cypherpunks I most revered. -- Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - decoy(a)iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front +358-50-5756111, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2 _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Med-privacy] National Individual Identifier
by peter marshall 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

National Individual Identifier http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/natindivid/index.htm _______________________________________________ Med-privacy mailing list Med-privacy(a)lists.essential.org http://lists.essential.org/mailman/listinfo/med-privacy ----- End forwarded message ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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[cryptography] preventing protocol failings
by Sampo Syreeni 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

(I'm not sure whether I should write anything anytime soon, because of Len Sassaman's untimely demise. He was an idol of sorts to me, as a guy who Got Things Done, while being of comparable age to me. But perhaps it's equally valid to carry on the ideas, as a sort of a nerd eulogy?) Personally I've slowly come to believe that options within crypto protocols are a *very* bad idea. Overall. I mean, it seems that pretty much all of the effective, real-life security breaches over the past decade have come from protocol failings, if not trivial password ones. Not from anything that has to do with hard crypto per se. So why don't we make our crypto protocols and encodings *very* simple, so as to resist protocol attacks? X.509 is a total mess already, as Peter Gutmann has already elaborated in the far past. Yet OpenPGP's packet format fares not much better; it might not have many cracks as of yet, but it still has a very convoluted packet structure, which makes it amenable to protocol attacks. Why not fix it into the simplest, upgradeable structure: a tag and a binary blob following it? Not to mention those interactive protocols, which are even more difficult to model, analyze, attack, and then formally verify. In Len's and his spouse's formalistic vein, I'd very much like to simplify them into a level which is amenable to formal verification. Could we perhaps do it? I mean, that would not only lead to more easily attacked protocols, it would also lead to more security...and a eulogy to one of the new cypherpunks I most revered. -- Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - decoy(a)iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front +358-50-5756111, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2 _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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ANNOUNCE: PGP Corporate Desktop 7.1 Now Available
by Will Price 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 [Resending as a signed message, hit the trigger a little too fast on the last one] PGP Security is pleased to announce that PGP Corporate Desktop 7.1 (formerly Desktop Security) has been made available in trial and upgrade versions on its website. I have included a textual version of the What's New file for Win32 below. Note that there are still a few errors on the website where the product is referred to as "Desktop Security", and the Mac What's New file has not yet been posted. These will be corrected shortly. - From this point forward, all What's New files will be posted online at the following location: http://www.pgp.com/products/whatsnew/ - ------ NEW FEATURES Modularity PGP Corporate Desktop has been split into four products: PGPmail - Email and File Security PGPdisk - Disk Security PGPvpn - IPsec Virtual Private Networking PGPfire - Personal Firewall and Personal IDS PGP Corporate Desktop is also available in the traditional form with all of the products integrated together. Each of the products can be installed and uninstalled in any combination to automatically combine the functionality. Smart Card Support PGP now provides full support for smart cards. Smart cards allow private key storage on secured hardware. Decryption and signing operations using private keys stored on smart cards occur on the smart card itself. Keys can also be generated on the card, and the cards do not allow the private keys to be read off the card. The smart card features have been integrated into PGP's core functionality and thus are available in all of the PGP products whenever key pairs are used. Three smart card types have been certified for this release: Rainbow's iKey 20XX Schlumberger's Cryptoflex GemPlus GemSafe Enterprise For best results, we recommend using these cards. PGP also provides more generic support for any type of smart card that provides full PKCS#11 compatibility. PGP's smart card implementation is fully compatible with certificates placed on cards by Windows 2000 or Netscape Communicator. Personal Firewall / Personal IDS / VPN Application-level firewall. PGP's enterprise-class Personal Firewall and Personal IDS (Intrusion Detection System) now supports the ability to specify applications associated with each firewall rule, and sports a significantly improved user interface. Firewall rule learning. PGP can now be told to watch your network traffic and write firewall rules dynamically for you. Notifications of unknown network traffic. PGP can now ask you whether you want to allow or deny applications from communicating over the network as they occur, and will automatically modify your firewall rules as appropriate based on your answers. Firewall rule sets can now be exported and imported. VPN IP Range support. In addition to the past support for VPN Subnets, PGP now supports Ranges. For many networks, especially extremely large networks, Ranges are a much superior way to specify the configuration of the network. Sniffer-format intrusion packet captures. Packets which cause the intrusion detection system to fire are now automatically captured and logged. They can later be analyzed using packet analysis tools such as Sniffer. Automatic IP Address block ownership tracing. When tracing Intruders, PGP will now provide information about the ownership of the IP Address block from which the intrusion originated. PGPfire is now compatible with the CheckPoint SecuRemote VPN client. Enhanced Exchange Server Support Exchange server identities, which are similar to ""/o=Acme/ou=HR/cn=Recipients/cn=JBob", can now be automatically added as a second PGP user ID when generating keys. The Outlook email plugin will automatically lookup identities of this form as well. This feature makes sending email using the Outlook plugin in an Exchange Server environment even more seamless. Large File Support PGP now supports file encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify operations on files greater than 2.5 Gigabytes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.1 iQA/AwUBOzaMZay7FkvPc+xMEQINwgCdGvO2rRFMharJZTjELFvoapOgmgYAmwT5 L8nGRgAOd8g4eG5zJ8l/gJay =QiHt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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News from my Tor Server raid
by morphium 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, as you may have noticed, 2 days ago I got raided due to ownership of the Domain wikileaks.de On the SAME day, a letter of the state attorney was sent to me (arrived yesterday), stating I can pick my things they raided about 20 months ago, on 1. of april (is that a joke now?) because they (the state attorney) has lifted the embargo. The raid 20 months ago was due to "spreading childporn" (running a Tor node). Just to keep you informed. morphium ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] blackmail / real world stego use
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2003 00:00:11 +0200 >From: Barry Wels <b.wels(a)nah6.com> >Subject: blackmail / real world stego use >Sender: owner-cryptography(a)metzdowd.com >To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > > >Hi, > >So far I have only found one English item in the news about this. > >http://www.expatica.com/index.asp?pad=2,18,&item_id=33655 > >So let me translate some of the dutch information about this >interesting case : > >A 45-year old chip designer from Utrecht was arrested June 3. >He confessed to have tried to blackmail the 'Campina' food company. >He had threatened to poison their products, and demanded 200.000 euro. >The most remarkable thing about this case is however how he >communicated with Campina, and how he thought to receive the money. > >He forced Campina to open a bank account, and get a 'world card' with >it. Then they had to deposit 200.000 Euro on it (about 185.000 >US dollar). He ordered them to buy a credit card reader, and read the >information off the magnetic-stripe of the 'world card'. >Then they had to send him the output of the card reader, together with >the pin code. With this information, he then could create a copy of >the 'world card' using a card-writer and a blank card. > >To send him the information, he made them use steganography! >Campina received an envelope via snailmail containing a floppy with a >stego program and instructions. >They had to encode the 'world card' info into a picture of a red VW >golf, using the stego program, and a fixed crypto key that was >included in the envelope. >Finally, they had to place the picture in a fake add on a website >where large amounts of people sell/buy second hand cars. >He would then read the add, and make a copy of the picture. >Decode the stego info out of it, write his own copy of the card, >and withdraw money. Without ever having personal contact with Campina >(or the police). To be real clever, he did not approach the website >with the car adds directly. Police found out the add was approached >trough a US anonymizer called SURFOLA.com. SURFOLA.com claims on their >website : >"We will not give out your name, residence address, or e-mail address >to any third parties without your permission, for any reason, at any >time, ever." > >The Utrecht police informed the FBI, and asked for assistance. Within >24 hours, the FBI cracked the case, supplying the Dutch police with >a '@wxs.nl' e-mail address and some paypal.com financial data. >This data led to the 45 year old chip programmer. >After his identity was known, the police ofcourse started surveillance on >him. The 'desert terrorist' was arrested red-handed when he withdrew money >from an ATM using the world-card copy.... > >Greetings, > >Barry Wels. > > >The Cryptography Mailing List >Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as adam(a)homeport.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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