July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[tor-talk] US Senators Seek to Crackdown on Bitcoin
by Christopher A. Lindsey 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

>From the article as it applies to Tor: "Senators Charles Schumer (D, New York) and Joe Manchin (D, West Virginia) have written to Attorney General Eric Holder and the DEA asking that action be taken to crackdown on the Silk Road. Silk Road is an online exchange that deals in drugs and Bitcoins. Since the Bitcoin transactions are anonymous, and Silk Road is accessed through Tor, authorities have no way to track down users buying drugs." Original article here: http://www.maximumpc.com/article/news/us_senators_seek_crackdown_bitcoin A more verbose version here: http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/06/09/senators-call-for-crackdown-on-bitcoi… Since it appears they're going to be targeting a Hidden Service, it will be an interesting test of Tor's resilience given the resources available to the US government. Take care, Chris -- Christopher A. Lindsey <CLindsey(a)GarudaLLC.com> Garuda, LLC _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Open Manufacturing] Fwd: [GRG] Open Source Sensing Needs Your Ideas and Help
by Bryan Bishop 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: L. Stephen Coles, M.D., Ph.D. <scoles(a)grg.org> Date: Fri, Jul 3, 2009 at 4:07 PM Subject: [GRG] Open Source Sensing Needs Your Ideas and Help To: Gerontology Research Group <grg(a)lists.ucla.edu> Cc: Chris Peterson <foresight(a)foresight.org> To Members and Friends of the Los Angeles Gerontology Research Group: B B B B B B B B This just in from Chris Peterson, VP of the Foresight Institute... -- Steve Coles Dear Foresight members and friends, B B B We've launched a new project here at Foresight b the Open Source Sensing Initiative: http://opensourcesensing.org The sensors are coming and they'll be greatb& B B B B B B B B As you know, nanotechnology is enabling ever-smaller, ever-cheaper sensors b ultimately able to detect and report on basically everything that happens, down to the molecular level. This can be a huge benefit to medicine, the environment, and security. Imagine being able to locate and tax pollution, instead of having to tax income, for instance.B Consider being able to easily tell if bioweapons are present. B B B B B B B B But therebs a potential downside b such sensors would be very useful in the control of civilian populations.B Think of your least favorite governments: wouldn't they appreciate such a tool for detailed monitoring of the actions of a population? B B B B B B B B Some of us have become resigned to a new age of total surveillance, seeing it as inevitable.B Others feel that privacy is an important tool in the protection of civil liberties, and are willing to sacrifice other benefits to maintain that privacy. We can have the benefits without the downsides, IF webre smart about it B B B B B B B B But as the graphic on the Open Source Sensing home page suggests, we may not need to give up either security or privacy/civil liberties. Consider the lesson of electronic voting: we have learned that the software and data handling need to be open, but the raw data b who voted for whom b need not be public, as long as we understand and trust the voting process itself.B It need not be public, and it should not be public.B Itbs the process, not the raw data, which should be open. B B B B B B B B This same principle can apply to sensing when privacy is impacted: letbs make the process open, not the raw data.B All we need is the desired answer (b Is bioweapon X here?b), not total knowledge of all events (b John just attended an unapproved political meetingb or b Susie's been smoking something naughtyb). We need clever systems design: how to get it? B B B B B B B B How can we make this happen?B Foresight membership overlaps heavily with the software profession, especially the open source community.B These groups grapple daily with the tradeoffs between security and privacy, and have come up with useful tools and processes for teams to use in working through the technical implementation of these values. B B B B B B B B The Open Source Sensing Initiative proposes to apply the tools of open source software to this new domain, to advance the immense practical benefits for the environment, health, and safety, without crossing the line into unnecessary total disclosure of every aspect of individualsb lives. Your role and Foresightbs role B B B B B B B B If webre successful, open source sensing will grow far beyond any one organization, just as open source software has.B At this early stage, to get it off to a strong start, Foresight is playing the coordinating role. Itbs a huge project, but itbs the right way to go as we move into the Sensor Age.B You can help: see the website at http://opensourcesensing.org, check out the slides and video linked to on the home page, let us know of your interest, and consider donating. B B B B B B B B Because although this is an open source-style project, and we hope for lots of volunteer help, we are dealing here with physical systems rather than software, and costs will be much higher than for software projects. Like all open source projects, this is b bottom-upb b it depends on help from a wide variety of people.B We hope to get your assistance: your ideas, skills, and donations. Best wishes, Chris Peterson VP, Foresight Institute Coordinator, Open Source Sensing Initiative PS:B Please, before you move on to your next task, take a few minutes now to check out opensourcesensing.org, visit the blog, and hit the b Make a Donationb button. If youbre considering a major donation, phone +1 (650) 289 0860 ext 255 or E-mail <peterson(a)foresight.org >. L. Stephen Coles, M.D., Ph.D., Co-Founder Los Angeles Gerontology Research Group URL: http://www.grg.org E-mail: scoles(a)grg.org E-mail: scoles(a)ucla.edu _______________________________________________ GRG mailing list GRG(a)lists.ucla.edu http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/grg -- - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Open Manufacturing" group. To post to this group, send email to openmanufacturing(a)googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to openmanufacturing+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/openmanufacturing?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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more on Hayden's Mistaken Understanding of the Fourth
by Bruce D. Larkin 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Dave, Further comment, if not overload, focused on General Hayden's January 23rd remarks and the exchange with Jonathan Landay. This is at my blog http://www.learnworld.com/blog/blog.html Bruce Saturday, May 06, 2006 ? MICHAEL V. HAYDEN: EREASONABLEB9 SURVEILLANCE? General Michael V. Hayden has been identified by unnamed newspaper sources as a frontrunner to be named Director of Central Intelligence in place of Porter Goss, whose resignation was announced today. In January 2006 General Hayden advanced a remarkable theory to vitiate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and justify unwarranted interception and use of communications to and from B3U.S. persons,B2 principally US citizens. In a speech at the National Press Club [1] General Hayden said, in part: B3Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use. Let me repeat that: Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use to ensure that we conform to the Fourth AmendmentB9s reasonable standard when it comes to protecting the privacy of these kinds of people. ... [T]he standard of what was relevant and valuable, and therefore, what was reasonable, would understandably change, I think, as smoke billowed from two American cities and a Pennsylvania farm field. And we acted accordingly.B2 The Fourth Amendment states: B3The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.B2 After General Hayden had delivered his remarks the floor was opened for questions. The following exchange took place between Hayden and Jonathan Landay of Knight-Ridder: QUESTION: Jonathan Landay with Knight Ridder. IB9d like to stay on the same issue, and that had to do with the standard by which you use to target your wiretaps. IB9m no lawyer, but my understanding is that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to be able to do a search that does not violate an AmericanB9s right against unlawful searches and seizures. Do you use b9 GEN. HAYDEN: No, actually b9 the Fourth Amendment actually protects all of us against unreasonable search and seizure. QUESTION: But the b9 GEN. HAYDEN: ThatB9s what it says. QUESTION: But the measure is probable cause, I believe. GEN. HAYDEN: The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure. QUESTION: But does it not say probable b9 GEN. HAYDEN: No. The amendment says b9 QUESTION: The court standard, the legal standard b9 GEN. HAYDEN: b9 unreasonable search and seizure. QUESTION: The legal standard is probable cause, General. You used the terms just a few minutes ago, B3We reasonably believe.B2 And a FISA court, my understanding is, would not give you a warrant if you went before them and say B3we reasonably believeB2; you have to go to the FISA court, or the attorney general has to go to the FISA court and say, B3we have probable cause.B2 And so what many people believe b9 and IB9d like you to respond to this b9 is that what youB9ve actually done is crafted a detour around the FISA court by creating a new standard of B3reasonably believeB2 in place in probable cause because the FISA court will not give you a warrant based on reasonable belief, you have to show probable cause. Could you respond to that, please? GEN. HAYDEN: Sure. I didnB9t craft the authorization. I am responding to a lawful order. All right? The attorney general has averred to the lawfulness of the order. Just to be very clear b9 and believe me, if thereB9s any amendment to the Constitution that employees of the National Security Agency are familiar with, itB9s the Fourth. And it is a reasonableness standard in the Fourth Amendment. And so what youB9ve raised to me b9and IB9m not a lawyer, and donB9t want to become one b9 what youB9ve raised to me is, in terms of quoting the Fourth Amendment, is an issue of the Constitution. The constitutional standard is B3reasonable.B2 And we believe b9 I am convinced that we are lawful because what it is weB9re doing is reasonable. >From General HaydenB9s reading of the Fourth Amendment it follows that the State must seek a search warrant only when it proposes an unreasonablesearch. Reductio ad absurdum. Or we could ask how EreasonablenessB9 is established, and how the issue is resolved if the StateB9s claim to EreasonablenessB9 of a specific searchb9here a program of interceptionsb9is contested. General HaydenB9s position is that he, as Director of NSA, determined EreasonablenessB9; that the program was and ought to have remained secret; and that therefore only those who were properly privy to the secret could have contested it, and then only within the limited circle of those entitled to the secret. Hence Congressional oversight or appeal to the Courts is precluded, unless someone who has learned about the secret intercept program goes public. General HaydenB9s position also neglects the fact that there is lawb9an Act of Congressb9which expressly prohibits what he chose to do as Director of the NSA and defended in January as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Title 50 B' 1802(a)(1) authorizes warrantless electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information, subject to some conditions, provided B3there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of the communication to which a United States person is a party;B2 [This distinguishes B3contentB2 from facts that might be gathered about a transaction.] Note that one US person is enough. Title 18 B' 2511 (2)(f) states in part that B3the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.B2 One term, setting scope, is domestic. For domestic surveillance FISA provides the B3exclusive meansB2. If domestic surveillance does not follow the terms of the FISA Act it is illegal. Of course, as everyone including the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee has said, we donB9t know exactly what NSA did, because they wonB9t say. Secret. We can, however, work General HaydenB9s language a bit further. Not every person in the United States is a B3United States personB2, despite General HaydenB9s attempt to convince his audience that any terrorist who stepped across the border would become protected from surveillance. In General HaydenB9s words B3And by the way, EU.S. personB9 routinely includes anyone in the United States, citizen or not.B2 But 50 USC B'1801(i) defines a B3United States personB2 as B3a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8)B2 and further defined associations and corporations. [3] B3So, for example,B2 Hayden continues, B3because they were in the United Statesb9and we did not know anything moreb9Mohamed Atta and his fellow 18 hijackers would have been presumed to have been protected person, U.S. persons, by NSA prior to 9/11.B2 But not thereafter? What General Hayden does not put on the table is that the law does not ban intercepts but distinguishes those intercepts which may be made without warrant, with Executive approval from those which may only be undertaken pursuant to court-issued warrant, subject to the conditions stipulated in law. The plain meaning of General HaydenB9s subsequent lines is that the communications of US persons are intercepted and judged, despite the law. B3If the U.S. person information isnB9t relevant, the data is suppressed.B2 Whether General Hayden is actually nominated to succeed Porter Goss as CIA Director or not, the claim that the Executive can undertake warrantless interception whenever it says that doing so is EreasonableB9 is pernicious and should be confronted head on. HaydenB9s remaining as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence after his January 23rd remarks is further evidence of problems which few Congressional Republicans, and no one in the White House, seems inclined or ready to address. [Note 1]: Remarks by General Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Former Director of the National Security Agency, Address to the National Press Club, B3What American Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation,B2 Natonal Press Club, Washington, D. C., January 23 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.pdf [Note 2:] http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/ usc_sec_50_00001809----000-.html [Note 3:] And the Congressional Research Service called attention to this definition in Elizabeth B. Basan, B3The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions,B2 22 September 2004, CRS Report RL30465, p. 11 note. -- =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Bruce D. Larkin Convenor and Director of Studies Global Collaborative on Denuclearization Design http://www.gcdd.net/ Sometime Professor of Politics, University of California at Santa Cruz Email: "Bruce D. Larkin [+]" <bruce.larkin(a)learnworld.com> The [+] flags incoming mail as wanted, avoiding loss amid SPAM. Web: http://www.learnworld.com/ and http://www.gcdd.net/ Mobile: +1-413-695-0264 Landlines: +1-413-634-8842. +353-23-40309. +1-831-429-8443. Course Syllabi: http://www.learnworld.com/COURSES/ =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Hayden's Mistaken Understanding of the Fourth
by David Farber 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[Open Manufacturing] Fwd: [GRG] Open Source Sensing Needs Your Ideas and Help
by Bryan Bishop 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: L. Stephen Coles, M.D., Ph.D. <scoles(a)grg.org> Date: Fri, Jul 3, 2009 at 4:07 PM Subject: [GRG] Open Source Sensing Needs Your Ideas and Help To: Gerontology Research Group <grg(a)lists.ucla.edu> Cc: Chris Peterson <foresight(a)foresight.org> To Members and Friends of the Los Angeles Gerontology Research Group: B B B B B B B B This just in from Chris Peterson, VP of the Foresight Institute... -- Steve Coles Dear Foresight members and friends, B B B We've launched a new project here at Foresight b the Open Source Sensing Initiative: http://opensourcesensing.org The sensors are coming and they'll be greatb& B B B B B B B B As you know, nanotechnology is enabling ever-smaller, ever-cheaper sensors b ultimately able to detect and report on basically everything that happens, down to the molecular level. This can be a huge benefit to medicine, the environment, and security. Imagine being able to locate and tax pollution, instead of having to tax income, for instance.B Consider being able to easily tell if bioweapons are present. B B B B B B B B But therebs a potential downside b such sensors would be very useful in the control of civilian populations.B Think of your least favorite governments: wouldn't they appreciate such a tool for detailed monitoring of the actions of a population? B B B B B B B B Some of us have become resigned to a new age of total surveillance, seeing it as inevitable.B Others feel that privacy is an important tool in the protection of civil liberties, and are willing to sacrifice other benefits to maintain that privacy. We can have the benefits without the downsides, IF webre smart about it B B B B B B B B But as the graphic on the Open Source Sensing home page suggests, we may not need to give up either security or privacy/civil liberties. Consider the lesson of electronic voting: we have learned that the software and data handling need to be open, but the raw data b who voted for whom b need not be public, as long as we understand and trust the voting process itself.B It need not be public, and it should not be public.B Itbs the process, not the raw data, which should be open. B B B B B B B B This same principle can apply to sensing when privacy is impacted: letbs make the process open, not the raw data.B All we need is the desired answer (b Is bioweapon X here?b), not total knowledge of all events (b John just attended an unapproved political meetingb or b Susie's been smoking something naughtyb). We need clever systems design: how to get it? B B B B B B B B How can we make this happen?B Foresight membership overlaps heavily with the software profession, especially the open source community.B These groups grapple daily with the tradeoffs between security and privacy, and have come up with useful tools and processes for teams to use in working through the technical implementation of these values. B B B B B B B B The Open Source Sensing Initiative proposes to apply the tools of open source software to this new domain, to advance the immense practical benefits for the environment, health, and safety, without crossing the line into unnecessary total disclosure of every aspect of individualsb lives. Your role and Foresightbs role B B B B B B B B If webre successful, open source sensing will grow far beyond any one organization, just as open source software has.B At this early stage, to get it off to a strong start, Foresight is playing the coordinating role. Itbs a huge project, but itbs the right way to go as we move into the Sensor Age.B You can help: see the website at http://opensourcesensing.org, check out the slides and video linked to on the home page, let us know of your interest, and consider donating. B B B B B B B B Because although this is an open source-style project, and we hope for lots of volunteer help, we are dealing here with physical systems rather than software, and costs will be much higher than for software projects. Like all open source projects, this is b bottom-upb b it depends on help from a wide variety of people.B We hope to get your assistance: your ideas, skills, and donations. Best wishes, Chris Peterson VP, Foresight Institute Coordinator, Open Source Sensing Initiative PS:B Please, before you move on to your next task, take a few minutes now to check out opensourcesensing.org, visit the blog, and hit the b Make a Donationb button. If youbre considering a major donation, phone +1 (650) 289 0860 ext 255 or E-mail <peterson(a)foresight.org >. L. Stephen Coles, M.D., Ph.D., Co-Founder Los Angeles Gerontology Research Group URL: http://www.grg.org E-mail: scoles(a)grg.org E-mail: scoles(a)ucla.edu _______________________________________________ GRG mailing list GRG(a)lists.ucla.edu http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/grg -- - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Open Manufacturing" group. To post to this group, send email to openmanufacturing(a)googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to openmanufacturing+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/openmanufacturing?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

more on Hayden's Mistaken Understanding of the Fourth
by Bruce D. Larkin 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Dave, Further comment, if not overload, focused on General Hayden's January 23rd remarks and the exchange with Jonathan Landay. This is at my blog http://www.learnworld.com/blog/blog.html Bruce Saturday, May 06, 2006 ? MICHAEL V. HAYDEN: EREASONABLEB9 SURVEILLANCE? General Michael V. Hayden has been identified by unnamed newspaper sources as a frontrunner to be named Director of Central Intelligence in place of Porter Goss, whose resignation was announced today. In January 2006 General Hayden advanced a remarkable theory to vitiate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and justify unwarranted interception and use of communications to and from B3U.S. persons,B2 principally US citizens. In a speech at the National Press Club [1] General Hayden said, in part: B3Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use. Let me repeat that: Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use to ensure that we conform to the Fourth AmendmentB9s reasonable standard when it comes to protecting the privacy of these kinds of people. ... [T]he standard of what was relevant and valuable, and therefore, what was reasonable, would understandably change, I think, as smoke billowed from two American cities and a Pennsylvania farm field. And we acted accordingly.B2 The Fourth Amendment states: B3The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.B2 After General Hayden had delivered his remarks the floor was opened for questions. The following exchange took place between Hayden and Jonathan Landay of Knight-Ridder: QUESTION: Jonathan Landay with Knight Ridder. IB9d like to stay on the same issue, and that had to do with the standard by which you use to target your wiretaps. IB9m no lawyer, but my understanding is that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to be able to do a search that does not violate an AmericanB9s right against unlawful searches and seizures. Do you use b9 GEN. HAYDEN: No, actually b9 the Fourth Amendment actually protects all of us against unreasonable search and seizure. QUESTION: But the b9 GEN. HAYDEN: ThatB9s what it says. QUESTION: But the measure is probable cause, I believe. GEN. HAYDEN: The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure. QUESTION: But does it not say probable b9 GEN. HAYDEN: No. The amendment says b9 QUESTION: The court standard, the legal standard b9 GEN. HAYDEN: b9 unreasonable search and seizure. QUESTION: The legal standard is probable cause, General. You used the terms just a few minutes ago, B3We reasonably believe.B2 And a FISA court, my understanding is, would not give you a warrant if you went before them and say B3we reasonably believeB2; you have to go to the FISA court, or the attorney general has to go to the FISA court and say, B3we have probable cause.B2 And so what many people believe b9 and IB9d like you to respond to this b9 is that what youB9ve actually done is crafted a detour around the FISA court by creating a new standard of B3reasonably believeB2 in place in probable cause because the FISA court will not give you a warrant based on reasonable belief, you have to show probable cause. Could you respond to that, please? GEN. HAYDEN: Sure. I didnB9t craft the authorization. I am responding to a lawful order. All right? The attorney general has averred to the lawfulness of the order. Just to be very clear b9 and believe me, if thereB9s any amendment to the Constitution that employees of the National Security Agency are familiar with, itB9s the Fourth. And it is a reasonableness standard in the Fourth Amendment. And so what youB9ve raised to me b9and IB9m not a lawyer, and donB9t want to become one b9 what youB9ve raised to me is, in terms of quoting the Fourth Amendment, is an issue of the Constitution. The constitutional standard is B3reasonable.B2 And we believe b9 I am convinced that we are lawful because what it is weB9re doing is reasonable. >From General HaydenB9s reading of the Fourth Amendment it follows that the State must seek a search warrant only when it proposes an unreasonablesearch. Reductio ad absurdum. Or we could ask how EreasonablenessB9 is established, and how the issue is resolved if the StateB9s claim to EreasonablenessB9 of a specific searchb9here a program of interceptionsb9is contested. General HaydenB9s position is that he, as Director of NSA, determined EreasonablenessB9; that the program was and ought to have remained secret; and that therefore only those who were properly privy to the secret could have contested it, and then only within the limited circle of those entitled to the secret. Hence Congressional oversight or appeal to the Courts is precluded, unless someone who has learned about the secret intercept program goes public. General HaydenB9s position also neglects the fact that there is lawb9an Act of Congressb9which expressly prohibits what he chose to do as Director of the NSA and defended in January as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Title 50 B' 1802(a)(1) authorizes warrantless electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information, subject to some conditions, provided B3there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of the communication to which a United States person is a party;B2 [This distinguishes B3contentB2 from facts that might be gathered about a transaction.] Note that one US person is enough. Title 18 B' 2511 (2)(f) states in part that B3the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.B2 One term, setting scope, is domestic. For domestic surveillance FISA provides the B3exclusive meansB2. If domestic surveillance does not follow the terms of the FISA Act it is illegal. Of course, as everyone including the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee has said, we donB9t know exactly what NSA did, because they wonB9t say. Secret. We can, however, work General HaydenB9s language a bit further. Not every person in the United States is a B3United States personB2, despite General HaydenB9s attempt to convince his audience that any terrorist who stepped across the border would become protected from surveillance. In General HaydenB9s words B3And by the way, EU.S. personB9 routinely includes anyone in the United States, citizen or not.B2 But 50 USC B'1801(i) defines a B3United States personB2 as B3a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8)B2 and further defined associations and corporations. [3] B3So, for example,B2 Hayden continues, B3because they were in the United Statesb9and we did not know anything moreb9Mohamed Atta and his fellow 18 hijackers would have been presumed to have been protected person, U.S. persons, by NSA prior to 9/11.B2 But not thereafter? What General Hayden does not put on the table is that the law does not ban intercepts but distinguishes those intercepts which may be made without warrant, with Executive approval from those which may only be undertaken pursuant to court-issued warrant, subject to the conditions stipulated in law. The plain meaning of General HaydenB9s subsequent lines is that the communications of US persons are intercepted and judged, despite the law. B3If the U.S. person information isnB9t relevant, the data is suppressed.B2 Whether General Hayden is actually nominated to succeed Porter Goss as CIA Director or not, the claim that the Executive can undertake warrantless interception whenever it says that doing so is EreasonableB9 is pernicious and should be confronted head on. HaydenB9s remaining as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence after his January 23rd remarks is further evidence of problems which few Congressional Republicans, and no one in the White House, seems inclined or ready to address. [Note 1]: Remarks by General Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Former Director of the National Security Agency, Address to the National Press Club, B3What American Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation,B2 Natonal Press Club, Washington, D. C., January 23 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.pdf [Note 2:] http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/ usc_sec_50_00001809----000-.html [Note 3:] And the Congressional Research Service called attention to this definition in Elizabeth B. Basan, B3The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions,B2 22 September 2004, CRS Report RL30465, p. 11 note. -- =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Bruce D. Larkin Convenor and Director of Studies Global Collaborative on Denuclearization Design http://www.gcdd.net/ Sometime Professor of Politics, University of California at Santa Cruz Email: "Bruce D. Larkin [+]" <bruce.larkin(a)learnworld.com> The [+] flags incoming mail as wanted, avoiding loss amid SPAM. Web: http://www.learnworld.com/ and http://www.gcdd.net/ Mobile: +1-413-695-0264 Landlines: +1-413-634-8842. +353-23-40309. +1-831-429-8443. Course Syllabi: http://www.learnworld.com/COURSES/ =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Hayden's Mistaken Understanding of the Fourth
by David Farber 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Secrecy News -- 04/23/13
by Steven Aftergood 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2013, Issue No. 41 April 23, 2013 Secrecy News Blog: http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/ ** GROUPS URGE WHITE HOUSE TO TAKE LEAD IN REDUCING SECRECY ** SURVEY OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS, AND MORE FROM CRS GROUPS URGE WHITE HOUSE TO TAKE LEAD IN REDUCING SECRECY The White House should undertake a focused effort to reduce national security secrecy, some 30 public interest organizations urged President Obama in a letter today. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/04/steering.pdf The groups called upon the President to adopt a recommendation of the Public Interest Declassification Board to set up a White House-led Security Classification Reform Steering Committee. http://www.archives.gov/declassification/pidb/ "A presidentially appointed Steering Committee would provide a mechanism for identifying and coordinating needed changes and for overcoming internal agency obstacles to change," the group letter said. "It would also reflect the urgency of reining in a classification system that is largely unchecked." To be effective, though, the proposed Steering Committee would need to be something more than just a deliberative, coordinating body, such as the ill-fated Security Policy Board of the 1990s. http://www.fas.org/sgp/spb/index.html Specifically, it would require "a clear mandate to reduce the size and scope of the national security classification system," the group letter said, as well as active White House participation to ensure agency cooperation and compliance. In principle, reductions in national security secrecy can actually benefit government agencies by diminishing the significant financial and operational costs they incur for classification. But in practice, such reductions have been hard to accomplish and agencies have resisted any externally imposed limits on their presumed autonomy to classify as they see fit. Of all the potential ways to reduce secrecy that could be envisioned, the proposal for a White House-led Steering Committee is currently the most salient. That's because it was recommended by the Public Interest Declassification Board, who developed it in response to a request from President Obama himself. "I also look forward to reviewing recommendations from the study that the National Security Advisor will undertake in cooperation with the Public Interest Declassification Board to design a more fundamental transformation of the security classification system," the President wrote in a December 29, 2009 memorandum. http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/wh122909.html Now the recommendations that the President looked forward to are in hand, and it will be up to the White House to act. SURVEY OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS, AND MORE FROM CRS Dozens of federal laws protect employees who report waste, fraud or abuse by their employers. Some of those laws, particularly those that apply to private-sector workers, have been strengthened in recent years, according to a new survey from the Congressional Research Service. "Eleven of the forty laws reviewed in this report were enacted after 1999. Among these laws are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act," the CRS report said. The report "focuses on key aspects of the federal whistleblower and anti-retaliation laws. For each law, the report summarizes the activities that are protected, how the law's protections are enforced, whether the law provides a private right of action, the remedies prescribed by the law, and the year the law's whistleblower or anti-retaliation provisions were adopted and amended." The report does not address national security whistleblowers, or those who disclose classified information with or without authorization. See Survey of Federal Whistleblower and Anti-Retaliation Laws, April 22, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43045.pdf Other new or newly updated CRS reports that Congress has not made publicly available include the following. State Taxation of Internet Transactions, April 19, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41853.pdf Drought in the United States: Causes and Issues for Congress, April 22, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34580.pdf Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: A Summary of Congressional Action for FY2013, April 22, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42557.pdf The FY2014 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request, April 18, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43043.pdf U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, April 22, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Expediting the Return to Work: Approaches in the Unemployment Compensation Program, April 18, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43044.pdf Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy, April 18, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41332.pdf Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2013, April 19, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42410.pdf The U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative, April 19, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, April 15, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/subscribe/ To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/unsubscribe/ OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: https://members.fas.org/donate _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[extropy-chat] UK police surveillance cameras catch criminals
by BillK 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

<http://networks.silicon.com/mobile/0,39024665,39128974,00.htm> English and Welsh police forces are developing a national network of thousands of cameras that will scan number plates and check them against police databases, a move they say will keep criminals off the road. The cameras use automatic number plate recognition technology (ANPR) to check a vehicle's identity against the Police National Computer, records at the DVLA and local intelligence systems. Cars flagged by the system can then be stopped by police and, in a trial of the technology by 23 forces last year, police stopped 180,543 vehicles and made 13,499 arrests, bagging 1,152 stolen vehicles and 13 firearms. <snip> Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Frank Whiteley said: "The launch of the ANPR strategy for the police service is a key step in grasping the opportunities ANPR provides for denying criminals use of the roads." ------------ This sounds as though they have at last started using surveillance cameras pro-actively to stop crime. The police also respond to city centre crimes that are spotted on camera, like fights and personal attacks. - There are a lot of them when the bars close on Saturday night. :) Criminals often steal cars to use in crime, so stopping cars that have been reported stolen should catch a lot. One problem in UK is the large number of unregistered cars (to avoid taxes and insurance, etc.) so they are working harder to get rid of them. Unregistered parked cars that traffic wardens notice are now towed away. I suspect that initially a lot of the police stops on this new system will be unregistered cars not known on their database. So they will just impound the car and charge the driver with minor offences. But even this is a big improvement - as anyone who has been crashed into by an unregistered car and had to pay for all the repairs themselves will agree. BillK _______________________________________________ extropy-chat mailing list extropy-chat(a)lists.extropy.org http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo/extropy-chat ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Tor 0.1.1.18-rc is out
by Roger Dingledine 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

This is the fourth release candidate for the 0.1.1.x series. Please let us know if you find bugs, because I expect only one more release candidate before the real thing. It adds a fifth authoritative directory server, and fixes a lot of bugs in threshold decisions around directories. http://tor.eff.org/download.html Changes in version 0.1.1.18-rc - 2006-04-10 o Major fixes: - Work harder to download live network-statuses from all the directory authorities we know about. Improve the threshold decision logic so we're more robust to edge cases. - When fetching rendezvous descriptors, we were willing to ask v2 authorities too, which would always return 404. o Minor fixes: - Stop listing down or invalid nodes in the v1 directory. This will reduce its bulk by about 1/3, and reduce load on directory mirrors. - When deciding whether a router is Fast or Guard-worthy, consider his advertised BandwidthRate and not just the BandwidthCapacity. - No longer ship INSTALL and README files -- they are useless now. - Force rpmbuild to behave and honor target_cpu. - Avoid warnings about machine/limits.h on Debian GNU/kFreeBSD. - Start to include translated versions of the tor-doc-*.html files, along with the screenshots. Still needs more work. - Start sending back 512 and 451 errors if mapaddress fails, rather than not sending anything back at all. - When we fail to bind or listen on an incoming or outgoing socket, we should close it before failing. otherwise we just leak it. (thanks to weasel for finding.) - Allow "getinfo dir/status/foo" to work, as long as your DirPort is enabled. (This is a hack, and will be fixed in 0.1.2.x.) - Make NoPublish (even though deprecated) work again. - Fix a minor security flaw where a versioning auth dirserver could list a recommended version many times in a row to make clients more convinced that it's recommended. - Fix crash bug if there are two unregistered servers running with the same nickname, one of them is down, and you ask for them by nickname in your EntryNodes or ExitNodes. Also, try to pick the one that's running rather than an arbitrary one. - Fix an infinite loop we could hit if we go offline for too long. - Complain when we hit WSAENOBUFS on recv() or write() too. Perhaps this will help us hunt the bug. - If you're not a versioning dirserver, don't put the string "client-versions \nserver-versions \n" in your network-status. - Lower the minimum required number of file descriptors to 1000, so we can have some overhead for Valgrind on Linux, where the default ulimit -n is 1024. o New features: - Add tor.dizum.com as the fifth authoritative directory server. - Add a new config option FetchUselessDescriptors, off by default, for when you plan to run "exitlist" on your client and you want to know about even the non-running descriptors. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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