July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Zero-Knowledge Press Release] Zero-Knowledge Systems Files
by Dov Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Preliminary Prospectus For Initial P ublic Offering Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 08:15:06 -0400 Sender: owner-zks-press(a)zeroknowledge.com ================================================================== Zero-Knowledge Systems Press Release, http://www.zeroknowledge.com ================================================================== For Immediate Release Zero-Knowledge Systems Files Preliminary Prospectus For Initial Public Offering MONTREAL, Quebec-June 3, 2002-Zero-Knowledge. Systems, a provider of security and privacy software for consumers and businesses, today announced it has filed a preliminary prospectus for an initial public offering. The net proceeds of the offering will be used to fund the commercial growth of the company's consumer and enterprise software solutions. The offering would consist of the issuance of common shares listed on the TSX-Venture Exchange under the ticker symbol 'ZKS'. Yorkton Securities Inc. is acting as underwriter for the offering. About Zero-Knowledge Systems Zero-Knowledge Systems (www.zeroknowledge.com) is a provider of security and privacy solutions for consumers and businesses. The Company's consumer product, Freedom. Security & Privacy Suite 3.2, is a defence against hackers and viruses, and it enables web-browsers to retain their security and privacy while using the Internet. The Company's corporate solution, Enterprise Privacy Manager (EPM) 1.0, enables enterprises to define, implement and manage corporate privacy policies and practices within their existing IT environment. Zero-Knowledge Systems is headquartered in Montreal, Quebec. Media can visit the online pressroom at http://www.zeroknowledge.com/media. For further information: Dov Smith/Zero-Knowledge Systems 514.350.7553/dov(a)zeroknowledge.com David Mason/The Equicom Group 416.815.0700 x 237/dmason(a)equicomgroup.com -------------------------- A l'attention des ridacteurs de la chronique affaires : Zero-Knowledge Systems dipose un prospectus provisoire pour un placement initial de titres MONTREAL, QC, le 3 juin-Zero-Knowledge Systems, fournisseur de logiciels de sicuriti et de protection des renseignements aux consommateurs et aux entreprises, a annonci aujourd'hui qu'elle a diposi un prospectus provisoire pour un placement initial de titres. Le produit net du placement servira ` financer la croissance commerciale des solutions logicielles de la Sociiti, destinies aux consommateurs et aux entreprises. Le placement consisterait en l'imission d'actions ordinaires inscrites ` la Bourse de croissance TSX sous le symbole +ZKS;. Yorkton Securities Inc. agira ` titre de preneur ferme. A propos de Zero-Knowledge Systems Zero-Knowledge Systems (www.zeroknowledge.com) est un fournisseur de solutions de sicuriti et de protection des renseignements aux consommateurs et aux entreprises. Le produit grand public de la Sociiti, le progiciel de sicuriti et de protection des renseignements Freedom 3.2, est un outil de difense contre les pirates informatiques et les virus. Il assure la sicuriti et la confidentialiti des renseignements pour les navigateurs Web lors du branchement ` Internet. La solution d'affaires de la Sociiti, Enterprise Privacy Manager (EPM) 1.0, permet quant ` elle de difinir, d'implanter et de girer les politiques et les pratiques de confidentialiti des renseignements dans les entreprises ` partir de l'environnement informatique qui y privaut. Zero-Knowledge Systems a son sihge social ` Montrial. Les midias peuvent consulter la salle des nouvelles virtuelle du site Web de la Sociiti ` l'adresse http://www.zeroknowledge.com/media. Pour de plus amples renseignements, communiquez avec : Dov Smith/Zero-Knowledge Systems 514 350-7553/dov(a)zeroknowledge.com David Mason/The Equicom Group 416 815-0700, poste 237/dmason(a)equicomgroup.com ________________________________ Dov Smith Director of Public Relations Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc. T 514.350.7553 F 514.286.2755 mailto:dov@zeroknowledge.com www.zeroknowledge.com/media ________________________________ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[tahoe-dev] Resurrecting Mojo Nation
by Jack Byer 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>> Do you think the more broader scope of Mojo Nation as a platform for >> market based allocated of computing resources is unworkable in >> principle or was it just a matter of being too ambitious for its time >> and/or poorly managed as a project? > >Level 1: Tahoe-LAFS as it currently exists. One set of storage servers >constitutes a grid. The administrator(s) authorize someone to run a >storage server by sharing the introducer furl with them. This same act >is also necessary and sufficient to authorize someone to run a storage >*client*. > >Level 2: the first results from Brian's imminent Accounting project. ... > >Hey, wait a second. Could we have this conversation on the tahoe-dev >mailing list? Just subscribe to it and post your question above. >Thanks! :-) > >Regards, > >Zooko Hello, all. My name is Jack and I am a non-coding Linux geek with an interest in economics. I was an avid Slashdot reader when the Mojo Nation project was announced and was very excited by the idea. My takeaway from the project was that it was about using market economics to allocate computing resources. Unfortunately it didn't work out but parts of it still live on, such as this project. Recently on the Bitcoin forums the idea came up to form a digital currency-based filesharing network and that thread (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=86384.0) reminded me of MN, leading to a discussion of whether or not it would be practical to bring back the idea of a market-based computing resource allocation. This isn't the first time a combination of Bitcoin and tahoe-lafs has been suggested but I'd like to ask a different question than just whether or not is makes sense to use bitcoins to pay people for storage. Is it practical to go back to the original goal of MN instead of a limited subset if the reasons for the project's failure are addressed? From what I can tell the pricing mechanism of MN was broken because it didn't really have a market. A market needs independent decision-making agents bidding against each other to resolve conflicting goals and MN didn't have that. It's not realistic to expect users to sit in front of a screen all day and daytrade Mojo in order to achieve price discovery. Now, ten years later, automated trading algorithms are common so perhaps it would be possible for a network to use dynamic pricing to allocate hard drive space, bandwidth, and CPU power. Are there any fundamental reason why a system like Mojo Nation couldn't work now that certain capabilities are available that weren't a decade ago? Jack _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] DHS considers initiating cyber attacks
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The sword is rattling the scabbard. Silicon Valley Mercury News (Apr 16) - "Homeland Security chief contemplating proactive cyber attacks" by Steve Johnson http://www.mercurynews.com/rss/ci_20410915 Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said Monday she would consider having tech companies participate with the government in "proactive" efforts to combat hackers based in foreign countries. Napolitano, who made the comments during a meeting at the San Jose Mercury News with the editorial board and reporters, declined to say what steps corporations and federal agencies might take against foreign cybercrooks, who have been blamed for numerous computerized incursions against the United States. She made the remarks in response to a question, and emphasized the idea is merely one she would consider and that no decisions have been made. In discussing the private partnerships she is promoting to combat cyberattacks, Napolitano was asked if instead of just taking defensive measures, the government and companies should be launching proactive counterattacks against foreign-based culprits. "Should there be some aspect that is in a way proactive instead of reactive?" she responded, and then answered her own question with "yes." She added, "it is not something that we haven't been thinking about," noting someone else had raised the subject with her earlier Monday. However, Napolitano said some restrictions might have to be placed on businesses participating in such cyber activities because "what you are doing is authorizing a private entity to do what might otherwise be construed as an attack on another entity." ... HT @JeffreyCarr <http://twitter.com/jeffreycarr/status/192239758141964290>, gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster<> http://entersection.com/ _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] How secure is Bluetooth?
by Matt Mackall 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sun, 2012-01-29 at 14:47 -0800, Brian Conley wrote: > Thanks Jacob, > > I expected you'd reply thusly. The implementation I'm talking about > doesn't appear to be compromised based on what I've read in the links > you've provided. The first link, from usenix, seems to be most > damning, however doesn't appear to suggest that the packets from a > voice call can be put back together in such a way they can be listened > to. Even if that is true, it appears based on what I'm reading that, > at most, current tools as of that paper, would only enable yo to > listen to, at most, 2.4 seconds of audio from a one minute call. Ok, so two academics in '07 get 90% of the way to a fully-working attack, but are stymied by a silly timing limitation in the software-defined radio they had on hand. They could trivially fix it by dropping another $1k on a second USRP for leapfrogging to the next channel, given that they _have exposed the hopping pattern_. And you conclude... "not compromised". Huh. I conclude "compromised for all practical purposes": I could take their paper and $2000 and build a fully-working attack if I had the motivation. As could any motivated interception capability vendor. Odds that this capability already exists: rapidly approaching unity. Also note that recording the traffic on all 79 3Mbit/s channels is trivially within the capabilities of any organization that designs its own hardware. This IC has programmable hop parameters and is < $5: www.atmel.com/atmel/acrobat/doc1612.pdf Slapping 79 of those on a board with a high-gain antenna and a USB interface left as an exercise for the reader. -- Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time. _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [linux-elitists] LOCAL Mountain View, California, USA: events this week
by Seth David Schoen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Don Marti writes: > Wednesday night: > Seth Schoen fixes TCPA, saves Freedom: > http://www.sdforum.org/p/calEvent.asp?CID=1182 Sorry that didn't happen. And I still haven't fixed TCPA. Intel has posted its Policy Statement on LaGrande Technology: ftp://download.intel.com/technology/security/downloads/LT_policy_statement_… 8.pdf LaGrande is in the interstices between TCG and NGSCB. TCG has not specified a secure I/O path or "curtained memory" as required by NGSCB. LaGrande does, so it effectively provides the complete hardware support NGSCB would need. (AMD has a similar project called SEM, which I know very little about other than that it is supposed to do similar things and at least one of the people working on it is exceptionally honest.) Anyway, Intel wants your comments on the LT policy. The thing that jumps out at me (as the author of "Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk") is that Intel thinks that opt-out or opt-in can solve the problems of attestation. This is the official view of a lot of trusted computing proponents. The defects of this view are difficult to describe and are complicated by the fact that some trusted computing critics don't believe that LT (or TCG or NGSCB) will actually provide an opt-out. (I do believe this.) The root of the difficulty is that, in the nature of attestation, you can be _punished_ for opting out (beyond the scope of simply not enjoying particular features to which what you opted out of is technically necessary). For example, if you have a feature with privacy implications like What's Related in browsers, you can opt of using What's Related and the only penalty will be that you won't see what's related to the sites you're looking at. Or if you don't like Microsoft's software updates, you can opt out of those and the only penalty will be that your software won't be patched. (This is actually a somewhat thorny issue since no other sources of patches to Microsoft software have so far arisen.) But in most other cases with which we're familiar, opting out has a relatively narrow effect, and there is fairly little leverage to punish you for having done so. At least, that's true of opt-out features in the context of technology choices; it might not be true in some off-line situations. In the nature of attestation and its effect on interoperability, though, opting out of attestation might be ruinous for your hopes of communicating with others. If they can be induced to use proprietary protocols or file formats, opting out may lead to a permanent inability to exchange data with them. Opting in, by the same token, could lead to a permanent loss of software choice (and the effective inability to reverse engineer or repair your software) at least during the particular periods of time when you want to communicate with other people or manipulate what they sent you. Opt-in can't undo the harmful network effects attestation will produce for competition and for all computer owners. Anyway, that's what I plan to tell Intel, in somewhat more detail, sometime before December 31. And remember: [T]rusted computing systems fundamentally alter trust relationships. Legitimate concerns about trusted computing are not limited to one area, such as consumer privacy or copyright issues. -- Seth David Schoen <schoen(a)loyalty.org> | Very frankly, I am opposed to people http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/ | being programmed by others. http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/ | -- Fred Rogers (1928-2003), | 464 U.S. 417, 445 (1984) _______________________________________________ linux-elitists http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-elitists ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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WikiLeaks inspired "New media haven" proposal passes Parliament
by Julian Assange 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

FYI: Reykjavik, Iceland; 4:00 UTC, June 16th 2010. The WikiLeaks advised proposal to build an international "new media haven" in Iceland, with the world's strongest press and whistleblower protection laws, and a "Nobel" prize for for Freedom of Expression, has unaminously passed the Icelandic Parliament. 50 votes were cast in favor, zero against, one abstained. Twelve members of parliament were not present. Vote results are available at http://www.althingi.is/dba-bin/atkvgr.pl?nnafnak=43014 One of the inspirations for the proposal was the dramatic August 2009 gagging of of Iceland's national broadcaster, RUV by Iceland's then largest bank, Kaupthing: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Financial_collapse:_Confidential_exposure_analysi… Two changes were made to the proposal from its original form as per the opinion of the parliament's general affairs committee [http://www.althingi.is/altext/138/s/1329.html] The first of these altered slightly the wording of the first paragraph so as to widen the arena for research. The second of these added two new items to the list of tasks for the government: - That the government should perform a detailed analysis, especially with respect to operational security, for the prospect of operating data centers in Iceland. - That the government should organize an international conference in Iceland regarding the changes to the legal environment being caused by expansion of cloud computing, data havens, and the judicial state of the Internet. Video footage from the proposal's vote will be available at: http://www.althingi.is/altext/hlusta.php?raeda=rad20100616T033127&horfa=1 http://www.althingi.is/altext/hlusta.php?raeda=rad20100616T033306&horfa=1 For details of the proposal and press contacts, please see http://www.immi.is ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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WikiLeaks inspired "New media haven" proposal passes Parliament
by Julian Assange 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

FYI: Reykjavik, Iceland; 4:00 UTC, June 16th 2010. The WikiLeaks advised proposal to build an international "new media haven" in Iceland, with the world's strongest press and whistleblower protection laws, and a "Nobel" prize for for Freedom of Expression, has unaminously passed the Icelandic Parliament. 50 votes were cast in favor, zero against, one abstained. Twelve members of parliament were not present. Vote results are available at http://www.althingi.is/dba-bin/atkvgr.pl?nnafnak=43014 One of the inspirations for the proposal was the dramatic August 2009 gagging of of Iceland's national broadcaster, RUV by Iceland's then largest bank, Kaupthing: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Financial_collapse:_Confidential_exposure_analysi… Two changes were made to the proposal from its original form as per the opinion of the parliament's general affairs committee [http://www.althingi.is/altext/138/s/1329.html] The first of these altered slightly the wording of the first paragraph so as to widen the arena for research. The second of these added two new items to the list of tasks for the government: - That the government should perform a detailed analysis, especially with respect to operational security, for the prospect of operating data centers in Iceland. - That the government should organize an international conference in Iceland regarding the changes to the legal environment being caused by expansion of cloud computing, data havens, and the judicial state of the Internet. Video footage from the proposal's vote will be available at: http://www.althingi.is/altext/hlusta.php?raeda=rad20100616T033127&horfa=1 http://www.althingi.is/altext/hlusta.php?raeda=rad20100616T033306&horfa=1 For details of the proposal and press contacts, please see http://www.immi.is ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] "If you have access to certain tools, you can completely ignore Tor."
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 12/19/2011 08:59 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote: > On Sun, 18 Dec 2011 21:02:37 -0600 > Joe Btfsplk <joebtfsplk(a)gmx.com> wrote: >> Under current US & other nations' laws, it's possible that gov'ts >> have already forced developers of any software - incl. Tor - to put >> in backdoors. And in fact, say it's illegal for the devs of any >> software to outright disclose such. > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Backdoor. If we're forced > to put one in someday, we'll make it obvious and loud that it is so. > The world will be in a sad state if this comes true. A forced backdoor > in Tor will be the least of your problems. > No Backdoors. No bugdoors. No so-called "lawful interception" systems. As another person working on Tor - I'll be more direct and less ambiguous: If anyone ever even *tries* to force us to insert a backdoor, we'd tell the world. We won't every compromise the security of Tor and we will never insert a backdoor. Never. We must reject these so-called "compromises" for so-called "lawful interception" and we must fight against their deployment everywhere. They are harmful to everyone - including those that use them legitimately - just ask the Greek phone operator who was suicided after the Great Greek Vodafone Backdoor was found. >> I don't know that it has happened w/ Tor, but it certainly has in >> other cases. If you want true anonymity, don't use the internet, > > I parse this as the 'abstinence model of Internets'. It doesn't work for > sex education, addictive substances, and it's unlikely to work for > anyone in a modern society. We need a better answer than 'all or > nothing'. We're trying to make Tor one of these better answers. > Indeed. The abstinence model is a punt. That model claims that the world exists outside of the internet and for most people it does not. It's also a claim that the "non-internet" world offers "true anonymity" and it does not. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] How secure is Bluetooth?
by Matt Mackall 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sun, 2012-01-29 at 14:47 -0800, Brian Conley wrote: > Thanks Jacob, > > I expected you'd reply thusly. The implementation I'm talking about > doesn't appear to be compromised based on what I've read in the links > you've provided. The first link, from usenix, seems to be most > damning, however doesn't appear to suggest that the packets from a > voice call can be put back together in such a way they can be listened > to. Even if that is true, it appears based on what I'm reading that, > at most, current tools as of that paper, would only enable yo to > listen to, at most, 2.4 seconds of audio from a one minute call. Ok, so two academics in '07 get 90% of the way to a fully-working attack, but are stymied by a silly timing limitation in the software-defined radio they had on hand. They could trivially fix it by dropping another $1k on a second USRP for leapfrogging to the next channel, given that they _have exposed the hopping pattern_. And you conclude... "not compromised". Huh. I conclude "compromised for all practical purposes": I could take their paper and $2000 and build a fully-working attack if I had the motivation. As could any motivated interception capability vendor. Odds that this capability already exists: rapidly approaching unity. Also note that recording the traffic on all 79 3Mbit/s channels is trivially within the capabilities of any organization that designs its own hardware. This IC has programmable hop parameters and is < $5: www.atmel.com/atmel/acrobat/doc1612.pdf Slapping 79 of those on a board with a high-gain antenna and a USB interface left as an exercise for the reader. -- Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time. _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] DHS considers initiating cyber attacks
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The sword is rattling the scabbard. Silicon Valley Mercury News (Apr 16) - "Homeland Security chief contemplating proactive cyber attacks" by Steve Johnson http://www.mercurynews.com/rss/ci_20410915 Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said Monday she would consider having tech companies participate with the government in "proactive" efforts to combat hackers based in foreign countries. Napolitano, who made the comments during a meeting at the San Jose Mercury News with the editorial board and reporters, declined to say what steps corporations and federal agencies might take against foreign cybercrooks, who have been blamed for numerous computerized incursions against the United States. She made the remarks in response to a question, and emphasized the idea is merely one she would consider and that no decisions have been made. In discussing the private partnerships she is promoting to combat cyberattacks, Napolitano was asked if instead of just taking defensive measures, the government and companies should be launching proactive counterattacks against foreign-based culprits. "Should there be some aspect that is in a way proactive instead of reactive?" she responded, and then answered her own question with "yes." She added, "it is not something that we haven't been thinking about," noting someone else had raised the subject with her earlier Monday. However, Napolitano said some restrictions might have to be placed on businesses participating in such cyber activities because "what you are doing is authorizing a private entity to do what might otherwise be construed as an attack on another entity." ... HT @JeffreyCarr <http://twitter.com/jeffreycarr/status/192239758141964290>, gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster<> http://entersection.com/ _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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