July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[IP] more on Mid-level military officers on responsibility for Iraq
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[IP] US fraction of world's traffic
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

________________________________________ From: David P. Reed [dpreed(a)reed.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2008 11:56 AM To: David Farber Cc: ip; Whitfield Diffie Subject: Re: [IP] US fraction of world's traffic I would think that the more interesting question is not the official one, but the correct one. To the extent that NSA uses this as a tool for claiming that monitoring calls from country A to country B is legitimate, the "correct" answer matters more. There seems to be some dim, secret ruling (perhaps in FISA) that says that it is legal to intercept bits that pass through the US. If I were the NSA, and I claim (without being able to prove the negative) that I'm not, I would pursue the following strategy: 1. find a way to tamper with foreign switches to route communications through the US based facilities. Easy - just send the right routing-table updates - whether IP or SS7, this is pretty easy. 2. install deep packet inspection equipment. This is becoming COTS, with sales to ISPs starting to drive costs down ane performance up. 3. select and record into a high-performance RAID cluster. COTS. Same techniques work remarkably well for tapping and recording competitor and economic target traffic. Interesting thought. To tap US-US communications, why not just route the traffic out through Gitmo and back? There also seems to be dim secret rulings that allow spying on traffic that goes across the border. Supposedly the legal framework is about calls that "terminate" outside the US. But I'm sure that "terminate" can be carefully redefined by good legal scholarship and a few pet lawyers in DoJ and DoD to include something like storing on disk for one disk rotation (17 msec) and then resending it. All hypothetically, of course. :-) David Farber wrote: > ________________________________________ > From: Whitfield Diffie [whitfield.diffie(a)sun.com] > Sent: Monday, January 14, 2008 1:02 PM > To: David Farber > Subject: US fraction of world's traffic > > Monday 14 January 2008 at 09:55 > > Have you yet been pestered with the following question: > > Any chance you can help me discern the percentage of the world's > phone calls and e-mails that pass through U.S.-based equipment? > > This seems like an FCC or DoC sort of question that must have an oficial answer > if you know where to look for it. Do you know where it resides? > > > Whit > > > > ------------------------------------------- > Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now > RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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<nettime>
by Caroline Heatlie 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/apr2004/blun-a24.shtml Twenty years after 1984, the date for George Orwell's dystopian vision, the British home secretary hopes to introduce a new category of imprisonable offence-"thought crime," or guilt by association. According to two recent newspaper articles, David Blunkett is considering jailing those who merely "sympathise" with so-called extremist Islamic groups or who continue to "associate" with alleged terrorist suspects. The Observer wrote on April 11, "Sympathisers with extremist Islamic groups will risk jail under controversial plans to make merely associating with a suspected terrorist a crime." The next day, the Times reported, "Those whose names were found on seized mobile phones, computers or e-mails and who tried further contact would find themselves facing prison." The paper added that the home secretary would like a formal warning given to "every known contact of a terror suspect or extremist Islamic group." A source close to the home secretary was quoted saying, "We are targeting support networks, the things that enable terrorism to be perpetrated by other people. It is intended to deter people from hanging around the fringes of undesirables." The latest musings of Blunkett are a double attack on democratic rights. Firstly, the proposal to introduce "guilt by association" makes criminals of those who have committed no crime. Secondly, by extension the so-called "undesirables" with whom they associate face a form of banning order reminiscent of the apartheid regime in South Africa, preventing them from coming into contact with anyone. Barry Hugill, spokesman for civil rights group Liberty, said, "You cannot start imprisoning people for what may or may not be going on inside their head." The Labour government has introduced some of the most draconian "anti-terrorist" legislation in Europe. Britain has declared a "technical" state of emergency, enabling the suspension of sections of the European Convention on Human Rights. This then makes possible the indefinite internment of foreign nationals as "terrorist suspects," without recourse to the normal juridical process. The 14 individuals who have been locked up under the terms of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) enter a Kafkaesque world where they may not see the evidence that supposedly justifies their incarceration, nor may they appoint an independent legal representative to challenge their imprisonment in the courts. They can only be set free if they agree to be deported back to the country from which they have fled, where their life may well be in danger. The choice is stark: indefinite detention without due legal process, or possible death. In February, Blunkett proposed the introduction of a form of "pre-emptive" justice, where suspects could be jailed based on charges for crimes they had not yet committed. It is a measure of the disregard for longstanding democratic norms that permeates official politics and most of the media in Britain that the home secretary's latest proposal passed largely without comment or criticism. See Also: Britain: home secretary proposes "pre-emptive" justice [10 February 2004] Britain prepares its own version of US Patriot Act [21 January 2004] # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo(a)bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)bbs.thing.net --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [IP] more on Mid-level military officers on
by Jock Gill 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

responsibility for Iraq Dave, For another perspective on a core problem, please feel free to share this pointer with IP. "U.S. Intelligence, like the Department of Defense, is a dinosaur from the Cold War, a direct outcome of allowing the military- industrial-congressional complex to specify how we spend the taxpayer dollar without regard to reality or proper intelligence. We have a special interests spy world and a special interests heavy-metal military." <http://www.greaterdemocracy.org/archives/000470.html> 10 Threats to the Public Interest & Security Robert David Steele 04.18.06, 6:00 PM ET Why Secret Intelligence is Bad Director of National Intelligence [DNI] Covers 17.5% In the Age of Information, when secret sources are less valuable and open sources are more essential in understanding reality and crafting responsible public policy, what are the ten greatest threats to the United States of America? What ten questions should the reformed and revitalized Director of National Intelligence (DNI) be able to answer for Congress and the public? This challenge has been answered generally by the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world, Our shared responsibility (United Nations, 2004), but nothing the DNI is doing today is helpful in actually addressing, in a substantive sustained way, each of these threats. -------- continued at: <http://www.greaterdemocracy.org/archives/ 000470.html> Regards, Jock On Apr 24, 2006, at 7:15 AM, David Farber wrote: > > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: EEkid(a)aol.com >Date: April 24, 2006 2:16:53 AM EDT >To: dave(a)farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] Mid-level military officers on responsibility for >Iraq > > >Mr. Farber, > >Unfortunately, I think the writer of this article doesn't really >understand the problem. Prior to the Iraq war, many of our >nation's military officers were clueless to the realities of the >battle field. Sure, some of the most senior officers knew, but >they became senior officers because at some point in time, they >became politicians in uniform. This article brings to mind a day I >had a couple years before 9/11. I was attending a Marine Static >Display, which is a display of military hardware. I stood there >shooting the breeze with an officer and we were talking about how >great the Humvee's were. I asked if the composite body panels >where bullet proof and he said no. I was a bit surprised that they >didn't take such a rugged design to the next level with some light >Kevlar armor. He added, that Humvee's aren't used in areas where >fighting occurs. He made some comment about the only time "jeeps" >are on a battle field is in the movies. Immediately my thoughts >traveled back in time to a family friend who was severely wounded >in Vietnam while driving a jeep down a dirt road. He was shot with >an AK-47. This wasn't on a battle field. We moved on to another >display which featured an M-16 with a third generation night vision >scope. He commented that the technology was new and only available >to the military.. I was a bit shocked that he didn't know this >exact same scope was available on the internet. In fact, I later >printed out an ad from the internet and gave it to him later. The >display also had several confiscated AK-47's and he commented that >they were worthless at a hundred yards because they were so >inaccurate. Well, I've personally shot many types of AK-47's from >all over Europe and Asia and every single one was accurate enough >to put a bullet on a pie plate at 100 yards with ease. I walked >away wondering what would happen if we ever had to go to war. > >In addition to this experience, I once had a conversation with an >officer regarding our reliance on very expensive, slow to produce, >high tech weaponry. I commented that we could never fight a large >scale protracted war with these weapons because we simply couldn't >build them fast enough. His response was we will never fight >another large scale war. I said, what happens if we were to go to >war with China? He said, we will never let that happen because we >know we can't win without using nuclear weapons. I walked away >stunned. > >I'm not criticizing our military here. Let me make an analogy. >Suppose you have an engineer who graduated from a good engineering >school. He then hangs out with other engineers from other good >schools. Yet, none of them have ever designed anything. After a >decade or so, they're suddenly given a very complex, large scale >and taxing engineering project to do in a short amount of time. >They are going to make mistakes and miscalculations, we as humans >can learn from books but we learn the most about our environment by >doing. Sure, I know our military constantly trains, but I bet they >didn't train in an environment with real roadside IED's and car >bombs in public places on a regular basis. > >Jerry > > >In a message dated 4/23/2006 7:09:40 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, >dave(a)farber.net writes: > > >There is a fascinating article in this morning's New York Times, >based on interviews with mid-level officers and others, suggesting >widespread discontent and debate within the military over the >failure of senior officers to give candid advice to Rumseld and >the Adminsitration about the reasoins why the invasion of Iraq >would be a mistake. > >http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/washington/23military.html? >hp&ex=1145851200&en=307b714052e595e5&ei=5094&partner=homepage > >Officers making such comments as, > >"This is about the moral bankruptcy of general officers who lived >through the Vietnam era yet refused to advise our civilian >leadership properly," said one Army major in the Special Forces who >has served two combat tours. "I can only hope that my generation >does better someday." and > >"The history I will take away from this is that the current crop of >generals failed to stand up and say, 'We cannot do this mission.' >They confused the cultural can-do attitude with their >responsibilities as leaders to delay the start of the war until we >had an adequate force. I think the backlash against the general >officers will be seen in the resignation of officers" who might >otherwise have stayed in uniform." > >There was also an interesting angle on Condoleeza Rice's famous >comment about "thousands of errors," casting it in a light I had >not considered, as a slap at the military and a deflection of >responsibility for the Administration's own failures: > >The debates are fueled by the desire to mete out blame for the >situation in Iraq, a drawn-out war that has taken many military >lives and has no clear end in sight. A midgrade officer who has >served two tours in Iraq said a number of his cohorts were angered >last month when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that >"tactical errors, a thousand of them, I am sure," had been made in >Iraq. > >"We have not lost a single tactical engagement on the ground in >Iraq," the officer said, noting that the definition of tactical >missions is specific movements against an enemy target. "The >mistakes have all been at the strategic and political levels." > > > > >Paul Alan Levy >Public Citizen Litigation Group >1600 - 20th Street, N.W. >Washington, D.C. 20009 >(202) 588-1000 >http://www.citizen.org/litigation > > >------------------------------------- >You are subscribed as jock(a)jockgill.com >To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > >Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- >people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Mid-level military officers on responsibility for Iraq
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[liberationtech] Images of Blocking in Different Countries?
by Joss Wright 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Aug 15, 2012, at 2:46 AM, "Eric S Johnson" <crates at oneotaslopes.org> wrote: > There are persistent reports that China?s cybercensorship can > sometimes vary (a little) by ISP, but I?ve never seen this (I?ve only > been to ~13 of the 34 PRC-defined provinces), and Alkasir hasn?t ever > detected any such variations. I carried out a few experiments last year, looking at regional variations in the responses of Chinese DNS servers for domains that had been reported as blocked by Herdict. (Using a list of DNS servers pulled from the APNIC WHOIS database.) There are plenty of caveats to the approach I took: DNS server location doesn't map reliably onto where the user is, DNS poisoning can occur at border routers, DNS servers can return different responses to different people, my methods for detecting poisoning were quite crude, etc. Given all that, I found a lot of variation in the DNS responses across China. I published a paper about it in FOCI'11 last year, but that mainly focused on the ethical issues of censorship research: http://static.usenix.org/events/foci11/tech/final_files/Wright.pdf There are some preliminary results and visualisations in this presentation: http://www.slideshare.net/josswright/finegrained-censorship-mapping (Apologies for my terrible GIS skills...) The approach was quite crude, but does support the hypothesis of filtering being at least partially decentralised. (Which makes sense for such a massive project.) I'm currently looking at quite a promising approach for a much more interesting set of experiments based on IP scans rather than DNS. Watch this space. :) Joss _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Keyczar
by Ben Laurie 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.links.org/?p=374 When I joined Google over two years ago I was asked to find a small project to get used to the way development is done there. The project I chose was one that some colleagues had been thinking about, a key management library. I soon realised that unless the library also handled the crypto it was punting on the hard problem, so I extended it to do crypto and to handle key rotation and algorithm changes transparently to the user of the library. About nine months later I handed over my "starter project" to Steve Weis, who has worked on it ever since. For a long time we've talked about releasing an open source version, and I'm pleased to say that Steve and intern Arkajit Dey did just that, earlier this week: Keyczar[1]. "Keyczar is an open source cryptographic toolkit designed to make it easier and safer for developers to use cryptography in their applications. Keyczar supports authentication and encryption with both symmetric and asymmetric keys. Some features of Keyczar include: * A simple API * Key rotation and versioning * Safe default algorithms, modes, and key lengths * Automated generation of initialization vectors and ciphertext signatures" When we say simple, by the way, the code for loading a keyset and encrypting some plaintext is just two lines. Likewise for decryption. And the user doesn't need to know anything about algorithms or modes. Great work, guys! I look forward to the "real" version (C++, of course!). [1] http://www.keyczar.org/ Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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[IP] Arrests key win for NSA hackers
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/freeheadlines/LAC/20040406/T ERROR06/international/International Arrests key win for NSA hackers By DAVID AKIN UPDATED AT 4:38 AM EDT Tuesday, Apr. 6, 2004 a530ea8.jpg A computer hacker who allowed himself to be publicly identified only as "Mudhen" once boasted at a Las Vegas conference that he could disable a Chinese satellite with nothing but his laptop computer and a cellphone. The others took him at his word, because Mudhen worked at the Puzzle Palace -- the nickname of the U.S. National Security Agency facility at Fort Meade, Md., which houses the world's most powerful and sophisticated electronic eavesdropping and anti-terrorism systems. It was these systems, plus an army of cryptographers, chaos theorists, mathematicians and computer scientists, that may have pulled in the first piece of evidence that led Canadian authorities to arrest an Ottawa man on terrorism charges last week. Citing anonymous sources in the British intelligence community, The Sunday Times reported that an e-mail message intercepted by NSA spies precipitated a massive investigation by intelligence officials in several countries that culminated in the arrest of nine men in Britain and one in suburban Orleans, Ont. -- 24-year-old software developer Mohammed Momin Khawaja, who has since been charged with facilitating a terrorist act and being part of a terrorist group. The Orleans arrest is considered an operational milestone for this vast electronic eavesdropping network and its operators. But Dave Farber, an Internet pioneer and computer-science professor at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, said the circumstances are also notable because it will be the first time that routine U.S. monitoring of e-mail traffic has led to an arrest. "That's the first admission I've actually seen that they actually monitor Internet traffic. I assumed they did, but no one ever admitted it," Mr. Farber said. Officials at the NSA could not be reached for comment. But U.S. authorities are uniquely positioned to monitor international Internet and telecommunications traffic because many of the world's international gateways are located in their country. And once that electronic traffic touches an American computer -- an e-mail message, a request for a website or an Internet-based phone call, for instance -- it is routinely monitored by NSA spies. "Foreign traffic that comes through the U.S. is subject to U.S. laws, and the NSA has a perfect right to monitor all Internet traffic," said Mr. Farber, who has also been a technical adviser to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission. That's what happened in February, when NSA officers at Fort Meade intercepted a message between correspondents in Britain and Pakistan, The Sunday Times reported. The contents of that message have not been revealed, but are significant enough that dozens of intelligence officials were mobilized in Britain, Canada and the United States. The intelligence officers at Fort Meade rely on a sophisticated suite of supercomputers and telecommunications equipment to analyze millions of messages and phone calls each day, looking for certain keywords or traffic patterns. Internet traffic is chopped up into small chunks called packets, and each individual package is then routed over the Internet, to be reassembled at the recipient's end. The packet is wrapped in what computer scientists sometimes refer to as the envelope. And just as the exterior of a regular piece of mail contains important addressing information, so does the envelope of a digitized packet. These bits of information are called headers, and they can be valuable to investigators as well. Headers typically contain generic descriptions of the packet's contents, in order to let computers make better decisions about how to route the packet through the Internet. E-mail traffic gets a lower priority than Internet video traffic, for instance. Headers also pick up the numeric or Internet Protocol (IP) address of all the computers a packet touches as it travels from its originating machine all the way to its destination. Every computerized device connected to the Internet has its own unique IP number. Investigators could program their supercomputers to flag packets of information that met certain criteria, such as a certain IP number, a certain traffic pattern or a certain kind of content. As soon as a packet is flagged, investigators would apply for warrants to assemble the packets and read the messages' contents. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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anonymous IP terminology (Re: [anonsec] Re: potential new IETF WG
by Adam Back 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

on anonymous IPSec (fwd from hal(a)finney.org)) User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i Sender: owner-cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Joe Touch <touch(a)ISI.EDU> wrote: > >The point has nothing to do with anonymity; > > The last one, agreed. But the primary assumption is that we can avoid a > lot of infrastructure and impediment to deployment by treating an > ongoing conversation as a reason to trust an endpoint, rather than a > third-party identification. Although anonymous access is not the primary > goal, it is a feature of the solution. Joe: I respectfully request that you call this something other than "anonymous". It is quite confusing and misleading. Some people have spent quite a bit of time and effort in fact working on anonymous IP and anonymous/pseudonymous transports. For example at ZKS we worked on an anonymous/pseudonymous IP product (which means cryptographically hiding the souce IP address from the end-site). There are some new open source anonymous IP projects. Your proposal, which may indeed have some merit in simplifying key management, has _nothing_ to do with anonymous IP. Your overloading of the established term will dilute the correct meaning. Zooko provided the correct term and provided references: "opportunistic encryption". It sounds to have similar objectives to what John had called opportunistic encryption and tried to do with freeSWAN. Lowever level terms may be unauthenticated as Hal suggested. Or non-certified key management (as the SSH cacheing of previously before seen IP <-> key bindings and warnings when they change). > Although anonymous access is not the primary goal, it is a feature > of the solution. The access is _not_ anonymous. The originator's IP, ISP call traces, phone access records will be all over it and associated audit logs. The distinguishing feature of anonymous is that not only is your name not associated with the connection but there is no PII (personally identifiable information) associated with it or obtainable from logs kept. And to be clear also anonymous means unlinkable anonymous across multiple connections (which SSH type of authentication would not be) and linkable anonymous means some observable linkage exists between sessions which come from the same source (though no PII), and pseudonymous means same as linkable anonymous plus association to a persistent pseudonym. Again there are actually cryptographic protcols for_ having anonymous authentication: ZKPs, multi-show unlinkable credentials, and refreshable (and so unlinkable) single-show credentials. Adam --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Tor 0.1.1.10-alpha is out
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

This is the tenth development snapshot for the 0.1.1.x series. We fix more crash bugs, fix some anonymity-related problems, and provide major performance speedups and use less memory than the previous alphas. http://tor.eff.org/download.html Changes in version 0.1.1.10-alpha - 2005-12-11 o Correctness bugfixes on 0.1.0.x: - On Windows, build with a libevent patch from "I-M Weasel" to avoid corrupting the heap, losing FDs, or crashing when we need to resize the fd_sets. (This affects the Win32 binaries, not Tor's sources.) - Stop doing the complex voodoo overkill checking for insecure Diffie-Hellman keys. Just check if it's in [2,p-2] and be happy. - When we were closing connections, there was a rare case that stomped on memory, triggering seg faults and asserts. - We were neglecting to unlink marked circuits from soon-to-close OR connections, which caused some rare scribbling on freed memory. - When we're deciding whether a stream has enough circuits around that can handle it, count the freshly dirty ones and not the ones that are so dirty they won't be able to handle it. - Recover better from TCP connections to Tor servers that are broken but don't tell you (it happens!); and rotate TLS connections once a week. - When we're expiring old circuits, we had a logic error that caused us to close new rendezvous circuits rather than old ones. - Fix a scary-looking but apparently harmless bug where circuits would sometimes start out in state CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT at servers, and never switch to state CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN. - When building with -static or on Solaris, we sometimes needed to build with -ldl. - Give a useful message when people run Tor as the wrong user, rather than telling them to start chowning random directories. - We were failing to inform the controller about new .onion streams. o Security bugfixes on 0.1.0.x: - Refuse server descriptors if the fingerprint line doesn't match the included identity key. Tor doesn't care, but other apps (and humans) might actually be trusting the fingerprint line. - We used to kill the circuit when we receive a relay command we don't recognize. Now we just drop it. - Start obeying our firewall options more rigorously: . If we can't get to a dirserver directly, try going via Tor. . Don't ever try to connect (as a client) to a place our firewall options forbid. . If we specify a proxy and also firewall options, obey the firewall options even when we're using the proxy: some proxies can only proxy to certain destinations. - Fix a bug found by Lasse Overlier: when we were making internal circuits (intended to be cannibalized later for rendezvous and introduction circuits), we were picking them so that they had useful exit nodes. There was no need for this, and it actually aids some statistical attacks. - Start treating internal circuits and exit circuits separately. It's important to keep them separate because internal circuits have their last hops picked like middle hops, rather than like exit hops. So exiting on them will break the user's expectations. o Bugfixes on 0.1.1.x: - Take out the mis-feature where we tried to detect IP address flapping for people with DynDNS, and chose not to upload a new server descriptor sometimes. - Try to be compatible with OpenSSL 0.9.6 again. - Log fix: when the controller is logging about .onion addresses, sometimes it didn't include the ".onion" part of the address. - Don't try to modify options->DirServers internally -- if the user didn't specify any, just add the default ones directly to the trusted dirserver list. This fixes a bug where people running controllers would use SETCONF on some totally unrelated config option, and Tor would start yelling at them about changing their DirServer lines. - Let the controller's redirectstream command specify a port, in case the controller wants to change that too. - When we requested a pile of server descriptors, we sometimes accidentally launched a duplicate request for the first one. - Bugfix for trackhostexits: write down the fingerprint of the chosen exit, not its nickname, because the chosen exit might not be verified. - When parsing foo.exit, if foo is unknown, and we are leaving circuits unattached, set the chosen_exit field and leave the address empty. This matters because controllers got confused otherwise. - Directory authorities no longer try to download server descriptors that they know they will reject. o Features and updates: - Replace balanced trees with hash tables: this should make stuff significantly faster. - Resume using the AES counter-mode implementation that we ship, rather than OpenSSL's. Ours is significantly faster. - Many other CPU and memory improvements. - Add a new config option FastFirstHopPK (on by default) so clients do a trivial crypto handshake for their first hop, since TLS has already taken care of confidentiality and authentication. - Add a new config option TestSocks so people can see if their applications are using socks4, socks4a, socks5-with-ip, or socks5-with-hostname. This way they don't have to keep mucking with tcpdump and wondering if something got cached somewhere. - Warn when listening on a public address for socks. I suspect a lot of people are setting themselves up as open socks proxies, and they have no idea that jerks on the Internet are using them, since they simply proxy the traffic into the Tor network. - Add "private:*" as an alias in configuration for policies. Now you can simplify your exit policy rather than needing to list every single internal or nonroutable network space. - Add a new controller event type that allows controllers to get all server descriptors that were uploaded to a router in its role as authoritative dirserver. - Start shipping socks-extensions.txt, tor-doc-unix.html, tor-doc-server.html, and stylesheet.css in the tarball. - Stop shipping tor-doc.html in the tarball. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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