July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [cryptography] Reliably Erasing Data From Flash-Based Solid State Drives
by Alexander Klimov 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

It is also harder to rely on SSD as evidence. <http://www.jdfsl.org/subscriptions/JDFSL-V5N3-Bell.pdf> Digital evidence is increasingly relied upon in computer forensic examinations and legal proceedings in the modern courtroom. The primary storage technology used for digital information has remained constant over the last two decades, in the form of the magnetic disc. Consequently, investigative, forensic, and judicial procedures are well-established for magnetic disc storage devices (Carrier, 2005). However, a paradigm shift has taken place in technology storage and complex, transistor-based devices for primary storage are now increasingly common. Most people are aware of the transition from portable magnetic floppy discs to portable USB transistor flash devices, yet the transition from magnetic hard drives to solid-state drives inside modern computers has so far attracted very little attention from the research community. Here we show that it is imprudent and potentially reckless to rely on existing evidence collection processes and procedures, and we demonstrate that conventional assumptions about the behaviour of storage media are no longer valid. In particular, we demonstrate that modern storage devices can operate under their own volition in the absence of computer instructions. Such operations are highly destructive of traditionally recoverable data. This can contaminate evidence; can obfuscate and make validation of digital evidence reports difficult; can complicate the process of live and dead analysis recovery; and can complicate and frustrate the post recovery forensic analysis. Our experimental findings demonstrate that solid-state drives (SSDs) have the capacity to destroy evidence catastrophically under their own volition, in the absence of specific instructions to do so from a computer. -- Regards, ASK _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] Cannot finish handshake with directory server (Kazakhstan)
by Andrew Lewman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:51:21 +0200 Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> wrote: > As asked by a commenter, is it known which companies supply the > Tor-focused DPI blocking technology to governments, universities, and > the like? I see two possible directions where such information might > be helpful: Yes, there are many, many companies. Bluecoat, Narus, Cisco, Fortinet, Nokia/Siemens, come to mind. For Kazakhstan specifically, I don't know which company they use, or maybe they're building their own like Iran. See https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/upcoming-supreme-court-case-may-hold-… and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/not-a-hoax-pakistan-requests-proposal… and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-tech-companies-their-authoritaria… Or just look at http://spyfiles.org/ for a list of possible companies. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x74ED336B _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tt] [ExI] The NSA's new data center
by J. Andrew Rogers 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 12:56 PM, David Lubkin <lubkin(a)unreasonable.com> wrote: >>It turns out that the algorithm families related to deep relationship >>analysis -- the kind of algorithms you use to invade privacy -- are >>very much in the former category. They only parallelize well under >>topological constraints so narrow that even having a giant data center >>is insufficient; you would need to deploy the data models on the >>cluster in carefully designed logical topologies in addition to a >>carefully designed physical topology. >> >>In this case, "winning" is biased toward whoever has both the biggest >>data centers and the best theoretical computer scientists. > > Why do you see this as a sustainable advantage? > > That is, won't we reach a point where the capabilities of this NSA > center are within the price range of reasonably sized coalitions of > private individuals? Yes, by then the government agencies would > have even more, but would it make a difference as a practical > matter? (I am not on Exi-Chat so posting here) It matters a great deal. The goal of building these models is deep behavioral modeling and prediction. With sufficiently good models, you can start steering outcomes of human behavior below the level of discernible manipulation on a mass scale. First across the line that feels like wielding that power wins. We are further down this path than most people imagine (though not so far that the specifics are foregone conclusions). It is a mathematics and computer science problem. This is very similar to "first to AI" games and the people that work on it are cognizant of this aspect. If you are far enough ahead, you can effectively manipulate the efforts of people chasing you. > There's only so much useful data about people and their interrelations. > It seems to me we move (big and central can analyze in ways > others can't) => (big and central can analyze it faster) => (being big > and central ceases to have an advantage). Most people can't imagine how detailed a model of their behavior can be constructed *today* from their data exhaust, nor the quantity of data exhaust currently collected, without even scratching the surface of what is theoretically possible. The best analogy I can think of is compressive sampling/sensing. There is vast amounts of useful data about individual behavior and it is almost unexploited compared to what we know is possible theoretically with the right algorithms and systems. The reason no serious discussion can be had about privacy is that most people do not grok the capabilities of the technology they face. Ironically, it is in many ways more powerful and a lot more invisible than anything Hollywood has portrayed. There is already quite a bit of well-known art around camouflaging this type of manipulation that is already deployed every day -- it is why few people notice. It is a "first across the line" race. The first organization to gain a material advantage and exploit it can only be caught if they allow themselves to be caught. Many organizations are looking for that advantage but the race favors those with very sharp minds and deep pockets. -- J. Andrew Rogers _______________________________________________ tt mailing list tt(a)postbiota.org http://postbiota.org/mailman/listinfo/tt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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another privacy survey
by Sonia Arrison 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

"Ranks of Privacy 'Pragmatists' Are Growing" Most Americans support the dissemination of data contained in public records, but they also say that there must be a legitimate legal or social reason for the extraction of this data, according to a recent survey conducted by Privacy and American Business and ORC International. As long as the information is not abused, most Americans support the use of personal data on the Internet for commercial purposes. This support includes the use of home or work addresses by law enforcement, potential employers, or consumer credit companies. Those surveyed believe it is less acceptable to allow private investigators or ordinary citizens to access the information. The 1,000 people surveyed in the report also say that they object to the government posting personally identifiable public information on the Internet unless there are safeguards. These safeguards include the government requiring the consent of the individual before personal information is displayed on public record, and requesting a specific purpose for such information to be displayed on the Internet. Privacy and American Business President Alan Westin says that more Americans now fall into the category of "privacy pragmatist" rather than "privacy fundamentalist." Ron Plesser of Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolf says that the Internet industry must determine how to properly use Social Security numbers. "Regulating the purchase and sale of Social Security numbers over the Internet won't come overnight," Plesser says. http://www.acm.org/technews/articles/2000-2/1211m.html#item6

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The Word Spy for 10/06/2003 -- declinism
by Paul McFedries 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

declinism (dee.CLYN.iz.um) n. The belief that something, particularly a country or a political or economic system, is undergoing a significant and possibly irreversible decline. --declinist n., adj. Example Citation --------------------------------- The declinists, we might say, will always be with us. Wherever anyone believes in progress, someone, possibly the same one, believes in decline. Declinism emerges today from the triumphalism of the right: In our greatness, conservatives say, there is much to lose, and many who threaten us. So, too, does it emerge from the pessimism of the left: Power corrupts, and the corrupt will get their comeuppance. At present, both impulses--triumphalist and pessimistic, chest-beating and self-lacerating--are on the upsurge. So too, then, declinism. --Laura Secor, "That sinking feeling," The Boston Globe, September 14, 2003 Backgrounder --------------------------------- Declinism has been called the "apocalypse soon" school of international relations. The word was coined in 1988 by Samuel P. Huntington (see the first use, below), but the noun "declinist" appears in the Oxford English Dictionary, where a citation from 1831 mentions the "doctrine of the decline of science" and labels one of its proponents as "the leader of the Declinists." The opposite is "triumphalism," which originally (circa 1964) referred to excessive or blind pride in the achievements of one's religion or church, but now has a broader mandate in the language (for example, excessive or blind pride in the achievements of one's country). Example Citation #2 --------------------------------- Nearly every sentiment and idea that Franzen relays about the fallen preeminence of literature has been expressed before, and better. No one needs to be reminded for the umpteenth time that Dickens was a popular sensation and that the audiences that once clamored at the docks for news of Little Nell now queue at the multiplex or congregate in cyberspace. Like Broadway, the fabulous invalid, the serious novel has seemed poised to breathe its last ever since electricity entered the home. As a cultural analyst, Franzen is simply the latest to join the chorus line of declinism: Gore Vidal has been signing the novel's death certificate for a half-century. --James Wolcott, "Advertisements for Himself," The New Republic, December 2, 2002 First Use --------------------------------- In 1988 the United States reached the zenith of its fifth wave of declinism since the 1950s. The roots of this phenomenon lie in the political economy literature of the early 1980s that analyzed the fading American economic hegemony and attempted to identify the consequences of its disappearance. ... Although predominantly of a liberal-leftist hue, declinist writings reflect varying political philosophies and make many different claims. In general, however, they offer three core propositions. First, the United States is declining economically compared to other market economy countries, most notably Japan but also Europe and the newly industrializing countries. The declinists focus on economic performance and on scientific, technological and educations factors presumably related to economic performance. Second, economic power is the central element of a nation's strength, and hence a decline in economic power eventually affects the other dimensions of national power. Third, the relative economic decline of the United States is caused primarily by its spending too much for military purposes, which in turn is the result, in Kennedy's phrase, of "imperial overstretch," of attempting to maintain commitments abroad that the country can no longer afford. --Samuel P. Huntington," The U.S. -- Decline or Renewal?," Foreign Affairs, December 1, 1988 See Also --------------------------------- bads: http://www.wordspy.com/words/bads.asp boomsayer: http://www.wordspy.com/words/boomsayer.asp dread merchant: http://www.wordspy.com/words/dreadmerchant.asp hyper-power: http://www.wordspy.com/words/hyper-power.asp panic merchants: http://www.wordspy.com/words/panicmerchants.asp soft power: http://www.wordspy.com/words/softpower.asp Subject Categories --------------------------------- Business - Economics: http://www.wordspy.com/index/Business-Economics.asp The World - Government: http://www.wordspy.com/index/TheWorld-Government.asp The World - Politics: http://www.wordspy.com/index/TheWorld-Politics.asp Words About Words --------------------------------- English is a language that simply cannot be fixed, not can its use ever be absolutely laid down. It changes constantly; it grows with an almost exponential joy. It evolves eternally; its words alter their senses and their meanings subtly, slowly, or speedily according to fashion and need. --Simon Winchester, English author, The Meaning of Everything, 2003 Subscription Stuff --------------------------------- If this post was forwarded to you and you want to join the Word Spy list, it's easy. Just send an e-mail to listmanager(a)logophilia.com and in the Subject line include the command "join wordspy". To try the HTML version of Word Spy, send a note to listmanager(a)logophilia.com and include the command "html wordspy" in the Subject line. You are currently subscribed as rah(a)shipwright.com. To drop this address from the list, you have two choices: Send a message to listmanager(a)logophilia.com and include only the command "leave wordspy" (without the quotation marks) in the Subject line. Or, Use the following Web address: http://www.wordspy.com/list/remove.asp?Email=rah@shipwright.com&ID=26169 ======================================================== --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[Politech] Mandatory data retention resurfaces; Gonzales, Mueller call for 2-year rule [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I've been busy at work writing a series of articles about what's going on in terms of forcing Internet service providers to snoop on Americans. Basically Attorney General Gonzales and FBI Director Mueller met with Internet and telecom companies (including Microsoft, Google, Verizon, and Comcast) last Friday and called on them to store data about users' activities for two years: http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6077654.html Until that meeting, Gonzales and the Justice Department had been saying this would be useful for child porn fighting. Now they've realized (took 'em long enough) that (a) the stored data would be useful for terrorism investigations and (b) it might be politically convenient to pitch it as an anti-terrorism measure: http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6078229.html Companies aren't very happy about this. And of course any such know-your-user law would presumably apply to libraries, schools, and coffee shops as well: http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6078689.html Looking ahead a few years, assuming that data retention is adopted, it's unclear that the Feds would stop there. Imagine a shocking horrible tragedy could have been prevented if only even more expansive laws had been adopted on top of data retention. The end game eventually could involve (a) making it unlawful to offer Internet access without verifying identities, effectively shutting down open WiFi nodes and (b) restricting the use of encryption and anonymity services -- after all, what good is a pile of retained data if it doesn't tell you very much? This is sheer speculation, mind you. But then again a House of Representatives committee once approved a bill that would make it unlawful to sell encryption products without backdoors for the Feds. And Sen. Judd Gregg talked about restricting encryption products soon after 9/11, so perhaps it's not _that_ unlikely either. One other thing worth thinking about in terms of the Washington endgame. The Internet providers I've talked to have been generally opposed to the idea. But one of their primary complaints is the logical one of how much it will cost. If the Feds decide to write them a fat check, their complaints could evaporate and the legislation would instantly experience far less opposition. Watch for this; it would follow what happened with CALEA. Here's Microsoft's statement on data retention: http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6078711.html Or, if you prefer, CNN and USA Today coverage of the topic: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-05-31-internet-recor… _x.htm http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/30/technology/justice_internet/ -Declan _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [tor-talk] Cannot finish handshake with directory server (Kazakhstan)
by Andrew Lewman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:51:21 +0200 Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> wrote: > As asked by a commenter, is it known which companies supply the > Tor-focused DPI blocking technology to governments, universities, and > the like? I see two possible directions where such information might > be helpful: Yes, there are many, many companies. Bluecoat, Narus, Cisco, Fortinet, Nokia/Siemens, come to mind. For Kazakhstan specifically, I don't know which company they use, or maybe they're building their own like Iran. See https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/upcoming-supreme-court-case-may-hold-… and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/not-a-hoax-pakistan-requests-proposal… and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-tech-companies-their-authoritaria… Or just look at http://spyfiles.org/ for a list of possible companies. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x74ED336B _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tt] [ExI] The NSA's new data center
by J. Andrew Rogers 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 12:56 PM, David Lubkin <lubkin(a)unreasonable.com> wrote: >>It turns out that the algorithm families related to deep relationship >>analysis -- the kind of algorithms you use to invade privacy -- are >>very much in the former category. They only parallelize well under >>topological constraints so narrow that even having a giant data center >>is insufficient; you would need to deploy the data models on the >>cluster in carefully designed logical topologies in addition to a >>carefully designed physical topology. >> >>In this case, "winning" is biased toward whoever has both the biggest >>data centers and the best theoretical computer scientists. > > Why do you see this as a sustainable advantage? > > That is, won't we reach a point where the capabilities of this NSA > center are within the price range of reasonably sized coalitions of > private individuals? Yes, by then the government agencies would > have even more, but would it make a difference as a practical > matter? (I am not on Exi-Chat so posting here) It matters a great deal. The goal of building these models is deep behavioral modeling and prediction. With sufficiently good models, you can start steering outcomes of human behavior below the level of discernible manipulation on a mass scale. First across the line that feels like wielding that power wins. We are further down this path than most people imagine (though not so far that the specifics are foregone conclusions). It is a mathematics and computer science problem. This is very similar to "first to AI" games and the people that work on it are cognizant of this aspect. If you are far enough ahead, you can effectively manipulate the efforts of people chasing you. > There's only so much useful data about people and their interrelations. > It seems to me we move (big and central can analyze in ways > others can't) => (big and central can analyze it faster) => (being big > and central ceases to have an advantage). Most people can't imagine how detailed a model of their behavior can be constructed *today* from their data exhaust, nor the quantity of data exhaust currently collected, without even scratching the surface of what is theoretically possible. The best analogy I can think of is compressive sampling/sensing. There is vast amounts of useful data about individual behavior and it is almost unexploited compared to what we know is possible theoretically with the right algorithms and systems. The reason no serious discussion can be had about privacy is that most people do not grok the capabilities of the technology they face. Ironically, it is in many ways more powerful and a lot more invisible than anything Hollywood has portrayed. There is already quite a bit of well-known art around camouflaging this type of manipulation that is already deployed every day -- it is why few people notice. It is a "first across the line" race. The first organization to gain a material advantage and exploit it can only be caught if they allow themselves to be caught. Many organizations are looking for that advantage but the race favors those with very sharp minds and deep pockets. -- J. Andrew Rogers _______________________________________________ tt mailing list tt(a)postbiota.org http://postbiota.org/mailman/listinfo/tt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Secrecy News -- 07/05/12
by Steven Aftergood 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 63 July 5, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ ** PROSECUTORS DISPUTE CLAIMS OF SELECTIVE ANTI-LEAK PROSECUTION ** NSA TELLS FORMER ISOO DIRECTOR TO FILE A FOIA REQUEST ** AIR FORCE POLICY ON CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS ** AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND MORE FROM CRS ** COVERT ACTION IS PROMINENT IN CARTER ADMIN HISTORY PROSECUTORS DISPUTE CLAIMS OF SELECTIVE ANTI-LEAK PROSECUTION Last month, former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who is accused of unlawfully disclosing classified information to two reporters, said in pre-trial motions that he had been wrongly and unfairly singled out for prosecution, particularly since he had criticized the U.S. practice of waterboarding. ("Kiriakou Calls Leak Prosecution Selective, Vindictive," Secrecy News, June 22). http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/06/kiriakou_selective.html This week, prosecutors unsurprisingly rejected such claims while affirming that they intend to vigorously pursue their case against Mr. Kiriakou. "The genesis of this prosecution has nothing to do with waterboarding, the national conversation about its wrongness or rightness, the defendant's opinions, or other public statements he may or may not have made," the July 2 government response states. http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/070212-resp50.pdf The new government filing presents a series of legal arguments against the defense motions for dismissal, explaining why prosecutors believe the Intelligence Identities Protection Act and the Espionage Act statutes under which Mr. Kiriakou is charged are sufficiently clear and specific to be constitutional. Beyond that, the new government response makes a couple of noteworthy points. "The government does not intend to seek the testimony of either journalist to whom Kiriakou made the charged disclosures," prosecutors wrote. By refraining from subpoenaing the two unnamed reporters -- believed to be Matthew Cole, formerly of ABC News, and Scott Shane of the New York Times -- prosecutors will steer clear of the controversies and difficulties facing the prosecution of former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling, which is currently suspended while the government appeals the right to subpoena New York Times reporter James Risen, to whom Sterling allegedly provided classified information. Prosecutors also suggest at one point that their obligation to prove at trial that Mr. Kiriakou had specific "reason to believe" his alleged disclosures would damage national security would be satisfied by "the non-disclosure agreements signed by Kiriakou," since those agreements include boilerplate language affirming that unauthorized disclosures could cause injury to the United States. This approach seems calculated to enable prosecutors to overcome the otherwise daunting hurdle of demonstrating the defendant's intent to harm the country. It is unclear if it would be found legally satisfactory by the court or persuasive to a jury. In a critical account of the Kiriakou case to date, Dan Froomkin wrote that "The bitterest irony of the case is that if Kiriakou had actually tortured, rather than talked about it, he almost certainly wouldn't be in trouble." See "Squelching Secrets: Why Are Obama's Prosecutors Pursuing John Kiriakou?", Huffington Post (www.huffingtonpost.com) July 4. NSA TELLS FORMER ISOO DIRECTOR TO FILE A FOIA REQUEST William Leonard, the former director of the Information Security Oversight Office, served as an expert witness for the defense in the misconceived prosecution of Thomas Drake, in which all felony charges against Mr. Drake were dismissed. (Mr. Drake pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count.) Now Mr. Leonard is seeking permission from the trial judge in the Drake case to publicly disclose and discuss certain National Security Agency documents cited in the charges against Mr. Drake that he says were classified in violation of national policy. "I believe the Government's actions in the Drake case served to undermine the integrity of the classification system and as such, have placed information that genuinely requires protection in the interest of national security at increased risk," Mr. Leonard wrote in a May affidavit seeking permission from Judge Richard D. Bennett to reveal the now-declassified (but still undisclosed) documents. Attorneys for Mr. Drake asked the court to release Mr. Leonard from the protective order that restricts disclosure of the documents, so that he could publicly pursue his criticism of their original classification by NSA. See "Former Secrecy Czar Asks Court to Release NSA Document," Secrecy News, May 23, 2012: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/05/drake_leonard.html But government attorneys said that Mr. Leonard has no standing to request relief from the protective order that was imposed on the NSA documents. They added that if he wants the documents to be publicly disclosed he should request them under the Freedom of Information Act. "The problem with Leonard's claim is that it relies not on injury to him, but instead on a general desire to complain to the press and the public," the government said in a June 22 response to Mr. Leonard. Instead of court-ordered release, "the proper alternative... is for Leonard to file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the National Security Agency (NSA), which is prepared to act expeditiously upon the request." http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/drake/062212-opp188.pdf As it happens, I requested one of those documents under FOIA last year, and NSA has not acted on it expeditiously, or at all. But the government said "The NSA has already prepared FOIA-approved versions of the documents at issue" which involve only minimal redactions. "The government has no animus toward Leonard or his desire to express his opinion about the documents in question -- only an interest in appropriately protecting the sensitive nature of the material and to prevent a flood of similar claims by non-parties in other completed cases," the government response said. See also "Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents" by Scott Shane, New York Times, August 1, 2011: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/us/02secret.html AIR FORCE POLICY ON CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS The U.S. Air Force says its policy is to provide information to Congress as needed, but with preference given to members of the Armed Services Committees over other Committees, and to the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committees over other members. "Per OSD Policy, Congressional Member clearances are automatic once the Member is elected into their current position in the United States Senate or U.S. House of Representatives. Once a Member is elected as a seated member of Congress, the Member is automatically read into SCI [sensitive compartmented information] and any other classification needed," a newly revised Air Force Instruction explains. "Members of Congress assigned to the defense committees (and to the intelligence committees only for intelligence SAPs) are accessed to all DoD SAPs, except for a limited number of programs judged to be of extreme sensitivity, referred to as waived SAPs." SAPs stands for "special access programs" which are classified programs involving access controls that are more restrictive than for other classified information. "Waived SAPs" are a subset of SAPs that are briefed to only a select group of congressmen. "Members of Congress not assigned to the defense committees (and to the intelligence committees only for intelligence SAPs) will be granted access to DoD SAPs (non-waived SAPs only) with the concurrence of the DoD after consultation with the Chairman and Ranking Member of the defense committees." "Air Force officials may not disclose classified information to the Congress for release to a congressional constituent." Remarkably, Members of Congress who seek information for their own legislative purposes enjoy no special treatment from the Air Force, according to the Air Force. "Requests from Members of Congress not seeking records on behalf of a Congressional Committee, Subcommittee, either House sitting as a whole, or made on behalf of their constituents shall be considered the same as any other requester." See "Air Force Relations With Congress," Air Force Instruction 90-401, 14 June 2012: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi90-401.pdf AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND MORE FROM CRS Updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made readily available to the public include the following. ACA: A Brief Overview of the Law, Implementation, and Legal Challenges, July 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41664.pdf Individual Mandate and Related Information Requirements under ACA, July 2, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41331.pdf Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt, July 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22331.pdf Mexico's Free Trade Agreements, July 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40784.pdf Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, July 2, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf COVERT ACTION IS PROMINENT IN CARTER ADMIN HISTORY Covert action was a particularly prominent feature of U.S. foreign policy during the Jimmy Carter Administration, according to a report last month from the State Department Historical Advisory Committee. Covert action or other intelligence activities are said to figure in at least half of the volumes that will constitute the official record of the Carter Administration's foreign affairs. The Historical Advisory Committee reported to the Secretary of State on June 13 regarding progress (or lack thereof) in the production of the official Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), which is the documentary record of U.S. foreign policy. Although there is a statutory requirement that FRUS be published no later than 30 years after the events it records, the series has never yet met that mandatory benchmark. http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/state/hac2011.html One of the obstacles to timely publication has been the need for a so-called High-Level Panel (HLP) composed of State, CIA and NSC officials to review documents related to covert action and other sensitive intelligence activities. Since the early 1990s, "more than 40 covert intelligence activities have now been acknowledged for publication in the [FRUS] series," the Committee report noted. However, any FRUS volume requiring HLP review "will spend at least one additional year, and often many more than one, in the declassification pipeline." The Committee report said that the challenge to timely publication will only increase because "at least half of the Carter volumes will require resolution of HLP issues." In other words, of the 28 projected FRUS volumes for the Carter Administration, at least half involve covert action or other sensitive intelligence activities. This "seems high," a former State Department official told Secrecy News. "Nowhere near half of the Nixon-Ford volumes had HLP [covert action] issues and it's hard to believe there were more covert actions going on during the 4 years of Carter than during the 8 Nixon-Ford years." The largest single covert action at that time would have been in Afghanistan, particularly following the Soviet intervention in 1979, said intelligence historian John Prados. He said there was also widespread intelligence involvement in "radio operations" around the globe, close observation of Cyprus, some focus on the PLO, some activity in South Yemen, and actions to counter the Cuban presence in various parts of Africa and Latin America. Though some of this material is public knowledge, that will not necessarily expedite the task of publishing the FRUS series. "The CIA... resolutely resists declassifying documents that entered the public domain through irregular channels," the State Department Historical Advisory Committee said. "These documents are widely known to scholars, and thus CIA's policy presents a special challenge for the HO [State Department Historian's Office] to publish [FRUS] volumes that meet the [statutory] standard of a 'thorough, accurate, and reliable' documentary record of United States foreign policy," the Committee report said. CIA's self-perception of its disclosure practices is rather different and altogether more flattering than the despairing view held by non-Agency historians, FOIA requesters, and others who attempt to elicit information from the Agency. "CIA, unlike any other agency in the Intelligence Community, much less Federal Government, makes discretionary releases of historically significant documents available to the public, journalists, and academicians in a purposefully organized manner," the CIA stated in a March 2012 report from the CIA Chief FOIA Officer. http://www.foia.cia.gov/txt/Chief_FOIA_Officer_Report_2012.pdf "CIA continues to inform record numbers of citizens, demonstrating our commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three goals of transparency, participation, and collaboration," the CIA report said. _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[cryptography] RSA admits securID tokens have been compromised
by Adam Back 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=11122 "RSA has finally admitted publicly that the March breach into its systems has resulted in the compromise of their SecurID two-factor authentication tokens." I guess everyone was suspecting as much reading between the lines of what was said so far, but there it is. Adam _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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