July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

The Liberty Dollar
by Gary Jeffers 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

My fellow Cypherpunks, The Liberty Dollar My fellow Cypherpunks, I think I may have some really great news here, but you all can check it out to be sure. I found an alternative money on the Internet. It is called the Liberty Dollar. The Internet site is: http://www.norfed.org NORFED is The National Organization for the Repeal of the Federal Reserve Act and the Internal Revenue Code. The money is backed by silver and gold and can be redeemed widely in America. As many of you know, the $US is a corrupt, proprietary, debt issued, fait, fractional reserved,illegal, unconstituional, U. S. State enforced monopoly currency. As corrupt as it is I don't know why it hasn't already collasped and dragged us down with it! If the Liberty Dollar is honest and robust, then it may be the vehical to beat the elite bankers tyranny and give us an honest wealth produced money. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers BEAT STATE !!!!

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[osint] Department of Homeland Security tightens grip on
by Brooks Isoldi 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

unclassified information Reply-To: osint(a)yahoogroups.com Department of Homeland Security tightens grip on unclassified information The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is imposing extraordinary new access controls on unclassified information that it deems "for official use only" (FOUO). The new information policy, which was spelled out in an internal DHS directive last month, imposes several classification-like access restrictions on information that is "sensitive but unclassified." So, for example, such unclassified information may only be shared with individuals who are determined to have a "need to know" it. Furthermore, DHS employees and contractors must sign a special Non-Disclosure Agreement before receiving access to unclassified FOUO information. As far as could be determined, no other executive branch agency systematically requires a non-disclosure agreement for access to unclassified FOUO information. Secure storage of FOUO information is required, and secure communication by encrypted telephone and fax is encouraged. In some respects, the new restrictions on unclassified FOUO information are not as onerous than those concerning classified information. For example, a security clearance is not required for access. But in other respects, the new FOUO information policy is actually more far-reaching than national security classification policy. Thus, classified information can only be generated by officials who have been authorized by the President, either directly or indirectly by delegation. But any DHS employee or contractor can designate information as FOUO if it falls within eleven broad categories. Moreover, managers and supervisors can also designate additional information as FOUO even if it falls outside of those categories. Further, the classification system provides for an oversight mechanism through the Information Security Oversight Office. No provision for oversight of the new FOUO policy is included. Finally, the classification system, with all of its limitations, has a declassification program built into it; by executive order, classified documents are to be automatically declassified with the passage of time. But at the Department of Homeland Security, the FOUO restriction will never lapse unless and until the originating authority so decides. "Information designated as FOUO will retain its designation until determined otherwise by the originator or a supervisory or management official having program management responsibility over the originator and/or the information." (Sec. 6E). A copy of the new DHS directive (MD 11042) on "Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information," dated May 11, 2004, was obtained... through the Freedom of Information Act. See: http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-sbu.html (This directive is apparently distinct from the pending DHS procedures for protection of "sensitive homeland security information" [SHSI], which are "at least a month away" from being circulated for external comment, one official said lately.) [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Yahoo! Domains - Claim yours for only $14.70 http://us.click.yahoo.com/Z1wmxD/DREIAA/yQLSAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, discuss-osint(a)yahoogroups.com. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor bisoldi(a)intellnet.org http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint(a)yahoogroups.com Subscribe: osint-subscribe(a)yahoogroups.com Unsubscribe: osint-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: osint-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[p2p-hackers] The State of Mixminion and Mixmaster Twitter Dialog
by Sir Valiance 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hello P2P-Hackers, My name is Sir Valiance and I am posting a conversation that took place on Twitter a few days back regarding the current state of anonymous remailers, specifically Mixmaster http://mixmaster.sourceforge.net/ and Mixminion http://mixminion.net/. A little background information on the dialog, I have recently starting working on updating Mixminion's codebase to advance the state of anonymous remailers and help develop a larger userbase. The conversation begins with the following individuals showing interest in discussing Mixminion and advances into discussing other remailer issues. It was suggested that someone collect the dialogue and post it to a mailing list, so I followed the conversation and hashtags and made an attempt at "threading" and organizing it the best I could to make it readable. Hopefully the posting here will inspire analysis and discourse on the current state of anonymous remailers. At the end of the conversation I said that I would be posting this to remailer(a)librelist.com but then it was suggested that p2p-hackers would be a better place so I will cross-post for now. I will be posting a follow up message and my thoughts on what can be done, what I plan to work on, and a general response to some of the issues discussed previously in the next few days. Thank You, Valiance The individuals involved in the conversation: https://twitter.com/#!/sirvaliance/ (Me) https://twitter.com/#!/lensassaman https://twitter.com/#!/antagonismorg https://twitter.com/#!/zooko https://twitter.com/#!/nickm_tor https://twitter.com/#!/maradydd https://twitter.com/#!/TomRittervg https://twitter.com/#!/hellais * Conversation Begins * lensassaman: @sirvaliance How's it going, coming up to speed on Mixminion? When I'm back in Leuven we should really talk; Sphinx is the better primitive. sirvaliance: @lensassaman It is going quite well I think. No code the past couple days, just reading about the topic. sirvaliance: @lensassaman I would love to talk about your thoughts on mixminion, etc.! I will be working on it this weekend. nickm_tor: @sirvaliance I would love to talk about mixminion ideas. I don't have time to hack on it these days, but I still care about the design. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor Awesome! I am still early in researching the topic so the only work so far was maintenance. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor I would love to talk as well and I will be sure to keep you updated! zooko: @sirvaliance @lensassaman I'd love to listen in on that conversation, too. I still think I was right about http://x.co/Xbda http://x.co/Xbdf lensassaman: @zooko Can't shift gears to fully grok those messages right now; on deadline for a different topic. But, you're aware of ... cc/@sirvaliance lensassaman: @zooko ... Minx and Sphinx right? Both are advances on Mixminion's tagging attack protection. Minx is broken, I think, but ... @sirvaliance zooko: @lensassaman @sirvaliance I never really grokked Sphinx in its fullness, and hadn't even heard of Minx! lensassaman: @zooko ... introduced some new ideas; there's also been some work in provable constructions against tagging attacks. @sirvaliance lensassaman: @zooko ... introduced some new ideas; there's also been some work in provable constructions against tagging attacks. @sirvaliance lensassaman: @sirvaliance Okay; you'll want to look at how Mixmaster did things, too, and if you can, read over the ML archives about Mixmaster 4.0. sirvaliance: @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor I am going to start collecting the research on the topic and find a central location to publicly post it. lensassaman: @sirvaliance @zooko @nickm_tor Well, there *already* is a central location for mix-net related research: the Anonbib. sirvaliance: @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor I meant a site devoted to cypherpunk issues, not just anonymity papers and research. lensassaman: @sirvaliance @zooko @nickm_tor Ah, gotcha. That would, indeed, but useful. The question is, what do you decide *isn't* relevant? tomrittervg: @lensassaman @sirvaliance If it would get more replies on liberation-tech, /r/crypto, randombit or wherever - people will put it there. zooko: @TomRittervg @lensassaman @sirvaliance You're welcome to use p2p-hackers, too. lensassaman: @zooko @TomRittervg @sirvaliance p2p-hackers really is where the cypherpunk-like discussions happen these days, so for a wider audience, do. nickm_tor: #mixminion IMO the current top 10 problems with mixminion don't begin to include any need to change its crypto a la minx/sphinx. nickm_tor: Top 11 #mixminion issues: 11.Should be modular 10.Should use mlock and encrypted storage 9.Dummies and link padding might be workable today nickm_tor: #mixminon issues ct'd 8. Die, SHA1, Die! 7. IPv6 support 6. Needs a nymserver. 5. Needs a less fascist envelope format: E2E-spec is crud nickm_tor: #mixminion issues ct'd: 4. DH-768? In 2011?? 3. The crypto should be a C library. 2. The directory protocol is a single point of failure. nickm_tor: And the number 1 remaining #mixminion issue IMO: It's unclear to me whether anon remailers can get enough users to provide them anonymity. lensassaman: #mixminion From my perspective as Mixmaster maintainer, I'm where I was in 2003; wanting a next-gen protocol that solves *my* list of probs. lensassaman: @nickm_tor @sirvaliance I've been thinking about getting Mixmaster 3.2 working on Android, then bringing it up to speak Mixminion; how well @nickm_tor @sirvaliance trusted is Sphinx, really? There's advantages to using it because of the use of ECC if we're talking SMS mixing. sirvaliance: @lensassaman @nickm_tor I was actually thinking about doing the exact same thing to #mixminion (mixminion/master) on Android sirvaliance: @lensassaman @nickm_tor My "day job" right now is building Android/iPhone applications and the first thought was how to port #mixminion maradydd: @lensassaman @sirvaliance @nickm_tor FYI whoever did the Tor NDK port left incredibly helpful instructions, thanks for that nickm_tor: @lensassaman @sirvaliance @zooko we ought to start talking using a #mixminion tag. lensassaman: @nickm_tor @sirvaliance @zooko Agreed. Topic of discussion: is Sphinx a suitable message format for Type III remailers? #mixminion nickm_tor: @lensassaman @sirvaliance @zooko IIRC Sphinx is suitable for #mixminion use, but like I said replacing the crypto isn't a top-10 need. nickm_tor: And the number 1 remaining #mixminion issue IMO: It's unclear to me whether anon remailers can get enough users to provide them anonymity. nickm_tor: #mixminion issues ct'd: 4. DH-768? In 2011?? 3. The crypto should be a C library. 2. The directory protocol is a single point of failure. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor @lensassaman @zooko I am new to the topic, but the #mixminion directory protocol jumped out as needing some reworking. nickm_tor: @sirvaliance dir-agreement.txt has a proposed improved #mixminion dir format; can't recall if I still like it. Probably needs revision. lensassaman: @sirvaliance The #Mixminion Directory Protocol has a *lot* of problems; I suspect it was a stub. You really want something like Leuchtfeuer. nickm_tor: @antagonismorg Whatever we need to build to get enough users, #mixminion and other remailers don't IMO have it yet. Not sure what it is. tomrittervg: @nickm_tor @antagonismorg I'm pretty sure it's a user experience that's easy to use and understand. #mixminion nickm_tor: @TomRittervg @antagonismorg IMO the biggest userexperience issues are easy replies, long-term nyms, and <30min arrival times. Maybe GUIs too sirvaliance: @nickm_tor @TomRittervg @antagonismorg Definitely GUI's, I don't think you should have to know your way around a command line to be anon. nickm_tor: @TomRittervg @antagonismorg But for <30min arrival times to be safe, we would need far more users. Possible chicken and egg antagonism: @nickm_tor TomRittervg how did Tor get around that issue when it started. nickm_tor: @antagonismorg By telling hacker types "this is experimental stuff; give it a try!" But anonymity of low-latency nets scales differently. antagonismorg: @TomRittervg users understand why to use Tor, anon mailing they don't seem to. antagonismorg: @nickm_tor In regards to issue 1, I think if we build it, they will come. nickm_tor: @antagonismorg Whatever we need to build to get enough users, #mixminion and other remailers don't IMO have it yet. Not sure what it is. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor @antagonismorg @lensassaman I had some ideas for mobile apps, possibly even a web app (do not know yet know practical web is) antagonismorg: @sirvaliance look into pyano for a web interface for mixmaster nickm_tor: @sirvaliance The problem with a webapp is: how do you know that an untrusted site is giving you a good anonymizer? #mixminion nickm_tor: @sirvaliance ...and if the website is trusted, why not just use them as a one-hop relay? sirvaliance: @nickm_tor In the case for the webapp, I was thinking for the not so technically advanced users. To at least give them something. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor I was thinking more like Tor Exit Enclave ==> Web App ==> Mixminion. Maybe not very well thought out though. nickm_tor: @sirvaliance If webapp is untrusted, I'm not sure that would provide more anonymity than Tor exit enclave ==> Web App ==> SMTP... nickm_tor: @sirvaliance But if webapp is honest, I'm not clear what the Tor step gets you. More thought needed. nickm_tor: (I never got my C #mixminion backend working, but the packet format is mostly there, and ISTR liking the api.) lensassaman: #mixminion I'd really like to see an implementation done in Haskell, if we were doing it from the ground up, architected a la postfix. sirvaliance: @lensassaman DJB's qmail is also an excellent implementation of this concept. lensassaman: #mixminion Mixmaster 2.0.x lent itself to "compile as library, link" easily, and we had a number of plugins based on it as well as wrappers. nickm_tor: Just asked Ian G: he says Sphinx had code at http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/Sphinx-0.8.tar.gz . #mixminion people might be interested. fpietrosanti: @nickm_tor any clue on leveraging tor existing network to make a #mixminion like email system alive? nickm_tor: @fpietrosanti Not per se; my #mixminion issues are ones Tor wouldn't solve, or wouldn't solve consistently with minion's threat model. hellais: @nickm_tor do you recon #mixminion plus hashcash would be able to provide anonymous email over tor while avoiding spam? nickm_tor: @hellais the paper "proof of work proves not to work" argues that any POW system hard enough to slow spam would impact users unacceptably. sirvaliance: @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor I would like to put together some sort of a mailing list, maybe even a crypto http://news.ycombinator.com sirvaliance: @lensassaman @zooko @nickm_tor I am thinking about taking http://lamsonproject.org/ and building a web-app, mailing-list hybrid. tomrittervg: @sirvaliance @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor Revitalizing remailers is very encouraging. I'm interested, pretty sure @antagonismorg is also antagonismorg: @TomRittervg most definitely, @lenassaman @zooko @sirvaliance @nickm_tor lensassaman: @nickm_tor @sirvaliance Oh! Now, that's *rather* useful. #mixminion nickm_tor: @sirvaliance 140-char limit is getting annoying. You seem most anonymous here: what works for you? IRC? Lists? RFC2549? Other? qbi: Oh @lensassaman does some brainstorming on #Mixminion. Good ideas. Maybe collect them and discuss on mailing list? lensassaman: @qbi Not just me; @nickm_tor and @sirvaliance kicked it off; check the #mixminion tag. lensassaman: #mixminion I think we absolutely must have clean separation between the discrete components in the remailer software, akin to postfix. lensassaman: #mixminion I'd like to see a crypto exe, a pool mix exe, a MMTP exe, a remailer function API, etc; GUIs should be drop-in-able. antagonismorg: @lensassaman definitely like that idea, monolithic programs are hard to review/understand lensassaman: @antagonismorg *nod* That's why I dislike them in general; in this case, it's also key to allow for easy functionality transfer. lensassaman: @antagonismorg My vision is "one protocol set, many implementations." The code that runs on phones may not be what runs on laptops. lensassaman: #mixminion I think forward and reply messages need to be considered separate until something much more clever than SURBS is invented. lensassaman: #mixminion I note that Mixmaster's approach (don't do replies) simply meant people kept using the Type I reply blocks (MURBS), and cringe. lensassaman: #mixminion I don't know that there is a really good solution here. I do think SURB functionality is useful for other reasons, though. lensassaman: #mixminion I'd really like to see an implementation done in Haskell, if we were doing it from the ground up, architected a la postfix. lensassaman: #mixminion I will argue the ability to create wrappers for, or embed the code for, the remailer client is what drives usability advances. lensassaman: #mixminion Mixmaster 2.0.x lent itself to "compile as library, link" easily, and we had a number of plugins based on it as well as wrappers. lensassaman: #mixminion Mixmaster 2.9/3.0 really broke that ability, and so we were never able to fully phase out the 2.0.x codebase. lensassaman: #mixminion Eventually, things like Quicksilver (the remailer client for Windows that relied on Mixmaster 2.0.x for its crypt) bit-rotted. lensassaman: #mixminion Maybe we should take this to a mailing list, though. I'm done for the night; have real work to do. sirvaliance: @lensassaman @zooko @nickm_tor In the mean time, I set up a temp list at http://librelist.com. Email remailer(a)librelist.com to subscribe. sirvaliance: @TomRittervg @maradydd @antagonismorg To continue, I set up a temp list at http://librelist.com. Email remailer(a)librelist.com to subscribe. sirvaliance: @lensassaman @qbi @nickm_tor I will compile todays conversation into a post on the list remailer(a)librelist.com. @qbi send a message to sub. * Conversation Ends * _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[cryptography] Declassified NSA Tech Journals
by Marsh Ray 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Came across this on Reddit: Declassified NSA Tech Journals http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/tech_journals.shtml It all looks so interesting it's hard to know where to start. - Marsh * Emergency Destruction of Documents - April 1956 - Vol. I, No. 1 * Development of Automatic Telegraph Switching Systems - July 1957 - Vol. II, No. 3 * Chatter Patterns: A Last Resort - October 1957 - Vol. II, No. 4 * Introduction to Traffic Analysis - April 1958 - Vol. III, No. 2 * Signals from Outer Space - April 1958 - Vol. III, No. 2 * Science and Cryptology - July 1958 - Vol. III, No. 3 * Net Reconstruction - A Basic Step in Traffic Analysis - July 1958 - Vol. III, No. 3 * Weather; its Role in Communications Intelligence - July 1958 - Vol. III, No. 3 * A New Concept in Computing - December 1958 - Vol. III, No. 4 * About NSA - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Antipodal Propagation - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Data Transmission Over Telephone Circuits - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Soviet Science and Technology: Present Levels and Future Prospects - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Cryptanalysis in The German Air Force - April 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 2 * The Special Felix System - April 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 2 * Intercept of USSR Missile Transmissions - July 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 3 * A Program for Correcting Spelling Errors - October 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 4 * COMINT Satellites - A Space Problem- October 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 4 * The Borders of Cryptology - October 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 4 * Did Aleksandr Popov Invent Radio? - January 1960 - Vol. V, No. 1 * Bayes Marches On - January 1960 - Vol. V, No. 1 * Book Review: Lost Languages - Fall 1960 - Vol. V. Nos. 3 & 4 * The "Tunny" Machine and Its Solution - Spring 1961 - Vol. VI, No. 2 * The GEE System I - Fall 1961, Vol. VI, No. 4 * Book Review: Lincos, Design of a Language for Cosmic Intercourse, Part 1 - Winter 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 1 * A Cryptologic Fairy Tale - Spring 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 2 * Aristocrat - An Intelligence Test for Computers - Spring 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 2 * Why Analog Computation? - Summer 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 3 * German Agent Systems of World War II - Summer 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 3 * The GEE System - V - Fall 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 4 * How to Visualize a Matrix - Summer 1963 - Vol. VIII, No. 3 * Book Review: Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision - Winter 1963 - Vol. VIII, No. 1 * Soviet Communications Journals as Sources of Intelligence - August 1964 - Vol. IX, No. 3 * Use of Bayes Factors With a Composite Hypothesis - Fall 1964 - Vol. IX, No. 4 * A List of Properties of Bayes-Turing Factors - Spring 1965 - Vol. X, No. 2 * A Boer War Cipher - Summer 1965 - Vol. X, No. 3 and Fall 1965 - Vol. X, No. 4 * Something May Rub Off! - Winter 1965 - Vol. X, No. 1 * Time Is - Time Was - Time Is Past Computes for Intelligence - Winter 1965 - Vol. X, No. 1 * The Apparent Paradox of Bayes Factors - Winter 1965 - Vol. X, No. 1 * Extraterrestrial Intelligence - Spring 1966 - Vol. XI, No. 2 * Some Reminiscences - Summer 1966 - Vol. XI, No. 3 * Communications with Extraterrestrial Intelligence - Winter 1966 - Vol. XI, No. 1 * The Voynich Manuscript: "The Most Mysterious Manuscript in the World" - Summer 1967 - Vol. XII, No. 3 * Weather or Not - Encrypted? - Fall 1967 - Vol. XII, No. 4 * The Library and the User - Spring 1968 - Vol. XIII, No. 2 * Mokusatsu: One Word, Two Lessons - Fall 1968 - Vol. XIII, No. 4 * Key to The Extraterrestrial Messages - Winter 1969 - Vol. XIV, No. 1 * Curiosa Scriptorum Sericorum: To Write But Not to Communicate - Summer 1971 - Vol. XVI, No. 3 * Multiple Hypothesis Testing and the Bayes Factor - Summer 1971 - Vol. XVI, No. 3 * The Rosetta Stone and Its Decipherment - Winter 1971 - Vol. XVI, No. 1 * Writing Efficient FORTRAN - Spring 1972 - Vol. IX, No. 1 * The Strength of the Bayes Score - Winter 1972 - Vol. XVII, No. 1 * Q.E.D. - 2 Hours, 41 Minutes - Fall 1973, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 * Rochford's Cipher: A Discovery in Confederate Cryptography - Fall 1973, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 * Earliest Applications of the Computer at NSA - Winter 1973 - Vol. XVIII, No. 1 * Addendum to "A Cryptologic Fairy Tale" - Winter 1973 - Vol. XVIII, No. 1 * Some Principles of Cryptographic Security - Summer 1974 - Vol. XIX, No. 3 * Selected SIGINT Intelligence Highlights - Fall 1974 - Vol. XIX, No. 4 * Der Fall WICHER: German Knowledge of Polish Success on ENIGMA - Spring 1975 - Vol. XX, No. 2 * A Personal Contribution to the Bombe Story - Fall 1975 - Vol. XX, No. 4 * Spacecraft Passenger Television from Laika to Gagarin - Spring 1976 - Vol. XXI, No. 2 * The Voynich Manuscript Revisited - Summer 1976 - Vol. XXI, No. 3 * An Application of Cluster Analysis and Multidimensional Scaling to the Question of "Hands" and "Languages" in the Voynich Manuscript - Summer 1978 - Vol. XXIII, No. 3 * An Application of PTAH to the Voynich Manuscript - Spring 1979 - Vol. XXIV, No. 2 * German Radio Intelligence - Fall 1980 - Vol. XXV, No. 4 _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Congress on verge of approving warrantless secret searches [Free Republic]
by Virginia Raines 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

["Pretended legislation" -- courtesy of Orrin Hatch.] "all should recognize that this is an act of "pretended legislation", void and without force from the day Xlinton signs it. For now, the only thing we can do is add it to the list of crimes that will appear in the Second Declaration of Independence (the phrase, "acts of pretended legislation" comes from the First Declaration and means laws passed without authority to do so). "15 Posted on 10/07/2000 05:50:04 PDT by Jim Noble" "The bill in question comes from Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). It is S. 2516, "The Fugitive Apprehension Act." The bill allows the government to obtain any kind of document it wants, without first getting a search warrant or a subpoena from a court." "Should S. 2516 become law, it would set a precedent for warrantless, secret searches on other subjects-including firearms laws. This is one reason why Barr, one of the staunchest Second Amendment defenders in Congress, is opposing the bill. "There is also a possibility that S. 2516 may be snuck through as an amendment to HR 3048, "The Presidential Protection Act of 2000." Of course S. 2516 has nothing to do with Presidential Protection. Instead, the bill is about constitutional destruction." http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a39dede1511bd.htm --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: The Liberty Dollar
by Michael Motyka 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Michael Motyka wrote: >Hi Steve, >Did you try to follow their site? >I love the bit on the website about "make 40% blah blah blah" by buying >these colorful bad boys in volume at $6 each. >The indexing of these things to Ag is truly fucked ( >http://63.126.1.222/AgOver10.asp ). Apparently a $10 Liberty Dollar is >redeemable for 1oz of Ag which is today about $4.50. If silver goes over >$10 then they'll reset things to a $20 base. Er..what? I guess I didn't >study enough mathematics. The value of the Liberty Dollars is determined by both their denominations and by their "bases". For instance, a $10 LIberty bill with a "$10 base" also printed on it could be redeemed for 1 oz. of silver. A $10 Liberty bill with with a "$20 base" printed on it could be redeemed for 1/2 oz. of silver. A $20 Liberty bill with a "$20 base" printed on it could be redeemed for 1 oz. of silver. Now, if you bought a $10 Liberty bill with "base 10" on it and NORFED then started using a $20 base - no problem - your $10 Liberty bill could still be redeemed for the 1 oz. of silver that you were entitled to at the time you bought the bill. You are not left "holding the bag". Michael Motyka wrote: >How the fuck are you going to make 40%? Especially in light of the sorry >fact that if you're dumb enough to buy these little buggers it's going >to be tougher'n'hell to find someone even more dumb to sell them to at a >profit. As explained in the NORFED text below, if you are a redemption center, then you can get a price break by buying in volume. This increases your profit. As far as your customers who buy Liberty Dollars from you - officially you charge a set premium on these dollars to customers, but I bet you don't have to. I think that you would be allowed to give a price break to customers. This would cut your profits but that might not bother you too much and maybe you are an ideologue. This would also allow the Liberty Dollar "end buyers" to take a minimum loss. If done well, all the Liberty Dollar buyers would take, at most, a small hit on the store of value function. Also, there are other values of honest, non-fiat money. For instance, the Liberty Dollar is inflation RESISTANT. That would protect us in inflationary times. We are so used to inflation that we think it goes on indefintely. However, it looks to me like we are headed for a deflationary depression. I think that in that case the Liberty Dollar would almost certainly lose value against the $US, but I think it would give good general protection against deflation too. The TRANSACTION function: I think this is where much of its potential lies and this needs a lot of experimenting. GENERATION: The Liberty Dollar is partially backed by silver and, therefore, is NOT DEBT CREATED! This is a very major value! Debt generated money dooms us! Michael Motyka wrote: >Note quite as cute as e-golb.com. Speaking of which I never found out if >it was a private enterprise or a slinking leo. The fucking ISP up in >Davis never returned my calls. >Mike Here are the financial incentives for becoming a redemption center: ------------------------------------------------- START text from NORFED -------------------------------------------------------------------- What is a Redemption Center? A Redemption Center (RC) is any individual, business or organization that has signed a contract with NORFED to use and distribute The Liberty Dollar. There are no dues, no meetings, no obligations, and no time requirements. You are required to physically redeem the currency for gold and silver, since that is handled by NORFED. It only takes $250 to become an RC. Out of the $250, your new RC gets back $100 in Liberty Dollars, your sponsor gets $100 for sponsoring your new RC, and NORFED retains $50 for administration fees. Your new RC is now upside-down for $150, but since you get $100 for every RC you sponsor, just sponsor two friends and now you are up $50. You have actually profited by doing what is good for the country! Sponsor more people, make more money. You can sponsor anyone, anywhere, anytime - many RCs sponsor on the Internet. There are no geographic limitations or boundaries. There are even international RCs. (NORFED is not a multilevel marketing program; the RC program is a single-tier sponsorship program.) In addition to your initial referral fee, you receive an additional 5% residual referral fee on all future currency that your sponsorees exchange. Want to make up to 40% on your money? What do Redemption Centers do? RCs make money by exchanging fiat government money for gold and silver money, placing The Liberty Dollar into circulation. RCs educate, evangelize, and support The Liberty Dollar by using the new currency in everyday transactions. RCs get the round, coin-like, one ounce Gold and Silver Libertys at greatly discounted prices. For instance, as an RC you can get 100 Silver Libertys (face value $10.00) for only $7.50 each. Every time you use or exchange a Silver Liberty at its face value of $10.00, you reclaim that discount of $2.50 and make 25% on your money. And if you purchase in greater quantities, you can get Libertys for even less than $7.50 each - sometimes as low as $6.00 a piece, depending on silver's market price! -------------------------------------------------- END text from NORFED --------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------- Yours truly, Gary Jeffers BEAT STATE!!!! oh, also all the other oppressors too.

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[osint] Department of Homeland Security tightens grip on
by Brooks Isoldi 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

unclassified information Reply-To: osint(a)yahoogroups.com Department of Homeland Security tightens grip on unclassified information The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is imposing extraordinary new access controls on unclassified information that it deems "for official use only" (FOUO). The new information policy, which was spelled out in an internal DHS directive last month, imposes several classification-like access restrictions on information that is "sensitive but unclassified." So, for example, such unclassified information may only be shared with individuals who are determined to have a "need to know" it. Furthermore, DHS employees and contractors must sign a special Non-Disclosure Agreement before receiving access to unclassified FOUO information. As far as could be determined, no other executive branch agency systematically requires a non-disclosure agreement for access to unclassified FOUO information. Secure storage of FOUO information is required, and secure communication by encrypted telephone and fax is encouraged. In some respects, the new restrictions on unclassified FOUO information are not as onerous than those concerning classified information. For example, a security clearance is not required for access. But in other respects, the new FOUO information policy is actually more far-reaching than national security classification policy. Thus, classified information can only be generated by officials who have been authorized by the President, either directly or indirectly by delegation. But any DHS employee or contractor can designate information as FOUO if it falls within eleven broad categories. Moreover, managers and supervisors can also designate additional information as FOUO even if it falls outside of those categories. Further, the classification system provides for an oversight mechanism through the Information Security Oversight Office. No provision for oversight of the new FOUO policy is included. Finally, the classification system, with all of its limitations, has a declassification program built into it; by executive order, classified documents are to be automatically declassified with the passage of time. But at the Department of Homeland Security, the FOUO restriction will never lapse unless and until the originating authority so decides. "Information designated as FOUO will retain its designation until determined otherwise by the originator or a supervisory or management official having program management responsibility over the originator and/or the information." (Sec. 6E). A copy of the new DHS directive (MD 11042) on "Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information," dated May 11, 2004, was obtained... through the Freedom of Information Act. See: http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-sbu.html (This directive is apparently distinct from the pending DHS procedures for protection of "sensitive homeland security information" [SHSI], which are "at least a month away" from being circulated for external comment, one official said lately.) [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Yahoo! Domains - Claim yours for only $14.70 http://us.click.yahoo.com/Z1wmxD/DREIAA/yQLSAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, discuss-osint(a)yahoogroups.com. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor bisoldi(a)intellnet.org http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint(a)yahoogroups.com Subscribe: osint-subscribe(a)yahoogroups.com Unsubscribe: osint-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: osint-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[p2p-hackers] The State of Mixminion and Mixmaster Twitter Dialog
by Sir Valiance 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hello P2P-Hackers, My name is Sir Valiance and I am posting a conversation that took place on Twitter a few days back regarding the current state of anonymous remailers, specifically Mixmaster http://mixmaster.sourceforge.net/ and Mixminion http://mixminion.net/. A little background information on the dialog, I have recently starting working on updating Mixminion's codebase to advance the state of anonymous remailers and help develop a larger userbase. The conversation begins with the following individuals showing interest in discussing Mixminion and advances into discussing other remailer issues. It was suggested that someone collect the dialogue and post it to a mailing list, so I followed the conversation and hashtags and made an attempt at "threading" and organizing it the best I could to make it readable. Hopefully the posting here will inspire analysis and discourse on the current state of anonymous remailers. At the end of the conversation I said that I would be posting this to remailer(a)librelist.com but then it was suggested that p2p-hackers would be a better place so I will cross-post for now. I will be posting a follow up message and my thoughts on what can be done, what I plan to work on, and a general response to some of the issues discussed previously in the next few days. Thank You, Valiance The individuals involved in the conversation: https://twitter.com/#!/sirvaliance/ (Me) https://twitter.com/#!/lensassaman https://twitter.com/#!/antagonismorg https://twitter.com/#!/zooko https://twitter.com/#!/nickm_tor https://twitter.com/#!/maradydd https://twitter.com/#!/TomRittervg https://twitter.com/#!/hellais * Conversation Begins * lensassaman: @sirvaliance How's it going, coming up to speed on Mixminion? When I'm back in Leuven we should really talk; Sphinx is the better primitive. sirvaliance: @lensassaman It is going quite well I think. No code the past couple days, just reading about the topic. sirvaliance: @lensassaman I would love to talk about your thoughts on mixminion, etc.! I will be working on it this weekend. nickm_tor: @sirvaliance I would love to talk about mixminion ideas. I don't have time to hack on it these days, but I still care about the design. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor Awesome! I am still early in researching the topic so the only work so far was maintenance. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor I would love to talk as well and I will be sure to keep you updated! zooko: @sirvaliance @lensassaman I'd love to listen in on that conversation, too. I still think I was right about http://x.co/Xbda http://x.co/Xbdf lensassaman: @zooko Can't shift gears to fully grok those messages right now; on deadline for a different topic. But, you're aware of ... cc/@sirvaliance lensassaman: @zooko ... Minx and Sphinx right? Both are advances on Mixminion's tagging attack protection. Minx is broken, I think, but ... @sirvaliance zooko: @lensassaman @sirvaliance I never really grokked Sphinx in its fullness, and hadn't even heard of Minx! lensassaman: @zooko ... introduced some new ideas; there's also been some work in provable constructions against tagging attacks. @sirvaliance lensassaman: @zooko ... introduced some new ideas; there's also been some work in provable constructions against tagging attacks. @sirvaliance lensassaman: @sirvaliance Okay; you'll want to look at how Mixmaster did things, too, and if you can, read over the ML archives about Mixmaster 4.0. sirvaliance: @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor I am going to start collecting the research on the topic and find a central location to publicly post it. lensassaman: @sirvaliance @zooko @nickm_tor Well, there *already* is a central location for mix-net related research: the Anonbib. sirvaliance: @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor I meant a site devoted to cypherpunk issues, not just anonymity papers and research. lensassaman: @sirvaliance @zooko @nickm_tor Ah, gotcha. That would, indeed, but useful. The question is, what do you decide *isn't* relevant? tomrittervg: @lensassaman @sirvaliance If it would get more replies on liberation-tech, /r/crypto, randombit or wherever - people will put it there. zooko: @TomRittervg @lensassaman @sirvaliance You're welcome to use p2p-hackers, too. lensassaman: @zooko @TomRittervg @sirvaliance p2p-hackers really is where the cypherpunk-like discussions happen these days, so for a wider audience, do. nickm_tor: #mixminion IMO the current top 10 problems with mixminion don't begin to include any need to change its crypto a la minx/sphinx. nickm_tor: Top 11 #mixminion issues: 11.Should be modular 10.Should use mlock and encrypted storage 9.Dummies and link padding might be workable today nickm_tor: #mixminon issues ct'd 8. Die, SHA1, Die! 7. IPv6 support 6. Needs a nymserver. 5. Needs a less fascist envelope format: E2E-spec is crud nickm_tor: #mixminion issues ct'd: 4. DH-768? In 2011?? 3. The crypto should be a C library. 2. The directory protocol is a single point of failure. nickm_tor: And the number 1 remaining #mixminion issue IMO: It's unclear to me whether anon remailers can get enough users to provide them anonymity. lensassaman: #mixminion From my perspective as Mixmaster maintainer, I'm where I was in 2003; wanting a next-gen protocol that solves *my* list of probs. lensassaman: @nickm_tor @sirvaliance I've been thinking about getting Mixmaster 3.2 working on Android, then bringing it up to speak Mixminion; how well @nickm_tor @sirvaliance trusted is Sphinx, really? There's advantages to using it because of the use of ECC if we're talking SMS mixing. sirvaliance: @lensassaman @nickm_tor I was actually thinking about doing the exact same thing to #mixminion (mixminion/master) on Android sirvaliance: @lensassaman @nickm_tor My "day job" right now is building Android/iPhone applications and the first thought was how to port #mixminion maradydd: @lensassaman @sirvaliance @nickm_tor FYI whoever did the Tor NDK port left incredibly helpful instructions, thanks for that nickm_tor: @lensassaman @sirvaliance @zooko we ought to start talking using a #mixminion tag. lensassaman: @nickm_tor @sirvaliance @zooko Agreed. Topic of discussion: is Sphinx a suitable message format for Type III remailers? #mixminion nickm_tor: @lensassaman @sirvaliance @zooko IIRC Sphinx is suitable for #mixminion use, but like I said replacing the crypto isn't a top-10 need. nickm_tor: And the number 1 remaining #mixminion issue IMO: It's unclear to me whether anon remailers can get enough users to provide them anonymity. nickm_tor: #mixminion issues ct'd: 4. DH-768? In 2011?? 3. The crypto should be a C library. 2. The directory protocol is a single point of failure. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor @lensassaman @zooko I am new to the topic, but the #mixminion directory protocol jumped out as needing some reworking. nickm_tor: @sirvaliance dir-agreement.txt has a proposed improved #mixminion dir format; can't recall if I still like it. Probably needs revision. lensassaman: @sirvaliance The #Mixminion Directory Protocol has a *lot* of problems; I suspect it was a stub. You really want something like Leuchtfeuer. nickm_tor: @antagonismorg Whatever we need to build to get enough users, #mixminion and other remailers don't IMO have it yet. Not sure what it is. tomrittervg: @nickm_tor @antagonismorg I'm pretty sure it's a user experience that's easy to use and understand. #mixminion nickm_tor: @TomRittervg @antagonismorg IMO the biggest userexperience issues are easy replies, long-term nyms, and <30min arrival times. Maybe GUIs too sirvaliance: @nickm_tor @TomRittervg @antagonismorg Definitely GUI's, I don't think you should have to know your way around a command line to be anon. nickm_tor: @TomRittervg @antagonismorg But for <30min arrival times to be safe, we would need far more users. Possible chicken and egg antagonism: @nickm_tor TomRittervg how did Tor get around that issue when it started. nickm_tor: @antagonismorg By telling hacker types "this is experimental stuff; give it a try!" But anonymity of low-latency nets scales differently. antagonismorg: @TomRittervg users understand why to use Tor, anon mailing they don't seem to. antagonismorg: @nickm_tor In regards to issue 1, I think if we build it, they will come. nickm_tor: @antagonismorg Whatever we need to build to get enough users, #mixminion and other remailers don't IMO have it yet. Not sure what it is. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor @antagonismorg @lensassaman I had some ideas for mobile apps, possibly even a web app (do not know yet know practical web is) antagonismorg: @sirvaliance look into pyano for a web interface for mixmaster nickm_tor: @sirvaliance The problem with a webapp is: how do you know that an untrusted site is giving you a good anonymizer? #mixminion nickm_tor: @sirvaliance ...and if the website is trusted, why not just use them as a one-hop relay? sirvaliance: @nickm_tor In the case for the webapp, I was thinking for the not so technically advanced users. To at least give them something. sirvaliance: @nickm_tor I was thinking more like Tor Exit Enclave ==> Web App ==> Mixminion. Maybe not very well thought out though. nickm_tor: @sirvaliance If webapp is untrusted, I'm not sure that would provide more anonymity than Tor exit enclave ==> Web App ==> SMTP... nickm_tor: @sirvaliance But if webapp is honest, I'm not clear what the Tor step gets you. More thought needed. nickm_tor: (I never got my C #mixminion backend working, but the packet format is mostly there, and ISTR liking the api.) lensassaman: #mixminion I'd really like to see an implementation done in Haskell, if we were doing it from the ground up, architected a la postfix. sirvaliance: @lensassaman DJB's qmail is also an excellent implementation of this concept. lensassaman: #mixminion Mixmaster 2.0.x lent itself to "compile as library, link" easily, and we had a number of plugins based on it as well as wrappers. nickm_tor: Just asked Ian G: he says Sphinx had code at http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/Sphinx-0.8.tar.gz . #mixminion people might be interested. fpietrosanti: @nickm_tor any clue on leveraging tor existing network to make a #mixminion like email system alive? nickm_tor: @fpietrosanti Not per se; my #mixminion issues are ones Tor wouldn't solve, or wouldn't solve consistently with minion's threat model. hellais: @nickm_tor do you recon #mixminion plus hashcash would be able to provide anonymous email over tor while avoiding spam? nickm_tor: @hellais the paper "proof of work proves not to work" argues that any POW system hard enough to slow spam would impact users unacceptably. sirvaliance: @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor I would like to put together some sort of a mailing list, maybe even a crypto http://news.ycombinator.com sirvaliance: @lensassaman @zooko @nickm_tor I am thinking about taking http://lamsonproject.org/ and building a web-app, mailing-list hybrid. tomrittervg: @sirvaliance @zooko @lensassaman @nickm_tor Revitalizing remailers is very encouraging. I'm interested, pretty sure @antagonismorg is also antagonismorg: @TomRittervg most definitely, @lenassaman @zooko @sirvaliance @nickm_tor lensassaman: @nickm_tor @sirvaliance Oh! Now, that's *rather* useful. #mixminion nickm_tor: @sirvaliance 140-char limit is getting annoying. You seem most anonymous here: what works for you? IRC? Lists? RFC2549? Other? qbi: Oh @lensassaman does some brainstorming on #Mixminion. Good ideas. Maybe collect them and discuss on mailing list? lensassaman: @qbi Not just me; @nickm_tor and @sirvaliance kicked it off; check the #mixminion tag. lensassaman: #mixminion I think we absolutely must have clean separation between the discrete components in the remailer software, akin to postfix. lensassaman: #mixminion I'd like to see a crypto exe, a pool mix exe, a MMTP exe, a remailer function API, etc; GUIs should be drop-in-able. antagonismorg: @lensassaman definitely like that idea, monolithic programs are hard to review/understand lensassaman: @antagonismorg *nod* That's why I dislike them in general; in this case, it's also key to allow for easy functionality transfer. lensassaman: @antagonismorg My vision is "one protocol set, many implementations." The code that runs on phones may not be what runs on laptops. lensassaman: #mixminion I think forward and reply messages need to be considered separate until something much more clever than SURBS is invented. lensassaman: #mixminion I note that Mixmaster's approach (don't do replies) simply meant people kept using the Type I reply blocks (MURBS), and cringe. lensassaman: #mixminion I don't know that there is a really good solution here. I do think SURB functionality is useful for other reasons, though. lensassaman: #mixminion I'd really like to see an implementation done in Haskell, if we were doing it from the ground up, architected a la postfix. lensassaman: #mixminion I will argue the ability to create wrappers for, or embed the code for, the remailer client is what drives usability advances. lensassaman: #mixminion Mixmaster 2.0.x lent itself to "compile as library, link" easily, and we had a number of plugins based on it as well as wrappers. lensassaman: #mixminion Mixmaster 2.9/3.0 really broke that ability, and so we were never able to fully phase out the 2.0.x codebase. lensassaman: #mixminion Eventually, things like Quicksilver (the remailer client for Windows that relied on Mixmaster 2.0.x for its crypt) bit-rotted. lensassaman: #mixminion Maybe we should take this to a mailing list, though. I'm done for the night; have real work to do. sirvaliance: @lensassaman @zooko @nickm_tor In the mean time, I set up a temp list at http://librelist.com. Email remailer(a)librelist.com to subscribe. sirvaliance: @TomRittervg @maradydd @antagonismorg To continue, I set up a temp list at http://librelist.com. Email remailer(a)librelist.com to subscribe. sirvaliance: @lensassaman @qbi @nickm_tor I will compile todays conversation into a post on the list remailer(a)librelist.com. @qbi send a message to sub. * Conversation Ends * _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[cryptography] Declassified NSA Tech Journals
by Marsh Ray 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Came across this on Reddit: Declassified NSA Tech Journals http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/tech_journals.shtml It all looks so interesting it's hard to know where to start. - Marsh * Emergency Destruction of Documents - April 1956 - Vol. I, No. 1 * Development of Automatic Telegraph Switching Systems - July 1957 - Vol. II, No. 3 * Chatter Patterns: A Last Resort - October 1957 - Vol. II, No. 4 * Introduction to Traffic Analysis - April 1958 - Vol. III, No. 2 * Signals from Outer Space - April 1958 - Vol. III, No. 2 * Science and Cryptology - July 1958 - Vol. III, No. 3 * Net Reconstruction - A Basic Step in Traffic Analysis - July 1958 - Vol. III, No. 3 * Weather; its Role in Communications Intelligence - July 1958 - Vol. III, No. 3 * A New Concept in Computing - December 1958 - Vol. III, No. 4 * About NSA - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Antipodal Propagation - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Data Transmission Over Telephone Circuits - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Soviet Science and Technology: Present Levels and Future Prospects - January 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 1 * Cryptanalysis in The German Air Force - April 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 2 * The Special Felix System - April 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 2 * Intercept of USSR Missile Transmissions - July 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 3 * A Program for Correcting Spelling Errors - October 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 4 * COMINT Satellites - A Space Problem- October 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 4 * The Borders of Cryptology - October 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 4 * Did Aleksandr Popov Invent Radio? - January 1960 - Vol. V, No. 1 * Bayes Marches On - January 1960 - Vol. V, No. 1 * Book Review: Lost Languages - Fall 1960 - Vol. V. Nos. 3 & 4 * The "Tunny" Machine and Its Solution - Spring 1961 - Vol. VI, No. 2 * The GEE System I - Fall 1961, Vol. VI, No. 4 * Book Review: Lincos, Design of a Language for Cosmic Intercourse, Part 1 - Winter 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 1 * A Cryptologic Fairy Tale - Spring 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 2 * Aristocrat - An Intelligence Test for Computers - Spring 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 2 * Why Analog Computation? - Summer 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 3 * German Agent Systems of World War II - Summer 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 3 * The GEE System - V - Fall 1962 - Vol. VII, No. 4 * How to Visualize a Matrix - Summer 1963 - Vol. VIII, No. 3 * Book Review: Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision - Winter 1963 - Vol. VIII, No. 1 * Soviet Communications Journals as Sources of Intelligence - August 1964 - Vol. IX, No. 3 * Use of Bayes Factors With a Composite Hypothesis - Fall 1964 - Vol. IX, No. 4 * A List of Properties of Bayes-Turing Factors - Spring 1965 - Vol. X, No. 2 * A Boer War Cipher - Summer 1965 - Vol. X, No. 3 and Fall 1965 - Vol. X, No. 4 * Something May Rub Off! - Winter 1965 - Vol. X, No. 1 * Time Is - Time Was - Time Is Past Computes for Intelligence - Winter 1965 - Vol. X, No. 1 * The Apparent Paradox of Bayes Factors - Winter 1965 - Vol. X, No. 1 * Extraterrestrial Intelligence - Spring 1966 - Vol. XI, No. 2 * Some Reminiscences - Summer 1966 - Vol. XI, No. 3 * Communications with Extraterrestrial Intelligence - Winter 1966 - Vol. XI, No. 1 * The Voynich Manuscript: "The Most Mysterious Manuscript in the World" - Summer 1967 - Vol. XII, No. 3 * Weather or Not - Encrypted? - Fall 1967 - Vol. XII, No. 4 * The Library and the User - Spring 1968 - Vol. XIII, No. 2 * Mokusatsu: One Word, Two Lessons - Fall 1968 - Vol. XIII, No. 4 * Key to The Extraterrestrial Messages - Winter 1969 - Vol. XIV, No. 1 * Curiosa Scriptorum Sericorum: To Write But Not to Communicate - Summer 1971 - Vol. XVI, No. 3 * Multiple Hypothesis Testing and the Bayes Factor - Summer 1971 - Vol. XVI, No. 3 * The Rosetta Stone and Its Decipherment - Winter 1971 - Vol. XVI, No. 1 * Writing Efficient FORTRAN - Spring 1972 - Vol. IX, No. 1 * The Strength of the Bayes Score - Winter 1972 - Vol. XVII, No. 1 * Q.E.D. - 2 Hours, 41 Minutes - Fall 1973, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 * Rochford's Cipher: A Discovery in Confederate Cryptography - Fall 1973, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 * Earliest Applications of the Computer at NSA - Winter 1973 - Vol. XVIII, No. 1 * Addendum to "A Cryptologic Fairy Tale" - Winter 1973 - Vol. XVIII, No. 1 * Some Principles of Cryptographic Security - Summer 1974 - Vol. XIX, No. 3 * Selected SIGINT Intelligence Highlights - Fall 1974 - Vol. XIX, No. 4 * Der Fall WICHER: German Knowledge of Polish Success on ENIGMA - Spring 1975 - Vol. XX, No. 2 * A Personal Contribution to the Bombe Story - Fall 1975 - Vol. XX, No. 4 * Spacecraft Passenger Television from Laika to Gagarin - Spring 1976 - Vol. XXI, No. 2 * The Voynich Manuscript Revisited - Summer 1976 - Vol. XXI, No. 3 * An Application of Cluster Analysis and Multidimensional Scaling to the Question of "Hands" and "Languages" in the Voynich Manuscript - Summer 1978 - Vol. XXIII, No. 3 * An Application of PTAH to the Voynich Manuscript - Spring 1979 - Vol. XXIV, No. 2 * German Radio Intelligence - Fall 1980 - Vol. XXV, No. 4 _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: whitehouse.gov/robots.txt
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> This robots.txt issue was exaggerated by leftist crtitics of the > administration. (This is not a general defense of the White House, > just a statement of fact.) The Bush WH.gov server has a special Iraq > section where press releases, speeches, etc. are reposted in a > different HTML template. The WH only wants the "master" copy indexed > and not the duplicate copy in the second template. Hence the apparent > weirdness in robots.txt. > > I have not found any skullduggery going on, though I suppose it > wouldn't hurt to keep a copy of the Iraq section for "diff" purposes > just in case. > > -Declan > > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2003 at 02:59:07PM +0200, Anatoly Vorobey wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2003 at 12:56:24PM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > > Can somebody with a webspider crawl these documents, and put it up > > > on the web? > > > > > > http://www.whitehouse.gov/robots.txt > > > > All or nearly all of them are duplicates of same documents > > elsewhere in the directory tree; "X/text/" and "X/iraq/" are > > supposed to be copies of "X/", with images removed in the first > > case. I suspect that downloading them all would just confirm that. > > > > -- > > avva

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