May 2006 - cypherpunks-legacy

AT&T Cable Modem Traceroutes Re: NS&AT&T
by Bill Stewart 18 May '06

18 May '06

At 10:20 AM 5/18/2006, Chris Olesch wrote: >Maybe its just me, but my brother-in-law and I used to wonder why most of >AT&T's cable traffic routed thru the east coast before going out west (or >asia). This would have been well within the range they decided to setup >camp. early 2002 thru 2003 (maybe 2004). On the MOT backbone traffic was >routed normally, yet at-home it took extra routes. Your traceroutes went to the east coast because that's the closest peering point to most of the destination networks you were going to, and BGP mainly works with hop counts unless you do a lot of tweaking. AT&T never really ran the cable TV IP networks themselves when they bought the cable companies - it was still the different cable company operating folks that did most of it, and really they knew a lot more about Pay-Per-View than Internet data, as you might guess from the Don't-Even-Think-About-Running-Servers rules. The level of lack of integration was such that even though most of the cable companies had huge infrastructures of dark fiber along their cable rights-of-way, we weren't able to use that to sell access services to customers until the last few months before Wall Street made us sell the cablecos and give the money back. AT&T did provide them a bunch of wholesale backbone service - I don't know most of the details, and probably couldn't tell you if I did because of the usual customer-confidentiality rules. But you've got to remember that 2002 is a long time ago compared to the current Internet peering relationships. Public Peering back then still mostly happened at the MAEs and NAPs, and still mattered back then, though most of the bigger ISPs did private peering for the bulk of their traffic.. I don't remember if everything had moved to Equinix yet. I don't know who @Home peered with other than AT&T - we peered with them in 9 or 10 cities, and typically peered with the really big ISPs in half a dozen cities each and the other big ISPs in 3-4 cities each, but I don't know how many of them @Home peered with. (AT&T peered with @Home in Chicago, but that doesn't mean that @Home peered with, say, UUnet there even if they could have.) AT&T had some OC192 backbone trunks in 2002, but mostly OC48 on big routes and there was still a fair amount of OC12, and most of the peering was at OC12 or OC3, which was still big back then. (We were the first carrier to run OC192 trunks, having scooped Sprint by a day or two, but for the first few months it was really a demo link from NYC-Boston that they only ran in the daytime for PR because the Cisco cards didn't really work yet...) >Tracert after tracert from within att's net, would mention long routes. It >would bounce 3 or 4 times go out the chicago trunk then end up on some cia, >or other federal line, then go back (but this time around chicago) and end >in cali. If our destination was Japan, or Siberia, the chat latency was >unbearable. > >I was glad when comcast took over, but then again maybe all this humdrum was >removed from the line (tracesrt's). Bouncing around Chicago 3-4 times was entirely no surprise - until carriers got really big hub switches in, you'd typically see at least three hops at any POP, one to an inbound router, one to a hub, and one to an outbound router, and the reason you don't see that today is that a lot of it's happening as Layer 2 Ethernet switching or Layer 2.5 MPLS switching depending on the carrier, so Traceroute doesn't know about it. And if you're going from carrier to carrier, you'll see more. And then there's annoying weirdness like connections from Carrier A in Denver going to Carrier B in Denver via Seattle and San Francisco because they don't peer directly there, but carrier B peers with Carrier C who's got an OC48 to Carrier A in Seattle and only an OC12 in SF so they hand it off there, and Carrier A connects Denver to SF and CHicago but not Seattle :-)

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Re: [Clips] UK Government to force handover of encryption keys
by Chris Olesch 18 May '06

18 May '06

I'm going to just lay-down and wait for the spaceship.....NOT!!! :0 On 18/05/06, R.A. Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> wrote: > > --- begin forwarded text > > > Delivered-To: rah(a)shipwright.com > Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com > Date: Thu, 18 May 2006 14:10:20 -0400 > To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> > From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> > Subject: [Clips] UK Government to force handover of encryption keys > Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com > Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com > > < > http://www.zdnet.co.uk/print/?TYPE=story&AT=39269746-39020330t-10000025c> > > > > > Government to force handover of encryption keys > > Tom Espiner > > ZDNet UK > > May 18, 2006, 12:10 BST > > The UK Government is preparing to give the police the authority to force > organisations and individuals to disclose encryption keys, a move which > has > outraged some security and civil rights experts. > > The powers are contained within Part 3 of the Regulation of > Investigatory > Powers Act (RIPA). RIPA was introduced in 2000, but the government has > held > back from bringing Part 3 into effect. Now, more than five years after > the > original act was passed, the Home Office is seeking to exercise the > powers > within Part Three of RIPA. > > Some security experts are concerned that the plan could criminalise > innocent people and drive businesses out of the UK. But the Home Office, > which has just launched a consultation process, says the powers > contained > in Part 3 are needed to combat an increased use of encryption by > criminals, > paedophiles, and terrorists. > > "The use of encryption is... proliferating," Liam Byrne, Home Office > minister of state told Parliament last week. "Encryption products are > more > widely available and are integrated as security features in standard > operating systems, so the Government has concluded that it is now right > to > implement the provisions of Part 3 of RIPA... which is not presently in > force." > > Part 3 of RIPA gives the police powers to order the disclosure of > encryption keys, or force suspects to decrypt encrypted data. > > Anyone who refuses to hand over a key to the police would face up to two > years' imprisonment. Under current anti-terrorism legislation, terrorist > suspects now face up to five years for withholding keys. > > If Part 3 is passed, financial institutions could be compelled to give > up > the encryption keys they use for banking transactions, experts have > warned. > > > > "The controversy here [lies in] seizing keys, not in forcing people to > decrypt. The power to seize encryption keys is spooking big business," > Cambridge University security expert Richard Clayton told ZDNet UK on > Wednesday. > > "The notion that international bankers would be wary of bringing master > keys into UK if they could be seized as part of legitimate police > operations, or by a corrupt chief constable, has quite a lot of > traction," > Clayton added. "With the appropriate paperwork, keys can be seized. If > you're an international banker you'll plonk your headquarters in > Zurich." > > Opponents of the RIP Act have argued that the police could struggle to > enforce Part 3, as people can argue that they don't possess the key to > unlock encrypted data in their possession. > > "It is, as ever, almost impossible to prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt' > that some random-looking data is in fact ciphertext, and then prove that > the accused actually has the key for it, and that he has refused a > proper > order to divulge it," pointed out encryption expert Peter Fairbrother on > ukcrypto, a public email discussion list. > > Clayton backed up this point. "The police can say 'We think he's a > terrorist' or 'We think he's trading in kiddie porn', and the suspect > can > say, 'No, they're love letters, sorry, I've lost the key'. How much > evidence do you need [to convict]? If you can't decrypt [the data], then > by > definition you don't know what it is," said Clayton. > > The Home Office on Wednesday told ZDNet UK that it would not reach a > decision about whether Part 3 will be amended until the consultation > process has been completed. > > "We are in consultation, and [are] looking into proposals on amendments > to > RIPA," said a Home Office spokeswoman. "The Home Office is waiting for > the > results of the consultation" before making any decisions, she said. > > The Home Office said last week that the focus on key disclosure and > forced > decryption was necessary due to "the threat to public safety posed by > terrorist use of encryption technology". > > Clayton, on the other hand, argues that terrorist cells do not use > master > keys in the same way as governments and businesses. > > "Terrorist cells use master keys on a one-to-one basis, rather than > using > them to generate pass keys for a series of communications. With a > one-to-one key, you may as well just force the terrorist suspect to > decrypt > that communication, or use other methods of decryption," said Clayton. > > "My suggestion is to turn on all of Part 3, except the part about trying > to > seize keys. That won't create such a furore in financial circles," he > said. > > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > _______________________________________________ > Clips mailing list > Clips(a)philodox.com > http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips > > --- end forwarded text > > > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > -- -G "The knack of flying is learning how to throw yourself at the ground and miss." "He felt that his whole life was some kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it." "He inched his way up the corridor as if he would rather be yarding his way down it..." "We demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!" "I love deadlines. I like the whooshing sound they make as they fly by." Famous Quotes written by Douglas Adams, (British comic writer, 1952-2001) http://hitchhikers.movies.go.com/

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[dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] No one on the planet will choose this voluntarily]
by Eugen Leitl 18 May '06

18 May '06

"self-destruct code for Blue-ray players"? Are they fucking nuts? ----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne(a)warpspeed.com> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] Workshop on Data Surveillance at Harvard on June 3rd]
by Eugen Leitl 18 May '06

18 May '06

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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Your account #7294245315
by Mamie Flynn 18 May '06

18 May '06

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dare counterproductive produce
by Carol Carlisle 18 May '06

18 May '06

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Fwd: [Clips] Re: [CYBERIA] Pres. Orders and Securities Act liability (strongly verging OT)
by coderman 18 May '06

18 May '06

thanks RAH, you save me much resource discovery time. exposed shareholders indeed. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: R.A. Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Date: May 17, 2006 6:36 PM Subject: [Clips] Re: [CYBERIA] Pres. Orders and Securities Act liability (strongly verging OT) To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah(a)shipwright.com Thread-Topic: Pres. Orders and Securities Act liability (strongly verging OT) Thread-Index: AcZ6A/JBF/buiOcZTWGMnGJvY6GkYQAFYwFF Priority: normal Date: Wed, 17 May 2006 21:22:13 -0400 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: Chris Savage <chris.savage(a)CRBLAW.COM> Subject: Re: [CYBERIA] Pres. Orders and Securities Act liability (strongly verging OT) To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM ________________________________ From: Law & Policy of Computer Communications on behalf of Ethan Ackerman Sent: Wed 5/17/2006 6:29 PM To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM Subject: Re: Pres. Orders and Securities Act liability (strongly verging OT) <snip> >>>>Second, I'm thinking that there's a problem here regarding consistency. If I have a material expenditure or liability (or, I suppose, revenue or income or investment) that may appropriately be kept secret under Section 78m(b)(3), then doesn't it follow logically that I will also exclude it from the financials I file with my 10Ks and 8Ks, etc.? Otherwise there will be a material mismatch between two publicly filed financial statements by the same company for the same period.<<<< >>-The exemption covers those documents too. Section 78m(b)(3) excuses non-compliance only with Section 78m(b)(2) - BUT that is itself the statutory authority for MOST of the SEC-required filings - including 10-Ks, 10-Qs, annual reports, Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements, etc. -- I should have made that more clear. Most all of the '34 Act (which covers publicly traded companies) rules are from 17 CFR Part 240 - and 78m(b)2 is the authority for most of those rules.<< So: Bottom line: If AT&T (or Verizon) got paid $1 billion from the spooks to do something, but got the right directive, they could simply not disclose that revenue on any SEC filing. Or, if they did something that exposed them to liability -- like violating relevant customer privacy requirements, and their normal obligation would be to disclose the liability and make a reserve for it, they just don't have to. If that's right, at the moment it seems to me that the shareholders of those companies are awfully exposed, aren't they....? Chris S. ************************************************************************ This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. ************************************************************************ ********************************************************************** For Listserv Instructions, see http://www.lawlists.net/cyberia Off-Topic threads: http://www.lawlists.net/mailman/listinfo/cyberia-ot Need more help? Send mail to: Cyberia-L-Request(a)listserv.aol.com ********************************************************************** --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

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by Paige Mobley 18 May '06

18 May '06

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by Antonia Mead 17 May '06

17 May '06

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Check out for HOT NEWS!!!
by Meredith Clifford 17 May '06

17 May '06

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