May 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

Reusable hashcash for spam prevention
by Anonymous 18 May '04

18 May '04

Recently someone proposed a system which combined ecash and hashcash for email postage. The effect is to get a form of reusable hashcash. Here is some analysis. There are already proposals and even some working code for hashcash email postage. See http://www.camram.org/. This is intended as an anti-spam measure. The idea is that to send email, the sender has to create a "proof of work" token, something which takes a relatively long time to compute but which can be checked quickly. The simplest proposal is a hash collision, as suggested by Adam Back at http://www.hashcash.org/. Spam filter software could be configured so that email containing a valid hashcash token would be presumptively viewed as non-spam. Most non-spammers have low volumes of outgoing mail and so they can generate the necessary hashcash at mail sending time, introducing only a modest delay. Spammers however rely on being able to send enormous volumes of email practically for free, so having to expend potentially several minutes of CPU time for each outgoing email would make their actions unprofitable. The alternative being proposed here is to let there be a way of exchanging hashcash tokens for ecash-like tokens at one or more trusted servers. These ecash tokens would not actually be "cash" any more than is hashcash, i.e. they would not have a specific monetary value, nor would the ecash servers exchange ecash tokens for cash. Rather, ecash tokens would be exchangeable only for other such tokens, and they could also be "purchased" with hashcash. These ecash tokens would then be used as a sort of postage stamp, instead of the straight hashcash tokens in Camram. There is not a particularly strong need for the ecash tokens to be blinded or unlinkable, since the value of them is so low. The servers just need a way to distinguish good and unspent ecash from bad or spent ecash. However if they are used and reused for email postage, allowing linkable tokens would show who was sending mail to whom, infringing email privacy. Hence it would be desirable for the tokens to be unlinkable, which will be possible after the Chaum patent expires in 2005. This is not a crypto anarchy system which would bring down the government and usher in a cypherpunk utopia. The value of these cash tokens would be small, pennies at best. However it represents an adaptation of ecash technology for a useful purpose and it would potentially introduce a limited form of cash-like tokens into widespread use. This system has pros and cons in terms of spam resistance, versus the straight hashcash approach. The biggest difference is that this system allows for effective reuse of tokens. You receive a token in an incoming email, you exchange it at the server for a new one (validating it in the process), and you use the new one to send out a message. Reuse is not possible with straight hashcash, because if people could reuse them, then people could double-spend them. If hashcash reuse were allowed, a spammer could generate a single hashcash token and put identical copies in all of his outgoing email. In order to prevent reuse, hashcash tokens must include enough information embedded in the hash collision to make them unique for a particular message. Typically this would include the recipient's email address, date/time information, and possibly even a message body hash. Hashcash verification involves checking not only the mathematical validity of the collision, but that these embedded fields are correct, as well. The implication of this requirement is that the hashcash token cannot be generated in advance, but must be created at the time the mail is sent. This reduces the acceptable amount of time required for a typical user to create it. If hashcash could be precomputed overnight, it might be okay to take even an hour to produce a token. But if it has to be done at mail sending time, only a much lower time limit will be acceptable. As a result, the size of hashcash collisions has to be set low enough for end users to generate a token in no more than a few seconds or minutes at most. And this increases the chance that spammers may be able to incorporate economies of scale and generate hashcash fast enough to make spamming still be economical. Some analyses suggest exactly this possibility - see for instance http://www.dtc.umn.edu/weis2004/clayton.pdf. Making hashcash reusable by exchanging it for ecash tokens would fix this problem. Instead of the hashcash including information within it to prevent double use, this would be handled by validating the ecash or hashcash at the server to make sure it had not been used before. Now, this means that the spam filter must make an Internet access to check validity, which was not necessary with straight hashcash. However, most spam filters today make many Internet accesses, to check black lists and other communal resources intended to fight spam. Adding a check to validate an ecash token would not change the basic functionality of the spam filter, or materially slow down its operation. Preventing reuse via this method means that hashcash will no longer have to embed the destination and mail-sending times as it does now. This will allow hashcash to be precomputed, and therefore much larger computation thresholds will be acceptable for widespread use. These larger thresholds will make the spammers' jobs that much harder. Another reason why a larger threshold will work is because people will have other ways of getting ecash tokens besides computing hashcash. The most obvious would be reusing tokens in incoming email. Anyone who gets about as many (non-spam) emails as he sends, which is probably the case for most people, would have little or no need to compute hashcash tokens. Spammers, however, send vastly more email than they receive, hence they would not be able to benefit from this shortcut. Switching from hashcash to ecash allows a single hashcash token to be the foundation for the ecash used to send many pieces of email, sequentially. This is another advantage of ecash: it is far less wasteful of compute resources. Hashcash is thrown away after each use. Ecash is conserved and reused. Eventually we may find that our computer cycles are important and valuable enough that wasting several minutes of computation on every outgoing email is unacceptable. In the long run we need something more like ecash than hashcash for email postage. If this system became widespread, it's likely that there will be another way of getting ecash tokens. You will be able to buy them. I proposed above that the ecash server would not be in the business of buying and selling, only exchange. But that wouldn't stop other people from selling ecash tokens. Initially this might be done on a small scale via eBay and Paypal, just like people sell virtual gold and armor from Everquest. Later companies could spring up which would sell tokens on a larger scale, all major credit cards accepted. The reason for such markets is that some people would have a need for many ecash tokens, and others would have a surplus of such tokens. People with extra tokens would include those who receive a lot of email; students and researchers who have access to unused server farms where they can generate many coins during off hours; and pirates who have broken into end user computers and commandeered them to compute coins, without the owners even knowing it. People who want to buy tokens would include legitimate businesses with opt-in email lists, and spammers. It may appear that this system will degenerate into one where hackers break into systems and generate coins, which are then sold to spammers. We would get the worst situation possible, where computer thieves have even more incentive than they do today to attack systems (since they will be able to make money at it), and spammers are still as much of a problem as ever. However, I don't see this outcome as likely. First, even if such a market appeared, the spammers wouldn't be getting their tokens for free. They'd still have to pay to get them from the computer hackers. Even a modest fee would enormously increase the per-message cost for the spammers, who are often sending tens of thousands of messages at a time. Spam is not going to be made profitable by such a market. And second, once people start to realize that their unused computer cycles are at least slightly valuable, they are more likely to take steps to protect them. Grad students who misuse server farms to generate stamps are going to get in trouble, once the Uni realizes that this is theft of something valuable. End user break-ins will be more noticeable if the system is busy all the time generating stamps, and owners will have more motivation to police their systems and keep them updated if they know they could be losing money. (I also believe that we will have much more secure end-user machines in a year or two with the next generation of software, which will make this even less of an issue.) What we are likely to see is that commercial email advertising will continue, but not in the form of the absurd, scatter-shot spam we see today, with ads for medications carefully misspelled to evade filters. For email advertising to be effective in the future, response rates must rise, which means it will be crafted and targeted. Your spam email will be on subjects that interest you, it will be legible and literate, and won't be such an annoyance. That seems like an acceptable balance between freedom of communication and efficient use of email. If we do see ecash postage being bought and sold for small sums, then it could evolve into a micropayment architecture good for other purposes as well. You're not going to be able to efficiently pay someone thousands of dollars for some illicit activity using two-penny stamps. But maybe you could send a few dozen stamps to a starving musician each time you download one of his songs, and that could make a difference for him if all his fans did that. There are other issues to consider, which are also discussed in the hashcash proposals. Over time the threshold for postage needs to be raised, as Moore's Law makes stamp generation cheaper. And users would have to instruct their spam filters to white-list any email lists they sign up for (a process which should be automated) as mailing list exploders wouldn't generate stamps for each subscriber. The biggest problem, of course, is belling the cat: convincing spam filter makers to include hashcash and/or ecash as a filtering mechanism, and providing options to include it in outgoing email. There is an IRTF (related to the IETF, the technical governing body of the Internet) task force studying anti-spam technology, http://asrg.sp.am/, and maybe someone could propose these ideas there for comment. It might be possible to write plugins based on the Camram work that could be used as a proof of concept. The technical implementation is not the hard part. The real work is in deciding whether this technology would accomplish our goals, and then convincing people that it is worthwhile installing it. Given that the spam problem shows no sign of abating, hopefully it will be possible to make progress on this issue.

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EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon
by R. A. Hettinga 17 May '04

17 May '04

<http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2004/0517euseeks.html> Network World Fusion EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon By Philip Willan IDG News Service, 05/17/04 The European Union is to invest $11 million ($13 million) over the next four years to develop a secure communication system based on quantum cryptography, using physical laws governing the universe on the smallest scale to create and distribute unbreakable encryption keys, project coordinators said Monday. If successful, the project would produce the cryptographer's holy grail -- absolutely unbreakable code -- and thwart the eavesdropping efforts of espionage systems such as Echelon, which intercepts electronic messages on behalf of the intelligence services of the U.S., the U.K., Canada, New Zealand and Australia. "The aim is to produce a communication system that cannot be intercepted by anyone, and that includes Echelon," said Sergio Cova, a professor from the electronics department of Milan Polytechnic and one of the project's coordinators. "We are talking about a system that requires significant technological innovations. We have to prove that it is workable, which is not the case at the moment." Major improvements in geographic range and speed of data transmission will be required before the system becomes a commercial reality, Cova said. "The report of the European Parliament on Echelon recommends using quantum cryptography as a solution to electronic eavesdropping. This is an effort to cope with Echelon," said Christian Monyk, the director of quantum technologies at the Austrian company ARC Seibersdorf Research and overall coordinator of the project. Economic espionage has caused serious harm to European companies in the past, Monyk said. "With this project we will be making an essential contribution to the economic independence of Europe." Quantum cryptography takes advantage of the physical properties of light particles, known as photons, to create and transmit binary messages. The angle of vibration of a photon as it travels through space -- its polarization -- can be used to represent a zero or a one under a system first devised by scientists Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984. It has the advantage that any attempt to intercept the photons is liable to interfere with their polarization and can therefore be detected by those operating the system, the project coordinators said. An intercepted key would therefore be discarded and a new one created for use in its place. The new system, known as SECOQC (Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography), is intended for use by the secure generation and exchange of encryption keys, rather than for the actual exchange of data, Monyk said. "The encrypted data would then be transmitted by normal methods," he said. Messages encrypted using quantum mechanics can currently be transmitted over optical fibers for tens of kilometers. The European project intends to extend that range by combining quantum physics with other technologies, Monyk said. "The important thing about this project is that it is not based solely on quantum cryptography but on a combination with all the other components that are necessary to achieve an economic application," he said. "We are taking a really broad approach to quantum cryptography, which other countries haven't done." Experts in quantum physics, cryptography, software and network development from universities, research institutes and private companies in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland will be contributing to the project, Monyk said. In 18 months project participants will assess progress on a number of alternative solutions and decide which technologies are the most promising and merit further development, project coordinators said. SECOQC aims to have a workable technology ready in four years, but will probably require three to four years of work beyond that before commercial use, Monyk said. Cova was more cautious: "This is the equivalent of the first flight of the Wright brothers, so it is too early to be talking already about supersonic transatlantic travel." The technological challenges facing the project include the creation of sensors capable of recording the arrival of photons at high speed and photon generators that produce a single photon at a time, Cova said. "If two or three photons are released simultaneously they become vulnerable to interception," he said. Monyk believes there will be a global market of several million users once a workable solution has been developed. A political decision will have to be taken as to who those users will be in order to prevent terrorists and criminals from taking advantage of the completely secure communication network, he said. "In my view it should not be limited to senior government officials and the military, but made available to all users who need really secure communications," Monyk said. Banks, insurance companies and law firms could be potential clients, Monyk said, and a decision will have to be made as to whether and how a key could be made available to law enforcement authorities under exceptional circumstances. "It won't be up to us to decide who uses our results," said Milan Polytechnic's Cova. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Iraq developments
by Justin 17 May '04

17 May '04

Politics in action... acting president of the Iraqi council is assassinated; coalition finds "small amounts of" sarin released from an exploding shell in Iraq. What's next, we steal all their remaining chemical weapons and bring them and our military home? -- "Not your decision to make." "Yes. But it's the right decision, and I made it for my daughter." - Bill, Beatrix; Kill Bill Vol. 2

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Vulnerability in the WinZip implimentation of AES?
by Dave Howe 17 May '04

17 May '04

http://www.cse.ucsd.edu/users/tkohno/papers/WinZip/ Abstract: WinZip is a popular compression utility for Microsoft Windows computers, the latest version of which is advertised as having "easy-to-use AES encryption to protect your sensitive data." We exhibit several attacks against WinZip's new encryption method, dubbed "AE-2" or "Advanced Encryption, version two." We then discuss secure alternatives. Since at a high level the underlying WinZip encryption method appears secure (the core is exactly Encrypt-then-Authenticate using AES-CTR and HMAC-SHA1), and since one of our attacks was made possible because of the way that WinZip Computing, Inc.~decided to fix a different security problem with its previous encryption method AE-1, our attacks further underscore the subtlety of designing cryptographically secure software.

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US to Collaborate With Interpol On Passport Data
by R. A. Hettinga 17 May '04

17 May '04

<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200405170340.html> US to Collaborate With Interpol On Passport Data This Day (Lagos) NEWS May 16, 2004 Posted to the web May 17, 2004 By Nneoma Ukeje-Eloagu Washington DC US Department of State weekend announced a new programme that would contribute substantially to worldwide travel document security and ability to impede the movement of terrorists and other criminals. To accomplish this, America is joining many other countries in providing current information on issued passports reported lost or stolen to the Interpol, lost and stolen document database which is available to border authorities worldwide. A statement from the department explained that under the programme, issued US passports, reported lost or stolen, are immediately invalidated, added to an electronic database, and may not be used for travel. However to protect the original passport holder's privacy, the name and biographical data from the passport would not be given to Interpol. Only the passport number, country of issuance and document type would be provided to Interpol. During the processing of travelers' documents at ports of entry, if a hit occurs against the Interpol database, the hit would be verified with US authorities before action is taken against the bearer of such a passport, the department further explained. Travel document fraud, including the fraudulent application and use of the US passport, represents a serious and growing threat to US national security and it is believe this new program is a significant step in the direction of curbing not only terrorism, but also identity theft and other types of identity fraud US citizens are encouraged to notify the department of the loss or theft of their passport at the earliest possible moment as a measure of preventing misuse of the document and identity theft. It said US citizens could obtain information on how to report a passport lost or stolen by consulting the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs website http://travel.state.gov while US citizens traveling or residing abroad should contact the nearest Embassy or Consulate abroad to report loss or theft of their passport. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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GoodIdea||BadIdea: Ayers Island Challenge?
by Nathan Fain 16 May '04

16 May '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,63316,00.html "This is going to push the envelope on a lot of fronts," said George Markowsky, president of Ayers Island LLC. "The goal is to detect anyone coming onto the island at any point, and to follow them if they exhibit suspicious behavior." When an envelope is pushed, especially in this case, it does so ALL fronts. The scenario is that *Man creates best-of surveillance and Good-vs-Evil differential/profiling system* with the reaction from this being *Evil changes to look more like Good*. Leaders and people alike often don't see validity in the second. Now don't get me wrong, I want the Ayers Island project to happen. I believe the work put in to this island and the boundaries it will push have already been pushed and are essential if not inevitable to happen in a more public manner. I'm just trying to find a way to use this to remind people of the forgotten effects. So, I'm curious if anyone would want to work together in building a simple online forum for chronicling the eventual subversion of their profiling system? The objective would be to track vulnerabilities in the methods used to determine "suspicious behavior" more so than technical vulnerabilities (such as, say, the fence system.) It would not be directly involved with any activity itself. Example content might be a story from someone that found a way to roam with a false ID, or no ID at all... or footage of reverse surveillance (see: http://wearcam.org/acm_mm96.htm ) fain://nathan http://cypherpoet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.3-nr1 (Windows XP) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFAp0ahveagdEkPM4ARAt2TAKCP/rB5ORnqId+dIAXlB1ivng1ljgCfdKSe qObiGrp0/K4ID/fkPW+jjKw= =j1JH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Card Seem at Risk? Try a Stunt Double
by R. A. Hettinga 16 May '04

16 May '04

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/16/business/yourmoney/16cred.html?th=&pagewa…> The New York Times May 16, 2004 SPENDING Card Seem at Risk? Try a Stunt Double By JENNIFER BAYOT FTER days of searching the Internet, Gen Tanabe of Palo Alto, Calif., found the rare 19th-century memoir he wanted to buy for his father for Christmas last year. But he had no intention of giving the Web site his credit card number. "The site looked like it might have been run by a teenager in a back room," said Mr. Tanabe, who writes books about college planning and financial aid. "I didn't know how secure it was, or what they would do" with the number. Online vendors typically encrypt credit card numbers at their Web sites, but the numbers must be decoded later to receive payment. And they are often stored in databases that may be vulnerable to hackers or dishonest employees long after the purchase. What if there was a way to fool those who would try to fool us, so that purchases could be made online without any danger of card numbers falling into the wrong hands? A few companies are trying such a plan: think of it as the stunt-double approach to online shopping. Anyone with a credit card from Citibank, MBNA or Discover can request a temporary account number for use when buying online, by telephone or mail order. The temporary numbers are linked to customers' real accounts, but they generally expire after one use, unless the cardholder requests otherwise - for example, by placing a spending limit on the number. Cardholders can get these numbers in one of two ways, depending on their issuer. They can download software that generates such numbers upon request or upon detecting that a cardholder is at the checkout page of an online retailer. Or, in the case of Citibank, which is owned by Citigroup, they can also register online, then revisit the company's site each time they want a new number. To avoid giving his real card number to that small online bookstore, Mr. Tanabe, 32, used a temporary number to buy the present for his father. "I probably wouldn't have bought it otherwise," he said. The temporary numbers can also prevent retailers from renewing purchases like magazine subscriptions or gym memberships without issuing reminders. Many customers forget that vendors may automatically charge their customers' credit cards for such recurring fees. Fraud remains a big concern for many online shoppers. In a survey of 12,000 consumers at the end of 2003, Forrester Research, based in Cambridge, Mass., found that about two-thirds were "very or extremely concerned" about the theft of their credit card numbers during online activity. Chris Hoofnagle, a lawyer for the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, says such temporary numbers ease those worries. Mr. Hoofnagle says he has used them himself, to prevent online retailers from keeping his card number in their files. "If the company stores your credit card number, that database just becomes a honey pot" for hackers, he said. The temporary numbers, he said, also make him more comfortable buying from newer or unfamiliar vendors. The free service has been available for more than a year, but few people seem to know about it. "I think if you interview 100 consumers, you'll find 100 consumers who've never heard of it," said John Gould, director of consumer lending and bank cards for the TowerGroup, a research company based in Needham, Mass., that was acquired recently by MasterCard. Industry analysts say consumers tend to rely on other protections - including the card companies' promise not to charge them for fraudulent transactions. Last month, in fact, American Express stopped offering its temporary-numbers program, called Private Payments, saying that other safety features already offered plenty of fraud protection. Some consumers may think that their credit card accounts are safe because retailers encrypt their card data at the time of purchase. Though the numbers may then be safe in transit, retailers must still decode the numbers to collect payment. Mr. Gould says it is impossible to ensure that all retailers take the next step: encrypting the numbers again, according to rules set by the card networks. "This is too big a territory to patrol; in the U.S. alone, you've got over 400,000 merchants online," he said. "You've always got the issue of the merchant who is careless. But the real problem is, you've got the merchant who's a fraudster, whose intent is to steal your information." ANALYSTS also suggest that the card issuers have done little to promote the feature because customers pay nothing for it. But the companies say that the numbers are still relatively new and need time to catch on, especially because their use requires some effort. "And since it's not being offered by every issuer, you just don't have the repetition or frequency to get people talking about it," said Steve Furman, director of marketing e-commerce at Discover Card. Although many consumers say they worry about fraud risks, some may not want to bother with temporary account numbers. "Consumers will tell you one thing and do another," said James F. McCarthy, senior vice president for emerging products at Visa. "There is only so much they will do to protect themselves." Citibank refers to its temporary numbers as virtual account numbers; information is available at www.citibank.com/us/cards/tour/ cb/shp_van.htm. Discover, meanwhile, calls them single-use numbers and offers them on its Deskshop page (www2.discovercard.com /deskshop). MBNA customers can create the numbers through the company's online ShopSafe program (www.mbnashopsafe.com) The companies have tried to make the numbers easier to use. A cardholder can now charge monthly phone bills and other recurring payments to the same disposable number, rather than entering a new one each time. Similarly, a cardholder can register a number with a favorite merchant for continued use only with that merchant. "You'll never need to reveal your actual credit card number again," said Amy Radin, executive vice president for the e-business unit of Citi Cards, a division of Citigroup. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Curb electronic surveillance abuses
by R. A. Hettinga 15 May '04

15 May '04

<http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpsch103794744may10,0,4385336,print.…> Newsday.com: WARRANTS PROVIDE GUARANTEES Curb electronic surveillance abuses As technological monitoring grows more prevalent, court supervision is crucial BY BRUCE SCHNEIER Bruce Schneier is chief technical officer of Counterpane Internet Security Inc. in Mountain View, Calif. He is the author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World." May 10, 2004 Years ago, surveillance meant trench-coated detectives following people down streets. Today's detectives are more likely to be sitting in front of a computer, and the surveillance is electronic. It's cheaper, easier and safer. But it's also much more prone to abuse. In the world of cheap and easy surveillance, a warrant provides citizens with vital security against a more powerful police. Warrants are guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and are required before the police can search your home or eavesdrop on your telephone calls. But what other forms of search and surveillance are covered by warrants is still unclear. An unusual and significant case recently heard in Nassau County's courts dealt with one piece of the question: Is a warrant required before the police can attach an electronic tracking device to someone's car? It has always been possible for the police to tail a suspect, and wireless tracking is decades old. The only difference is that it's now much easier and cheaper to use the technology. Surveillance will continue to become cheaper and easier - and less intrusive. In the Nassau case, the police hid a tracking device on a car used by a burglary suspect, Richard D. Lacey. After Lacey's arrest, his lawyer sought to suppress evidence gathered by the tracking device on the grounds that the police did not obtain a warrant authorizing use of the device and that Lacey's privacy was violated. It was believed to be the first such challenge in New York State and one of only a handful in the nation. A judge ruled Thursday that the police should have obtained a warrant. But he declined to suppress the evidence - saying the car belonged to Lacey's wife, not to him, and Lacey therefore had no expectation of privacy. More and more, we are living in a society where we are all tracked automatically all of the time. If the car used by Lacey had been outfitted with the OnStar system, he could have been tracked through that. We can all be tracked by our cell phones. E-ZPass tracks cars at tunnels and bridges. Security cameras record us. Our purchases are tracked by banks and credit card companies, our telephone calls by phone companies, our Internet surfing habits by Web site operators. The Department of Justice claims that it needs these, and other, search powers to combat terrorism. A provision slipped into an appropriations bill allows the FBI to obtain personal financial information from banks, insurance companies, travel agencies, real estate agents, stockbrokers, the U.S. Postal Service, jewelry stores, casinos and car dealerships without a warrant. Starting this year, the U.S. government is photographing and fingerprinting foreign visitors coming into this country from all but 27 other countries. CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) will probe the backgrounds of all passengers boarding flights. Over New Year's, the FBI collected the names of 260,000 people staying at Las Vegas hotels. More and more, the "Big Brother is watching you" style of surveillance is becoming a reality. Unfortunately, the debate often gets mischaracterized as a question about how much privacy we need to give up in order to be secure. People ask: "Should we use this new surveillance technology to catch terrorists and criminals, or should we favor privacy and ban its use?" This is the wrong question. We know that new technology gives law enforcement new search techniques, and makes existing techniques cheaper and easier. We know that we are all safer when the police can use them. And the Fourth Amendment already allows even the most intrusive searches: The police can search your home and person. What we need are corresponding mechanisms to prevent abuse. This is the proper question: "Should we allow law enforcement to use new technology without any judicial oversight, or should we demand that they be overseen and accountable?" And the Fourth Amendment already provides for this in its requirement of a warrant. The search warrant - a technologically neutral legal requirement - basically says that before the police open the mail, listen in on the phone call or search the bit stream for key words, a "neutral and detached magistrate" reviews the basis for the search and takes responsibility for the outcome. The key is independent judicial oversight; the warrant process is itself a security measure protecting us from abuse and making us more secure. Much of the rhetoric on the "security" side of the debate cloaks one of its real aims: increasing law enforcement powers by decreasing its oversight and accountability. It's a very dangerous road to take, and one that will make us all less secure. The more surveillance technologies that require a warrant before use, the safer we all are. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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The Doghouse: IQ Networks (Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, May 15, 2004)
by R. A. Hettinga 15 May '04

15 May '04

At 3:46 AM -0500 5/15/04, Bruce Schneier wrote: > The Doghouse: IQ Networks > > > >In general, the Doghouse is a showcase for stupid security companies or >products. Snake-oil cryptography, nonsense computer security, that >sort of thing. But this month we have something different: a company >committing out-and-out fraud. > >IQ Networks claims to have an impressive advisory board: Ross Anderson, >Mihir Bellare, Steve Bellovin, Shafi Goldwasser, Peter Gutmann, Doug >Stinson, Ron Rivest, and Markus Kuhn. Unfortunately, none of these >people had ever heard of the company. Nor did they agree to have >content of theirs on the site. They also claim to be involved with the >Honeynet Project -- none of the Honeynet guys had ever heard of them -- >and Password Safe: I've never heard of them, either. > >They have an impressive customer list. I'll bet anything that all of >them are fabrications, too. Oh; they're under investigation by SANS >for pirating SANS training material. > >The rest of the site is also amusing, with a lot of generic security >gobbledygook and not a whole lot of information. The company claims to >do pretty much anything. > >Would you buy your security services from a company that lies about, >um, everything? > > >Website: ><http://www.iq-net-works.com/> > >Customer list (hard to find, and will probably be deleted soon): ><http://www.iq-net-works.com/clientes_english.html> > >Peter Gutmann sent this link to me a few weeks ago, and has challenged >the company about their use of his name. In response, the company has >pulled their list of technical advisors from its website. It forgot, >however, to pull the list from the Spanish website. ><http://www.iq-net-works.com/spanish/equipo.html> >Look quickly, I expect it will be gone soon. > >You can also look them up on archive.org, which has saved the company's >list of advisors (also in Spanish) from 2003. (This website is great >for finding old versions of webpages, or webpages that are no longer >around.) ><http://web.archive.org/web/20030705082011/www.iq-net-works.com/equipo.h >tml> or <http://tinyurl.com/2dbwj> -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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#331: 05-14-04 DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE, HOMELAND SECURITY ANNOUNCE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FILE-SHARING CRACKDOWN
by R. A. Hettinga 15 May '04

15 May '04

<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_crm_331.htm> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FRIDAY, MAY 14, 2004 WWW.USDOJ.GOV CRM (202) 514-2008 TDD (202) 514-1888 DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE, HOMELAND SECURITY ANNOUNCE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FILE-SHARING CRACKDOWN Law Enforcement Initiative Targets Child Pornography Over Peer-To-Peer Networks WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Securityms U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Forces today announced a national law enforcement initiative aimed at combating the growing volume of illegal child pornography distributed through peer-to-peer (P2P) file trafficking computer networks. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Assistant Attorneys General Christopher A. Wray of the Criminal Division and Deborah Daniels of the Office of Justice Programs, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Michael J. Garcia, FBI Deputy Assistant Director Keith Lourdeau, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Administrator J. Robert Flores and Sgt. Scott Christensen of the Nebraska State Patrol announced the initiative at a news conference this afternoon in Washington. The law enforcement operation, which began in the Fall of 2003, has already resulted in the execution of hundreds of searches nationwide, and the identification of thousands of suspect computers used to access the child pornography. The FBI, ICE and the ICACs have opened more than 1,000 domestic investigations into the distribution and possession of child pornography and conducted more than 350 searches. More than 65 individuals have been arrested and charged with crimes to date as a result of this law enforcement effort, with coordination by the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorneysm Offices across the country. These cases have charged not only offenses related to the possession and distribution of child pornography, but also sexual abuse of children. Further, the investigations have identified several individuals who have previously been convicted of sex offenses and several registered sex offenders. lNo one should be able to avoid prosecution for contributing to the abuse and exploitation of the nationms children,n said Attorney General Ashcroft. lThe Department of Justice stands side-by-side with our partners in the law enforcement community to pursue those who victimize our children under the perceived, but false, cloak of anonymity that the peer-to-peer networks provide.n lThis aggressive, multi-jurisdictional enforcement action will help bring justice to those who exploit our children,n said Assistant Attorney General Wray. lThis is an impressive demonstration of how law enforcement can effectively address the problem of technology being used to commit illicit and abhorrent crimes against children.n lThe men and women of state and local law enforcement who comprise the 39 Internet Crimes Against Children task forces are to be commended for their efforts that have resulted in over 50 arrests nationwide,n said Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs. lThe unprecedented cooperation of law enforcement to track the sale and trade of child pornography over the Internet has made this country a safer place for our children.n lTodayms announcement sends a clear message that the digital environment will not offer sanctity to those pedophiles who lurk in peer-to-peer networks. We will identify you. We will pursue you. We will bring you to justice,n said FBI Director Robert Mueller. lTodayms announcement also raises public awareness to the inherent risks associated with file-sharing networks. Parents must know that access to these networks is free and exposure to child pornography is often a frightening reality.n lICE will use its technical expertise and its legal authorities to target those who would purchase child pornography over the internet or trade in those despicable images," said Michael J. Garcia, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. lBy partnering with our colleagues at the Department of Justice and in local and state law enforcement, we will uncover these transactions and bring the offenders out of the anonymity of cyberspace and into a court of law.n lAs individuals we have a responsibility to provide love and guidance to our children; as a society, we have a collective duty to defend our children from predators who would stalk them,n said J. Robert Flores, Administrator for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. lThe Internet Crimes Against Children task forces were developed to prevent child abuse and punish abusers and this joint effort between local and federal law enforcement will send a strong message to those who would exploit our children.n The multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional P2P initiative, combining the resources of federal, state and local law enforcement, is part of an ongoing effort to keep pace with emerging technologies that are being used to commit, facilitate and even hide crimes. Unlike traditional computer networks, which employ the use of a server to exchange files, peer-to-peer networks allow users to connect their computers directly to one another, without the use of a central server. Once a user installs a peer-to-peer software application on his or her computer, he or she can directly access and search the files designated for distribution on any of the computers that are using the network at that moment in time, and then download desired files to his or her computer. Investigators and agents from the participating agencies used several techniques - including undercover work - to infiltrate the P2P networks and identify those who have distributed and taken possession of child pornography images. Several cases illustrate the scope of the P2P law enforcement operation: * Investigators in California, working with the Wyoming Attorney Generalms Office, Division of Criminal Investigation, identified a P2P client named Pedokiller. Jimmy Richard Morrison, a 40-year-old male from Modesto, California, allegedly had countless images of underage girls on the wall of his bedroom. A search of his computer revealed thousands of images of child pornography, along with photos and videos from actual victims. Morrison admitted knowingly distributing images of child pornography, and when asked why he used the P2P network to distribute images, he replied, lBecause the cops are in the chat rooms.n Morrison was indicted in the Federal District Court of Wyoming for distribution of child pornography, and also charged with other criminal offenses in the Eastern District of California. The suspect is in custody in California pending trial. * Following a P2P investigation by the Nebraska State Patrol, Jeremiah Zalesky of Lincoln, Nebraska, was arrested on state charges of sexually assaulting a child after evidence developed that Zalesky allegedly molested the young daughter of a couple with whom he had been staying. A subsequent search of his computer found 10 images of child pornography. * An FBI investigation in New York led to the identification of a subject who allegedly distributed, received and possessed child pornography using P2P networks. The investigation also found that the subject, Matthew Fling, allegedly molested two girls, ages 6 and 8, during the past four years. An examination of the subjectms computer revealed hundreds of child pornographic images and movies. In February 2004, Fling was indicted in the Northern District of New York on federal charges child pornography charges, and he was arrested in March 2004. State Police officials are handling the sexual abuse allegations. * Earlier this week, a federal grand jury in Houston, Texas, indicted 28-year-old Stephen Alan Gardner on charges of distributing images of child pornography from his home computer, and possession of child pornography. According to court documents, a file containing movies depicting children being sexually assaulted had been made available for sharing from a computer at Gardnerms home using a P2P software program. Gardner is currently being held without bond in the Harris County, Texas, jail on charges filed in the state of Colorado involving the sexual assault of a six-year-old child. * During the course of a multi-state investigation, ICE agents in Arizona received child pornography from a peer-to-peer application user who they later identified as 19-year-old Marlon Winston. During the investigation, Winston indicated that he started using peer-to-peer applications to access music, but later moved on to images and movies of child pornography. Winston used simple search terms to find the materials, and noted that his habit grew by ljust clickingn image after image. Winston was arrested in December 2003, and pleaded guilty to child pornography charges in February of this year. On May 12, 2004, Winston was sentenced to 37 months in prison and three years' supervised release. Winston will be required to register as a sex offender upon his release from prison. Individuals arrested and charged in connection with this initiative are, of course, presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. The maximum federal sentence for the distribution of child pornography is 20 years in prison. The PROTECT Act, enacted on April 30, 2003, also created a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison for this crime. If an individual committed a prior sex abuse offense, the mandatory minimum is 15 years in prison and the statutory maximum is 40 years. The following is a brief rundown of the roles played by various agencies in the P2P operation: Internet Crimes Against Children Task Forces In 1998, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) of the Department of Justice funded ICAC Task Forces in jurisdictions all over the country. There are 39 task forces comprised of more than 175 law enforcement agencies. The 39 ICAC Task Forces conducted an undercover investigation code-named lOperation Peerlessn to investigate the distribution of child pornography over the Internet. Undercover operations have identified more than 3,000 computers worldwide sharing child pornography using the P2P networks. To date, ICACs efforts have resulted in the execution of more than 196 search warrants, and 50 arrests. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security In September 2003, investigators at the ICE Cyber Crime Center in Virginia initiated a P2P operation known as lOperation Peer Pursuitn to target individuals who exchange child pornography images over the Internet using P2P networks. Working with investigators in ICE offices nationwide, ICACs and other law enforcement agencies, ICE investigators have opened 213 cases, identified 46 foreign leads, executed 72 search warrants and arrested 10 individuals responsible for trading tens of thousands of images of child pornography. Operation Peer Pursuit is an outgrowth of Operation Predator, ICEms comprehensive, nationwide initiative designed to protect young people from pedophiles, human traffickers and other predatory criminals. Since its inception in July 2003, Operation Predator has resulted in the arrest of more than 2,600 child sex predators nationwide. The Federal Bureau of Investigation As part of the FBIms P2P operation, codenamed lPeer Pressure,n FBI agents and prosecutors from the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Justice Department developed a protocol for investigating the distribution of images of child pornography through P2P networks. Agents, acting in an undercover capacity, were able to successfully conduct 166 on-line sessions in P2P networks, targeting individuals who were openly offering multiple child pornography images. Of the 106 subjects identified as a result of the FBI investigation, 32 were determined to have had access to children, three were registered sex offenders and 23 had criminal histories. Most importantly, FBI agents identified and rescued eight children who had been molested. The FBI operation has led to 103 searches to date, the arrest of seven subjects and nine indictments. The Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Criminal Division, U.S. Attorneysm Offices Through the coordinated efforts of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Criminal Division and 29 U.S. Attorneysm Offices across the country, more than a dozen defendants have been charged with federal crimes related to child pornography trafficking over P2P networks. For further information about the P2P operations, please contact the following offices: * Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, (202) 514-2007 * Office of Justice Programs, for information about ICAC, Office of Communications, (202) 307-0703 * Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Public Affairs, (202) 324-3691 * Department of Homeland Securityms Immigration and Customs Enforcement, (202) 514-2648 ### 04-331 -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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