May 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key server
by lynn.wheeler＠firstdata.com 20 May '04

20 May '04

yahoo draft internet standard for using DNS as a public key server http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-delany-domainkeys-base-00.txt misc past news refs: http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release1143.html http://blogs.ittoolbox.com/linux/technologist/archives/000241.asp http://www.computerweekly.com/Article127082.htm http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5164279.html http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/32995.html a few past threads on using DNS as a public key server http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#pkiart2 Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact... http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay4.htm#comcert2 Merchant Comfort Certificates http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay4.htm#comcert4 Merchant Comfort Certificates http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#gaopki4 GAO: Government faces obstacles in PKI security adoption http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki2 Software for PKI http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki10 Software for PKI http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki11 Software for PKI http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki12 Software for PKI http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki14 DNSSEC (RE: Software for PKI) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki16 DNSSEC (RE: Software for PKI) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#cfppki5 CFP: PKI research workshop http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#28 SSL, client certs, and MITM (was WYTM?) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#31 some certification & authentication landscape summary from recent threads http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#81 SSL certs & baby steps http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#82 SSL certs & baby steps (addenda) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#37 Who's afraid of Mallory Wolf? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#40 Why trust root CAs ? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#8 Server authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#9 Server authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#36 solicit advice on purchase of digital certificate http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#41 solicit advice on purchase of digital certificate http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#26 Can I create my own SSL key? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#40 Can I create my own SSL key? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#46 Can I create my own SSL key? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#2 Root certificates http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#19 Root certificates http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#3 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#37 CA Certificate Built Into Browser Confuse Me http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#57 Certificate Authentication Issues in IE and Verisign http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#56 PKI and Relying Parties http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#64 SSL certificate modification http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#65 SSL certificate modification http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#18 Cirtificate Authorities 'CAs', how curruptable are they to http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#19 Cirtificate Authorities 'CAs', how curruptable are they to http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#36 Proposal for a new PKI model (At least I hope it's new) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#43 Proposal for a new PKI model (At least I hope it's new) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#51 Proposal for a new PKI model (At least I hope it's new) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#53 Proposal for a new PKI model (At least I hope it's new) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#60 Proposal for a new PKI model (At least I hope it's new) -- Internet trivia, 20th anv: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

[mises] praxeology and game theory
by Pro-Choice 20 May '04

20 May '04

Today, in Managerial Economics, the professor talked about Game Theory. The subject made me hark back to "Austrian Economics and Game Theory: a Stocktaking" at http://tinyurl.com/2vyna. I also thought of *The Games Economists Play*, by Murphy, at http://tinyurl.com/2vgoq. I see some interesting elements of value in game theory. Fundamentally, it appears to be strongly influenced by praxeology, human action, as is indicated in the basic Prisoner's Dilemna. Furthermore, though Murphy notes that game theory has been used to justify state intervention (because the Nash-equilibrium is not the optimum cooperation), there are also those who have used game theory to argue against State intervention. See *The Possibility of Cooperation* by Michael Taylor. Anyways, a cruel alternative to prisoner's dilemna occured to me in the class. This was not really my own creation, but I remembered it from Baldur's Gate II. * If both push their buttons, both die. * If neither push their buttons, both die. * If one of them pushes their button, but the other doesn't, the one who did not push the button dies. * Each of them has one hour to decide whether or not to push the button * Neither of them can see whether the other is about to or has pushed his or her button Obviously, this is a one-shot "game", so we need not considder repeated games. The following outcome table emerges (in each cell, the first listed outcome is what happens to A, the second listed one is what happens to B, given the inputs, which are the row and column headers: A --------------------------------------------- | | Push | Don't Push | |-------------|------------|----------------| | Push | D,D | D,L | B |-------------|------------|----------------| | Don't Push | L,D | D,D | --------------------------------------------- (clearly, this is a game that you don't want to play) At first, it appears that there are only three possible outcomes (I will not differentiate between them both dying from them both pushing, or them both dying from them both not pushing): D,D: A dies, B dies D,L: A dies, B lives L,D: A lives, B dies -------------------------- The Game Theorist Analysis -------------------------- The game theorist analysis, I would guess, would go as follows. A would prefer that A lives, B that B lives. A's analysis of the situation would go something like this: If A does not push the button, A will most certainly die, whether B pushes the button or not. However, if A pushes the button, he will live if B does not push the button, though he will die if B also pushes the button. It is at least conceivable to A -- albeit unlikely -- that if he pushes the button, he will survive. B's analysis proceeds in exactly the same manner. Thus, if each wishes for himself to live, both A and B will push the button. The Nash equilibrium is that they would both push the button, and thus that they should both die. In short, if they each picks the strategy that they see as allowing for the possibility that their-selves could live, they both will die. According to this standard line of game theory reasoning, it is impossible that either of them could live. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- In the following, I will list possible ordinal preference rankings for A and B in a list, with the most preferred outcome at the top of the list, progressively going towards less preferred outcomes. This seems to be simple, but in fact the list becomes rather long once you realize that it is perfeclty *possible* that A could prefer D,D, or that A could be indifferent between the three outcomes, or between two ofthe outcomes. In the case where there is indifference between two or three outcomes, they are listed side-by-side In the case where A is indifferent between two or three outcomes, that indifference cannot explain why he either pushes a button or does not push a button. I am aware that preference can only be revealed through action, and that indifference *cannot* be illustrated by action. These ordinal preferences I am listing are not all praxeological preferences, because action can only illustrate preference, not indifference. They are, rather, preferences from a prior psychological point of view. Praxeological ordinal rankings can only be revealed via action. This is an exhaustive list of all possible ordinal rankings. If I am either A or B, I know which ranking I prefer: 1 2 3 4 5 6 D,L D,L L,D L,D D,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,D L,D D,L D,D L,D D,L 7 8 9 D,L L,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D 10 11 12 L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,L L,D D,D 13 D,D D,L L,D Immediately, a problem with game-theory is apparent. It goes beyond economics and into psychology. From all I've heard, game theory seems to concern itself only with one possibility: A would want to live, and B would want to live. This cannot be an acceptable assumption. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- >From a praxeologically significant standpoint, ordinal preference rankings can only be revealed through action. However, in this case, it can only be deduced what one *does not* prefer based on one's button pushing: If A pushes the button, what can we deduce? Not much, unless we make certain assumptions. Strictly speaking, if A pushes the button, all that we can deduce is that his highest valued outcome was *not* D,L -- that he dies and B lives. There are two possible reasons why A pushed the button: (1) he preferred that both of them should die (D,D); or (2) he preferred that he should live and B should die (L,D). Thus, from the following actions by A or B, in this case, we can only deduce what they do not prefer: A pushes button: Does not prefer D,L A does not push button: Does not prefer L,D B pushes button: Does not prefer L,D B does not push button: Does not prefer D,L --------------------------------- Some Problems with Game Theorists --------------------------------- It seems to me that game theorists -- not game theory itself -- have some problems from the start. Namely, they go beyond economics and into psychology, making assumptions which can hardly be assumed to be univeral. The game theorist would assume that A would want the L,D outcome and B would want the D,L outcome. However, why does that need to be so? Let's consider one possible preference which everyone seems to reject off-hand: D,D. Let's say that A and B were married. It is possible to think that both, then, would place the highest value on outcome D,D, as both know that neither would want to live without the other. Once we accept that the fact that it is possible that A and B may have any of the listed 13 value scales, the normal game theory analysis is completely exploded, and this seemingly "simple" example becomes unbelievably complex. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises Sponsor: www.mises.org Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: mises-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer --On the eve of Britain's entry into World War II: "If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may be even a worse fate. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.

1 0

[mises] praxeology and game theory
by Pro-Choice 20 May '04

20 May '04

Today, in Managerial Economics, the professor talked about Game Theory. The subject made me hark back to "Austrian Economics and Game Theory: a Stocktaking" at http://tinyurl.com/2vyna. I also thought of *The Games Economists Play*, by Murphy, at http://tinyurl.com/2vgoq. I see some interesting elements of value in game theory. Fundamentally, it appears to be strongly influenced by praxeology, human action, as is indicated in the basic Prisoner's Dilemna. Furthermore, though Murphy notes that game theory has been used to justify state intervention (because the Nash-equilibrium is not the optimum cooperation), there are also those who have used game theory to argue against State intervention. See *The Possibility of Cooperation* by Michael Taylor. Anyways, a cruel alternative to prisoner's dilemna occured to me in the class. This was not really my own creation, but I remembered it from Baldur's Gate II. * If both push their buttons, both die. * If neither push their buttons, both die. * If one of them pushes their button, but the other doesn't, the one who did not push the button dies. * Each of them has one hour to decide whether or not to push the button * Neither of them can see whether the other is about to or has pushed his or her button Obviously, this is a one-shot "game", so we need not considder repeated games. The following outcome table emerges (in each cell, the first listed outcome is what happens to A, the second listed one is what happens to B, given the inputs, which are the row and column headers: A --------------------------------------------- | | Push | Don't Push | |-------------|------------|----------------| | Push | D,D | D,L | B |-------------|------------|----------------| | Don't Push | L,D | D,D | --------------------------------------------- (clearly, this is a game that you don't want to play) At first, it appears that there are only three possible outcomes (I will not differentiate between them both dying from them both pushing, or them both dying from them both not pushing): D,D: A dies, B dies D,L: A dies, B lives L,D: A lives, B dies -------------------------- The Game Theorist Analysis -------------------------- The game theorist analysis, I would guess, would go as follows. A would prefer that A lives, B that B lives. A's analysis of the situation would go something like this: If A does not push the button, A will most certainly die, whether B pushes the button or not. However, if A pushes the button, he will live if B does not push the button, though he will die if B also pushes the button. It is at least conceivable to A -- albeit unlikely -- that if he pushes the button, he will survive. B's analysis proceeds in exactly the same manner. Thus, if each wishes for himself to live, both A and B will push the button. The Nash equilibrium is that they would both push the button, and thus that they should both die. In short, if they each picks the strategy that they see as allowing for the possibility that their-selves could live, they both will die. According to this standard line of game theory reasoning, it is impossible that either of them could live. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- In the following, I will list possible ordinal preference rankings for A and B in a list, with the most preferred outcome at the top of the list, progressively going towards less preferred outcomes. This seems to be simple, but in fact the list becomes rather long once you realize that it is perfeclty *possible* that A could prefer D,D, or that A could be indifferent between the three outcomes, or between two ofthe outcomes. In the case where there is indifference between two or three outcomes, they are listed side-by-side In the case where A is indifferent between two or three outcomes, that indifference cannot explain why he either pushes a button or does not push a button. I am aware that preference can only be revealed through action, and that indifference *cannot* be illustrated by action. These ordinal preferences I am listing are not all praxeological preferences, because action can only illustrate preference, not indifference. They are, rather, preferences from a prior psychological point of view. Praxeological ordinal rankings can only be revealed via action. This is an exhaustive list of all possible ordinal rankings. If I am either A or B, I know which ranking I prefer: 1 2 3 4 5 6 D,L D,L L,D L,D D,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,D L,D D,L D,D L,D D,L 7 8 9 D,L L,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D 10 11 12 L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,L L,D D,D 13 D,D D,L L,D Immediately, a problem with game-theory is apparent. It goes beyond economics and into psychology. From all I've heard, game theory seems to concern itself only with one possibility: A would want to live, and B would want to live. This cannot be an acceptable assumption. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- >From a praxeologically significant standpoint, ordinal preference rankings can only be revealed through action. However, in this case, it can only be deduced what one *does not* prefer based on one's button pushing: If A pushes the button, what can we deduce? Not much, unless we make certain assumptions. Strictly speaking, if A pushes the button, all that we can deduce is that his highest valued outcome was *not* D,L -- that he dies and B lives. There are two possible reasons why A pushed the button: (1) he preferred that both of them should die (D,D); or (2) he preferred that he should live and B should die (L,D). Thus, from the following actions by A or B, in this case, we can only deduce what they do not prefer: A pushes button: Does not prefer D,L A does not push button: Does not prefer L,D B pushes button: Does not prefer L,D B does not push button: Does not prefer D,L --------------------------------- Some Problems with Game Theorists --------------------------------- It seems to me that game theorists -- not game theory itself -- have some problems from the start. Namely, they go beyond economics and into psychology, making assumptions which can hardly be assumed to be univeral. The game theorist would assume that A would want the L,D outcome and B would want the D,L outcome. However, why does that need to be so? Let's consider one possible preference which everyone seems to reject off-hand: D,D. Let's say that A and B were married. It is possible to think that both, then, would place the highest value on outcome D,D, as both know that neither would want to live without the other. Once we accept that the fact that it is possible that A and B may have any of the listed 13 value scales, the normal game theory analysis is completely exploded, and this seemingly "simple" example becomes unbelievably complex. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises Sponsor: www.mises.org Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: mises-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer --On the eve of Britain's entry into World War II: "If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may be even a worse fate. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.

1 0

[mises] praxeology and game theory
by Pro-Choice 20 May '04

20 May '04

Today, in Managerial Economics, the professor talked about Game Theory. The subject made me hark back to "Austrian Economics and Game Theory: a Stocktaking" at http://tinyurl.com/2vyna. I also thought of *The Games Economists Play*, by Murphy, at http://tinyurl.com/2vgoq. I see some interesting elements of value in game theory. Fundamentally, it appears to be strongly influenced by praxeology, human action, as is indicated in the basic Prisoner's Dilemna. Furthermore, though Murphy notes that game theory has been used to justify state intervention (because the Nash-equilibrium is not the optimum cooperation), there are also those who have used game theory to argue against State intervention. See *The Possibility of Cooperation* by Michael Taylor. Anyways, a cruel alternative to prisoner's dilemna occured to me in the class. This was not really my own creation, but I remembered it from Baldur's Gate II. * If both push their buttons, both die. * If neither push their buttons, both die. * If one of them pushes their button, but the other doesn't, the one who did not push the button dies. * Each of them has one hour to decide whether or not to push the button * Neither of them can see whether the other is about to or has pushed his or her button Obviously, this is a one-shot "game", so we need not considder repeated games. The following outcome table emerges (in each cell, the first listed outcome is what happens to A, the second listed one is what happens to B, given the inputs, which are the row and column headers: A --------------------------------------------- | | Push | Don't Push | |-------------|------------|----------------| | Push | D,D | D,L | B |-------------|------------|----------------| | Don't Push | L,D | D,D | --------------------------------------------- (clearly, this is a game that you don't want to play) At first, it appears that there are only three possible outcomes (I will not differentiate between them both dying from them both pushing, or them both dying from them both not pushing): D,D: A dies, B dies D,L: A dies, B lives L,D: A lives, B dies -------------------------- The Game Theorist Analysis -------------------------- The game theorist analysis, I would guess, would go as follows. A would prefer that A lives, B that B lives. A's analysis of the situation would go something like this: If A does not push the button, A will most certainly die, whether B pushes the button or not. However, if A pushes the button, he will live if B does not push the button, though he will die if B also pushes the button. It is at least conceivable to A -- albeit unlikely -- that if he pushes the button, he will survive. B's analysis proceeds in exactly the same manner. Thus, if each wishes for himself to live, both A and B will push the button. The Nash equilibrium is that they would both push the button, and thus that they should both die. In short, if they each picks the strategy that they see as allowing for the possibility that their-selves could live, they both will die. According to this standard line of game theory reasoning, it is impossible that either of them could live. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- In the following, I will list possible ordinal preference rankings for A and B in a list, with the most preferred outcome at the top of the list, progressively going towards less preferred outcomes. This seems to be simple, but in fact the list becomes rather long once you realize that it is perfeclty *possible* that A could prefer D,D, or that A could be indifferent between the three outcomes, or between two ofthe outcomes. In the case where there is indifference between two or three outcomes, they are listed side-by-side In the case where A is indifferent between two or three outcomes, that indifference cannot explain why he either pushes a button or does not push a button. I am aware that preference can only be revealed through action, and that indifference *cannot* be illustrated by action. These ordinal preferences I am listing are not all praxeological preferences, because action can only illustrate preference, not indifference. They are, rather, preferences from a prior psychological point of view. Praxeological ordinal rankings can only be revealed via action. This is an exhaustive list of all possible ordinal rankings. If I am either A or B, I know which ranking I prefer: 1 2 3 4 5 6 D,L D,L L,D L,D D,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,D L,D D,L D,D L,D D,L 7 8 9 D,L L,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D 10 11 12 L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,L L,D D,D 13 D,D D,L L,D Immediately, a problem with game-theory is apparent. It goes beyond economics and into psychology. From all I've heard, game theory seems to concern itself only with one possibility: A would want to live, and B would want to live. This cannot be an acceptable assumption. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- >From a praxeologically significant standpoint, ordinal preference rankings can only be revealed through action. However, in this case, it can only be deduced what one *does not* prefer based on one's button pushing: If A pushes the button, what can we deduce? Not much, unless we make certain assumptions. Strictly speaking, if A pushes the button, all that we can deduce is that his highest valued outcome was *not* D,L -- that he dies and B lives. There are two possible reasons why A pushed the button: (1) he preferred that both of them should die (D,D); or (2) he preferred that he should live and B should die (L,D). Thus, from the following actions by A or B, in this case, we can only deduce what they do not prefer: A pushes button: Does not prefer D,L A does not push button: Does not prefer L,D B pushes button: Does not prefer L,D B does not push button: Does not prefer D,L --------------------------------- Some Problems with Game Theorists --------------------------------- It seems to me that game theorists -- not game theory itself -- have some problems from the start. Namely, they go beyond economics and into psychology, making assumptions which can hardly be assumed to be univeral. The game theorist would assume that A would want the L,D outcome and B would want the D,L outcome. However, why does that need to be so? Let's consider one possible preference which everyone seems to reject off-hand: D,D. Let's say that A and B were married. It is possible to think that both, then, would place the highest value on outcome D,D, as both know that neither would want to live without the other. Once we accept that the fact that it is possible that A and B may have any of the listed 13 value scales, the normal game theory analysis is completely exploded, and this seemingly "simple" example becomes unbelievably complex. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises Sponsor: www.mises.org Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: mises-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer --On the eve of Britain's entry into World War II: "If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may be even a worse fate. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.

1 0

[mises] praxeology and game theory
by Pro-Choice 20 May '04

20 May '04

Today, in Managerial Economics, the professor talked about Game Theory. The subject made me hark back to "Austrian Economics and Game Theory: a Stocktaking" at http://tinyurl.com/2vyna. I also thought of *The Games Economists Play*, by Murphy, at http://tinyurl.com/2vgoq. I see some interesting elements of value in game theory. Fundamentally, it appears to be strongly influenced by praxeology, human action, as is indicated in the basic Prisoner's Dilemna. Furthermore, though Murphy notes that game theory has been used to justify state intervention (because the Nash-equilibrium is not the optimum cooperation), there are also those who have used game theory to argue against State intervention. See *The Possibility of Cooperation* by Michael Taylor. Anyways, a cruel alternative to prisoner's dilemna occured to me in the class. This was not really my own creation, but I remembered it from Baldur's Gate II. * If both push their buttons, both die. * If neither push their buttons, both die. * If one of them pushes their button, but the other doesn't, the one who did not push the button dies. * Each of them has one hour to decide whether or not to push the button * Neither of them can see whether the other is about to or has pushed his or her button Obviously, this is a one-shot "game", so we need not considder repeated games. The following outcome table emerges (in each cell, the first listed outcome is what happens to A, the second listed one is what happens to B, given the inputs, which are the row and column headers: A --------------------------------------------- | | Push | Don't Push | |-------------|------------|----------------| | Push | D,D | D,L | B |-------------|------------|----------------| | Don't Push | L,D | D,D | --------------------------------------------- (clearly, this is a game that you don't want to play) At first, it appears that there are only three possible outcomes (I will not differentiate between them both dying from them both pushing, or them both dying from them both not pushing): D,D: A dies, B dies D,L: A dies, B lives L,D: A lives, B dies -------------------------- The Game Theorist Analysis -------------------------- The game theorist analysis, I would guess, would go as follows. A would prefer that A lives, B that B lives. A's analysis of the situation would go something like this: If A does not push the button, A will most certainly die, whether B pushes the button or not. However, if A pushes the button, he will live if B does not push the button, though he will die if B also pushes the button. It is at least conceivable to A -- albeit unlikely -- that if he pushes the button, he will survive. B's analysis proceeds in exactly the same manner. Thus, if each wishes for himself to live, both A and B will push the button. The Nash equilibrium is that they would both push the button, and thus that they should both die. In short, if they each picks the strategy that they see as allowing for the possibility that their-selves could live, they both will die. According to this standard line of game theory reasoning, it is impossible that either of them could live. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- In the following, I will list possible ordinal preference rankings for A and B in a list, with the most preferred outcome at the top of the list, progressively going towards less preferred outcomes. This seems to be simple, but in fact the list becomes rather long once you realize that it is perfeclty *possible* that A could prefer D,D, or that A could be indifferent between the three outcomes, or between two ofthe outcomes. In the case where there is indifference between two or three outcomes, they are listed side-by-side In the case where A is indifferent between two or three outcomes, that indifference cannot explain why he either pushes a button or does not push a button. I am aware that preference can only be revealed through action, and that indifference *cannot* be illustrated by action. These ordinal preferences I am listing are not all praxeological preferences, because action can only illustrate preference, not indifference. They are, rather, preferences from a prior psychological point of view. Praxeological ordinal rankings can only be revealed via action. This is an exhaustive list of all possible ordinal rankings. If I am either A or B, I know which ranking I prefer: 1 2 3 4 5 6 D,L D,L L,D L,D D,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,D L,D D,L D,D L,D D,L 7 8 9 D,L L,D D,D L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D 10 11 12 L,D D,D D,D D,L D,L L,D D,L L,D D,D 13 D,D D,L L,D Immediately, a problem with game-theory is apparent. It goes beyond economics and into psychology. From all I've heard, game theory seems to concern itself only with one possibility: A would want to live, and B would want to live. This cannot be an acceptable assumption. -------------------------------------------------- Possible Psychological Ordinal Preference-Rankings -------------------------------------------------- >From a praxeologically significant standpoint, ordinal preference rankings can only be revealed through action. However, in this case, it can only be deduced what one *does not* prefer based on one's button pushing: If A pushes the button, what can we deduce? Not much, unless we make certain assumptions. Strictly speaking, if A pushes the button, all that we can deduce is that his highest valued outcome was *not* D,L -- that he dies and B lives. There are two possible reasons why A pushed the button: (1) he preferred that both of them should die (D,D); or (2) he preferred that he should live and B should die (L,D). Thus, from the following actions by A or B, in this case, we can only deduce what they do not prefer: A pushes button: Does not prefer D,L A does not push button: Does not prefer L,D B pushes button: Does not prefer L,D B does not push button: Does not prefer D,L --------------------------------- Some Problems with Game Theorists --------------------------------- It seems to me that game theorists -- not game theory itself -- have some problems from the start. Namely, they go beyond economics and into psychology, making assumptions which can hardly be assumed to be univeral. The game theorist would assume that A would want the L,D outcome and B would want the D,L outcome. However, why does that need to be so? Let's consider one possible preference which everyone seems to reject off-hand: D,D. Let's say that A and B were married. It is possible to think that both, then, would place the highest value on outcome D,D, as both know that neither would want to live without the other. Once we accept that the fact that it is possible that A and B may have any of the listed 13 value scales, the normal game theory analysis is completely exploded, and this seemingly "simple" example becomes unbelievably complex. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises Sponsor: www.mises.org Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mises/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: mises-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer --On the eve of Britain's entry into World War II: "If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may be even a worse fate. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.

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Re: 3. Proof-of-work analysis
by Adam Back 20 May '04

20 May '04

Here's a forward of parts of an email I sent to Richard with comments on his and Ben's paper (sent me a pre-print off-list a couple of weeks ago): One obvious comment is that the calculations do not take account of the CAMRAM approach of charging for introductions only. You mention this in the final para of conclusions as another possible. My presumption tho don't have hard stats to measure the effect is that much of email is to-and-fro between existing correspondents. So if I were only to incur the cost of creating a stamp at time of sending to a new recipient, I could bear a higher cost without running into limits. However the types of levels of cost envisaged are aesthetically unpleasing; I'd say 15 seconds is not very noticeable 15 mins is noticeable and 1.5 hrs is definately noticeable. Of course your other point that we don't know how spammers will adapt is valid. My presumption is that spam would continue apace, the best you could hope for would be that it is more targetted, that there are financial incentives in place to make it worth while buying demographics data. (After all when you consider the cost of sending junk paper mail is way higher, printing plus postage, and yet we still receive plenty of that). Also as you observe if the cost of spamming goes up, perhaps they'll just charge more. We don't know how elastic the demand curve is. Profitability, success rates etc are one part of it. There is an interplay also: if quantity goes down, perhaps the success rate on the remaining goes up. Another theory is that a sizeable chunk of spam is just a ponzi scheme: the person paying does not make money, but a lot of dummy's keep paying for it anyway. Another potential problem with proof-of-work on introductions only, is that if the introduction is fully automated without recipient opt-in, spammers could also benefit from this amortized cost. So I would say something like the sender sent a proof-of-work, and the recipient took some positive action, like replying, filing otherwise than junk or such should be the minimum to get white-listed. On the ebiz web site problem, I think these guys present a problem for the whole approach. An ebiz site will want to send lots of mail to apparent new recipients (no introductions only saving), a popular ebiz site may need to send lots of mail. Well it is ebiz so perhaps they just pass the cost on to the consumer and buy some more servers. Another possibility is the user has to opt-in by pre-white-listing them, however the integration to achieve this is currently missing and would seem a difficult piece of automation to retrofit. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a spammer is the imbalance between mail sent and mail received. Unfortunately I do not see a convenient way to penalize people who fall into this category. Also because of network effect concerns my current hashcash deployment is to use it as a way to reduce false positives, rather than directly requiring hashcash. Well over time this could come to the same thing, but it gives it a gentle start, so we'll see how long it is before the 1st genuine spam with hashcash attached. CAMRAM's approach is distinct and is literally going straight for the objective of bouncing mail without some kind of proof (hashcash or reverse-turing, or short term ability to reply to email challenge-response). Adam Richard Clayton wrote: > [...] Ben Laurie) and I have recently > been doing some sums on proof-of-work / client puzzles / hashcash > methods of imposing economic constraints upon the sending of spam... > > Ben wanted to know how big a proof was needed for a practical scheme > he was considering -- and I told him it wasn't going to work. We then > carefully worked through all the calculations, using the best data > that we could obtain -- and we did indeed come to the conclusion that > proof-of-work is not a viable proposal :( > Paper: > > http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/proofwork.pdf

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Mixmaster Protocol Draft (revision)
by R. A. Hettinga 19 May '04

19 May '04

--- begin forwarded text

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New changes
by Shamrock 19 May '04

19 May '04

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/octet-stream which had a name of Readme.com]

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Re: [ISN] Safe and insecure
by Major Variola (ret) 19 May '04

19 May '04

At 12:06 PM 5/19/04 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: >--- begin forwarded text > >http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004/05/18/safe_and_insecure/index.html > >By Micah Joel >May 18, 2004 > >Last week, I turned off all the security features of my wireless >router. I removed WEP encryption, disabled MAC address filtering and >So why am I doing this? In a word, privacy. By making my Internet Plausible deniability its called. There's also the 802.11b freenet movements, a serious experiment/implementation of free access. (Some perhaps are facetious but some are real.) You could fly a flag of the warchalking symbol. Or put a decal on your window. As evidence of your freenet intent. Practically, you could buy another AP, set it up "secure", and use that for your own access. Not a bad recycling of old .11b-only APs, setting up free hotspots. Interference should be small, even if your parallel, secured AP system (which probably supports more modern cards/protocols/bands) has to drop down to the same .11b that your freenet uses. Its also a bit of a honeypot and sniffer. Its like putting an extension of your phone on the street, limited to free local calls only, but obviously capable of recording all calls. (A rather interesting art/experiment..) Could lead to trouble before the trial though. Like being an anon email endpoint. YMMV. IANAL.

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RE: EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon
by Trei, Peter 19 May '04

19 May '04

Tom Shaddack wrote: > On Tue, 18 May 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: > > > "Monyk believes there will be a global market of several > million users once > > a workable solution has been developed. A political > decision will have to > > be taken as to who those users will be in order to prevent > terrorists and > > criminals from taking advantage of the completely secure > communication > > network, he said." > > Hope the technology hits the streets fast enough after getting on the > market. Monyk apparently doesn't believe that people who > don't have the > money to buy the Official Approval have no right to access to this > technology. Actually, I read this as the sort of puffery we more often see from the snake-oil vendors; "Our proprietary Auto Generated One Time Pad (TM) crypto is soooo strong that the government may ban it - get it while you can!" Peter

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