May 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: MailVault to sell of user mail, PGP keys (was: MailVault.com for auction (LFCity dissolution)]
by Trei, Peter 02 May '03

02 May '03

> LFCFA[SMTP:webmaster@lfcfa.org] writes: > > For seven years, the Laissez Faire City International Trust built and > planned Laissez Faire City, the first sovereign international city > domiciled in cyberspace. In 2002, Laissez Faire City closed its > doors. Since then, important steps have been taken to bring the > organization to a just and final dissolution. This week, we are > taking one of the final steps in that process: to auction off > remaining assets, both intellectual and physical property. > > Among the properties available for public bidding is Mailvault(R), > the first private, PGP-encrypted e-mail service on the Internet. The > LFCIT supported and funded the Mailvault(R) service; as of April > 2003, more than 5000 users take advantage of Mailvault's fast, easy, > PGP-enabled service to keep their communications private. > Mailvault(R) itself, as well as several other domain names, software > projects and more, are all available for sale during this sale. We > hope that this auction will help us settle accounts with our > creditors, and find new homes for these projects. > > The auction is available to the public at http://www.lfcfa.org > starting now. Bids will be accepted on items or lots listed for sale, > from now until Monday, May 5th 2003, at 5:00pm CST. Following an > internal deliberation period, winners will be announced at the > http://www.lfcfa.org web site on Friday evening, May 9th 2003. > I took a peek at the items on sale. Of particular interest to privacy buffs is Item U1 (see https://www.lfcfa.org/auction/prop.aspx) 4.User Data ITEM: U1 Mailvault service user data DESCRIPTION: all manner of user data currently stored in the Mailvault system - this includes user accounts, stored mail, PGP keys. If I were a Mailvault customer, I would find this perturbing. Peter Trei Disclaimer: My opinons! No one elses!

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Re: Fake News for Big Brother
by Nomen Nescio 02 May '03

02 May '03

> On February 14, a Florida Appeals court ruled there is absolutely > nothing illegal about lying, concealing or distorting information by a > major press organization. The court reversed the $425,000 jury verdict > in favor of journalist Jane Akre who charged she was pressured by Fox > Television management and lawyers to air what she knew and documented > to be false information. The ruling basically declares it is technically > not against any law, rule, or regulation to deliberately lie or distort > the news on a television broadcast. It's significant that a United States Court of Appeals has a stronger commitment to the First Amendment than supposed arch-libertarian Tim May. Look at May's response when confronted with the idea that a newspaper has the right to print what it chooses: > But the journalist and his editors are still alive. > > When they have been necklaced and lit, we can rest easier. > > Burning down the entire newspaper office would maybe be overkill, but, > hey, what the hell. > > Fuck them dead. That's right: Tim May believes people should be tortured and killed for saying the wrong thing in their own newspaper. Apparently he believes that he has the right to set rules which everyone else must follow in what they say, under penalty of a horrific death. Needless to say, nothing could be further from the letter and spirit of the First Amendment. Thank God for the protection of anonymity. With people like Tim May throwing around death threats towards those who say the wrong thing, this may soon be the only way we can communicate without fear. Please join me in condemning this savage trampling on principles supported by all men of honor.

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Re: Fake News for Big Brother
by James A. Donald 02 May '03

02 May '03

-- On 30 Apr 2003 at 12:00, David Howe wrote: > Which of the two will 98% of the public believe, and which > will be derided as a crackpot theory (hint, the answer isn't > "whichever is true") > > remember that more than half of americans are firmly > convinced saddam was responsible for 9/11 You are demented. This much reported fact is not a fact. You, not americans, live in a deranged world of your own. Very few americans believe saddam was responsible for 9/11. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG nyGGBaDcPbxvHeeaxPrVstyxhpCdk2/CSYXN8x5i 4eP9dWr2HeA5nEHeHmfVREVaoq4YL32ytKew35bN3

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Re: Making Money in Digital Money
by James A. Donald 02 May '03

02 May '03

-- On 1 May 2003 at 10:20, Sunder wrote: > Really they are? If Joe P2P User wants to hear a Metallica > song, does he really give a shit who signed it and said it > was authentic? Is it the signature or the song what he's > after? Go find some P2P users and ask them. My library is nearly all old songs. I would value some source of good songs, whose recommendation was sufficient for me to try something I had not heard -- indeed, if there was some convenient way to make micropayments, I would put a quarter in their player, to see what was playing. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG a53K6g90F+W3lpSUE83AfxHTo1Jjzh1726kciUj4 4u/+InWapRqXUJ813rOSnG1spl5BFB7d7cL5k0qEQ

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Re: patriotism considered evil
by James A. Donald 02 May '03

02 May '03

-- On 30 Apr 2003 at 11:15, Tim May wrote: > Of course, this isn't a survey of the _prevalence_ or > _magnitude_ of the claims, but it's an example that at least > some Brits on the pro-war side are using slurs about the > patriotism of the opponents. Galloway was paid the equivalent of half a million US dollars a year by Saddam, and that is why they think him unpatriotic. By the way, every time I defend free trade and so called sweatshops, I ask Nike to put me on their payroll, but so far they have not replied. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG N0mPTEGvv6f4r9v6Qj1IzfvUzTngQhZTpTfgWkS3 4PzoR0ZyFqhFp3kizgfP+09cN94WufYCU4JLEIpZg

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stuff
by Shawn K. Quinn 02 May '03

02 May '03

This message contains the word "fuck" just to trip the silly content filter at uspto.gov. Have a nice day. -- Shawn K. Quinn

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NOWAR - Showdown in Texas, Teach-ins, and More (fwd)
by Jim Choate 01 May '03

01 May '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2003 10:33:17 -0500 From: NOWAR <worker-nowar(a)lists.tao.ca> To: nowar(a)lists.tao.ca Subject: NOWAR - Showdown in Texas, Teach-ins, and More Hello, all. More information about the Showdown in Texas, which will happen this weekend. Also a correction on the location of tonight's event. On Wednesday, April 30, at 7:00 pm, there will be a teach-in on "Enhancing Democracy? Why the U.S. Military Won't Bring Democracy to the World." Speakers include UT History Professor Geoffrey Schad, speaking on Syria; Communications Professor Dana Cloud; and Rahul Mahajan of the Nowar Collective, author of the forthcoming "Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond" (http://www.sevenstories.com/Book/index.cfm?GCOI=58322100353810) Location: UT Campus, Gearing 105 (Gearing is at 24th and University. http://www.utexas.edu/maps/main/buildings/gea.html) On Saturday, May 3, the Showdown in Texas commences (other related events will already be in progress -- see http://www.showdowntx.com/html/schedule.html) The Showdown rally is a demand for human security, not "homeland" security: funding for healthcare, housing, education and jobs; environmental sustainability; protection of civil liberties for citizens, immigrants and indigenous peoples, a moratorium on the death penalty, and an end to US military interventions and war at home and abroad. Starting at 11:00 am at least 6 issue marches starting in different locations (see http://www.showdowntx.com/html/schedule.html for details) will converge at the Capitol at High Noon for an opening rally. This rally will be followed by a mass march past some of the top defense industry contractors located in downtown Austin and end up back at the Capitol for a Festival of Love and Resistance. The main events are at the State Capitol: 12:00 noon. Opening rally with a large slate of national speakers, including Lucius Walker of Pastors for Peace, Medea Benjamin of Global Exchange (http://www.globalexchange.org) Cheri Honkala of the Kensington Welfare Rights Union, and Rania Masri. 1:15 Military Reality March - participants will march past some of the downtown corporate and military defense contractors and back to the Capitol building. 3:00-5:00 pm - Festival of love and Resistance. More speakers, music, and a special guest star. Also poets, breakdancers, low riders, and much more. On Sunday, May 4, from 6:00-8:00pm, there will be a teach-in on "The Texas Military-Industrial Complex: Profiting from War and Occupation." This event is associated with the Showdown. Speakers will talk about Lockheed Martin, Dyncorp, the role of oil in the Military-Industrial Complex, and the connection of Texas to the occupations of Palestine and Iraq. Speakers include Rahul Mahajan of the Nowar Collective, author of the forthcoming "Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond" (http://www.sevenstories.com/Book/index.cfm?GCOI=58322100353810) Stefan Wray (http://www.iconmedia.org/mdp) and Quent Reese. Location: UT Campus, Jester Auditorium, 21st and Speedway, across Speedway from the Perry-Castaneda Library. All events are free and open to the public. Please forward where appropriate. In Solidarity, the Nowar Collective

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Re: Anonglish (was: Re: Authenticating Meat)
by John Kelsey 01 May '03

01 May '03

At 08:41 AM 4/30/03 -0400, Sunder wrote: >According to Schneier doing this is a bad idea - (or so I recall from the >A.P. book which I've not reread in quite a while - I may be wrong) if you >use the same (or similar) cypher. i.e.: > >blowfish(blowfish(plaintext,key1),key2) is bad, Nope. As long as key1 and key2 are independent, this can't make things worse if the cipher is any good. Suppose there is no attack on blowfish(plaintext,key1), but there is an attack on blowfish(blowfish(plaintext,key1),key2) when the two keys are independent. As an attacker, you automatically get an attack on blowfish(plaintext,key1) from this, by just choosing a random key2, encrypting the ciphertext from single-blowfish with that key, and then forgetting key2 and applying your attack on double-blowfish. --John Kelsey, kelsey.j(a)ix.netcom.com PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259

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Re: Quarantines may be justified
by Harmon Seaver 01 May '03

01 May '03

On Thu, May 01, 2003 at 11:47:49AM -0400, Sunder wrote: > > Point is that street, and that air is not your property, it's shared > property - and hence not subject to your whims, likes and distates, but > upto the community to decide its usage. If a large enough population who > uses said street wishes to smoke there, then the whims of a small minority > of who are offended by second hand smoke should not force the rules to > be changed. > You've got it exactly backwards -- it's only a small (and decreasing as well) portion of the population that smokes, and it's the majority who don't want to breath the second-hand smoke. That's why the mayor of NYC is able to get away with banning smoking in bars and restaurants. Get over it -- public smoking is going to be banned everywhere, plenty of cities have already banned it in restaurants, public buildings, etc. It's only a matter of time before it's also banned on the street, and there are already proposed laws being considered to do just that. -- Harmon Seaver CyberShamanix http://www.cybershamanix.com

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Re: Making Money in Digital Money
by Nomen Nescio 01 May '03

01 May '03

Zem writes: > Alice the music critic buys copies of new content at relatively high > prices from the creator, or close sources. When Bob requests a copy of > a particular file, Alice encrypts it to Bob's public key and signs the > encrypted copy, selling him this 'reviewed' copy for reproduction cost + > profit. Bob can verify he's received a good copy, but he can't > redistribute Alice's reviewed version without revealing his secret key. Four points: First, I want to reiterate that the original idea of the so-called "recursive auction" is fatally flawed. Apparently Eric Hughes was aware of this, but it never sunk into Bob Hettinga's thick head. All this talk of editing and reputation is a different idea with a different goal. The original recursive auction was simple, as Hettinga described it: you sell the first copy for a lot, the next for somewhat less, the next for even less, and so on. That doesn't work. End of story. Second, your idea above for preventing redistribution doesn't work. Aside from the workaround you came up with, using a throw-away encryption key, it is easy to redistribute the signed data. When the file was encrypted to Bob's key, using PK cryptography, what actually happens is that a single-use key is generated, which we'll call K. This is a symmetric crypto key, like for AES or 3DES. K is encrypted with Bob's public key, and then the file is encrypted using K. So all Bob has to do is to reveal K when he redistributes the Alice-signed, encrypted file. This allows everyone to read the data and see that Alice did sign it in encrypted form. The fact that K produces a meaningful decryption of the AES encrypted file is itself proof that K is valid, but if more is needed, it is easy to release additional information to prove that K is a valid decryption of the PK encrypted part. Third, there are better cryptographic ways to do what you want. You can use Chaum's designated confirmer signatures, which Alice can issue such that only Bob can confirm the signature. Or you could use the ring signatures from Rivest et al, which produce a file which could have been signed either by Alice or Bob, meaning that when Bob redistributes it there is no actual evidence that Alice signed it. (That's how the designated confirmer signatures work, too.) Neither of these approaches requires the data to be encrypted, just signed. Or even simpler, Alice can avoid signing entirely, making the file available for download to subscribers who authenticate with SSL. The key exchange in this case involves Bob sending K to Alice, encrypted with her public key; and the fact that she decrypts it proves to Bob that she is who she claims. But this is not a transferable proof because Bob could have forged it all. Fourth, Eric Hughes pointed out the fundamental flaw in this whole approach, many years ago. As others have pointed out, Bob can simply distribute Alice's files under his own name, and quickly gain a reputation for faithfully passing along Alice's information. If Alice threatens to cancel subscribers who do this, Bob redistributes under a different identity. Now we are back to watermarking to try to figure out which subscribers are passing along her reports, with all the countermeasures and counter-countermeasures that entails. There is no evidence that the content protector can expect to win such a battle.

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