May 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Court will decide if police need warrant for GPS 'tracking'
by Major Variola (ret) 13 May '03

13 May '03

I read somewhere that the original wiretap laws were motivated when police bugged a phone booth (fishing), and snared someone placing a bet. The court held that there was an expectation of privacy. Interesting to see what they say now. Segues nicely with the CALEA/cellphone locator tech too. http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/121572_gps12.html Monday, May 12, 2003 Court will decide if police need warrant for GPS 'tracking' By KATHY GEORGE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER William Bradley Jackson worried that he hadn't properly concealed his victim's shallow grave. So he snuck away one quiet fall day to finish the job, unaware that sheriff's deputies had secretly attached a satellite tracking device to his truck. Police trickery triumphed over his treachery. Spokane County sheriff's investigators used the hidden device to retrace Jackson's path to the gravesite, where they found crucial evidence that would lead to his murder conviction in 2000. But what if the same secret technology, called global positioning satellite tracking, could track anyone at any time? The Washington Supreme Court will decide soon whether police agencies throughout the state may use the device freely -- without a warrant. The Jackson case is the first in the state dealing with the issue. "Do we really want the ability to track everybody all the time, without any suspicion, or without probable cause?" asked Doug Klunder, a Seattle attorney who wrote an amicus brief, or friend of the court, in the case on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington. "How close are we to Big Brother?" Many law enforcement agencies, including the King County Sheriff's Office and King County Prosecutor's Office, believe no warrant is needed for the tracking devices. That's because they simply record electronically what anyone could see by following a vehicle on the public streets. "We'd be shocked if the court said otherwise," said King County sheriff's spokesman Kevin Fagerstrom. In Jackson's case, the state Court of Appeals in Spokane agreed no warrant was needed. The court's opinion last year said, "A law officer could legally follow Mr. Jackson's vehicles on public thoroughfares .... The GPS devices made Mr. Jackson's vehicles visible or identifiable as though the officers had merely cleaned his license plates, or unobtrusively marked his vehicles and made them plain to see." Critics of the Spokane court's opinion say there's a big difference between following someone's real-time movements and recording them for computer analysis later. "There's just something that feels more underhanded about it," said Klunder. It's not just government abuse the ACLU fears. Stalkers could use GPS to find their victims, and jealous husbands could use it to spy on their wives. "If the police can do it without a warrant, then presumably a private citizen can, too," Klunder said. <snip>

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Ames, Hanssen, Stakeknife
by Major Variola (ret) 13 May '03

13 May '03

"If it is true that Stakeknife was the head of [IRA] internal security, then it is a major coup for the British," http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030512-043253-8646r (Yank megamedia notices what cryptome.org's had for days..) Yep, just like counter intel chiefs Aldrich Ames and Bob Hanssen. Funny how CI/"internal security" attracts double agents... Stakeknife was only an eighth-of-million US$ a year, much cheaper than the CIA & FBI's moles were to the CCCP, but living expenses are probably cheaper in N. Ireland than in D.C. ---- "Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent" -- John Maynard Keynes RNA virii can mutate faster than you can sequence it

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Trusted Computing at WEIS2003
by Nomen Nescio 12 May '03

12 May '03

The 2nd annual workshop on "Economics and Information Security" will be held May 29-30 at the University of Maryland. Unfortunately the website at http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/rhsmith3/index.html is woefully out of date. At least two of the papers will focus on Trusted Computing as exemplified in the TCG (formerly TCPA) and NGSCB (former Palladium) proposals. Ross Anderson himself, co-chair and founder of the conference, has a new paper at http://www.ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/tcpa.pdf. Another one, by Stuart Schechter et al, is discussed at an EWeek article, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,1053555,00.asp. The Schechter paper is online at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~stuart/papers/eis03.pdf. EWeek talks about the role of TC in limiting which applications get access to protected content: "This kind of protection is seen as central to the types of advanced digital rights management systems sought by content owners as a countermeasure against piracy. However, this chain of trust can be turned around and used by the people doing the illegal copying and distribution, according to the paper's authors." The authors are quoted, "Though this technology was envisioned to thwart pirates, it is exactly what a peer-to-peer system needs to ensure that no client application can enter the network unless that application, and the hardware and operating system it is running on, has been certified by an authority trusted by the existing clients..." A similar point was made here last summer during our extensive debate about the potential threat of Trusted Computing. It would be fair to say that it was not well received, however. Perhaps now that the ideas are being aired in an academic environment, people will take a closer look at TC and gain a fuller understanding of the technology. Even Ross Anderson recognizes that TC can help the pirates as well as the protectors: "There is also a significant risk - that if TC machines become pervasive, they can be used by the other side just as easily. Users can create `blacknets' for swapping prohibited material of various kinds, and it will become easier to create peer-to-peer systems like gnutella or mojonation but which are very much more resistant to attack by the music industry - as only genuine clients will be able to participate. The current methods used to attack such systems, involving service denial attacks undertaken by Trojanned clients, will not work any more [23]. So when TC is implemented, the law of unintended consequences could well make the music industry a victim rather than a beneficiary." Anderson's paper is a significant improvement on his bizarrely paranoid and error-filled FAQ. He's had to back down on a number of his claims. For example, Windows Server 2003 implements some DRM and document-locking features which he attributed to Palladium. He also seems to back away from claims that Microsoft will censor your data. He has to squirm to deal with the work on TC Linux and try to explain how this fits into his model of the monopolizing influence of these technologies. Anderson now has to admit that his claims of a software blacklist are mistaken as well: "Among early TCPA developers, there was an assumption that blacklist mechanisms would extend as far as disabling all documents created using a machine whose software licence fees weren't paid. Having strong mechanisms that embedded machine identifiers in all files they had created or modified would create huge leverage. Following the initial public outcry, Microsoft now denies that such blacklist mechanisms will be introduced - at least at the NGSCB level [18]." Notice the claim that Microsoft has perhaps removed this feature based on public outcry - an outcry for which Ross Anderson can no doubt take credit. This fulfils a prediction made here last year, that when their apocalyptic scenarios failed to arrive, the critics would take credit for having prevented them! What a racket - if you're right, you're right, and if you're wrong, you're even more right. While this newer paper is better than the abysmal FAQ (which unfortunately is still spreading its lies and misinformation, even though Anderson now admits that he knows it is wrong), it has significant flaws as well. All the analysis is presented from the perspective that businesses can do whatever they like and consumers have no choice but to go along helplessly. Not once does he consider that the discipline of the marketplace applies to sellers as well as buyers. Any paper claiming to be relevant to the topic of "Economics and Information Security" should not be content with such a one-sided view. All too often the text degenerates into the kind of anti-Microsoft conspiracy theories which can be found in the sleaziest corners of the net. He never really explains why Intel, IBM and HP are going along with these nefarious schemes. Intel, we are told is behaving "strategically". What is the strategy? Why will TC help Intel? Anderson mumbles something about "lock-in" but that doesn't apply to the hardware vendors. He doesn't want to admit the obvious, that Intel thinks this will sell more computers, because people will like their computers better when they can access more content. This is what happens when you ignore the demand side in your analysis. Anderson also presents a number of scenarios of Microsoft dominance in the application demain as if they are new. Why, law firms might feel obligated to buy Microsoft Office in order to communicate with their clients! Imagine that. Who could conceive of such a twisted, backwards, upside down world as one in which companies felt stuck with buying Microsoft for compatibility? If he really thinks this is a new threat, I'd suggest Anderson visit the real world occasionally. I dunno, maybe things are different over there in the Unreal Kingdom. Despite these problems, I do want to emphasize that Anderson's paper is a step forward. And the paper by Schechter is also encouraging in that it is willing to reject the anti-TC paranoia and take a clear-eyed look at the technology. Still, both of these papers express their results in somewhat negative terms: look, you guys at the RIAA and MPAA, you better not push for TC because it might benefit the pirates too. None of these authors has quite been able to take accept the logical conclusion of their analysis, which is that this is a technology which can enable a whole host of powerful new applications, many of which have probably not even been invented yet. Then it should be up to the marketplace to decide which will succeed and which will fail. Everyone wants to short-circuit that messy final step and decide for themselves which are the "good" applications and which are evil. I suggest that we not reject out of hand the principle of allowing people to make decisions for themselves about what they want to do with their computers, and that includes utilizing TC technology.

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changes at lne.com
by Eric Murray 12 May '03

12 May '03

The spam load at lne.com is WAY too high. Last month for example there was an average of 96 spams per day submitted to cypherpunks(a)lne.com. "submitted" means that it was the first time we saw that particular mail. Since the CDR system sends everything to all nodes, that means we got and passed on about 4x that number. 800 spams a day is a waste. So I have changed the way we deal with CDR mail. We will no longer pass to other CDRs mail that we would not send to subscribers. Eliminating outbound spam will cut our cypherpunks spam load in half. I am also going to filter the non-subscriber mail more effectively. Lately I have had to check about 50 spams a day to see if they are actually posts to the list. I find one real post every two or three days. Now I will save for human processing only the non-subscriber mail that is PGP signed or encrypted, or that looks like a reply. The majority of non-subscriber mails I've forwarded to the list have been replies. (I'll save everything for a while to make sure my filtering works). As always, other CDR operators and anyone else interested in running a CDR are welcome to my scripts. Eric

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New seccure commercial messaging site?
by barabbus＠hushmail.com 12 May '03

12 May '03

Stealth Message is a secure messaging system designed for communicating sensitive and confidential information. It protects your privacy, allowing you to communicate in complete confidence with friends and colleagues. http://www.stealthmessage.com/s/home/index.cfm?re=about Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get FREE encrypted email: https://www.hushmail.com/?l=2 Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger https://www.hushmail.com/services.php?subloc=messenger&l=434 Big $$$ to be made with the HushMail Affiliate Program: https://www.hushmail.com/about.php?subloc=affiliate&l=427

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Re: New seccure commercial messaging site?
by Major Variola (ret) 12 May '03

12 May '03

At 01:05 PM 5/12/03 -0700, barabbus(a)hushmail.com wrote: >http://www.stealthmessage.com/s/home/index.cfm?re=about Also: the user MUST trust that that site does not log IP addresses of the sender. (Otherwise traffic analysis is easy.) The workaround here is to send from a netcafe, wearing a mask, with a stone in your shoe. For sending messages to friends from work, their approach suffices.

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Re: New seccure commercial messaging site?
by Major Variola (ret) 12 May '03

12 May '03

At 01:05 PM 5/12/03 -0700, barabbus(a)hushmail.com wrote: >http://www.stealthmessage.com/s/home/index.cfm?re=about Interesting, but: 1. Who clicks on links in unsolicited email? Workaround is for recipient to go to site on their own. 2. Who browses with Javascript enabled? Java is at least safe (rather, much safer) and would do the same. 3. Who believes in 'self-destructing' bits? Merely forgetting your passphrase suffices, IFF your correspondent hasn't screengrabbed your message (FWIW). I do like giving Joe Sixpack traffic-analysis resistance though, without (e.g.) having to scan some usenet list or spend bandwidth with stego. I also realize the answer to 1-3 is most sheeple, but still.. --- If I have nothing to hide, nobody wants to know. -- Steve Schear

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Cryptoanarchy: violence or peace?
by Nomen Nescio 12 May '03

12 May '03

Tim May writes: > I'd take > everyone involved in blocking Wingspread, the project, and have them > hanged for stealing Ry Kelley's property. I figure killing the 50 or 70 > major culprits would send a message. Cryptoanarchy will someday mean > the millions who need to be punished for their crimes will in fact be > punished and converted into fertilizer, soap, lampshades, and other > things which can be sold to partially pay for their crimes.) How exactly will cryptoanarchy accomplish this? Millions will be killed, and their remains used in this way? Please spell out the details. Cryptoanarchy could reduce the revenues available to government (but they could still lay taxes on visible physical property like land - a victory for the Georgeists after all). It could allow people to traffic in forbidden information goods, to make untraceable payments. It's possible there could be an increase in crimes like the ones you support, but those will still involve activity in the physical world. Assuming that human nature remains constant, people will still support the same general policies that we see today. There will not be widespread general support for turning millions into lampshades, any more than there is in the present world. How could a few disaffected cranks cause millions to be murdered? And even supposing that this can be accomplished, what about other people unhappy with the state of things? What will stop radical Greens from using the tools of cryptoanarchy to further their own violent goals, anonymously executing people for developing their own land? Mr. Kelley above might have faced far worse if he had proceeded with "Wingspread" under a framework of widespread cryptoanarcy. Instead of being shut down and harmed financially, he could have been tortured and murdered. But there is no evidence that cryptoanarchy will grant so much power for violence to an angry minority. The physical world will still exist, governments can function there based on taxing physical goods, and they will deter crime and punish criminals just as they do today. The true nature of cryptoanarchy is fundamentally peaceful. It offers an opportunity for people to interact in a world and framework where physical coercion is impossible. It points to a new form of wealth and value, which is built on richness of information and connectivity, rather than physical wealth. Neal Stephenson was prophetic in his vision of Hiro Protagonist living a simple, anonymous, almost barren life in the physical world while engaging in online activities of superlative excitement and power. This is the world which cryptoanarchy makes possible, a world of peace and fulfillment, not the dark, twisted and violent picture you conjure up in your sickening revenge fantasies.

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RE: changes at lne.com
by Trei, Peter 12 May '03

12 May '03

I hope you whitelist known regular posters. I subscribe to minder, but often post thru lne. Peter Trei > ---------- > From: Eric Murray[SMTP:ericm@lne.com] > Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 12:57 PM > To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com > Subject: changes at lne.com > > The spam load at lne.com is WAY too high. > Last month for example there was an average of 96 spams per day submitted > to cypherpunks(a)lne.com. "submitted" means that it was the first > time we saw that particular mail. Since the CDR system sends everything > to all nodes, that means we got and passed on about 4x that number. > 800 spams a day is a waste. > > So I have changed the way we deal with CDR mail. We will no longer pass > to other CDRs mail that we would not send to subscribers. Eliminating > outbound spam will cut our cypherpunks spam load in half. > > I am also going to filter the non-subscriber mail more effectively. > Lately I have had to check about 50 spams a day to see if they are > actually posts to the list. I find one real post every two or three days. > Now I will save for human processing only the non-subscriber mail that is > PGP signed or encrypted, or that looks like a reply. > The majority of non-subscriber mails I've forwarded to the list > have been replies. (I'll save everything for a while to make > sure my filtering works). > > As always, other CDR operators and anyone else interested > in running a CDR are welcome to my scripts. > > Eric

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Re: community gardens
by Tyler Durden 12 May '03

12 May '03

"Yup. Barbed wire definitely spruces up a community..... " I guess you've never been to Brooklyn Neighborhoods such as Red Hook or East New York... -TD >From: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart(a)pobox.com> >To: "Tyler Durden" <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com> >CC: cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: community gardens >Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 10:33:01 -0700 > > >>Tim May wrote... >>"I said I saw the same thing in Berkeley and Santa Cruz. Both are said >>to be "progressive" communities, but in both places the so-called >>community garden areas are essentially for hoboes and deadbeats to scratch >>at." > >Minor technical correction - hoboes are migrant workers, >as opposed to tramps, who are migrant non-workers, >or bums, who are non-migrant non-workers, >and hoboes aren't likely to be hanging out in that kind of area, >at least during the times of year there's active gardening going on, >because that's when they're most likely to be working on farms. >That may be different down in Watsonville, where there's a lot of >railroad connectivity and a lot of farms, but up in Santa Cruz and >certainly up in Berkeley, it's much more likely to just be bums. > >>At 10:21 AM 05/12/2003 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >>In NYC the phenomenon is entirely different. First of all, the gardens are >>almost always gated and barbwired. For two, its primarily the non-drugged >>members of a community that are working the garden, and a prime reason for >>creating the garden is to pretty up and otherwise crappy looking block. >>The flowers and produce of the garden are almost tertiary. > >Yup. Barbed wire definitely spruces up a community..... > _________________________________________________________________ Add photos to your e-mail with MSN 8. Get 2 months FREE*. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/featuredemail

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