December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: CDT Policy Post 3.08 - Senate Committee Approves Key Crypto Bill
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 19:22:37 -0400 (EDT) From: Charles Platt <cp(a)panix.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: Re: CDT Policy Post 3.08 - Senate Committee Approves Key Crypto Bill (fwd) > From: Jonah Seiger <jseiger(a)cdt.org> > This process is raw and smelly, I know, but it's also called Democracy. The United States is not a pure democracy, it is a constitutional republic. I believe I have a constitutional right to privacy. I also believe that I probably have a constitutional right to anonymity. It doesn't matter what "most senators" think, or indeed what "most Americans" think, if their thinking is contradicted by the Constitution. We do not have simple majority rule, here. In fact the founders of the country went out of their way to insure that the simple majority could not easily violate the principles upon which the country was founded. > But before we get all caught up in the old jihad between "the purists" and > the "pragmatists", just think about this for a moment: If we are going to > have a prayer of getting out of this Congress without getting stuck with > manditory key recovery, we have to at least recognize where we fit in to > the overall equation and how the system actually works. We can do a lot to > impact the outcome of this issue -- but not if we are operating in a > different area code from reality. This can be summarized as "compromise or else." I have never believed that this is an acceptable policy when dealing with people who are ethically impaired. Moreover, it is not even a SENSIBLE policy, from a purely pragmatic point of view. Did ACT-UP adopt a compromising position in order to get what they wanted? Would they have done better if they had agreed to compromise? Of course not. You have no hope of getting even a fraction of what you want, when dealing with the power-crazed yahoos in DC, unless you are willing either to bribe them or be an intransigent extremist. (So it seems to me, anyway.) The CDT party line always seems to be, "play ball and kiss ass in the hope that legislators will be nice to you." Thanks, but no thanks.

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Re: [EFGA] WE won our court case!! (fwd)
by Robert A. Costner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 04:57 PM 6/20/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >>From: "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> >>To: action(a)efga.org >>Subject: [EFGA] WE won our court case!! >> >>EFGA was granted a preliminary injunction in our court case >>against the state of Georgia. Details and press release to follow. > >Yee-hah! If you ignore CONgress, we've had a good week, between >this court and the New York CDA courts doing the right thing >and the DES crack finishing. > >>Let's meet somewhere tonight to celebrate! >Obviously y'all should meet in the Atlanta Underground, wearing masks :-) >(though I won't be there, since it's a bit far from the West Coast...) I find messages like this to be interesting. I assume that there is some void in the souls of some that cannot be filled and they look elsewhere for that spark that will bring them what they are looking for. I regret that when they look to me, they do not find it. That I am not the answer does not surprise me. That anyone would think I might be the answer is what is surprising. What is EFGA? It is an unfunded group of Georgia based internet users who have an interest in privacy, free speech, and the free use of the internet. For about six months or so, we grumbled about how bad things were. Then, a few of us got the idea that if only we tried to change something, we just might do it. Eighteen months later, we won a case in federal court against the state of Georgia. "Yee-ha"? Is this meant to be a derisive comment? No money. No legal training. Not a lawyer to support us. What were we to do? We went to the ACLU and they told us the case had no standing - they couldn't help us with the Georgia law. We got no better treatment from EFF. This message was not sent to this list - cyberpunks or remailer operators. It was only sent to an internal EFGA list of people who made a claim that they wanted to find out more about EFGA. Me? I'm a software developer. I don't work for EFGA. I just founded the group, and participate in it's running and policy. No one works for EFGA. As I said we are unfunded. We have no offices, we have no staff. Obviously this is a victory for free speech. This is grassroots activism. This email message I see is not unusual. Why do so many people who would presumably be on the same side as EFGA and myself do what is apparently trying to pick at us? What is the difference between someone in EFGA and someone else on this list? If I can read the federal register when I get home from work and call up the Social Security Administration and ask to speak on a panel they are having, then anyone can. If a group of people with no financial or legal resources can call themselves EFGA and sue the state, then why can't someone else? Yee-ha? Meet in Underground Atlanta wearing masks? What kind of comments are these? I spent gasoline, time, and three dollars for parking today to meet with the CIO of Georgia to speak with him about PGP & encryption. He met with me because I called him on the phone and asked. What are you saying here? Are you suggesting that change is wrong? Are you, like others on this list implying that you can't afford the three dollars or you just don't know how to dial the phone? I didn't post the original message here. If you would like to trade insults, I'll be happy to do so with you. I'd rather just go up to D.C. on a cheap flight and sit in a congressman's office for 45 minutes until a staffer can speak with me. Reasonable men adapt to match the world around them. Unreasonable men try to adapt the world to themselves. Therefore, only unreasonable men bring about change in the world. I may be unreasonable, but I'm not pathetic. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQBVAwUBM6tHFkGpGhRXg5NZAQEyigIAiYVY9kTroAD6Ci4k8plGLBw172HmnzfB snkzbOpnhThf8FokELwXgxgdM7ixJDweKuAICBITY8iozQfVWKUcOQ== =pRgU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746 Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh@efga.org http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key

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crypto wars
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"There must be some way out of here", Said the joker to the thief "There's too much confusion -- I can't get no relief. Businessmen, they drink my wine Plowmen dig my earth. None of them all along the line Know what any of it is worth." "No reason to get excited", the thief he kindly spoke "There are many here among us Who feel that life is but a joke But you and I, we've been through that, and this is not our fate So let us not speak falsely now The hour is getting late." All along the watchtower Princes kept the view While the women came and went, Barefoot servants, too Outside, in the cold distance, A wildcat did growl Two riders were approaching The wind began to howl.

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Re: "Strength of encryption standard proved again"
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: > >( cryptography(a)c2.net removed from the distribution list, as I am not a > subscriber to that list, and Perry has admonished me when I have > accidentally left his list on the cc: to my messages) From: sameer <sameer(a)c2.net> To: emergent(a)eval-apply.com (ET) CC: cryptography(a)c2.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sameer has his bum-buddy, Perry, censoring c2.net's crypto-propaganda list in order to reflect favorably on cryptography business interests. It seems that this is cheaper than using his legal team to stifle free speech regarding corporate products, especially his own. Despite the fact that Sameer feels free to spam the cypherpunks list with self-serving horseshit that he is sending to cryptography(a)c2.nut, it seems that he has a deep-rooted fear of his products and motives being discussed on the c2.net list. Perry is a horse's ass who gets offended that people subjected to cc:'s of the c2.net propoganda machine don't seem to feel it is their job to perform his censorship for him by deleting sameer's list from the cc:'d spam their list members send out. I would suggest that if Perry wants to act as a censor of free speech on the internet, that he take responsibility for deleting any messages that he deems to be beneath the corporate standards of the list that he censors. Of course, he could always automate the list to only allow posts by subscribers. If the software he uses to run the list doesn't have the capability to do so then perhaps he could ask the Stronghold programers to build a back door in the software to allow him to do so. TruthMonger

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CNNFN transcript -- EPIC vs. Family Research Council on CDA
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 22:16:38 -0400 From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg(a)epic.org> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu I'm not looking for any awards, but I thought this debate with Cathy Cleaver went very well. As I said earlier, she doesn't expect to win next week. Marc. ---------- <fontfamily><param>Geneva</param><bigger> CNNFN SHOW: IT'S ONLY MONEY 13:00 pm ET June 20, 1997; Friday 1:17 pm Eastern Time Transcript # 97062002FN-l05 HEADLINE: Panel Discussion on Internet Pornography Law GUESTS: Cathy Cleaver, Bruce Fancher, Marc Rotenberg BYLINE: Valerie Morris BODY: VALERIE MORRIS, CNNfn ANCHOR, IT'S ONLY MONEY: The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act, better known as the CDA, sometime next week. Now, whatever the outcome, the CDA will set the precedent for all future laws involving any censoring of material on the Internet. The past year's debate over the CDA has divided net users into distinct camps of - on issues of cyber censorship. I'm joined today by some important members of those opposing camps, first of all from our bureau in Washington, Marc Rotenberg, who is director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Marc was a counsel in challenging the CDA. And from our bureau in Los Angeles, Cathy Cleaver, director of legal policy with the Family Research Council - Cathy co-authored a brief on behalf of members of Congress in defense of the CDA. And with me here in our New York studio is our Generation-X representative on the issue, Bruce Fancher. Formerly a computer hacker, now an entreprenuer, Bruce is the president of Online Evolution Systems. He is also the co- founder of Digital Liberty, which is an online civil rights advocacy group. To all of you, welcome. CATHY CLEAVER, DIRECTOR, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL: Thank you. MORRIS: I'd like to start out - Cathy, could you please outline what the CDA proposes? CLEAVER: What the CDA does is make it a crime to knowingly send indecent material or pornography to known minors and also makes it a crime to knowingly make it available to minors without taking good faith steps to try to screen minors out, a very reasonable law, no censorship involved. We like that word "censorship." But it's very similar to other laws restricting adults from selling, giving or showing pornography to children in other media. MORRIS: OK. Marc, what's EPIC's response, and what is the challenge with regard to the CDA from your perspective? MARC ROTENBERG, DIRECTOR, EPIC: Well, EPIC and the American Civil Liberties Union challenged the constitutionality of the bill, and so far, we've been successful in our litigation. We've had 2 panels of judges in New York and Philadelphia that have agreed with us unanimously that, contrary to what Cathy says, the bill was poorly drafted. It sweeps much too broadly. It tries to prohibit access to information that the First Amendment has always protected. MORRIS: All right. And now to Bruce, who is here in the studio with me, what's your stance with regard to the issue? BRUCE FANCHER, PRESIDENT, EVOLUTION ONLINE SYSTEMS: My stance is that, while I think the law is clearly ridiculous and unconstitutional, I'm inclined to see it a little bit like the British tax on tea in 1776. So in some sense I hope it is upheld because, sooner or later, the government is going to try to regulate in Internet and we need to start developing tools now to make that difficult or impossible, including moving some of these operations offshore. MORRIS: I'm now going to try and facilitate this with all 3 of you jumping in as you see fit. I would like to ask Bruce, though, a follow- up question. Do you see any business related activity on the net being impacted dramatically by the CDA? FANCHER: Well, my business could potentially be impacted. We run a discussion group which is open to anyone who wants to join, and that's about 10,000 people on it. And we don't have any control of what the people say. So we're vulnerable in that way. MORRIS: Cathy, is indecency out of control on the Internet in your opinion? CLEAVER: Well, we know that people online that sell pornography, for instance, is the fastest growing online marketing right now. It's impossible now to predict what exactly would happen if the CDA were upheld, but let me tell you, you know, when the CDA was first presented, online pornographers started checking their material. They started screening for children, but then when they won their first round in the courts, as Eric mentioned, they went back to showing free pictures of pornography to anyone who came to the site. So, yes, I think it should affect business. Pornography is a booming business online, but it shouldn't affect the adult's ability to get pornography, but only children's ability to get pornography, which is what indecency laws have done for 30 years. MORRIS: Marc, there are regulations for television, regulations for radio. How is the Internet different? ROTENBERG: Well, the Internet is very different from television and radio. There is no central licensing. There is no government review or authority. The Internet is much more like a series of interconnected bookstores or newsstands or libraries, and to understand just how sweeping the CDA could be in its application, it would effectively restrict the ability to anyone to publish information on the Internet, which is why, you know quite frankly, I think the Supreme Court, when it rules next week, will say no, you can't legislate in this manner. CLEAVER: That is truly ridiculous I think, because, listen, we've got indecency laws that effect all of those areas that he just mentioned. So the question. ROTENBERG: Cathy, to what (OFF-MIKE) CLEAVER: .really is -- the question is just: Should we provide an exemption in cyberspace to Larry Flint? Should he be able to sell his magazines to 12 year olds online? We, as a society, say no, you can't do that over the - in a bookstore and you can't rent or sell x- rated videos to kids in a video stores. Should pornographers have a carte blanche in cyperspace? It makes no sense. And the Constitution doesn't require that. Look, free speech is not an absolute right. We all know that. Adults are not able to exploit children by selling them or giving pornography anywhere, and they should be able to, and I believe they won't be able to do that on the Internet. MORRIS: The CD. ROTENBERG: Valerie. MORRIS: Yes? ROTENBERG: .if I could ask a question here. MORRIS: Yes, you can. ROTENBERG: Cathy, how do you think the Supreme Court is going to rule next week? I mean, let's just - let's be blunt about this. Are they going to side with you and say this type of sweeping legislation is permissible, or are they going to side with the people who have been trying to defend free speech online and say, no, you can't do this in this country, you can't try to impose such draconian legislation and controls on what other people may see even if you happen to disagree with it? MORRIS: I'm going to ask you both to hold. Cathy, I will start with your answer when we come back. We do need to take a break right now. Don't go away. We will be back with more on IT'S ONLY MONEY with more on the Communication Decency Act, and when we return, we'll open up the phones for your questions, the number, 1-800-304-fnet. Back in a moment. VALERIE MORRIS, CNNfn ANCHOR, IT'S ONLY MONEY: We are talking about the Communications Decency Act with Marc Rotenberg who is Director of Electronic Privacy Information Center and in opposition to the CDA, Cathy Cleaver who is Director of Legal Policy for the Family Research Council and a supporter of the CDA, and Bruce Fancher, an entrepreneur, founder of Evolution Online Systems. He believes the Internet should be completely unregulated. We will be taking your calls. The number 1-800-304-FNET. As we went to break, Cathy, you had been asked a question by Marc, how do you think the Supreme Court will rule? Please give us your answer. CATHY CLEAVER, DIRECTOR, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL: Well, one of the challenges, of course, is to the indecency standard itself, and we can look to just last year when the Supreme Court upheld the indecency standard as a constitutional standard, not overly broad and not vague. You know, the decency standard means a patently offensive depiction of sexual or excretory activities. So, it's not a vague challenge. So, I think that's a definite win. I find it difficult to see how the Supreme Court would reverse itself, since just last year in the cable pornography case, it upheld indecency regulation using that standard for cable. But also, remember, this law has a lot of good faith defense that people can use to show pornography to adults but also make attempts to keep it from children. That's all the law's ever required. MORRIS: But there are a couple of things-the CDA's being challenged on a couple of bases. One is because some say that it's too broad. The other is a standard of decency is unconstitutional, and I think those are the concerns, Bruce, some of which you had an opinion with regard to how the Supreme Court is going to rule. And you say it's because of the unconstitutional issue? GBRUCE FANCHER, PRESIDENT, EVOLUTION ONLINE SYSTEMS: Well, I'm not a lawyer, but from what I've read, it seems to me-my opinion will rule that it's unconstitutional. But I'm much less concerned with placing faith in the political process to protect the Internet than with developing tools which we can use to effectively protect our privacy and our right to communicate and engage in trade on the Internet, regardless of what the government decides to do. MORRIS: Because those are also issues. I mean, we sometimes get stuck on this one, but the CDA also covers surveillance, encryption and consumer privacy. But the most immediate concern tends to be this free speech issue in Cyberspace. CLEAVER: If I can just jump in, the CDA protects privacy in Cyberspace. So, that's how it addresses privacy. It upholds and refers to EPIC's privacy provision that it got it in. MORRIS: Mark, do you agree? MARC ROTENBERG, DIRECTOR, EPIC: I don't know what Cathy's talking about. We didn't have anything to do with the drafting of the bill. It's bad for privacy. But let me just say in response to Bruce, while I'm aware of his concerns and I think there should be good techniques to protect privacy and liberty online, I have not given up on the American political system. I feel very strongly about our constitutional form of government, and the first amendment in particular. And I think next week will in fact be a great victory for our system of government. We will preserve liberty in the online world. MORRIS: All right, we have a caller, Darren, from Canada, thanks for joining us. What's your question or comment? CALLER: Yes, basically I'm just wondering how this all will be enforced. MORRIS: All right, who would like to take that on? How will the law be enforced? CLEAVER: I can take that. Just like other laws are enforced, where first of all, we would require or rely upon, you know, self regulation, that's what happens now with video stores and magazine stores. We require the clerks to abide by the law. And when they don't, then when they run afoul of the law, then prosecutors can, you know, bring an action against them and an investigation. You know, it's not going to be like some have suggested that there's going to be some government Cyberpolice or some sort of government pre-screening of information of all of that which suggests great privacy violations. The law doesn't do that. This is kind of like Chicken Little. You know, the sky is going to fall if the CDA is upheld. That's just nonsense. MORRIS: But what it does to and part of the concern is what about the liability? Who is going to be liable? Marc, can you take that on? ROTENBERG: Yes, well, the liability issue here is actually key. You asked the question at the outset, what is the impact on business? The impact would be enormous for anyone who's trying to use the Internet to get information out. CLEAVER: Only pornographers. ROTENBERG: That's not true, and you know that's not true. CLEAVER: That is true. ROTENBERG: People engaging in speech, operating chat rooms, discussion groups. CLEAVER: Patently offensive sexual or excretory speech. ROTENBERG: Sexual information. We had people testifying at the Philadelphia hearing that if they were providing medical information on breast cancer or to AIDS patients that they faced a risk of prosecution under the statutes. CLEAVER: That's just not true. The indecency definition has never been applied in that way. It's never been applied in that way. ROTENBERG: The judges who have looked at the CDA heard our arguments, heard your arguments, have rejected your arguments. They don't agree with you, Cathy. CLEAVER: Well those judges didn't. ROTENBERG: And I think it's important to keep that in mind. We are going to win next week in the Supreme Court. MORRIS: I would like to inject something here, and ask Bruce, with regard to your business, will the CDA have direct impact on your business, and especially because you still have online chat rooms? I mean, do you see that as a potential area where you could be held liable? FANCHER: That's really something that I've been concerned about. I haven't consulted a lawyer specifically, but I'm definitely concerned about it. MORRIS: OK, we have another caller, Christian, from New York. Thanks for joining us. What's your question? CALLER: Hi, my question is as follows: How can we regulate the world? As we know, the Internet is not only one organization located in the United States. But it's all over the world. How can we impose laws to the entire world. We can't do that. FANCHER: That's a very good point, what affect the CDA will have if it's upheld is it will advance the process which is going to eventually happen anyway of moving any kind of Internet service or activities which might be slightly illicit or simply where the proprietors want to avoid taxation or regulation to other parts of the world, specifically places like the Caiman Islands, the Bahamas, Anguilla. It does not take a lot of resources to run copper wire to a Caribbean island and operate an Internet server there. And I'm looking forward to the day when that's more common. ROTENBERG: Bruce, let me say, I'm not looking forward to that day. I think the Internet offers wonderful opportunities for American business and American citizens and American consumers, and the thought that we would want a law to pass which would effectively move all of this activity offshore doesn't seem to me to be something that many people would be in favor of. FANCHER: Well, only the servers have to be offshore. The people behind the information can remain in the United States. As you know, using encryption, that's perfectly feasible. MORRIS: And what about the penalties? Let's get to that. If the CDA is upheld by the Supreme Court, what kind of penalties are people facing? Are these felonies? ROTENBERG: Well, these are criminal sanctions. I mean, which includes both fines and the risk of imprisonment. And one of the other great concerns that arises when you try to punish people for speech is always the question how are these decisions going to be made? What type of speech is going to trigger, you know-one type of publication ends you up in jail for 3 years, and another type of publication isn't prosecuted. There's always a problem with prosecuting people based on what they say or what they print. MORRIS: I'm going to ask each of you in the last moments that we have- we have about 20 seconds each to wrap up your point of view. Can I start, Cathy, we started with you. Let's begin this wrap-up with you. CLEAVER: Sure. The idea that Cyberspace is going to be exempt from any laws, I think, is just nonsense. We know that to be the case. If Cyberspace, if the Internet is going to survive as a marketing forum which most of the people want it to be, there are going to have to be some rules and regulations, some laws against fraud, some laws against exploitation. There are laws now against child pornography. You know, these are important. It's important to build this new community in such a way that we can actually operate with each other as we do with an amount of trust and an amount of responsibility imposed by laws. It's just-it's inevitable. It's going to happen. MORRIS: Cathy Cleaver from-the Director of Legal Policy for Family Research Council. Thank you very much for adding to today's conversation. CLEAVER: You're welcome. MORRIS: And, Bruce, your comment for a wrap-up. FANCHER: Well, I'd like to say to Cathy that 25 years ago the idea of 100 million personal computers sounded like nonsense. And 5 years ago the idea of 40 or 50 million people connected to the Internet sounded like nonsense. So, I'd be very careful before making statements like that. And I would like to say that I still believe in the U.S. Constitution, but I believe we need technological solutions to back it up. MORRIS: All right, Bruce Fancher, thank you very much for being with us. And then the final word, Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center. ROTENBERG: Well, Valerie, I'm looking forward to next week. The Supreme Court is going to rule on a very important case, affecting the freedom and the future of the Internet. And it is my hope and my belief that they're going to take one of the principles that this country was founded on, a right of individuals to express their views, even when others may disagree strongly, and protect that right. It was established in the 18th century, and I'm hopeful that it will remain with us in the 21st. MORRIS: Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center. Thank you to all three of you. I hope that we can revisit this issue if not next week, in the very near future. Thank you all very much. END LANGUAGE: ENGLISH LOAD-DATE: June 20, 1997 </bigger></fontfamily> ================================================================== Marc Rotenberg, director * +1 202 544 9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * +1 202 547 5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301 * rotenberg(a)epic.org Washington, DC 20003 USA + http://www.epic.org ==================================================================

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Re: CDT Policy Post 3.08 - Senate Committee Approves Key Crypto Bill (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 16:41:30 -0700 (PDT) > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > Subject: Re: CDT Policy Post 3.08 - Senate Committee Approves Key Crypto Bill > The United States is not a pure democracy, it is a constitutional > republic. I believe I have a constitutional right to privacy. I also > believe that I probably have a constitutional right to anonymity. It > doesn't matter what "most senators" think, or indeed what "most Americans" > think, if their thinking is contradicted by the Constitution. We do not > have simple majority rule, here. In fact the founders of the country went > out of their way to insure that the simple majority could not easily > violate the principles upon which the country was founded. Actualy with the wording of the 9th and 10th you as a citizen are reserved ANY right you choose and the benefit of the doubt goes to you, the citizen. For the government to prove their side they MUST demonstrate a constitutional mandate. Also notice the heirarchy of prohibition detailed in the 10th. The people are NOT mentioned at all. In effect it says that the final say in ANY discusssion of federal powers versus citizen rights falls to the people since only they are specificaly NOT mentioned as a party the Constitution even has the power to prohibit. ARTICLE IX. The enumeration of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. [ This in effect says that my rights as a citizen are not limited by those that may be listed explicity in the Constitution. In effect an admission that my rights as a citizen, or even as a human being, are not limited by the Constitution by explicit intent of the authors.] ARTICLE X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. [ The powers which are not assigned to the federal government by the Constitution OR prohibited in respect to the states falls to the states (acting per their own individual constitutions as the deciding factor within their borders) and if not covered in the state constitution then to the poeple to decide (assuming a popular vote). It is critical to note that no explicit limit is placed on the issues decidable by the people, a difference explicitly pointed out with the federal and state governments.] [The first ten amendments went into effect on 15 December 1791.] A perfect non-crypto example is the current brew-haha over assisted suicide and a Constitutional right to die. The question is not whether I have a right to kill myself (assisted or otherwise). The 9th clearly states that just because a right I might claim is not listed does not mean I don't have it. Now the 10th says that if the federal government wants to control it they must show a delegation of authority in the Constitution. So, despite what the esteemed Supremes may think the question is not "Does the Constitution allow a citizen to do this?" which is what they announced as their 'first' question but rather, " does the Constitution delegate the authority to decide when or how a citizen may die?" If not then each individual state should decide the issue until or if an amendment can be passed. Should individual states not cover such decisions in their own constitutions then the poeple decide the issue individualy until a vote can be arranged. The problem with our current operation is that we don't have enough plebicites. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: HOT Summer IN White House
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the New Yoahkah just ran a piece on the gfriend-o-Brown. Quite worth a read. Most of the first paragraph below seems sort of lifted from that article. At 09:42 AM 6/20/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > > >This item is one of many such articles outlining the corruptions within >Washington. Some of these corruptions are huge, and go far beyond simple >pork-barreling. On a level with Watergate, it seems to many of us. > >I don't usually forward items from "talk.politics.crypto," as I assume >many of you are already reading it. But this particular item fits with the >"Washington as crime capital in more ways than one" them I've been >hitting. > >Look especially for how favors were granted for high tech exports. > >--Tim > >> From: softwar(a)us.net (SOFTWAR) >> Newsgroups: >talk.politics.crypto,alt.politics.org.nsa,alt.politics.org.fbi,alt.politics .cia,alt.politics.clinton,alt.politics.datahighway,talk.politics.misc,alt.po litics.democrats.d,alt.politics.usa.republican >> Subject: HOT Summer IN White House >> Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 10:35:29 GMT > >> >> It's going to be a long hot summer for the Clinton >> administration. >> >> Wednesday night ABC Primetime did a special on Ron Brown's >> girlfriend. The accusations flying around the dead Secretary >> of Commerce do not bode well for the living inside the Beltway. >> First, it seems that Ron acquired an offshore bank account with >> nearly a million dollars deposited for him by the Government of >> Vietnam. Vietnam wanted to normalize trade relations with the >> US and bribing the top dog at Commerce certainly helped grease >> the skids. Vietnam got their trade deal but Brown found out >> that the FBI knew about his bank account. So he could not touch >> the money. The bribery accusation is collaborated by an >> ex-Vietnamese official who has also turned his evidence over to >> the FBI. Mr. Brown's girlfriend plans to testify before both >> the Senate and the House committees investigating wrongdoing in >> the Clinton administration. >> >> Another revelation which should come as no shock is that the >> First Lady put John Huang in the Commerce Department. This >> demand apparently did not sit well with Mr. Brown, who, >> according to his girlfriend, did not like Mrs. Clinton. It >> seems that Ron's strong personality ran smack head on into >> Hillarys demanding attitude. Yet, he bent over backward and >> made sure that Huang was hustled into his government position, >> complete with a secret clearance. Once Huang entered the >> Commerce Department strange events really started to pop up. >> The Commerce Department initially denied Huang had access to >> anything important. It is now known that Huang attended dozens >> of secret CIA briefings. Huang is alleged to have discussed >> secret materials with his former employers at the Lippo group. >> The allegations come from material obtained by taps on Huang's >> Commerce Department telephone. >> >> Can the same be said for Ira Sockowitz? >> >> No. Ira Sockowitz was placed into his Commerce position >> directly and personally by President Clinton. It was Ira >> Sockowitz who ran Ron Borwn's airline seating arrangements, >> between working on government affairs. Whenever Mr. Brown would >> fly on a government sponsored trade trip - Ira would line up big >> Corporate powers to ride along on the party plane. Mr. >> Sockowitz had more experience as a DNC fund-raiser than security >> software. Despite this lack of technical skills Mr. Sockowitz >> entered the field of banking security software at Commerce. It >> is the Commerce Department which approves or denies export of >> such financial software. The amount of money involved, invested >> and possible returns, are staggering. Obviously, the >> push/pull/shove involved in getting such a product approved is >> no easy task. Few export licenses have been issued and those >> who have them are not too anxious for any others to join them. >> >> Just how easy was it to obtain such a privilege? Not very. Not >> even Fortune 500 companies could obtain export rights from the >> Commerce Department. Letters from IBM, Motorola, Digital, HP >> and a host of other billion dollar firms clearly indicate their >> unsuccessful efforts to obtain Commerce licenses to export their >> products. >> >> However, letters from certain other companies are covered with >> redacted notes which the Commerce Department refuses to release. >> One letter to the Commerce Department in particular was faxed to >> someone (also redacted) along with a memo on how to obtain a >> "waiver" for export. Another set of Sockowitz documents being >> withheld are a set of hand written notes on a conversation, a >> three pages fax and two applications for license for export >> dated 8/11/94. The Clinton administration will not say who sent >> the fax nor will they say who Ira Sockowitz talked to. Yet, >> clearly the topic was a license to export. A license that could >> have been worth billions of dollars. >> >> It's going to be a long hot summer for the Clinton >> administration. >> >> 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775 >> >> Charles R. Smith >> SOFTWAR >> http://www.us.net/softwar >> >> Pcyphered SIGNATURE: >> 5317BD5D86A9257B2048D1D80523D9ACF320DB56A078CA4EA62BABF7A43EBE6B >> 2F5FB787CDEF242FA01EF13984F7071AC2B401DAD0010740F1F024C3CCF9D841 >> 9760977F67662EEF > > >

1 0

fbi+eu mass wiretapping?
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: chasm(a)insync.net (Schuetzen) To: ADVISORY.LIST(a)insync.net, snetnews(a)world.std.com Subject: SNET: (fwd) piml] Global telephone tapping system. Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 04:19:01 GMT - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List X-No-Archive: Yes FORWARDED On Thu, 19 Jun 1997 15:19:36 -0400, "Mark A. Smith" <msmith01(a)eng.eds.com> wrote: To: piml(a)mars.galstar.com Subject: piml] Global telephone tapping system. From: "Mark A. Smith" <msmith01(a)eng.eds.com> Date: Thu, 19 Jun 1997 15:19:36 -0400 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. European Union and FBI launch global surveillance system ------------------- From Statewatch, 25 February 1997, London, UK ------------------- "The EU, in cooperation with the FBI of the USA, is launching a system of global surveillance of communications to combat "serious crime" and to protect "national security", but to do this they are creating a system which can monitor everyone and everything. The EU will be able to trawl the airwaves for "subversive" thoughts and "dissident" views and, with its partners, across the globe." "It seems extraordinary given the concern over the Police Bill in the UK and the "Clipper chip" in the USA that there has been no debate over the creation of a global telephone tapping system initiated by the EU and the USA and supported by Canada, Australia, Norway and Hong Kong." "the UK Parliament, like many others in the EU, has been by- passed in the most blatant way. To claim as the Home Secretary does that the "Memorandum of Understanding" is "not a significant document" and to fail to send the main EU Council Resolution to parliament for scrutiny is quite extraordinary when the Police Bill - which extends police surveillance - is going through parliament." OVERVIEW EU-FBI: global tapping system The Council of the European Union and the FBI in Washington, USA have been cooperating for the past five years on a plan to introduce a global telecommunications tapping system. The system takes advantage of the liberalisation of telecommunications - where private companies are taking over from national telephone systems - and the replacement of land/sea based lines and microwave towers by satellite communications. Telephone lines are now partly land-based or under sea or via microwave land-based towers but the new generation of telecommunications will be totally satellite based. The EU-FBI initiative notes the demise of: 1. state-owned telephone companies 2. nationally-based telephone systems is concerned about: 3. the problems faced with intercepting "mobile" phones and encrypted communications and wants to ensure: 4. there is harmonisation of national laws on interception 5. to ensure that telecommunications provider business cooperate with the police and internal security 6. the equipment produced has standards which can be intercepted 7. as many countries as possible to sign up and thus create a de facto global system (through provisions of equipment etc to third countries) A related disclosure in a book by Nicky Hager shows that instead of "suspects" and "targets" the ECHELON system simply trawls the airwaves for "subversive thoughts" in written form and increasingly in verbal form. ECHELON is run under the 1948 UKUSA agreement by the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. REPORT The Trevi decision The first reference to this initiative was at a Trevi Ministers meeting in December 1991 which decided that: "a study should be made of the effects of legal, technical and market developments within the telecommunications sector on the different interception possibilities and of what action should be taken to counter the problems that have become apparent" At the meeting of Trevi Ministers in Copenhagen in June 1993 they agreed the text of a "questionnaire on phone tapping" which was sent to each Member State in July 1993 and to the new members (Finland, Sweden and Austria) in September 1993 (see below). EU-FBI linkup At the first meeting of the new Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Brussels on 29-30 November 1993 they adopted the following Resolution on "the interception of telecommunications" which speaks for itself and reproduced here in full: "COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE INTERCEPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS The Council: 1. calls upon the expert group to compare the requirements of the Member States of the Union with those of the FBI; 2. agrees that the requirements of the Member States of the Union will be conveyed to the third countries which attended the FBI meeting in Quantico and were mentioned in the memorandum approved by the Ministers at their meeting in Copenhagen (Sweden, Norway, Finland (countries applying for accession to the European Communities), the USA and Canada) in order to avoid a discussion based solely on the requirements of the FBI; 3. approves for practical reasons the extension to Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand (which attended the FBI seminar) of the decision on co-operation with third countries which was taken at the Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen; 4. hereby decides that informal talks with the above-named countries may be envisaged: to that end the Presidency and the expert group might, for example, organize a meeting with those third countries to exchange information." Source: "Interception of communications", report to COREPER, ENFOPOL 40, 10090/93, Confidential, Brussels, 16.11.93. Main Resolution on the "lawful interception of communications" The draft Resolution on the "lawful interception of communications", an initiative by the Netherlands (which set out the "Requirements", see below) was discussed in the K4 Committee in March, April, November and December 1994. The JHA Council discussed the draft Resolution in March 1994 but it was only formally adopted by "written procedure" (by telexes to Member States dated 21.12.94, 9.1.95, and 18.1.95: source Council of the European Union; the last date is after the Resolution was agreed) on 17 January 1995. The decision was not published in any form for almost two years - on 4 November 1996 it finally appeared in the Official Journal. The Resolution has three parts: First, the short Resolution which says: "the legally authorised interception of telecommunications is an important tool for the protection of national interest, in particular national security and the investigation of serious crime." Second, the "REQUIREMENTS" which place a whole series of obligations on: network providers, eg: satellite communications networks; and on service providers, who provide the equipment for national telecom centres, business, groups and individuals. And finally, a Glossary of definitions. The "Requirements" are based on the needs of "law enforcement agencies" (defined as "a service authorised by law to carry out telecommunications interceptions") who "require access to the entire telecommunications transmitted.. by the interception subject" (defined as: "Person or persons identified in the lawful authorisation and whose incoming and outgoing communications are to be intercepted") who is the subject of an "interception order" defined as: "An order placed on a network operator/service provider for assisting a law enforcement agency with a lawfully authorised telecommunications interception." The "law enforcement agencies" are required to be provided with access not just to the content of a communication, in whatever, form, but also "associated data", "post-connection" signals (eg: conference calling or call transfer), all numbers called, all numbers called by - in both cases even if a connection is not made - plus "realtime, fulltime monitoring capability", the location of mobile subscribers, simultaneous and multiple interceptions "by more than one law enforcement agency", and "roaming" by mobile phone users "outside their designated home serving area". The network operators and service providers are expected to provide "one or several" permanent "interfaces from which the intercepted communications can be transmitted to the law enforcement monitoring facility." And, if they provide "encoding, compression or encryption" to the customer they must provide it en clair (decrypted) to the law enforcement agencies. Finally, they are obliged to ensure that: "neither the interception target nor any other authorised person is aware of any changes made to fulfil the interception order... [and] to protect information on which and how many interceptions are being or have been performed, and not to disclose information on how interceptions are carried out." Source: "Memorandum of Understanding concerning the lawful interception of telecommunications", ENFOPOL 112, 10037/95, Limite, Brussels, 25.11.95; this report contains the "Memorandum" with the Resolution adopted on 17 January 1965 attached. The Resolution was published in the Official Journal on 4.11.96, ref: C 329 pages 1-6. Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal Interception of Telecommunications The "Memorandum of understanding with third countries" (later described as the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal Interception of Telecommunications") was discussed at the K4 Committee in November 1994. The significance of the "Memorandum" is that it extends the agreement on the surveillance of telecommunications to non-EU countries who are being invited to adopt it - and with it the "Requirements". The Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the 15 EU Member States on 23 November 1995 at the meeting of the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers. The contact addresses for signatory countries and for further information, which confirms the EU-USA link, should be sent to: a. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attention: Information Resource Division, 10 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20535 b. General Secretary of the Council of the European Union, FAO The President, Rue de la Loi 175, B-1048 Brussels, Belgium." The number of signatories to the "Memorandum" is open-ended, any country can join providing the existing member states agree. It invites "participants" because "the possibilities for intercepting telecommunications are becoming increasingly threatened" and there is a need to introduce "international interception standards" and "norms for the telecommunications industry for carrying out interception orders" in order to "fight.. organised crime and for the protection of national security." The strategy appears to be to first get the "Western world" (EU, US plus allies) to agree "norms" and "procedures" and then to sell these products to Third World countries - who even if they do not agree to "interception orders" will find their telecommunications monitored by ECHELON (see below) the minute it hit the airwaves. Source: "Memorandum of Understanding concerning the lawful interception of telecommunications", ENFOPOL 112, 10037/95, Limite, Brussels, 25.11.95. "not a significant document" - the Home Secretary The Chair of the Select Committee on the European Communities in the House of Lords, Lord Tordoff, took up the "Memorandum" with the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, in an exchange of letters on the Committee~s access to documents for scrutiny. On the subject of the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal Interception of Telecommunications" Mr Howard told Lord Tordoff: "The Memorandum of Understanding is a set of practical guidelines to third countries on the lawful interception of telecommunications. It is NOT A SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENT and does not, therefore, appear to meet the criteria for Parliamentary scrutiny of Title VI documents." (emphasis added) It is quite clear from this Briefing that the "Memorandum" is not an insignificant document concerning as it does a EU-US plan for global telecommunications surveillance. The "Memorandum" itself is just two pages. It is the full text of the "Resolution" attached to it which demonstrates its full meaning. However, not only did Mr Howard not think the "Memorandum" was "a significant document" he also apparently believes the attached Resolution also insignificant as he did not submit it to the House of Lords Committee for scrutiny prior to its adoption in January 1995 or thereafter. Source: Correspondence with Ministers, 9th Session 1995-96, HL 74, pages 26-29. Letter to international standards bodies In December 1995 COREPER agreed a letter to be sent out to "international standardisation bodies in the field of telecommunications" (IEC, ISO and ITU). The letter said: "Modern telecommunications systems present the risk of not permitting the lawful interception of telecommunications if they have not been adapted, at the standardisation and design stage, to allow such interception." These bodies are "invited" to take account of the requirements of the Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 and told that Member States would be applying "these requirements to network operators and providers of services". The December 1995 letter to international standards bodies and the publication of the main Resolution in November 1996 in the Official Journal announced to manufacturers of equipment and service providers that they will be expected to meet the "Requirements" allowing surveillance for any new contracts within the EU and via the "Memorandum" that these standards would also apply to any countries signing up to it - for example, the USA. Source: "Draft letter to be sent to the international standardisation bodies concerning the Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of communications", Council General Secretariat to COREPER/COUNCIL, ENFOPOL 166, 12798/95, Limite, 14.12.95. Letter to non EU countries At its meeting on 28-29 November 1996 the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agreed a "draft letter" prepared by the K4 Committee to "non EU participants in the informal international Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar". "The letter.. informs you of the wider international support for the "Requirements" annexed to the Council Resolution. The Council considers that the lawful monitoring of telecommunications systems is an important tool in the prevention and detection of serious crimes and in safeguarding national security. Mindful of new technological developments in the field of telecommunications, the Council adopted the Resolution of 17 January, 1996 laying down technical Requirements, for the lawful interception of telecommunications. The Member States of the European Union have been called upon to apply those Requirements to telecommunications operators and service providers... The "Requirements" have been discussed by interception experts from EU Member States with colleagues from other countries which are equally concerned to ensure that adequate technical provision is made for legally authorized interception in modern telecommunications technologies. Arising from those discussions which have taken place during a seminar, the Council of the European Union has received expressions of support for the Requirements from Australia, Canada, Norway and the United States of America. In particular, the relevant authorities In those countries have undertaken to (i) have the Requirements taken into account in their appropriate national policies and (ii) use the Requirements as a basis for discussions with the telecommunications industry, standards bodies and telecommunications operators... You are invited to take note of this letter for the purpose of your further discussions with the telecommunications industry standards bodies and telecommunications operators. The President, for the Council of the European Union." Source: "Draft letter to non EU participants in the informal international Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar regarding the Council Resolution", ENFOPOL 180, 11282/96, Limite 6.11.96. Behind the scenes Behind the formal decisions and letters the various Working Parties under the K4 Committee were at work on the details. In January 1995 the Police Cooperation Working Group, which comes under the K4 Committee, considered a report by the UK delegation on the problems presented by the next generation of satellite-based telecommunications systems which should be able to: " ~"tag" each individual subscriber in view of a possibly necessary surveillance activity." The report said that the new mobile individual communications working through satellites were already underway and unlike the current earth-bound systems based on GSM-technology would "in many cases operate from outside the national territory". The rationale for the plan was that these new systems: "will provide unique possibilities for organised crime and will lead to new threats to national security". The report said all the new systems have to have the capability to place all individuals under surveillance - the product of "tagging" individual phone lines could therefore easily be extended to political activists, "suspected" illegal migrants and others. The fact that the new systems were being developed by large private international corporations, not national state-run systems, created "unusual problems for the legally permitted surveillance of telecommunications". The first problem to surface, according to the report, was that: "initial contacts with various consortia... has met with the most diverse reactions, ranging from great willingness to cooperate on the one hand, to an almost total refusal even to discuss the question." It goes on to say: "it is very urgent for governments and/or legislative institutions to make the new consortia aware of their duties. The government will also have to create new regulations for international cooperation so that the necessary surveillance will be able to operate." Another "problem" for surveillance under the new systems is that satellites will communicate with earth-bound stations which will function as distribution points for a number of adjoining countries - there will not be a distribution point in every country. While the existing "methods of legally permitted surveillance of immobile and mobile telecommunications have hitherto depended on national infrastructures" (italics added). The: "providers of these new systems do not come under the legal guidelines used hitherto for a legal surveillance of telecommunications." The report says it would be difficult to monitor the "upward and downward connections to the distribution point" so the "tag" would start the surveillance at "the first earthbound distribution point". Due to the number of different countries that might be involved in making a connection it has been agreed that the following "relevant data" should be provided: "the number of the subscriber calling, the number of the subscriber being called, the numbers of all subscribers called thereafter". The report uses the example of a subscriber who is a national of country A, with a telephone subscription in country B (supplying the relevant data for the "tag"), who occasionally uses the system in country C which uses the distribution point in country D (which conducts the surveillance) and who is in contact with a person in country E concerning a suspected serious crime in country F. The report with a series of recommendations including amendments to national laws to "ensure that surveillance will be possible within the new systems" and that "all those who are involved in planning the new systems" should be made aware of "the demands of legally permitted surveillance". A later report from the same Working Party, in June 1995, concludes: "These new telecommunications systems have much in common with existing mobile phone systems... [and] will very quickly develop into a global problem, which looks like it can only be controlled by global cooperation of a hitherto unknown degree." Sources: "Legally permitted surveillance of telecommunications systems provided from a point outside the national territory", report from the UK delegation to the Working Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 1, 4118/95, Restricted, 9.1.95; Report from the Presidency to the Working Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 1, 4118/2/95 REV 2, Limite, 2.6.95. Questionnaire on "national law regarding phone tapping" In November 1995 while the EU Ministers were signing the "Memorandum of Understanding" for non-EU countries a Working Party under the K4 Committee was considering a report from the Spanish delegation on national laws within the EU on phone tapping surveillance. The 1995 report opens with the cynical observation: "As it was foreseeable, all states which have answered the questionnaire guarantee the confidentiality of private communications either by their constitution or their Basic Law, or both, in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights." However, it goes on to observe, and assume, "under certain conditions the interception of telecommunications" is allowed. The report says the country surveys showed - and this is of crucial importance regarding surveillance by ECHELON (see below) that: "At the moment there does not seem to be a legal problem for interception that depends on the kind of device used for the transmission of voice, text, data or images" This is a reference to forms of "written" communications or "images" sent by e-mail, fax, and telex. It summarises the legal positions as: the following countries "can simply" make changes in the penal procedure: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal, while Belgium, France, the UK, Ireland, Greece, Norway and Sweden require new legislation, with a combination of both in Italy. Discussions had taken place, the report says, on the "great advantages" the police have if: "they can keep people under surveillance on the grounds of suspicion of criminal activity". Some countries require objective evidence of an offence before surveillance can start but in Austria a request for a phone tap "leads automatically to an investigation being opened". Another problem addressed was the right of individual's to be informed about phone tapping (Article 6.3 in relation to Article 8 of the ECHR): "Obviously such information prejudices the result of the police investigation. Therefore, each country has to arrange for a procedure to legally delay notification." The report recommends the Danish system where a lawyer is appointed by the Justice Ministry who represents the interests of the person to be placed under surveillance at a private hearing but is not allowed to tell the person concerned. The survey found that the maximum duration of authorisation varied from 2 weeks to 4 months. The report concludes that phone tapping "is justified by a serious offence" where "a punishment of imprisonment of one year or more" is available to fight "organised crime". Yet again the justification for combating "organised crime" is so widely drawn - sentences of just one year or more - that the purpose of surveillance has to be fundamentally questioned. Source: "Report on the national laws regarding the questionnaires on phone tapping", Report from the Spanish Presidency to the Working Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 15, 4354/2/95 REV 2, Restricted, 13.11.95. Who is going to pay for it? One issue on which the reports from the K4 Committee are silent is who is to pay the costs for the special facilities needed under the "Requirements" of law enforcement agencies - network and service providers or the governments? However, a report produced by the German government, says that the costs are going to be astronomical. It estimates that to set up surveillance of mobile phones alone will cost 4 billion D-Marks. Source: draft report, dated 5 May 1995, from the German government on the "problems and solutions regarding the surveillance of telecommunications". The "ECHELON" connection "ECHELON" is a world-wide surveillance system designed and coordinated by the US NSA (National Security Agency) that intercepts e-mail, fax, telex and international telephone communications carried via satellites and has been operating since the early 1980s - it is part of the post Cold War developments based on the UKUSA agreement signed between the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1948. The five agencies involved are: the US National Security Agency (NSA), the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) in New Zealand, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in Canada and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) in Australia. The system has been exposed by Nicky Hager in his 1996 book, Secret Power: New Zealand's role in the International Spy Network. He interviewed more than 50 people who work or have worked in intelligence who are concerned at the uses of ECHELON. "The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on a particular individual's e-mail or fax link. Rather, the system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and using computers to identify and extract messages from the mass of unwanted ones." There are three components to ECHELON: 1. The monitoring of Intelsats, international telecommunications satellites used by phone companies in most countries. A key ECHELON station is at Morwenstow in Cornwall monitoring Europe, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. 2. ECHELON interception of non-Intelsat regional communication satellites. Key monitoring stations are Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Bad Aibling in Germany. 3. The final element of the ECHELON system is the surveillance of land-based or under-sea systems which use cables or microwave tower networks. At present it is thought ECHELON's effort is primarily directed at the "written form" (e-mails, faxes, and telexes) but new satellite telephones system which take over from old land-based ones will be as vulnerable as the "written word". Each of the five centres supply "Dictionaries" to the other four of keywords, phrases, people and places to "tag" and the tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country. It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its potential development on phone calls combined with the standardisation of "tappable" telecommunications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and the USA which presents a truly global threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls. Source: "Exposing the global surveillance system", Nicky Hager. CovertAction Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pages 11-17. CHRONOLOGY December 1991 A meeting of the Trevi Ministers decide a study should be carried out on the new telecommunications systems and "the different interception possibilities". 29-30 November 1993 The first meeting of the new, post-Maastricht, Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers meeting in Brussels adopt a Resolution calling on experts to compare the needs of the EU "with those of the FBI". March, April, November and December 1994 The K4 Committee discusses the draft Resolution on the lawful interception of telecommunications and the "Requirements" to be placed on network and service providers. March 1994 The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers discuss the draft Resolution. November 1994 The K4 Committee discusses the draft "Memorandum of Understanding with third countries". 9 January 1995 The Working Group on Police Cooperation, under the K4 Committee, considers a report on the need to "tag" all communications. 17 January 1995 The Resolution is adopted by "written procedure". It is not published in any form until 4 November 1996 when it appears in the Official Journal. 13 November 1995 The Working Group on Police Cooperation consider a report on the situation in each EU state on telephone tapping. 23 November 1995 The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree the "Memorandum of Understanding". It is not published in any form. December 1995 COREPER agree the text of a letter to be sent to international standards bodies attaching the Resolution. 7 May 1996 Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, tells the Chair of the Select Committee on the European Communities in the House of Lords that the "Memorandum of Understanding on the legal interception of communications" is "not a significant document". 28 November 1996 The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree the text of a letter to be sent out to other potential "participants" (countries) in the "Memorandum of Understanding". Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers Set up under Title VI, Article K, of the Maastricht Treaty. First meet on 29 November 1993 when it took over from the Trevi Group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration. K4 Committee Also set up under the Maastricht Treaty to coordinate the work on the "third pillar" - policing, immigration and asylum, and legal cooperation. Is comprised of senior officials from Interior Ministries and prepares report to go to the Council. Under the K4 Committee there are three Steering Groups covering policing and customs, immigration and asylum, and legal cooperation (civil and criminal) to which a series of Working Groups report. COREPER The Committee of Permanent Representatives from each EU state based in Brussels. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright: Statewatch, February 1997. Material in this report may be used provided the source is acknowledged. Statewatch, PO Box 1516, London N16 0EW tel: 00 44 181 802 1882 fax: 00 44 181 880 1727 e-mail: statewatch-off(a)geo2.poptel.org.uk - --------------773C24486F5992E16EEA4806 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="sig.sav" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline; filename="sig.sav" ==================================================================== ///, //// Mark A. Smith \ /, / >. \ /, _/ /. * * * \_ /_/ /. \__/_ < UNITED STATES THEATRE COMMAND /<<< \_\_ /,)^>>_._ \ email: msmith01(a)flash.net (/ \\ /\\\ http://www.flash.net/~msmith01 // ```` ======((`=========================================================== - --------------773C24486F5992E16EEA4806-- _______________________________________ Charles L Hamilton (chasm(a)insync.net) Houston, TX X-No-Archive: Yes - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: chasm(a)insync.net (Schuetzen) ------- End of Forwarded Message

1 0

PGP Crack Challenge Ciphertext
by Pearl Harbor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Below is the encrypted text of the "hidejews.asc" file which must be decrypted in order to meet the "PGP Crack Challenge" sponsored by Pearl Harbor Computers. In order to meet the terms of the contest, the winner must post the decrypted text to the cypherpunks list, signed with their secret key. Please note that in order to ensure the fairness and integrity of the "PGP Crack Challenge" that the secret key used to encrypt the message will be placed in escrow with a Trusted Third Party. The person chosen for this honor is a respected member of the cypherpunk list, Alec McCrackin. - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 MessageID: qoLXESdTeOgwO9d+ih1SNm28wJzD5AZ0 hQEMAzxR/vV9bQ8hAQf/TAnNvPRMxYwpv6M9H4YF2h01KMjGYx5Fn8pvHtgy1KiN lvT0GFq7h36g2YncKjRKVkU9RwrOBaGCN9iwslLpuomMgFMBfwhHqyWCchzYUAVg B0oHnfyKM7EIaOgPRZwhuEwmWpvMOOTqltfKKtMZ08A5swFjcHa1c5+BapoI3nah cAXeMXYuCWwFQPDPYywpKNtHyp9D4KIjKkoWTUcC3p3u+dOyao2ZSO1CzVO+CuNf p5SO2eDb9Jqa7/ekIMS3seaH7aYzmZ9QS51YXoLUhfAdtS9tg1Zh7t6qgWd77qgp 7qtW9x3bfhKrL+xp6OhxeI/6I6y6LP/4fsD2ZGFHQaUCov1zaoBOTgvLY0ZypQsk ElxQFRYVId6rvLTODgi7MfkxXhl6l9hR4zkVAxx5vgjJYd2n14SW31Ex3lnqFxkR S/IvpxfIUwtbe7wPKd0Xofymn30LDVn7ziUcSlFJQhvOiyNxBBC2irPXGH56Sjfc vUnz3j8adPfr2Ao+NGH4ignpap2D0KhaVHc0O5Ja/QsOIiuwj1JlEjB9GT8tEiqz f2oOiatGlEcGD9ncxoVp3L23sOEHs/0iDfTTsnVAni+BtckL9zIXbw+B/uwsthp0 sm2AHgBikLL/UtqSQbD1vtZ1KlTDf0nSl3IsmpfUw06Ve8gyzlgK31YAsjCmwtRw vULz557cOkwcNocJxSPhskMYRcR7llkl+HT+nysKUMXhibL4FBZFjcgYvDPFbwHl bpmnoNdcFT+8TxmrfuYYthPxys4YhjQHxjBKL2T7yaHv+IzONAD3lVtxGCptFCKp I15FuEvPZuwpI2h37FXu2ju3QgaV+jul3MqXiz3Trgm3y6GUg5/U72dVK3ncVbbQ 7pzExgFMYNa5jG9qrlPJIlXzwOsy1bUSi8A1qUxv+R8zp8BPneL8slR64lE5WlLz LXKPVIczjz2AcNAYAD4cRj1brG3E0a4T14Djm55UUaQLpKnZDcTj91axug7Tl8SV Gs/bWx/CzoJcvZA+pwHrHvbOtNo2UwlMB8c5bJmKFneIze+cQuw235nR3gLhu1aW +JzME6I5vbqXNBCsxMCK5mY+LtYscF1egmCndp1QiVDU1OadYvAWFPeuGyEUST8Z 0CeHkqgXMjpAkbVCgLDhHkWbsZYysET4Kk/K8QFaVz3xkFEiiB9pXrOgekoE7ceg l46cemnO7Fyu1G+shn6bdVtFqkvtreqgoOeZ3DrnkE+spa6X =WRL+ - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBM6raTjxR/vV9bQ8hAQEBVAf7BWAr9mJb4kY1iVJiGB55muBfWgSkT6cS oGyNnpWeqIkiOqR29SZYecaz1ve9oEUMXJoP9Si1vvg0qIFS+ZZKFxRQuhk8owxU UFmRf8gaq+ovvQdGIWgfTAFnzYfTOJSh8LpmgNoAeVL5Q5/KAmG4qqOepJyzenkF NneOKcozz/eDWtizzur1jOLutTPTUjJX9alyOa3wzh0hahWVZySmYekqFt7H3bwa KPdX9qj7I7Skm/nw+kKZOMjxbWtXzL5uBfDkboC2QmIZJcFy3Bwlrbn4rJfic+iw JMy3S8hxvKuQeud+5PCFnyIzIGROaMj4cD/CgZfRDOorD8V1O5iK7g== =2pkA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP Crack Solution
by AlecMcCrackin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Solution to Pearl Harbor Computer's ----------------------------------- "PGP Crack Challenge" --------------------- "The cypherpunks aren't hiding Jews." "They are hiding that murdering Armenian bastard, Ray Arachelian, and cocksucker John <spit> Gilmore <fart>." --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ "I think we should all send Pearl Harbor Computers back 10 copies of this" --- Graham-John Bullers -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 iQCVAgUBM6rHzSKJGkNBIH7lAQGxzgP+MQuVm9DWABUxhp0xVp+5L7qm9JlCZ/GU e2Yktx4n8ouRfUpf5WK9uxCGnKd5S1sv38yrJy8sMbQkN1uY8nJYevmwb/6oH1+n cbXJccanXFtAe4Qt6c6bHKJorU+cjk5K2Xl3c/w3PJBgox2r2sAhC98oGE7l4i71 uiRNsXsbbbg= =OIRG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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