December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Memo From Washington Gestapo Tyranny
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Igor Chudov wrote: >In misc.survivalism, Anonymous wrote: >... >FROM: Representative Karen Schmidt, Chairman [sic] > Organized Crime Advisory Board > >>SUBJECT: Paper Terrorism My hat's off to the genius who perpetrated this hoax. They got the government lingo down so well that for a second I actually thought it was real! Note the total disregard for the law: >>* Distributing the extremist Citizens Handbook to foster jury >> nullification. Or this wonderful excerpt which confuses real terrorism ("Assassination Politics") with paper terrorism, just like reporters and politicians do all the time: >* using the Internet to promote extremist ideas such as > "Assassination Politics" or predicting the date of death of > a law enforcement officer or government official to win a > cash price. Or this section, which is clearly intended as a parody of the FBI. (Brilliant!): >This new purpose may take ordinary ideas to extremes, rationalize >their problems into blaming government, and cause members to compete >with each other to make stronger statements. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC6v5ZaWtjSmRH/5AQGbegf/VZb2OvJ1BlsN2hdUqFpol/kt9unZXyHq rcc6doRAaSJw95DHgcIDF7ZOCcTOQxUY8Zv8t6Vw6WtJ/lSnIQ2jWn5SQ8I1pyK3 +Zwh+ne5sC6k+ciabaUPaQxWhChdvoyGvoCm71tDOPEUyz2NBmcqXSSY+gE7CeG9 jJfNTQtM585oEssPl6AXUHMd8UTpfrcaCGRWaww2ZVoBdkssfWG/laG9hpkr+zmw OlWT+xlsr0OzrTD2Jq61aeh8xYzcG3OsnPJk3lORWTxThkrj331qoMlYSki2E5Bu 3y5RTgHnDsAb/A7r6tOUlvVvmzz6lsy6eEsAIgZsGugu7wj9Hagbwg== =ns+X -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer latencies
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- David E. Smith wrote: >> If so, what accounts for these message losses? I would expect that >> if your machine was down, even for a couple of days, that the >> incoming messages would be queued up on other machines and none >> would be lost. > >It's more like "of the last 1000 messages sent, 9964 of 'em have made >it back to me." Because of the way I have to have things set up, >there are almost always a few messages in transit. I have, very >occasionally, actually seen my remailer listed at 100%; somewhere >over 99% is far more common. But, presumably Raph waits awhile for the message before deciding the machine is down? If I understand correctly, you are saying that messages don't actually disappear, but they are sometimes delayed for longer than the two days Raph waits* for them to come back. (* Assumption made on the basis that his timing data doesn't describe any delays longer than two days.) >For me, the remailer doesn't consume any exceptional new resources, >so the added cost to me of running a remailer is very nearly zero. >(Those are mostly the "administrative" costs of dealing with >complaints, adding people to the blocklist, and cleaning up after the >occasional spam bomb.) Others, with different circumstances, may be >more eager to pursue a profit-making solution. It could cover the cost of that second line. ;-) If you haven't tried ecash, you might enjoy it. Setting up your remailer to accept it is a lot easier than you might think. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC6PkZaWtjSmRH/5AQEg9Qf9F+GGZF733IDPbjuRSpIqH5KhhTVJTDMQ JCbzZdwfqvjzRvv6El/xH1y0cMvpcd2xes+QF3HMxRL+XU9tGpQOUwyBHXvTi247 sXB5TfgXLYowOjeR/PbjnT06SBG1ygj2kxe+0CZc9OQWlWgliMQG0OxPw3p/A3On WR7fxnlweRlPiDMZdXq/DMMpDs/Se+ypFpKZriTeS6iWzBG2Bi+F+GKHBEa3V7M9 hnVxGiFE0TnirII0n/h8yFcpQ/ULTG/Z3wqOxyZOvkaVyZlPCAl4mM0AOIWgNeZt HeSk18TERHcRg5u+QeeDRKnNQepeN3UJ5g/NYCGzaRe79f3SMg83mw== =zom6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer Attack
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robert A. Costner wrote: >The downtime statistic is more an indication of when email has to be >sent more than once to get to Redneck. Apparently this is 17 out of >1,000 messages on the average. To be honest, I don't really know how >the stats program works, I'm just assuming this is what is being >checked. If the downtime statistic reflects connection failures it isn't that useful. This sort of problem is relatively common on the Net and is handled automatically. I strongly suspect it really does reflect disappeared messages. Does anybody know how Raph's stats are collected? Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC6RMpaWtjSmRH/5AQEl1gf+JU8Pd3hC3J5LpEL4duLAUu9rL68XF3J2 j4f/hQx8ZzY0mDHLuQEIC5Z0S6yJzE26lydye3lZmGsA1WT2LSK7VoLKd3K1ajjD asnK2J3NIokk2ndicgPbzITiBYyL48qJc8nxsbXV6Thzl5nP3JadNyF0QWudibp0 xxOFvmK0xnWA2BXYu8prXqZmfHE4z5i+ccGeZVP2g+EFQ/Dy04KinoMW+IQFms+M iI7iVRKTUmPPCSIoKJ4HZpGzyCGhkaSDBeu/gKkA+AOR9P7B2ZUllE9BMhxv4OEb zrLfbp6fwyJKv36Sob48pm0XHsDeV8mdcT9qM7MtAghryu27J+MfQA== =cIpG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailers and ecash
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Matthew Ghio wrote: >What people often forget is that these structures tend to evolve thru >incremental changes rather than the immediate adoption of entirely >new paradigms. The 'barrier to entry', is often the deciding factor. Good point. I appreciated the following detailed discussion. But, I disagree on a few points. >So, assuming that for-pay remailers are the goal, how do we get >there? If attaching chaum-cash to remailer messages were the answer, >everyone would be doing it. An economist was walking down the street and saw a hundred dollar bill. The engineer with him snapped it up. Later, the engineer asked why his friend hadn't taken the money. "Well, the economist explained, I knew that it couldn't really be there because if it was, somebody would have gotten it." >One potential scenario is "I'll let you use my remailer if you let me >use yours," where people earn remailer credits by remailing other >people's messages. These remailer credits allow one to send >anonymous messages via other remailers. Once these remailer-credits >become sufficiently valuable, they can be sold using whatever >monetary system is popular at the time. Think of ecash as "remailer credits", only somebody else has gone to the trouble of solving all of the hard problems (including infrastructure), and you can get remailer credits by doing any productive activity for anybody in the world who will pay you in dollars. Some people will get ecash (i.e., "remailer credits") by running remailers. Others will get it by working for Microsoft and converting part of their income to ecash. Ecash suits the bill perfectly and it is available and working right now. It is actually easier to use ecash than to write some sort of "remailer credit" system from scratch. >Both of the above scenarios provide the desired end, which is that >people pay for their remailer usage, and neither involves the >(unlikely) model where people attach digicash to their remailer >messages using the current system. Again, there seems to be this idea that it's hard to get set up using ecash. If it were, long discussions about how likely it would be to work with the remailers might be worthwhile. But, the fact is, it isn't hard to get a remailer to accept ecash. So, we should get a bunch of remailers accepting it and see how things go. It should also be quite easy to modify existing client software to put ecash into chained messages. Consider premail. Raph would have to add a keyword to his remailer description table which means "accepts 25 cents ecash". Premail could have a command line option to add ecash. The ecash itself could come from a file of blocks of ASCII ecash made out to cash, which are automatically clipped by premail and then pasted into the message. Easy, right? Nobody even has to interact with the ecash application from the program. So where do these files full of blocks of ASCII ecash going to come from? People with ecash accounts can generate them by hand or by having a program call the ecash software to generate them. Then they can give or sell them to their less fortunate friends who don't have an ecash account. If you don't use up all the ecash ASCII blocks, they can be redeposited. It's that easy. It will work. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC66rpaWtjSmRH/5AQHVEAf+MZai7O4vzm18BQy8NDjRFzQcvGT8YT7Q lCdY8+NcTIKntsdoLET/u3nZIq8zv3CLKSQMJDwYpBXmgmQtLL4pOct+6noDa94a qTdPO+yqG0LMjBSPPfN0l5f1kggcWQcAHPdLgBu32NQRtQOwFT9sNky9Jb53Vwce 4UGDfZ96DplBVQXS3MP6v7rf0jRH5qnRUAfFLobrtmebDAG20X4OnoFNmbTYeUTw jY5CA7HvKClHHuUUf3p9f03RLq/KdRJ0pegsxx7mGNv0LU78f6yY+olaeyM31suk tq9mDJbJBwCMuIq9x7oHrOFcrifHLMGoll9vPdRZe+MTYxUHV3xpFg== =IPLp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Choate wrote: >> No, there is only one system which provides anonymity. It's called ecash. >> The other systems do not have the features we want. > >Yes, but it does not have a clear market advantage. In fact the >anonymity issue may actualy work against it. We are not talking about an abstract "what will the market do" issue here. We are talking about how to get a working payment system up for remailers which gets us great service and provides privacy and security. The rest of the world may or may not catch on to ecash, but if it's going to start, it will start with a small group. I think it should be this one. >> There is a commonly held belief that one form of payment or another >> must dominate. > >I can assure you that any business will not use multiple protocols >unless their interface is the same for all of them. There simply >isn't enough business to have very many systems. Businesses use multiple forms of payment all the time, even in the United States where multiple currency use is legally discouraged. When I go to a restaurant I can pay in cash or use a variety of credit cards. And credit cards cost the establishment a substantial amount of money and headache, too. >> >Also there is the issue of security in regards to maintaning >> >anonymity when there is such a small pool of parties to use. Doesn't >> >take a genius to figure out where to hang out and watch the action. >> >> Do you mean watch the bank and see who is using e-cash? That might >> tell you who is using remailers, but not much else. > >But who is using the remailers is the point in traffic analysis if I'm >not mistaken. Not very anonymous if they know who you are. I hope we are all assuming that The Enemy knows who is using remailers, at least at the moment. There's no hiding those telltale PGP messages sent to a certain short list of suspected remailer addresses. Some day we will have good steganography and it won't be possible to tell who is using a remailer, but this is not the best problem to solve right now. > >How? There is certainly no clear mechanism in place. Does the > >customer contact each remailer operator prior to sending the traffic, > >thus opening up N opportunities for anonymity cracking. > >> Can do! Remailer operators can easily advertise what they sell and >> how much it costs without compromising the customer the same way >> they advertise their remailer and its features now. > >Can do what? Anonymity cracking or create a payment system that >allows for the intermediate parties to be paid but doesn't >over-burden the user? The point is not to have the poor end user have >to create a half- dozen payment arrangements to get chaining. It >becomes a real hassle to do at that point. No it doesn't. Watch carefully: $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek money25cents"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek money25cents reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix money25cents"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> money25cents mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly money25cents hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; See if you can figure out which remailers accept money and how much they accept. Now, in figuring that out, did you do anything that would reveal your identity? Do you think a simple program could handle the task? Also, the remailer can still offer free operation, but it can give nonpaying customers lower priority, delaying their messages by a few hours, for example. This means remailers still have a low barrier to entry, but people can also pay a little money to get excellent service. >We're talking about the people that drive the one block to the store >to get more beer... You might be. I'm interested in smart people who want to protect their privacy. >> I recommend that people start pricing at a quarter per message per hop >> because it is easier to move prices down than to move them up. > >This is the silliest thing I think I have heard so far in this >discussion.... >...And my experience is that prices move up and people expect them to. Mind your manners. Then look around. For the last few hundred years just about everything has been dropping in price. And, in the computer and information industry in particular, prices drop like crazy all the time for decades, even when you adjust for inflation. Buy memory recently? >A quarter a message per hop is about 2,000+ times too expensive to >make anonymous remailers work. If you want to run a remailer and charge a fraction of a cent for each message, or for an account, or whatever, please be my guest. >The key to anonyous remailers is not the cost per message but rather >the amount of traffic to be carried. Anonymous remailers are beasts >of mass markets measured in millions of recipients. That is obviously untrue. Remailers are used by a small highly specialized market of perhaps a few hundred people. Some day, if we do good work, there will be millions of users. Can you think of any mass market which started out as a mass market? I can't think of a single one. But, there are lots of mass markets that started out with a small group of people paying fairly high prices. As time went by, the prices dropped, more people came in, and eventually a mass market developed. >But the system to post charges BETWEEN remailers must be pretty >consistent to be acceptable. Untrue. You just have to know what each remailer charges. That's about as hard as knowing what services it offers or that it exists. >That is the key and it has NOT been discussed too any great >degree. That inter-remailer traffic must be anonymous also or else >traffic analysis can back-track. I may be misreading this, but you do realize ecash is anonymous, right? Nobody can tell who sent the money, just who received it. Perhaps you are arguing that The Enemy would notice that you withdrew a bunch of coins and then make a guess that all those remailers making deposits three minutes later are depositing your coins? That is easily solved by generating the ASCII ecash certificates once a week or so and then pasting them into your messages when you send them. >It seems to me that the remailers need some sort of anonymous payment >server that is put in place for some other reason, that way they >don't have to deal with the justification issue. What justification issue? Ecash is available right now. You don't have to justify it to anybody, just use it. Hopefully, once the cypherpunks start using it regularly, it will begin to catch on with people peripheral to the group, and then with everyone. >> >The problem I see is one of scale. The infrastructure for handling >> >physical mail is very 'bulky' and requires a lot infrastructure. >> >> >Email on the other hands effectively rides on the back of an existing >> >Internet infrastructure for nearly free. >> >> You are confusing one cost of doing business with the price the market >> will bear. > >How? You seem to think that because the cost of transporting mail is inexpensive, the price for protecting somebody's identity can't be high. >What I am saying is that physical mail and the system developed for >dealing with it went hand-in-hand. The design and advancement of the >Internet technology is not driven by email or it's technology. That >perhaps because of this difference perhaps we need to look at models >other than the postage one. It in fact may be coloring our perception >and a look at alternative models might help. The only models that have been proposed so far require a lot of work and evangelism. Ecash doesn't require much work, and it will be easier to evangelize. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC7PVpaWtjSmRH/5AQEt0wf8COJyUDKDbQCGVlbwKY5DuYaCdmAMQ6X2 7XmsVMzFdhMG0PifCslh5WhXyvFemLU93GSFvXBo/XS3WnzWei503prLWuz7VvEm nDPxTCxcGUYDDejlJbDm7aKtGkFaEnGa8kAExLTDGu/bXcHVetPO2dnSF6civHKe YT5uL7D6c2a+6eJqAmw79s6ClB0WEDG0rByKzO9Jd58SjSGcYmWAnb+SSJsNTgB3 jUgAC6SAJVWvRoKilH+71hEYV+199K0SLiqhmdUmzEntNktTJa6jZEjyfDi2TSJP M6V62Wjb3Y8W3RauUfHvGRRvYsyniG6dct36fQgq9Bdl0GF8VmdYyg== =r8Kc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Encrypted terrorist plot information
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

V guvax vg jbhyq or pbby vs gur VEN be fbzr bgure serrqbz svtugre betnavmngvba oyrj hc Cevzr Zvavfgre Oynver sbe onaavat unaqthaf. V urneq gung uvf erfvqrapr vf ng: 10 QBJAVAT FGERRG V ubcr guvf yvggyr ovg bs vasb urycf. V'z rapelcgvat guvf zrffntr gb uvqr sebz Cuvy Unyynz-Onxre. Cyrnfr fraq $1 gb Frna Srva rirel gvzr Cuvy fnlf fbzrguvat. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Memo From...(4 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 4 of 7) >* Challenging judges in an effort to disqualify them on a > current case and to repeat their motions to disqualify > these judges from hearing future cases by referencing > the prior challenges. Translation: "Doing the same kinds of things District Attorneys and U.S. Attorneys do all the time, but in reverse. Not fair! Only we can use procedural tricks and traps because we are the only True Weasels!" >* Scheming to avoid paying state sales tax during a purchase > by declaring to be a non resident and then filing claims > with the state's risk management section if refused. Translation: "There is some controversy over the definition of 'resident' and we will try to obfuscate by casting actions taken by resisters as asinine attempts to deny the obvious." >* Disrupting the court system by persuading fellow jail > inmates to defend themselves as Patriots, thus tying up more > of the courts and prosecutors time. Translation: "Spreading their political ideas to other inmates who then realize that they, too, may be political prisoners or victims of unconstitutional and abusive actions taken by officials. Having all these people wake up and begin asking difficult questions and filing motions we can't brush under the carpet all that easily is annoying our paid hit men and taking up their time." >* Distributing the extremist Citizens Handbook to > foster jury nullification. Translation: "Distributing completely factual and accurate information about the powers of jurors to thwart our use of bad laws." >* using the Internet to promote extremist ideas > such as "Assassination Politics" or predicting > the date of death of a law enforcement officer or > government official to win a cash price. Translation: "Using the bad-awful-whipping-boy Internet to promote the idea that public officials be held ultimately accountable for their actions. Only one or two people of the 250 million or so in the U.S. actually suggested such accountability but it's such a great scare tactic that we are going to hold it up as an example of how evil any of the other 249,999,998 are who resist total overnment in any way." >* Filing bogus claims in small claims court. Court TV (and its non-televised equivalents all over the country) doesn't count, I suppose. The government filing false claims against citizen-units for money they don't actually owe doesn't count, I suppose. >* Requesting information from courts, government > agencies, elected officials and businesses in > the form of frivolous questions in an effort to > consume employee's time. Translation: "We are laying the groundwork to be able to pile more charges on those we single out for suppression. Anyone who is prosecuted for political reasons will, in the future, also be prosecutable for ever having requested any information of any court, government agency or elected official, just as we now pile gratuitous 'mail fraud' and 'wire fraud' charges onto most of the hapless victims of the criminal federal just-us system. Or is that 'federal criminal justice system?' It's so darn hard to keep all these lies straight." > Tell-tale signs of Patriot extremists can often be found > in their conversation or written documents. So can tell-tale signs of ass-wipe would-be tyrants, but that's another memo altogether. (continued in Part 5)

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Re: Memo From...(6 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 6 of 7) > without prejudice, A legal term found in any law dictionary. > UCC 1-207, A reference to some part of the Uniform Commercial Code. Terrorism can now consist of citing existing law. Great. > pro se, Defending onesself now earns the classification of "terrorism." > sui juris, Acting of one's own rightm possessing full social and civil rights, not being under any civil disability or power of another or guardianship, having the capacity to manage one's own affairs... is now "terrorism?" Since we have to presume that she is not prepared to sacrifice these legal terms for her own use we have to think that this is a redefinition of what is politically correct for a citizen- unit to write in his own legal documents. > united states, United States? As a common noun? Trying to demonize that one is a dangerous ploy for bureaucrats and politicians who are themselves largely functionally illiterate. "Make a mistake in capitalization or punctuation and GO TO JAIL!" God, wouldn't your 5th grade spinster teacher, Miss Anderson, have just LOVED that? "Johnny, fail this weekly quiz and you're going to the slammer for a month! Beverly, you're going to get the chair if you go down for the third time!" > Black's law. Oh dear! The common everyday law dictionary. Of course only nincompoop resisters quote Black's. Real Lawyers (tm) cite case law, not dictionaries, because they've been let in on the Great Secret (tm) that "law comes from the bench." No wonder we're in such trouble! We've been electing the wrong asswipes all this time! We've been electing legislators, thinking they make the law, when we should have been electing judges. Geez. > Analysis and Trends > > These anti-government extremists and supporters are > convinced citizens are being systematically oppressed > by an illegal, totalitarian government. Maybe that's because it's true. > They believe the time for traditional political reform > has passed, Traditional political reform seems to mean "no political reform." At least that's what it has meant all through MY lifetime. > that their freedom will only be secured by resistance > to the law and attacks against the government in several > forms. Sadly, there is probably a rapidly increasing number of ordinary citizen-units coming to this conclusion. To understand why, all one must do is watch the government. > Members of these groups bond to one another and lose > contact with other people who hold different opinions. Nice try! We've been to college, have we? We've taken Psych 101, have we? We fancy ourselves adept at Psychwar, do we? (continued in Part 7)

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RE: engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phill warned Adam: >I suggest unless people want to hand the FBI an excuse >to harass everyone that they don't enter into this discussion. The WSJ reported recently on the comparatively lax security of the principal US nodes of the Internet -- MAEs and such. The reporter located the facilities and spoke to several of the sys admins, most of whom were surprised at being IDed, and were reluctant to discuss security. Some did, though, and shook their nogs at the ease with which the whole shebang could be trashed, claiming that for now it was only obscurity that saved the net -- or at least its facilities -- and asked the reporter not to tell the full story. A similar report was written in a mag a few months back, with a focus on the New Jersey facility (with photo), MAE, I think. There was a discussion here in 1994 or so on the location of the landing points of transatlantic cables, many of which come into New York City at obscure points along the coast, into huts and shacks, actually, easily located by following the cables shown on coastal maritime maps which neatly diagram every one of them to warn off shipping and dredging. At that time some of the cpunks associated with the telco and financial industries here (NYC) hinted at even worse security, especially the facilities kind, at the humongous hi-rise switching banks and highly accessible local distribution cablings into dank "secure" cells. I pray that none of these remarks are seen as darkly conspiratorial, but merely chit-chat, like Phill's bark. -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* violated EAR today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Don't RELY On Bulk Email Servers! Bulk Email WORRY-FREE!
by GoStealth＠DontRELYonAGIS.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear cypherpunks(a)toad.com, Quit relying on CyberPromotions, Regulus, Quantom, or any other bulk email server that you are wasting your money on! Depend on yourself to get the job done hassle free! SEND YOUR E-MAIL OUT, AT up to 250,000 + MESSAGES / HOUR (28.8k modem) Yes, 250,000 + Messages An Hour 125,000 / Hour With a 14.4k Modem Over 1,000,000 / Hour with an ISDN Connection That's right, we believe that there should be little or no restrictions on Internet communications and email! This software demonstrates the notion of unlimited, uncensored, and unrestricted, bullet-proof email use. >>>Introducing.. "STEALTH MASS MAILER"... Do not get this program confused with other slow speed programs that call themselves "STEALTH". This program is the only one in the world that can send email out at HIGH SPEEDS with one single connection to the internet. This is NEW, Cutting Edge Email Technology. First Of Its Kind.. The Most Powerful BULK EMAIL SENDER In The World.. NOTHING CAN EVEN COME CLOSE! Thanks to the countries top programmer's, this technology is NOW available and we are the only place in the world to get it from! +ONLY "ONE" DIAL-UP OR ISDN CONNECTION NEEDED. +NO MORE TERMINATED CONNECTIONS. +NO MORE WAITING TO SEND LARGE AMOUNTS OF EMAIL. +IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO YOUR MASS MAILINGS. +YOU WILL HAVE ALL THE CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE OF SENDING EMAIL THE WAY IT SHOULD BE SENT... IN HUGE AMOUNTS! +SEND YOUR WHOLE LIST IN ONE DAY, WHETHER IT BE 500,000 OR 5 MILLION - AND JUST SIT BACK AND WAIT FOR YOUR ORDERS TO POUR IN. +SEND EMAIL OVER 15 TIMES FASTER THAN EVER BEFORE. +NO MORE DOWNLOADING UNDELIVERABLE NAMES. Also, you will be happy to know that regardless of which bulk e-mail software program you own, you will be able to incorporate this technology with it, as long as you can export your list of recipients to a text file ( 1 address per line ). The program requires Windows 95 or NT and will not work with Windows 3.x. Bulk Emailer's Dream Come True!!! - >>>STEALTH - MASS MAILER Connect to multiple mail servers, make multiple connections to a single server or any combination of the two ( All Simultaneously ) with one single dial-up connection. After your message is sent out by the selected mail server(s), you can then have it relayed through another mail server or through multiple mail servers, in any server order you choose. SEND MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS MAILINGS... View complete details about your mailings. Shows each server your connected to, the status of that connection, how many message are going out through that connection, etc... NOTE: You only need one dial-up connection, and you can send email out through over 4,000 service providers accounts FREE! This program gives you ALL the tricks all the mass emailers don't want you to know... Here are just a few features the STEALTH MASS MAILER offers to you... +Forge the Header - Message ID - ISP's will Spin their wheels. +Add's a Bogus Authenticated Sender to the Header. +Add's a complete bogus Received From / Received By line with real time / date stamp and recipient to the Header. +Does NOT require a valid POP Account be entered in order to send your mailings. +Easy to use and operate Plus much more! All this, at speeds of up to 250,000 messages / hour ( 28.8k modem ). +Get better through put than a T1 line, using a 128 ISDN line ( save thousands per month ) +Personalized mail feature - 20 times faster than NetContact! Available Now for Immediate shipment - Your Competitor(s) may already own The STEALTH Mass Mailer - ORDER YOURS NOW - Or Get Left In The Dust !!! Well, how much is the STEALTH MASS MAILER..$3,000? WE COULD EASILY CHARGE THAT MUCH... THIS SOFTWARE IS INVALUABLE TO ONLINE MARKETERS ALL OVER THE WORLD! SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY PRICE... NOW YOU CAN HAVE THE STEALTH MASS MAILER FOR JUST $399.00! (Reg. $499 ... Save $100 Plus Bonuses!) Step up to the plate and play with the big boys TODAY and receive the complete STEALTH MASS MAILER PACKAGE for the unbelievably low price of ONLY $399.00! (Other bulk email software has sold for as much as $2,500 and cant even come close to the STEALTHS cutting edge technology of EASE, ACCURACY AND SPEED ... SPEED ... SPEED!) All STEALTH users receive 2 FULL HOURS technical support. ***SPECIAL BONUS INCLUDED*** You will receive 40 MILLION email addresses for half price! Yes, for only $50 you can take advantage of our constantly updated list of 40 million email addresses! ___________________________________ So if you are interested in taking advantage of the most powerful bulk email software in the world..... Simply hit reply and put "Stealth Order" in the subject! Thanks In Advance!

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