December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Transmission Management
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >And PGP's Policy Enforcer has another side to it: have you ever >forgotten to encrypt email that should have been encrypted? I >have. With the Policy Enforcer installed, that can't happen. Which >may well save big hassles in the future. (This feature is independent of the GAK aspects of the product.) It's probably a good idea to set up your mailer so that it discourages transmission of unencrypted mail. This could be as simple as a sequence of questions: "Do you want to do this?", "Do you really want to do this?", and "Are you absolutely one hundred percent sure that it is a good idea to put this message on tape at Fort Meade for eternity?" But, you could make more amusing warnings. For example, the mailer could convert your message into a front page article for the New York Times and show you what it will look like. Agencies which handle encrypted communications typically track every message sent. We should do the same thing. Most people probably do this in an informal way, but really slick tools for doing this would have their uses. This is especially true when managing an identity. Not only would it be nice to track every transmission in a nice easy to assess way, but also track exactly how it was transmitted, the precise time of transmission, and the remailers used to deliver it. This raw information would be neat to have, but it wouldn't get really useful without an analysis tool. For instance, you could see how much your identity depends on the security of certain remailers. If you use one remailer in your chains a lot, you might want to have something which warns you that you are becoming overly dependent on that remailer. Or, you might want to run "what if" scenarios to see if you would be vulnerable if a particular set of remailers were compromised. If the analysis tool were really good, it would hunt for weaknesses based on known remailer attacks. And, naturally, for proper identity management it would be important to keep a running score for the odds that each identity were compromised and by which threats. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDh0V5aWtjSmRH/5AQFyFwf+OhIbig7B/njU1yTlDdIuBHs3jpYyH6Ol /+Cjk9X2MbFkYGec3vm8muf1alGI/8ZH+NV73cXry1rN8FqdIY/eoJX5OoRhTQpa ajQFNnSaufbY2xgx45o7S+jFCFGaasInjsvl7q78iH8JL2seXgG3t7HNsK/SZOqD lZynyUqCaVssiSTkDHiZx72TUPJbhUCOvkoKdiy5evQlN7PPyKNmajB9INbzin7z qKqfyyHyFR+Gu618IojassyZ9wuEzbjMStTRMf8TGOo8yJWaH0+W7KX9JHVF3Zdv EjINSw7EBxMAOk83AY9YP0nuLJnwaEoloKifX6D+MmQ+Jx9Js2ocuA== =HUZ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn wrote: >Remember when the phone company used to lease you your phone? Surely >that doesn't make the data that goes over the phone their property? >If my doctor calls me at work with the results of a critical test, >you believe that data is no longer private? I hope not. You think >whatever goes on in a rental car I drive is the property of the >rental company? That if some company rented the car they are >entitled to read whatever papers I have in there? What about a >hotel? A leased apartment? A restraunt back room? I challenge the >"ownership gives the owner the right to all that occurs or is >produced on or in the property" premise because it is just not a >valid one, legally or (in my opinion) ethically. Mr. Avon is talking about agreements, I believe, although he is using the private property approach to argue that there is certainly a meeting of the minds between the two parties. It seems reasonable that employees may agree to give up their rights, for example their inalienable right to stay at home and watch TV, in exchange for employment. When the employment agreement is at will, as most are, it seems reasonable that the company may change it whenever it pleases: "If you wish to continue working here, you will have to let the company read your mail." This is complicated by the bizarre legal environment which employers face in the United States. In practice one would have difficulty terminating an employee by changing the "at will" agreement. More generally, it seems a good guess that Mr. Avon would not object to an agreement with a company in which the company was able to continuously monitor the employees communications or activities. (This is why the private property approach can confuse people: this is not the core issue.) >[I'm not on cypherpunks anymore, anyone there who wants to put me >through the wringer without having to endure my response might not >want to CC: me.] Guess you miss out, then. ;-) Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDh325aWtjSmRH/5AQFfWwf/RfjQ38YvvqNAxkcSTWKhFM09fySjgCvG PlSrimP30jC/dWHAH3iZavS5fn8LE+rfHSHBy5UZyE6xyuyAsJHpMYXDjoQ7gMau vKWHCPCKoxNoi/UNFJ6FQXAEy3o+nBp1pRVupOr/gGFaegCd0tglEyzxCEiFguOf utUGX2X7C5wK2Lwhe+lVJqqlvzkwLXt9UKYzanJc8LZmlAjmcmrPySXC+KSnvfve YHGGqD6+jxxqNxqRVpvCpO4JeJ8O+95O3oCxrOKg7b5SwtOo21qnxkBkFNGyuTq9 YGzQJs/0Ha8Gr9Vk+QiT5CjUAdw+N/uahaPkNWjf1f4SztKpz3y0ZA== =FlvU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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MISTY encryption
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MISTY Misty is a cryptographic algorithm developed by Mitsubishi Electric after they broke DES in 1994.It is designed to withstand linear and differential cryptanalysis, but has not yet been cryptanalysed. As it has not undergoneintensive peer review, the usual caution is recommended. It is being considered for inclusion into the SET 2.0 standard. http://www.mach5.com/crypto/algorithms.html ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Moderation Revisionism (Try to forget!)
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Those who are so quick to act as apologists for the C2Nut blitzkreig on the anarchistic freedom of the CypherPunks list forget that by the end of the 'moderation experiment,' the mailing list had lost an estimated 6 million Jewish subscribers. It is likely that we would have lost even more, had it not been for the valiant efforts of Dimitri Vulis to warn us about murdering Armenian bastards in our midst. When the Johnboot of Fascism descended on the CypherPunks mailing list, the evil Dr. Sandfort was given free reign to do bizarre experiments with twin mailing lists, severing parts of toad.com's electronic brain into seperate sections, and producing a mutant clone which was passed off as the original entity. Unfortunately, the Electronic DNA of the mutant strain of the list was not stable, and began to disintegrate, resulting in a denigration of the mutant list body to the point where parts of its electronic body began to become corrupted, even falling completely off, at times. After the nuking of toad.com and Nagasaki, the list CypherSpace was divided up among the winners, with the Eastern Block under control of Comrade Chewd-Off, the Western Block was apparently liberated under the flag of InfoNex (although their ties to the C2Nut secret government remain in place), and Texas, as always, remained a seperate CypherPunk nation just south of Intel, with Commander in Chief Choate launching a bandwidth race to keep ahead of the Eastern Block. Currently there are calls for crypto disarmament coming from the peace-loving folks in DC, in the interests of making the world a safer place, but they are meeting resistance from crypto-guerillas who refuse to recognize that the war is over and it is time for us to ask, "Why can't we all just get along (a long toilet plunger and shove it up somebody's ass)." DigiCash remained neutral during the moderation experiment and denies that they are in possession of large sums of eca$h left with them for safekeeping by the missing Jewish members of the mailing list. There have been rumors that many of the leaders of the attack on the CypherPunks list escaped to Anguilla, a small island in the Caribbean, where they plotted an even greater conspiracy to take over all of cryptography by seizing control of the financial cryptography arena, but Herr Hettinga claims that it was simply a meeting of the Bavarian Illuminati. He denies any claim that there were closed meetings in which a secret alliance was formed with the Japanese, but recent activity by Jochi Ito has led many to suspect that this is indeed the case. In my private meetings with the remaining members of the CypherPunks mailing lists, each of them confirmed that they are members of one three-letter organization or another, although most of them continue to deny it in public. Kent Crispin and Phillip Hallam-Baker asked me to please not blow their 'covers,' so I will not comment on them directly. I hope that this clears things up for everybody. Now just try to forget all about it. RevisionMonger

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >Meanwhile, I can understand the desire of a company to be able to >read old outgoing email even after the employee quit or forgot their >passphrase. After all, it might contain valuable information about >details surrounding past negotiations with clients. Information that >I would not want to be without. I have never seen or even heard of an instance where it was necessary to go through an employee's electronic mail. Has anybody else ever witnessed such a situation? While we can construct hypothetical circumstances, in practice the need for this feature is rare. What, then, are some sources of the (alleged) demand? 1. PGP is preparing to compromise with The Great Satan, and to have a viable company after The Fall. 2. Secure software is becoming perceived as naughty. Given the insecure legal and regulatory environment in which companies operate, a perception as a naughty company can be expensive. 2.1 Drug testing is an example of similar behavior. In practice, few companies implement an effective drug testing program. External image, then, is the likely motivation. 3. Many companies have a corporate culture of dominance over their employees. This is yet another way of expressing their perceived position. (Perceived, that is, by the employees and the employers, but not perhaps by outsiders.) 3.1 Common drug testing techniques have sado-sexual overtones. 4. Companies may not wish to have their right to read employee mail challenged. (Were employees to commonly protect their mail from employers, the common practice could, in time, be transformed into a right, regardless of contractual agreements.) Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDhuUZaWtjSmRH/5AQFflAf5AWr65whT2ZM9yzaHxs5lX9ViocBCqr6A O+1FG/2xPzk+o4hf9zeXMTThyKu+iQ5NgcCWd+ocRRPwIsIB3TJuAmxBJ2tgLISZ dqtgDkEyXmoD4Mq+ALpNy0wcJ0Z/q1LUhZErm6gGOPGhkVeVTn8Gscj+qDHJPu2M ji8/9v8pjYRKe1BsS8ZJlirNwMdC5Use6Ig/Z3uOHmEcnMh+jeZmbAyLcGupNzd9 hjh/q7hThyEIN7v5mJVjg16oXJ0ryN1SkbIvnMimx8b8dYs47z5C5HaUZYX2CZDc XicfmAv5w+Y87dE7HQh9hKmOH36c2Ajfw0hdbQTxWWkFmPys6hDdvQ== =cJtj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Pretty Good Piracy
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/5/97 6:37 PM, Anonymous (nobody(a)REPLAY.COM) passed this wisdom: >Ryan Anderson wrote: >> Okay - the only difference between this and a normal version of >> PGP is that it always encrypts to a certain key-id, in addition >> to all others. >> >> That's the only weakness you'll see in it. > >It's the only weakness that's needed to compromise all the keys. It seems to me that it should not necessarily compromise all keys, though it does in effect provide for a goodly number of 'known plaintext' objects. Could some of our hardcore crypto experts comment on IDEA's susceptability to known plaintext which then provides 'plaintext' to the DH/DSS or RSA keys and what is their susceptability to 'known plaintext' It occured to me while proofreading the above that in effect a digitally signed cleartext document provides 'known plaintext' every time its used, since the SHA-1/MD-5 can be computed the hash is a 'known plaintext' on the DH/DSS and RSA keys ... is this one of the reasons for the two key types in PGP5 ??? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDgmJcdZgC62U/gIEQIvgwCg/kybc9ons3ji3cbi9jtSnQ3kptkAn3IC 90pwzjjpt2qqhpjn8VRlrOGR =IIkE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "Never ask what sort of computer a guy drives. If he's a Mac user, he'll tell you. If not, why embarrass him?" - Tom Clancy

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Zergo Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Adam Back and Ross Anderson the full Zergo Report on encryption use by the NHSnet is online at: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/ukcrypto/zergo.html (139K) There may be action by HMG to prohibit publication in the UK (and maybe elsewhere) so we've mirrored it at: http://jya.com/zergo-aba.htm Other mirrors encouraged.

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C2Net offers Vulis $100,000 for not talking about Stronghold
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sameer Parekh called Dmitry Vulis on the phone today and offered him $100,000 if Vulis promises not to publicize the security flows that Vulis has found in Stronghold, C2Net's only remaining product.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) The remailer list here has been out of date for some time, but should be up to date now. I'm still working on updating the web page. Last update: Mon 6 Oct 97 6:46:39 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net ##*+#*#**### :42 99.99% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org *###+***##** 1:33 99.98% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org ++++++**++*+ 17:20 99.97% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++******+++* 11:30 99.96% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ++***++++++* 22:36 99.89% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.-----..-- 9:58:11 99.68% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com + -***+++++* 52:53 99.65% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** * ****** 3:36 99.57% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ----------- 3:06:27 99.44% neva remailer(a)neva.org --**-***+ + 1:15:50 99.17% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net - + ++++ * 36:51 98.65% hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ---- ------- 4:34:09 97.76% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --- ------- 3:15:49 97.49% arrid arrid(a)juno.com - . ---- 10:06:05 79.88% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -16.56% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: russia_1.html
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Harka <root@DosLinux> > US Sees No KGB Role in Russia's Nuclear Arms > > WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The United States Friday rejected the claim of a > Russian scientist that Moscow had secretly developed nuclear "suitcase > bombs" under KGB orders in the 1970s specifically for terrorist > purposes. > >[...] > > Testifying before Congress Thursday, Alexei Yablokov, a respected > scientist who served on the Russian National Security Council, > contradicted statements by Russian officials denying the existence of > the weapons and buttressed claims that many of them have gone missing. > > "I am absolutely sure that they have been made," he told the House > Military Research and Development subcommittee. > > The issue arose when former Russian National Security Adviser Alexandr > Lebed alleged that up to 100 portable suitcase-sized bombs were > unaccounted for since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. > > According to Lebed, who has agreed to testify before the House > committee later this month, the devices have an explosive capacity of > one kiloton -- the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT -- can be activated > by a single person and could kill as many as 100,000 people. > > Yablokov said he had spoken to the scientists who worked on the > weapons and so was certain of their existence. [...] I saw part of this on CSPAN. Yablokov made one point that I felt was interesting. These devices were made during the Cold War period, and it's extremely unlikely that any could have been made since the Soviet Union fell apart. The plutonium cores of thermonuclear devices have a limited shelf life - he claimed 6 years, which jibes with what I've heard from other open sources. Fission products build up in the cores which can poison a chain reaction. Thus all Pu based devices need to have the cores periodically removed and replaced with new ones, while the old ones have to go through a non-trivial reprocessing stage to remove the fission products. Thus, a nuke left on the shelf eventually turns into a dud. The time since the Soviet Union fell (which is the upper limit of the last time these particular 'suitcases' could plausibly have been repacked) is long enough ago that they are now either duds or becoming unreliable (I don't know if the degredation results in gradually decreasing yield, or if one day they simply don't work). Of course, even contaminated Pu in the hands of a terrorist (or a State) is a disquieting notion. Peter Trei trei(a)Process.com

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