December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Testing headers, ignore
by Paul Bradley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Test sent at 3:45pm 3/11/97 from c12 Paul Bradley Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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FUD Trivia -- Sex, Bells, 'a'nd... / [Fwd: Sampler: November 3] Sampler: November 3
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Protocols for Insurance to Maintain Privacy
by John Kelsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: Cypherpunks ## Date: 11/01/97 ## Subject: Protocols for Insurance to Maintain Privacy ] >Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1997 09:24:39 -0700 >From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> >Subject: Protocols for Insurance to Maintain Privacy >There are interesting protocols which can be used to skirt >statist laws about insurance. A la carte insurance, for >specific illnesses, is one of the best examples. Thus, a >heterosexual male who doesn't use IV needles can "opt out" >of coverage for AIDS-related treatments, thus transferring >the effective cost to those most worthy. I can see practical problems with this (like finding out that the fine print on page 248 of my insurance contract turns out not to cover dog bites that occur on Thursdays), but it's really just letting customers buy only what they want. >This has similarities to crypto protocols. And anonymity. To >wit, it is possible to arrange anonymous blood tests for >various conditions. So, Alice arranges a distributed set of >such tests, perhaps at multiple labs. When she finds she has >no preconditions or precursors for Diseases A, B, C, and D, >she opts out of being covered for these diseases. One problem with this is that, if it becomes widespread, nobody will ever buy insurance for these diseases unless they have it or probably will get it. This kind-of defeats the point of having insurance, which is to protect yourself from low probability high cost things happening. That is, before I've taken the test for genetic disease X, my best estimate of the probability that I will test positive is very low. Once I have taken it, I know the result. If I sign up for a-la-carte insurance for this disease, the insurance company effectively knows I must have tested positive for a predisposition to it, and so either won't give me insurance, or will give me insurance only at an extremely high rate (corresponding to a 1/10 chance of getting the disease, rather than a 1/1,000,000 chance). On the other hand, information isn't free--I have to spend some money for each of the hundreds of genetic tests available. There may be a profitable business in providing a battery of genetic tests for a large up-front fee, in a sort-of inverse-lottery scheme--if you get unlucky enough to have one or more of these disease precursors, we pay your insurance costs, or at least give you a big bundle of money to spend as you will. This is subject to various kinds of abuse (if you know you're predisposed to get some disease, you have a strong incentive to enter the ``lottery''), but it still might work. >--Tim May --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNF1ZdEHx57Ag8goBAQFZsQQA7NGzgc39WbyB8eACZN71wrBwOdapExNn fvn1aEFeHoLWZnHIcLHwzSuCiJ22I9kGK8Co88fDfjDebb+kzHj9oO4xpfMecHLr pjvKWfEDOnv5th6hxCmzKrA6OpuMqYgtvX9USRuO1oLckjX4mTc6jvEp6ZBD96vB uWvXhj1bPUM= =Vc/C -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36

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re: Speech as co-conspiring? I don't think so.
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Minty Cuntskin (Sorry Monty, I couldn't resist ;-) wrote: >The producers of the show certainly know that there are terrorist >elements and psychopaths who would be watching. They know that these >people will be turned on by the imagery of a BATF agent being brutally >murdered. They could have told the same story using different >imagery. Instead of using graphic violence, they could have expressed >the idea of the BATF agent getting killed with a heartrending scene of >his wife getting the phone call. That certainly would not have been >inflammatory. > >But they didn't. The opted to go with a glorification of the act. >Why? Incompetence won't wash - anybody getting to national TV has >spent years in the business and is a total pro. They know what effect >they are having. True. I think the majority of the Hollywood community is on our side in this one. Folks likes Clint Eastwood have made a sincere effort to expose the BATFucks for the thugs they are. Some of you may recall that Clint has become a vocal critic of the seige at Waco and spoken out against it on several occasions. >They glorified this act of violence to encourage others to do the >same. Where is the FBI? Why isn't anybody doing anything? If the >life of only one BATF agent is spared, it will be worthwhile! Think >of his poor wife and kids. Yes, imagine having to be related to such a creep. Tim May wrote: >>Ah, what has the world come to? > >Remailers? ;-) Though not a panacea, remailers do create some interesting possibilities for the freedom of expression. Nerthus -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNF1BiuFWwZe05jcJAQGGmgf7BS7N+fJ9M24l2S9rQ92iU3+/W5/K3AP2 sMdGoOKhsbKYPGhjiH4QjBw1cKWLf+99WqwDzcF+Z662zfElhShZS46TOaboxtof B4QukJGKDws0Hqf5ixG7+H6SqEE0wyjYWMX19o204JJNIvS8dgg0egXzZiJFu6JM aT7NS26jMXl/BAfAz73a3sWMiJ6Td92El05X2Keknblswf4WfrSCPOl1uBefLNzv jE86NY51A2htaQO2mIa6ed1kdBG7GRhyOAw+gwRIAi3E6F7+ORJwMLmMi0lR8LSz f+AqJDkV+INgwHj5algunSACrIkfRdEnMNjPwImFoBNPl7xpXfEBKg== =e2sj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Secret Spin wrote: > -----BEGIN PLP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Let's say you are Robert E. Lee and you are writing "Ulysses" > on your nice little Linus blanket. Because you fear Lucy in > the Sky with Diamonds pulling away the football, you use > encrypted virtual herniated disks. > > Because you are the Beaver, you have ten such disks. One > contains your glass of draft and "Ulysses", four contain > harmless nuclear information, and five contain killfiles > full of TruthMonger posts. > > The jack booted Sandfarts kick down your door and drag you > by your dick to jail. The gay-hispanic-transexual liberal <spit> > Judge orders you to produce the pass phrases of all the disks or be > penisized for condemned of court. > > Now, you are in an interesting situation. You can't give the > passwords for half of the disks, but you are unable to prove this. > This means you have nothing to gain by giving the pass phrase to the > "Ulysses" disk - you will always be seen as holding out. Even if you > convince the Judge that some of the disks are noise, you have no > reason not to include the "Ulysses" disk in this set. I am only going to not-say this once, so listen up (snoozing==luzing). Since I am not-saying this, you are going to have to think about it. -----NON-STANDARD DISCLAIMER---- I accept no legal responsibility for anyone who sprains, or otherwise injures their brain, by stepping off the well-lit main streets of proper societal thought patterns and ducking into the dark alleyways of their mind, where strange, outlawed personas still lurk, secretly engaging in the lost arts of alchemical cognition and evolutionary development of logic, thought, rationality and common-fucking-sense. -----IS THAT NON-STANDARD ENOUGH FOR YOU?----- Free brochure: Circleiculum at 'THE WORLD'S WORST CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHOOL' ------------------------------------------------------- 101 - Making Sure Mom Can't Find Your Dirty Pictures 201 - Making Sure Your Employee Can't Hide His Dirty Pictures 301 - Government Cryptography Issues--How Many Algorithms Can Stand On The Head Of A Pin? 302 - Your Legal Right To Refuse To Hand Over Secret Keys The Government Already Has! 401 - Trusting PRZ From The PGP Cradel To The PGP Grave. Free brochure: Magicircleiculum at 'THE WORLD'S NON-EXISTENT CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHOOL' ------------------------------------------------------------------ Open-Ended Course / Self-Structured The student is given a plain text file upon entering the program, and then told to "Fuck off." When ready, the student returns for the test. The student gives his/her encrypted file to a cryptanalyst, who proceeds to take the test. The cryptanalyst gets all the time he/she needs to take the test, while the student waits. If the cryptanalyst decrypts the file, he/she passes the test and the student is sentenced to death. If the cryptanalyst fails to decrypt the file, the student is told to "Fuck off." Students sentenced to death are taken to Life or Death Row which has a Death Chamber at one end and a Door To Freedom at the other. The Executioner asks the student, "Does PRZ talk in his sleep?" If the student answers, the Door To Freedom automatically locks. Once the Door To Freedom locks, it does the student no good to realize that the proper answer was to turn and walk out the Door To Freedom. The school has no graduates...only survivors.

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No Subject
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NSA, Crypto AG, and the Iraq-Iran Conflict by J. Orlin Grabbe One of the dirty little secrets of the 1980s is that the U.S. regularly provided Iraq's Saddam Hussein with top-secret communication intercepts by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Consider the evidence. When in 1991 the government of Kuwait paid the public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton ten million dollars to drum up American war fever against the evil dictator Hussein, it brought about the end of a long legacy of cooperation between the U.S. and Iraq. Hill & Knowlton resurrected the World War I propaganda story about German soldiers roasting Belgian babies on bayonets, updated in the form of a confidential witness (actually the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.) who told Congress a tearful story of Iraqi soldiers taking Kuwaiti babies out of incubators and leaving them on the cold floor to die. President George Bush then repeated this fabricated tale in speeches ten times over the next three days. What is remarkable about this staged turn of events is that, until then, Hussein had operated largely with U.S. approval. This cooperation had spanned three successive administrations, starting with Jimmy Carter. As noted by John R. MacArthur, "From 1980 to 1988, Hussein had shouldered the burden of killing about 150,000 Iranians, in addition to at least thirteen thousand of his own citizens, including several thousand unarmed Kurdish civilians, and in the process won the admiration and support of elements of three successive U.S. Administrations" [1]. Hussein's artful slaughter of Iranians was aided by good military intelligence. The role of NSA in the conflict is an open secret in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Only in this country has there been a relative news blackout, despite the fact that it was the U.S. administration that let the crypto cat out of the bag. First, U.S. President Ronald Reagan informed the world on national television that the United States was reading Libyan communications. This admission was part of a speech justifying the retaliatory bombing of Libya for its alleged involvement in the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin's Schoeneberg district, where two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman were killed, and 200 others injured. Reagan wasn't talking about American monitoring of Libyan news broadcasts. Rather, his "direct, precise, and undeniable proof" referred to secret (encrypted) diplomatic communication between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in East Berlin. Next, this leak was compound by the U.S. demonstration that it was also reading secret Iranian communications. As reported in Switzerland's Neue Z^Árcher Zeitung, the U.S. provided the contents of encrypted Iranian messages to France to assist in the conviction of Ali Vakili Rad and Massoud Hendi for the stabbing death in the Paris suburb of Suresnes of the former Iranian prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his personal secretary Katibeh Fallouch. [2] What these two countries had in common was they had both purchased cryptographic communication equipment from the Swiss firm Crypto AG. Crypto AG was founded in 1952 by the (Russian-born) Swedish cryptographer Boris Hagelin who located his company in Zug. Boris had created the "Hagelin-machine", a encryption device similar to the German "Enigma". The Hagelin machine was used on the side of the Allies in World War II. Crypto AG was an old and venerable firm, and Switzerland was a neutral country. So Crypto AG's enciphering devices for voice communication and digital data networks were popular, and customers came from 130 countries. These included the Vatican, as well the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Such countries were naturally skeptical of cryptographic devices sold in many NATO countries, so turned to relatively neutral Switzerland for communication security. Iran demonstrated its suspicion about the source of the leaks, when it arrested Hans Buehler, a top salesman for Crypto AG, in Teheran on March 18, 1992. During his nine and a half months of solitary confinement in Evin prison in Teheran, Buehler was questioned again and again whether he had leaked Teheran's codes or Libya's keys to Western powers. Luckily Buehler didn't know anything. He in fact believed in his own sales pitch that Crypto AG was a neutral company and its equipment was the best. They were Swiss, after all. [3] Crypto AG eventually paid one million dollars for Buehler's release in January 1993, then promptly fired him once they had reassured themselves that he hadn't revealed anything important under interrogation, and because Buehler had begun to ask some embarrassing questions. Then reports appeared on Swiss television, Swiss Radio International, all the major Swiss papers, and in German magazines like Der Spiegel. Had Crypto AG's equipment been spiked by Western intelligence services? the media wanted to know. The answer was Yes [4]. Swiss television traced the ownership of Crypto AG to a company in Liechtenstein, and from there back to a trust company in Munich. A witness appearing on Swiss television explained the real owner was the German government--the Federal Estates Administration. [5] According to Der Spiegel, all but 6 of the 6000 shares of Crypto AG were at one time owned by Eugen Freiberger, who resided in Munich and was head of the Crypto AG managing board in 1982. Another German, Josef Bauer, an authorized tax agent of the Muenchner Treuhandgesellschaft KPMG, and who was elected to the managing board in 1970, stated that his mandate had come from the German company Siemens. Other members of Crypto AG's management had also worked at Siemens. Was the German secret service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), hiding behind the Siemens' connection? So it would seem. Der Spiegel reported that in October 1970, a secret meeting of the BND had discussed how the Swiss company Graettner could be guided into closer cooperation with Crypto AG, or could even merged with it. The BND additionally considered how "the Swedish company Ericsson could be influenced through Siemens to terminate its own cryptographic business." [6] A former employee of Crypto AG reported that he had to coordinate his developments with "people from Bad Godesberg". This was the location of the "central office for encryption affairs" of the BND, and the service instructed Crypto AG what algorithms to use to create the codes. The employee also remembers an American "watcher", who strongly demanded the use of certain encryption methods. Representatives from NSA visited Crypto AG often. A memorandum of a secret workshop at Crypto AG in August 1975, where a new prototype of an encryption device was demonstrated, mentions the participation of Nora L. Mackebee, an NSA cryptographer. Motorola engineer Bob Newman says that Mackebee was introduced to him as a "consultant". Motorola cooperated with Crypto AG in the seventies in developing a new generation of electronic encryption machines. The Americans "knew Zug very well and gave travel tips to the Motorola people for the visit at Crypto AG," Newman told Der Spiegel. Knowledgeable sources indicate that the Crypto AG enciphering process, developed in cooperation with the NSA and the German company Siemans, involved secretly embedding the decryption key in the cipher text. Those who knew where to look could monitor the encrypted communication, then extract the decryption key that was also part of the transmission, and recover the plain text message. Decryption of a message by a knowledgeable third party was not any more difficult that it was for the intended receiver. (More than one method was used. Sometimes the algorithm was simply deficient, with built-in exploitable weaknesses.) Crypto AG denies all this, of course, saying such reports are ""pure invention". What information was provided to Saddam Hussein exactly? Answers to this question are currently being sought in a lawsuit against NSA in New Mexico, which has asked to see "all Iranian messages and translations between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996". [7] The passage of top-secret communications intelligence to someone like Saddam Hussein brings up other questions. Which dictator is the U.S. passing top secret messages to currently? Jiang Zemin? Boris Yeltsin? Will Saddam Hussein again become a recipient of NSA largess if he returns to the mass slaughter of Iranians? What exactly is the purpose of NSA anyway? One more question: Who is reading the Pope's communications? Bibliography [1] John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, Hill and Wang, New York, 1992. [2] Some of the background of this assassination can be found in "The Tehran Connection," Time Magazine, March 21, 1994. [3] The Buehler case is detailed in Res Strehle, Verschleusselt: der Fall Hans Beuhler, Werd Verlag, Zurich, 1994. [4] "For years, NSA secretly rigged Crypto AG machines so that U.S. eavesdroppers could easily break their codes, according to former company employees whose story is supported by company documents," "No Such Agency, Part 4: Rigging the Game," The Baltimore Sun, December 4, 1995. [5] Reported in programs about the Buehler case that were broadcast on Swiss Radio International on May 15, 1994 and July 18, 1994. [6] "Wer ist der befugte Vierte?": Geheimdienste unterwandern den Schutz von Verschlusselungsgeraten," Der Spiegel 36, 1996. [7] U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, William H. Payne, Arthur R. Morales, Plaintiffs, v. Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director of National Security Agency, National Security Agency, Defendant, CIV NO 97 0266 SC/DJS.

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Re: SynCrypt: the new PGP?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > It is like pgp but has lots of cool features. File wiping, group > > encryption, automatic encryption of files put in certain directories. > > Am I supposed to be impressed? They only support the proprietary > products of a company supporting draconian gun controls. You mean Microsoft. It's foolish to reject encryption software because it runs on the OS used by 90% of its customers. > >Is this the new pgp? No gak or even cak in sight. > > No source no security. You don't trust Schneier? You've seen the limitations of source code release. Experts like Schneier and his team designing the crypto is worth more than a bunch of know nothings scratching their heads and wondering where to begin with 1000+ pages of source code.

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Larry Lessig: a new CDA better than censorware?
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*********** Date: Mon, 3 Nov 1997 11:11:56 -0500 From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)WELL.COM> Subject: Law Professor calls for new CDA To: NETLY-L(a)pathfinder.com (I have been saying for some time that Professor Lessig, despite how he characterizes himself, is no friend of freedom of speech. But here's where the other shoe has dropped.) From the online edition of the New York Times: October 30, 1997 By CARL S. KAPLAN Is a Better CDA Preferable To Opaque Censorship? he Communications Decency Act is dead, and most free speech advocates say, "good riddance." If there must be a solution to the problem of kids and cyber-pornography, let a thousand software-blocking packages bloom in homes, libraries and schools. Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard Law School is having none of this, however. In a recent controversial draft essay on the regulation of cyberspace, Lessig, a respected cyberlaw scholar, argues that if government must embrace a solution to indecent speech, a revamped CDA-like plan would be far more protective of traditional free speech values than the dangerous filtering products that many civil libertarians seem to love, or at least to prefer. "My sense is that this first major victory [in Reno v. ACLU] has set us in a direction that we will later regret," Lessig writes, referring to the Supreme Court opinion striking down the CDA on First Amendment grounds. "It has pushed the problem of kids and porn towards a solution that will (from the perspective of the interest in free speech) be much worse. The (filtering products) touted by free speech activists in Reno are, in my view, far more restrictive of free speech interests than a properly crafted CDA." Lessig is not the first free speech advocate to damn filtering software. But he goes further than most in his nostalgia for a revised CDA. He also knows that his conclusions may invite some fury. "Promoting a CDA-like solution to the problemb of indecency is very much to step out of line," he writes. "I am not advocating a CDA-like solution because I believe there is any real problem. In my view, it would be best just to let things alone. But if Congress is not likely to let things alone, or at least if the President is more likely to bully a private solution then we need to think through the consequences of these different solutions. . . . We may well prefer that nothing be done. But if something is to be done, then whether through public or private regulation, we need to think about its consequences for free speech." Lessig's article, titled "What Things Regulate Speech," is a trove of ideas and legal scholarship on the permissible scope of government regulation of indecency, the evils of filtering and the nature of law in cyberspace, where restrictions on speech, for example, are apt to be enacted not by federal or state statues, but by minimally debated software codes. Happily, the article is written in plain English, not law school professor-ese. Many of the author's ideas have been expressed in earlier articles, law review essays and speeches. Boiled down and simplified, the main points of Lessig's CDA argument run like this: First, he argues that government has the power to place or "zone" hard-core pornography out of the reach of kids, so long as the means chosen is the least restrictive form of discrimination that existing technology permits. For example, Lessig notes that a California law making it a crime to sell porn in unattended vending machines, unless the machines are equipped with an adult identification system, was upheld by a Federal Appeals court. The Supreme Court earlier this year declined to review the case and thereby left the California law standing. In a historical footnote, the denial was issued in the same week the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the CDA case w another matter involving the distribution of porn to kids. Next, Lessig points out that the success in the CDA case came in persuading the Court that other, less restrictive means for protecting children from porn were still available. The evils associated with the less restrictive means [ traditional blocking software ] are legion, however. For one thing, blocking software is crude because it tends to filter out too much [ sites opened to discuss AIDS or gay rights, for example ] because of mistaken associations with indecency. Also, blocking software is opaque, because the lists of banned sites are not published. Finally, the filtering companies, prompted by the demands of the market, tend to offer generalized censorship [ restrictions on access to a variety of potentially objectionable sites, from those dealing with violence to gambling ] not just censorship of so-called indecent sites. The upshot is that to the extent that government embraces filtering software, or mandates its use in libraries or schools, for example, such state action may be unconstitutional, because the government is exceeding its narrow justification in separating kids from hard-core pornography. As bad as private blocking is, PICS is worse, Lessig argues. PICS, an acronym for "Platform for Internet Content Selection," is a proposed labeling standard that makes it possible to rate and block material on the Net. "It was motivated as an alternative to the CDA," Lessig, 36, said in a recent telephone interview. "The MIT geniuses who thought it up realized it had broader potential that just blocking indecent speech." Like blocking software, PICS will probably be used as a general filtering tool w far exceeding the narrow interests of government, Lessig says. Another problem is the invisible nature of PICS: "If I use PICS on a search engine, and PICS returns two hits, and blocks 8 hits, it doesn't report back to me that 8 sites have fallen off the Earth," Lessig says. Most ominously, he argues, PICS can be imposed by anybody in the distribution chain. Thus a filter can be placed on an person's computer, or at the level of a company, an ISP or even a nation without the end user ever knowing it, Lessig says, making it easier for centralized censors to place filters on the Net. Taken together, filtering software and PICS lead to a hard-wired architecture of blocking that is antagonistic to the original free-wheeling and speech-enhancing values of the Internet, Lessig argues. By contrast, the scheme proposed by the old CDA wasn't that bad, he suggests. Of course, the original CDA was flawed because it went after a category of speech that was too vague to pass constitutional muster, Lessig says - a problem that CDA II could fix by taking sharper aim at hard-core pornography. More important, the scheme envisioned by the old law was somewhat protective of free speech values. Under the CDA, the "means" offered to separate kids from pornography was to put porn behind a wall that screened out kids with reasonable effectiveness. The technique was not filtering. It was to set up identity checks on the doors through which people wanted to pass. This type of system has two things going for it, says Lessig. First, its restrictions extend only as far as the legitimate governmental interest w screening kids from porn. Second, it is unlikely to morph into a more comprehensive system for general censorship. Lessig adds that this type of identification system - contrary to the court's factual findings - is workable. Reaction to Lessig's ideas from the free-speech cohort is understandably mixed. James Boyle, a law professor at American University, for example, agrees with Lessig's point that people should be very suspicious of technological solutions to indecent speech on the Internet, like blocking software and PICS. "There's a kind of belief that technological solutions are pure and neutral. They have an allure - like Jetson's Jurisprudence," he says. "But I agree with Larry; people need to understand that technology isn't necessarily benign." Even so, Boyle is disinclined to reconsider the merits of the CDA adult identification scheme. "I do diverge there," he says, adding that it is impractical to be totally against filtering systems. "The question is how to design filtering systems so they have the maximum vibrancy." Jonathan Wallace, a New York lawyer and writer on cyberspace issues, also shares Lessig's skepticism on blocking software and PICS. But he thinks a dusting off of the CDA is "wrongheaded." Even assuming that an adult identification scheme were viable - which he doubts - Wallace asserts that any attempt to redefine indecent speech more narrowly would invite lawsuits from right-wing groups intent on proving that under their community standards, objectionable speech should be banned. Carl S. Kaplan at kaplanc(a)nytimes.com welcomes your comments and suggestions. Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- We shot a law in _Reno_, just to watch it die. Mike Godwin, EFF Staff Counsel, is currently on leave from EFF, participating as a Research Fellow at the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center in New York City. He can be contacted at 212-317-6552. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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by 5kir＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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More on Censorware Summit, from Communications Daily
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Communications Daily November 3, 1997, Monday ONLINE SUMMIT ON KIDS' ISSUES SET FOR DEC. Broad-based effort by industry, consumer and advocacy groups to come up with means to protect children who use Internet and online services will begin to announce its solutions at summit meeting Dec. 1-3 in Washington. Summit, which could involve as many as 300 participants, is result of meeting at White House in July following Supreme Court decision to strike down key parts of Communications Decency Act (CDA). At meeting, industry promised to find ways to protect children. While original focus was on protecting children from pornography, plan is being drawn up to include examination of other issues with children online such as privacy and marketing. Longer term project could take another 6 months or as long as year, said Christine Varney, ex-FTC member now in private practice who is chmn. of summit. She was heavily involved with online issues during her tenure at FTC. Varney said there will be other events next year, tentatively set for Feb., April, May and June, although structure for those hasn't been set. Idea was to concentrate first on children's safety issues for Dec. meeting, she said in interview. Dec. conference in Washington will announce tools and recommendations that industry and interest groups have come up with in safety area, Varney said, and there will be "concrete action at each stage" of process on issues to be considered. Those recommendations aren't yet final, but could include some types of rating system. Varney rejected notion that there are First Amendment concerns involved, saying project "is not at all about censorship." Biggest danger, she said, is that there could be single rating system -- it's not censorship if there are many rating systems. Daniel Weitzner, deputy dir. of Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), one of groups that challenged CDA, agreed, saying that key difference is between govt.'s taking role of censor and parents' deciding what can be seen by children. He, too, said he was worried about proposals for "some kind of mandatory labeling, which would be clearly unconstitutional." Because of technical limitations, TV can accommodate only one system, Weitzner said, but computers are much more flexible. He added: "I know of no interpretation of the First Amendment which says individuals, private citizens, can't control what they read." There is some disagreement, however. David Banisar of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) called meeting "censorware summit." He said it's "attempting to undo what the Supreme Court did when it struck down the CDA," and "this is something that should be avoided because it's worse than the disease." Banisar agreed no First Amendment restraint is involved, but more basic principles of free speech can be violated by filtering tools and software that could be used on national level. That possibility, he said, is "equally as dangerous as the CDA." Banisar said he's working with "a coalition of free speech groups on alternatives" to summit. He said private industry and group effort is more dangerous than legislation because "at least with legislation there are certain rights under the First Amendment that can be applied." One of Varney's challenges in heading project is to bring together groups who spent years fighting each other over CDA and to determine whether there could be some areas of agreement. So far, she said, process has been working very well. In addition to goal of coming up with recommendations on substance of issues is goal of "creating partnerships where they didn't exist before," process that she said was particularly important because it's taking place as new medium develops. She acknowledged that there must be concerted effort to maintain focus on children in deliberations while persuading former opponents to "check their differences at the door" on CDA and other issues. Donna Hughes, communications dir. for Enough Is Enough, anti-child porn group, said she was pleased that summit has adopted much of her group's agenda. She said she was "pleased to be at the table, to work very closely with many people who we had debated for 3 years." One benefit of summit, she said, is to "get to know each other. That's always constructive." Hughes said she doesn't view online summit process as refighting of CDA issues, saying result of CDA debate was to focus public attention on dangers to children. Varney agreed, saying that "great beauty" of process is that "folks so divided on the CDA" are agreed on children's' issues. But Banisar takes different view. He said his group was part of anti-CDA coalition that had view different from CDT. Now, he said, CDT is taking "a very industry viewpoint on this." Commitment of America Online (AOL), another CDA defendant and major sponsor of online summit, to free speech "has been premised that it doesn't want to be held liable for what its people said. It doesn't mind when it's censoring."

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