December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

bug in my Maurer code; retraction of claim; ref
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was a numerical bug in the C code for Maurer's Univ. Stat. Test for Randomness which I posted. The "float" variable "Sum" should be "double". This will cause an incorrect input-size dependence for large >40Mbyte files. Measuring (with the fixed version) the output of a block cipher in feedback mode, I find that it DOES NOT differ from truly nondeterministic noise, as I had claimed. The difference I had observed was due to a larger sample size for my cipher-noise. Boy do I feel stupid. Needless to say, sorry about any inconvenience. The fixed code follows at the bottom. This version also spits out an early estimate after a million samples; this turns out to be very close to the final value for (homogenous) large samples. Also: I recently found the following amendment to Maurer's work at http://www.eleves.ens.fr:8080/home/coron/escience.html#1 Abstract. Maurer's universal test is a very common randomness test, capable of detecting a wide gamut of statistical defects. The algorithm is simple (a few Java code lines), flexible (a variety of parameter combinations can be chosen by the tester) and fast. Although the test is based on sound probabilistic grounds, one of its crucial parts uses the heuristic approximation: c(L,K) = 0.7 - 0.8/L + (1.6 + 12.8/L)K-4/L In this work we compute the precise value of c(L,K) and show that the inaccuracy due to the heuristic estimate can make the test 2.67 times more permissive than what is theoretically admitted. Moreover, we etablish a new asymptotic relation between the test parameter and the source's entropy. 09/08/98 - Jean-Sébastien Coron ..................................... /* UELI.c 28 Oct 98 This implements Ueli M Maurer's "Universal Statistical Test for Random Bit Generators" using L=16 Accepts a filename on the command line; writes its results, with other info, to stdout. Handles input file exhaustion gracefully. Ref: J. Cryptology v 5 no 2, 1992 pp 89-105 also on the web somewhere, which is where I found it. -David Honig honig(a)sprynet.com Built with Wedit 2.3, lcc-win32 http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~lcc-win32 26 Sept CP Release Version Notes: This version does L=16. It evolved from an L=8 prototype which I ported from the Pascal in the above reference. I made the memory usage reasonable by replacing Maurer's "block" array with the 'streaming' fgetc() call. 27 Oct 98 compiled under Sun cc OK if C++ stuff taken out.. 28 Oct 98 made "Sum" into a double, from float; fixes a bug found with larger (40M files); reposted with retraction. Usage: ULI filename outputs to stdout */ #define L 16 // bits per block #define V (1<<L) // number of possible blocks #define Q (10*V) // at LEAST 10 * V, to assure each block seen #define K (100*Q) // at LEAST 100 * Q, as large as possible #define MAXSAMP (Q + K) #include <stdio.h> #include <math.h> int main( int argc, char **argv ) { FILE *fptr; int i; int b, c; int table[V]; double sum=0.0; int run; // Human Interface printf("UELI 27 Oct 98 double-precision, with early value\n L=%d %d %d \n", L, V, MAXSAMP); if (argc <2) {printf("Usage: ULI filename\n"); exit(-1); } else printf("Measuring file %s\n", argv[1]); // FILE IO fptr=fopen(argv[1],"rb"); if (fptr == NULL) {printf("Can't find %s\n", argv[1]); exit(-1); } // INIT for (i=0; i<V; i++) table[i]=0; for (i=0; i<Q; i++) { b= fgetc(fptr)<<8 | fgetc(fptr); table[ b ]=i; } printf("Init done\n"); // COMPUTE run=1; for (i=Q; run && i<Q+K; i++) { // COMPOSE A 16-bit quantity b=fgetc(fptr); c=fgetc(fptr); if (c<0 || b<0) run=0; if (run) { b = b<<8 | c; sum += log( (double) ( i-table[b] ) ) ; table[ b ]=i; } if (i==1000000+Q) printf("Early measurement after %d samples = %g\n\n", i-Q, (sum/( (double) (i-Q) ) ) / log(2.0)); } if (!run) printf("Premature end of file; read %d blocks.\n", i-Q); sum = (sum/( (double) (i-Q) ) ) / log(2.0); // i should be K if enough samples printf("%s fTU= %g\n\n", argv[1], sum); printf("Expected value for L=16 is 15.167379 \n"); // Add further interpretation/thresholding of the number of sigmas from expected, // and include the fudge factors explained in the paper. } // end

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Re: log files (was: Re: dbts: Cryptographic Dog Stocks, The Dirigible Biplane, and Sending the Wizards Back to Menlo Park )
by Lynn.Wheeler＠firstdata.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in fact, large number of security studies show that variety of operations are at greatest risk from insiders.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 excuse this bandwidth. me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.0 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> iQA/AwUBNjiEBHUkEFXvH2ZAEQJ11wCdEEcGeWaOWjrNZ2e22a0Q5WtRMtIAmwQH JkSiA2UUrB6pahgHqA0dvIYc =8qn4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: don't use passwords as private keys (was Re: Using a password as a private key.)
by RedRook 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You don't know you have to destroy a key file, until it is too late. Until then, it's just laying around waiting for some one to copy and crack. If you are paranoid enough to assume your opponent is going to torcher you to get your signature password, you should assume that he already has your keyfile, and is willing to torcher you to get it's password. Thus coercion and dicitonary attacks are moot points. That is, if your password is good enough. So, what's worse; guarding a high entopy password with a low entropy password, or trying to memorize a high entropy password? Harv Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote: > > > Some people have been talking about using passwords as private keys. > (By using the passphrase as seed material for regenerating the private > and public key). > > I don't think this is a good idea. > > You can't forget passphrases. You can destroy private key files. > > Therefore you open yourself up to coercion, and forward secrecy is not > possbile with these schemes. This means it is less secure. > > The other reason it is less secure others commented on: you provide an > open target for dictionary attacks. I wouldn't want to do that, even > with high entropy passphrase, it loses one important line of defense: > unavailability of private key file. > > Adam > _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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Re: Random array (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 17:33:29 +0100 > From: Anonymous <nobody(a)replay.com> > Subject: Re: Random array > A couple responders have said there is no SWAP_TIMES > which would work. But I don't understand why the > following wouldn't work: > > First of all, make sure that x and y can't be equal, since > there's no point in swapping an element with itself. This > should add a negligible amount of time. > > x=getrand(); > do > y=getrand(); > while (x == y); > > Now, simply calculate how many SWAP_TIMES it would take for it > to be equally as likely that an element would not be touched as > it would to land in its original spot. > > (255/256)^(t*2) = 1/256 > > or > > t = ln(1/256)/(2*ln(255/256)) > > or > > 708.3955 > > > Another anonymous wrote: > > In the following snippet of pseudo-code, what should the value of > SWAP_TIMES be to make the array A[] random, assuming > that getrand() returned a truly random integer between > 0 and 255 > > A[256]; > > for(i=0;i<SWAP_TIMES;i++){ > x=getrand(); > y=getrand(); > swap(A[x],A[y]); > } > > Thanks > Actualy the optimal value is even easier to calculate. Given an initial array, A(m), and the desire to randomly swap the contents until there is sufficient entropy to pass the various statistical tests leaves us with: Given m initial element and we are swapping them two at a time then we need to execute at most m/2 swaps to randomize the array. So, the optimal SWAP_TIMES ends up being, in this case, 128. This of course doesn't touch on the new rule above about testing for x=y. In which case you could simply do it over again. Now given that there are m elements and the odds of selecting any given one is 1/n and the odds of selecting it twice at one time is 1/n^2. ____________________________________________________________________ To know what is right and not to do it is the worst cowardice. Confucius The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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IP: One Million Sign Petition to Kill IRS Code
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: One Million Sign Petition to Kill IRS Code Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 19:47:24 -0600 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: US Newswire http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/1028-112.txt NFIB: One Million Sign Petition to Kill IRS Code U.S. Newswire 28 Oct 12:00 NFIB: Petition to Kill IRS Code Hits Million Signature Mark To: National Desk Contact: Jim Weidman of the National Federation of Independent Business, 202-554-9000 SAN DIEGO, Calif., Oct. 28 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) today reached a milestone in its drive to abolish the federal tax code and replace it with a simpler and fairer system. At a downtown rally here today, NFIB President Jack Faris announced that the national petition drive calling on Congress to sunset the current IRS code had collected its one-millionth signature. Onlookers cheered as Faris placed the landmark signature atop an 18-wheeler stacked with scores of boxes bearing signed petitions collected during the group's year-long campaign. Labeling the petition drive "the most ambitious tax reform initiative since the Boston Tea Party," Faris expressed thanks to the more than 30,000 small-business owners who served as "volunteer captains, collecting signatures on Main Streets throughout the country in this unprecedented grassroots effort to restore reason to our tax system." The nation's leading small-business advocacy group, NFIB has 600,000 members nationwide. "We now have 1 million reasons for Congress and the president to do what's right for small business, and what's right for America," Faris said to a crowd of hundreds who gathered in front of an IRS office building for the tax reform event. "These first 1 million petitions will serve as the symbol as well as the fuel that keeps this effort to abolish the code going strong. We won't give up!" Faris also added that "NFIB will continue to gather petitions and grassroots support, because Washington sees the light when they feel the heat from Main Street." Faris outlined his group's plan for action in the 106th Congress: "NFIB will continue to stand up for small business on this issue and others. We will be a catalyst, urging Congress to sunset the IRS code as the first step toward responsible tax reform, so that the new century may begin under transition to a new tax system." Noting that the nation's economy is strong, and economic optimism is high, Faris said, "This is the right time for Congress and the president to answer the call from grassroots America and replace our broken tax code. To ignore that call -- at a time when we are able to answer it -- would be irresponsible. One million signatures can't be ignored." The San Diego rally was the latest event in NFIB's ongoing "Campaign for Responsible Tax Reform," which was kicked off one year ago in Independence, Mo. Today's event was simulcast live on the Roger Hedgecock Show on KSDO-AM (1130) and KOGO-AM (600). ----- For a copy of NFIB's Seven Steps to Responsible Tax Reform, or any other materials related to the campaign, visit NFIB's special Web site at www.not4IRS.org. -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 10/28 12:00 Copyright 1998, U.S. Newswire ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ****************************************************

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IP: FCC Proposes Location Tracking for Wireless Phones
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Ari Schwartz <ari(a)cdt.org> Subject: IP: FCC Proposes Location Tracking for Wireless Phones Date: Wed, 28 Oct 1998 11:12:21 -0500 (EST) To: policy-posts(a)cdt.org The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 4, Number 27 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 4, Number 27 October 28, 1998 CONTENTS: (1) FCC Proposes Location Tracking for Wireless Phones (2) Public Comment Sought - CDT Launches Citizen Action Site (3) FCC Opens Inquiry into Wiretapping in Packet Networks (4) Other Surveillance Features (5) Subscription Information (6) About CDT ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <ari(a)cdt.org> _____________________________________________________________________________ (1) FCC PROPOSES LOCATION TRACKING FOR WIRELESS PHONES Rejecting privacy arguments, the Federal Communications Commission on October 22 proposed turning wireless phones into location tracking devices. Ruling under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), the Commission proposed requiring cellular and other wireless phone companies to track the location of their customers, identifying the cell site at the beginning and end of every call. This decision, if finalized, would allow the FBI to get out of the privacy deal it struck in 1994 when CALEA was adopted. At the time, the FBI said that location information was not required by CALEA, and the Congressional intent is 100% clear on the point. For background on CALEA and the FCC's proceeding, see CDT's digital telephony page: http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/ _____________________________________________________________________________ (2) PUBLIC COMMENT SOUGHT - A CHANCE TO TELL THE FCC THAT CELL PHONE TRACKING IS NOT ACCEPTABLE! The FCC decision on cell phone tracking is only a tentative decision, known as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The Commission is seeking public comment on its proposal. The public comment period has not been set, but could be between 30 and 60 days. Until now, the discussion on this issue has been held by policy-makers in Washington, but this decision will affect the entire nation. Since this will likely be the only chance for those outside the beltway to weigh in with a comment, CDT urges citizens to let their voice be heard. CDT has established a special "Action" page to make it easy for citizens to contact the FCC and file comments opposing the location tracking proposal: http://www.cdt.org/action/filing.html _____________________________________________________________________________ (3) FCC LAUNCHES INQUIRY INTO WIRETAPPING IN PACKET NETWORKS On a separate issue in the same CALEA proceeding, the Commission agreed with CDT and other privacy advocates. The FCC said that industry's initial plan for conducting surveillance in so-called "packet" networks was insufficient, and the Commission asked for further technical and legal comment. Packet networks break communications up into many small packets, each one consisting of a segment of content with addressing information attached to rout it to its intended destination. Under the industry's proposal, carriers could have provided to the government a person's entire packet stream, including both routing information and content, even when the government did not have the authority to intercept the content of the communications. CDT argued that the carriers should be required to separate addressing information from the content of communications and only give the government what it was authorized to intercept. The Commission decided that it needed to launch a technical inquiry. This could determine the future of surveillance. The question is whether carriers have an obligation to protect the privacy of communications the government is not authorized to intercept. For CDT's discussion of the packet issue, see: http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/980426_fcc_calea.html#ivc _____________________________________________________________________________ (4) OTHER SURVEILLANCE FEATURES PROPOSED On other items sought by the FBI, the Commission tentatively decided that carriers should be required to continue tapping parties on a conference call after the subject of the court order has dropped off the call, and to extract dialed number information from the content stream and provide it to the government under a minimal standard. In all, the Commission tentatively accepted five out of nine new surveillance capabilities sought by the FBI. As of today, only a sumamry of the Commission's decision, not the full NPRM, was not publicly available. CDT will make the full text of the NPRM available on-line as soon as it becomes public. ____________________________________________________________________________ ____ (5) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by Internet users, industry leaders, policymakers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to majordomo(a)cdt.org In the BODY of the message (leave the SUBJECT LINE BLANK), type subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with NOTHING IN THE SUBJECT LINE AND a BODY TEXT of: unsubscribe policy-posts ____________________________________________________________________________ ____ (6) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: http://www.cdt.org/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 4.27 10/28/98 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ Ari Schwartz Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 202 637 9800 fax 202 637 0968 ari(a)cdt.org http://www.cdt.org ------------------------------------ **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ****************************************************

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discrete log attack on 1st use of Kong signature? (Re: Using a password as a private key.)
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous writes: > Bill Stewart writes: > > Kong takes an interesting approach to key certification and signatures - > > it doesn't use the "True Name" model with a Certificate Authority Trusted > > Third Party Subject To Many Government Regulations certifying that the > > person who has this key has that True Name. Instead, you sign messages, > > and it keeps a database of signed messages from peop le, and you can > > compare a message you have with a message you've received previously to > > see if it's signed by the same key, and you can send encrypted messages > > to the person who sent you a previous message. > > What happens if you create another key which signs an existing message, > as was illustrated here recently in the case of Toto's key. Can you > convince Kong that you are the same person who sent the earlier message? Depends if the discrete log attack anonymous used works over elliptic curves, or if an analogous attack can be mounted on the elliptic curve signature scheme James is using. Anonymous wrote on his attack: : N is the product of two primes, but each p-1 has about 16 small : prime factors (about 25-35 bits) to allow calculating the discrete : log efficiently. With this choice of primes it took about three : hours to run the discrete log. in otherwords n is 1024 bit, p and q 512 bit, p1..p16, q1..q16 are about 25-35 bits each: n = p x q p-1 = p1 x p2 x .... x p16 q-1 = q1 x q2 x .... x q16 then he can take discrete logs modulo n. With this given signature s on message m with unpublished public key, he can compute a public and private exponent e, d which could have signed message m: s = m ^ d mod n and m = s ^ e mod n so compute discrete log of m mod n in base s to compute an e. Then compute a d using the normal: e.d = 1 mod (p-1)(q-1) If something like this worked on Kong's signatures, you would need two signatures, or a signature on a message together with a signed public key. Does Kong use self signed public keys? Adam

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17 Dec '03

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Bic-Assassins Convicted
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN http://www.cnn.com/US/9810/30/weapons.case.ap/ Two men convicted in biological weapons case October 30, 1998 Web posted at: 3:10 a.m. EST (0810 GMT) BROWNSVILLE, Texas (AP) -- Two men accused of scheming to attack President Clinton and others with cigarette lighters equipped with poison-coated cactus needles were convicted of sending threatening e-mail. Johnie Wise, 72, and Jack Abbott Grebe, 43, were convicted Thursday of two counts of sending threatening e-mails -- one message to the Internal Revenue Service and one to the Drug Enforcement Agency. Grebe and Wise were acquitted on one count each of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction count and five counts each of sending threatening messages -- to President Clinton, U.S. Customs, the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, and the Secret Service. They could get life in prison at their Jan. 29 sentencing. Prosecutors said Wise schemed to modify a cigarette lighter so it would shoot cactus needles coated with toxins such as rabies, botulism, anthrax or HIV. Defense attorneys called idea 'silly' Among the men's alleged targets: Clinton, the U.S. and Texas attorneys general, and FBI Director Louis Freeh. Defense attorneys called the idea "silly" and "cockamamie." There was never any evidence that the accused possessed biological weapons or tried to develop a deadly lighter. The e-mailed threats were vaguely worded and did not discuss the lighter or cactus thorns. Under federal law, however, the threats were enough for a conviction and no biological weapons were needed, prosecutors said. The men would have carried out their plan to hurt government employees and their families if they hadn't been arrested, Assistant U.S. Attorney Mervyn Mosbacker said. Wise and Grebe were accused of concocting the plan to threaten government officials with e-mails. One e-mail, sent June 12, was titled "Declaration of War" and a second one, sent June 26, said government workers had been "targeted for destruction by revenge." A third defendant, Oliver Dean Emigh, 63, was acquitted on all counts. He was accused of writing the June 12 message, but the charges against the men stemmed from the June 26 e-mail. -- Thanks to D.

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