December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for publishing PGP on his web page. Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto tools that we use daily. Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! (I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten except you.) I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. (Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend on a single site.) Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. John Gilmore --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 21:38:55 -0500 > From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 > From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> > The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only > all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As > today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating > bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for > publishing PGP on his web page. And this is different from yesterday how? > Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong > crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they > threaten to erect. Are you offering to put up your monies to provide any and all legal and other support for any such site that participates? When is your site going up? ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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LA Times article on Wiretapping
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a link to the LA Times feature story on the LAPD's use of wiretaps. An interesting read. Expect such things from the rest of the constabulary when examined. http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/STATE/t000111718.html --- | Bill Clinton - Bringing back the Sixties one Nixon at a time! | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: DSA for encryption
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 06 Dec 1998 22:25:57 -0600, Bennett Haselton <bennett(a)peacefire.org> wrote: >I'm working on an enhancement to a Web-based program that allows you to >circumvent proxy server censorship by sending a request for a Web page to a >computer in the outside world that is not blocked by the proxy, and having >that computer re-send a copy of the banned page back to you. Good idea! >Of course, any manufacturer of Internet censorship proxy server software >could easily add ians.ml.org to their list of blocked sites (as they have >all already done with Anonymizer), so the idea would be for people to get >their friends to set up port-forwarding programs on computers that were not >blocked by the censoring proxy, and those could be set up to relay requests >between the IANS server and the computer behind the proxy server. It may not be so easy to get people to set up port-forwarding programs. These could be a target for hackers seeking to cover their tracks as they try break-ins. Also, how many people in this day of commercial ISPs are able to set up port-forwarding programs? It would seem more promising to make your web page script be simple and portable enough that even users of AOL and free webpage hosts like GeoCities would be able to install it. >I am working on a JavaScript form that could be used on the client side to >solve this problem. We would like to use DSA to encrypt the requests sent >using IANS, since I've heard DSA can be used for encryption without >royalties, unlike, for example, RSA. DSA per se is probably not your best choice - unless you already have a DSA implementation which you want to try to use. DSA is a signature algorithm, and while it is sometimes possible to use a DSA implementation to do encryption, it is not particularly convenient. What you want to do is to use the mathematical principle behind DSA, which is the difficulty of solving the discrete log problem, and use an encryption algorithm which relies on that same math problem, namely Diffie-Hellman or ElGamal encryption. If you need to use DSA, Bruce Schneier describes in his book Applied Cryptography how to get the effect of ElGamal encryption. Here is what he writes, on page 490: : ElGamal Encryption with DSA : : There have been allegations that the government likes the DSA because it is : only a digital signature algorithm and can't be used for encryption. It is, : however, possible to use the DSA function call to do ElGamal encryption. : : Assume that the DSA algorithm is implemented with a single function call: : : DSAsign (p, q, g, k, x, h, r, s) : : You supply the numbers p, q, g, k, x, and h, and the function returns the : signature parameters: r and s. : : To do ElGamal encryption of message m with public key y, choose a random : number k, and call : : DSAsign (p, p, g, k, 0, 0, r, s) : : The value of r returned is a in the ElGamal scheme. Throw s away. Then, : call : : DSAsign (p, p, y, k, 0, 0, r, s) : : Rename the value of r to be u; throw s away. Call : : DSAsign (p, p, m, 1, u, 0, r, s) : : Throw r away. The value of s returned is b in the ElGamal scheme. You now : have the ciphertext, a and b. : : Decryption is just as easy. Using secret key x, and ciphertext messages : a and b, call : : DSAsign (p, p, a, x, 0, 0, r, s) : : The value r is a^x mod p. Call that e. Then call : : DSAsign (p, p, 1, e, b, 0, r, s) : : The value s is the plaintext message, m. : : This method will not work with all implementations of DSA. Some may fix : the value sof p and q, or the lengths of some of the other parameters. : Still, if the implementation is general enough, this is a way to encrypt : using nothing more than digital signature function. If you need more information about what the various values mean, or how to create a DSA and/or ElGamal key, just ask. Really, ElGamal is simple enough that if you have access to a large-number math package, writing your own is probably easier than trying to get DSA to do it. It is unlikely that you will find a DSA implementation which allows you to specify all the needed parameters above, particularly h and k. Usually h is forgotten after key generation and not used during signature, and implementions will probably want to choose k themselves since it is a very sensitive parameter.

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PUTS MONEY INTO YOUR POCKET -- BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY AD
by jill567＠copacabana.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Information you need
by JCousino＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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knapsack....
by Bernardo B. Terrado 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where could I find the algorithm (per se) for Merkle-Hellman knapsack ? (if it is not for free just say so) :) I've read in Mr. Schneier's book that Chor-Rivest knapsack is secure (unless for some specializerd attack). Is it still as secure today as the latter years? Bernie

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This brings to mind again a method of distribution that I've thought for some time and has probably been discussed on this list before. In this distribution method, as long as there is the opportunity to cooperate ahead of time and out of band, there is the potential for retaining the ability to provide access any binary data that would be subject to unwanted control. The scheme is just a variation of secret sharing and all that is necessary is for several different entities to replicate portions of the desired software, which portions in and of themselves cannot be subject to any control. For (a trivial) example take the image of PGP zipped up for download. Three different sites create a unique portion of that image for themselves, for example, each site takes every third byte, and throw in some additional obfuscation by each site XORing their portion of the image by some additional data available at a fourth site such as a collection of cypherpunk list text. It then is trivial to reconstruct the desired image from the independent sources, while none of the sources themselves can be subject to controls without having to go down the rat hole of having to define what really constitutes the restricted material -- either in all possible forms, or in terms of all possible transforms applicable to the partitioned source material. Otherwise it could be argued that there is a function and that takes the image of an ASCII representation of Herman Melville's Moby Dick into the image of PGP.ZIP and therefore Moby Dick is an export controlled item. Or is the transform the export-controlled item? Or what? Eh? At 09:38 PM 12/7/98 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > > >--- begin forwarded text > > >X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use >HELO protocol >To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com >Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls >Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 >From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> >Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net > >The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only >all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As >today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating >bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for >publishing PGP on his web page. > >Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong >crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they >threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in >a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, >SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto >tools that we use daily. > >Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for >volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware >organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be >exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from >your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The >Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to >try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) > >And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for >you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the >pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can >get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your >own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the >citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! > >(I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you >own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. >That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten >except you.) > >I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy >to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people >will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. >(Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend >on a single site.) > >Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto >distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase >strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public >that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments >of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. >And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on >smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each >country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when >the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. > > John Gilmore > >--- end forwarded text > > >----------------- >Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> >Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > > >

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Re: Wei Dei's "b-money" protocol
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

there must be something here that I'm missing. At the core of this protocol seems to be the establishment not of crypto anarchy but of a crypto elite. in this scheme only the processors of computing power have economic power. Now I realize that our current economic system is based on economic power being invested in a closed community of powerful elites, and is by no means egalitarian, but this looks to be like simply substituting one group of "haves" for a different group of "haves" I have to admit not being familiar with the Orthodoxy of crypto anarchy, but if the premise is a centerless self organizing system of free agents this protocol seems to miss the mark. or what is it that I am missing here? At 07:37 PM 12/5/98 GMT, you wrote: > > >Wei Dei recently announced (on cypherpunks) his "b-money, a new >protocol for monetary exchange and contract enforcement for >pseudonyms". > >Below is the text of his proposal. > >Comments to follow. > >Adam > >====================================================================== >http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/bmoney.txt >====================================================================== > >I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities >traditionally associated with the word "anarchy", in a crypto-anarchy the >government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and >permanently unnecessary. It's a community where the threat of violence is >impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible >because its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical >locations. > >Until now it's not clear, even theoretically, how such a community could >operate. A community is defined by the cooperation of its participants, >and efficient cooperation requires a medium of exchange (money) and a way >to enforce contracts. Traditionally these services have been provided by >the government or government sponsored institutions and only to legal >entities. In this article I describe a protocol by which these services >can be provided to and by untraceable entities. > >I will actually describe two protocols. The first one is impractical, >because it makes heavy use of a synchronous and unjammable anonymous >broadcast channel. However it will motivate the second, more practical >protocol. In both cases I will assume the existence of an untraceable >network, where senders and receivers are identified only by digital >pseudonyms (i.e. public keys) and every messages is signed by its sender >and encrypted to its receiver. > >In the first protocol, every participant maintains a (seperate) database >of how much money belongs to each pseudonym. These accounts collectively >define the ownership of money, and how these accounts are updated is the >subject of this protocol. > >1. The creation of money. Anyone can create money by broadcasting the >solution to a previously unsolved computational problem. The only >conditions are that it must be easy to determine how much computing effort >it took to solve the problem and the solution must otherwise have no >value, either practical or intellectual. The number of monetary units >created is equal to the cost of the computing effort in terms of a >standard basket of commodities. For example if a problem takes 100 hours >to solve on the computer that solves it most economically, and it takes 3 >standard baskets to purchase 100 hours of computing time on that computer >on the open market, then upon the broadcast of the solution to that >problem everyone credits the broadcaster's account by 3 units. > >2. The transfer of money. If Alice (owner of pseudonym K_A) wishes to >transfer X units of money to Bob (owner of pseudonym K_B), she broadcasts >the message "I give X units of money to K_B" signed by K_A. Upon the >broadcast of this message, everyone debits K_A's account by X units and >credits K_B's account by X units, unless this would create a negative >balance in K_A's account in which case the message is ignored. > >3. The effecting of contracts. A valid contract must include a maximum >reparation in case of default for each participant party to it. It should >also include a party who will perform arbitration should there be a >dispute. All parties to a contract including the arbitrator must broadcast >their signatures of it before it becomes effective. Upon the broadcast of >the contract and all signatures, every participant debits the account of >each party by the amount of his maximum reparation and credits a special >account identified by a secure hash of the contract by the sum the maximum >reparations. The contract becomes effective if the debits succeed for >every party without producing a negative balance, otherwise the contract >is ignored and the accounts are rolled back. A sample contract might look >like this: > >K_A agrees to send K_B the solution to problem P before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. >K_B agrees to pay K_A 100 MU (monetary units) before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_C >agrees to perform arbitration in case of dispute. K_A agrees to pay a >maximum of 1000 MU in case of default. K_B agrees to pay a maximum of 200 >MU in case of default. K_C agrees to pay a maximum of 500 MU in case of >default. > >4. The conclusion of contracts. If a contract concludes without dispute, >each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H >concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash >H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all >signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the >amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then >credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation >schedule if there is one. > >5. The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree >on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each >party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or >evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the >actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly. > >In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by >a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of >everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. >The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the >same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each >transaction should verify that the message has been received and >successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers. > >Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to >keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of >money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for >proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and >commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each >participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and >that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount >of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from >permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can >also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers. > >The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous >entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them >with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The >protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this >is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical >possibility. > >====================================================================== > > >

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by wbclinic＠efn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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