December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Announcement: Mac-Crypto Conference Oct 6-9, 1998
by vinnie＠vmeng.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The Membership of the Mac-Crypto List invites you to The Third Annual Macintosh Cryptography and Internet Commerce Software Development Workshop October 6 - 9th, 1998 Town Hall Auditorium Apple R&D Campus 4 Infinite Loop, Cupertino, CA, USA Keeping with tradition, this is still free workshop, but we'd *really* like it if you register (see below). We are once again hosting our annual workshop, where you are sure to find the latest and greatest information about whats going on in the Macintosh cryptography world. A lot has happened in the past year in the world of the Internet and Cryptography, so this year, thanks to popular demand we have allocated more time and a larger hall for developers to talk about what they are working on. PRELIMINARY WORKSHOP TOPICS: (more to come) Introductions and Overviews: Intro to Crypto Systems Export Controls & Crypto software Crypto Opportunities for the Mac Tech Stuff: AppleShare Authentication Architecture PGPticket - A Secure Authorization Protocol The AltaVec PowerPC Architecture Apple Security Architecture Overview. Apple Keychain / Subwoofer update OpenPGP & the IETF standards process Overview of Crypto API's and Toolkits Applications of Cryptography RC5 cracking effort & the Mac PGPUAM - Appleshare Public Key Authentication Graphically displaying the Web of Trust Anonymous Communications and the Macintosh Open Sessions: As requested we scheduled lots of time for developer demos and open discussions plus the much asked for and a PGP Keysigning party ... and plenty of time for developers to network with each other and Apple. We have also left time open for a few last-minute speakers. If you would like to present a paper or give a talk, please contact Vinnie Moscaritolo at vinnie(a)apple.com To find out more about previous Mac-Crypto workshops check out our webpage at http://www.vmeng.com/mc/ REGISTRATION: To register, complete the following form, and email it to mac-crypto-conference(a)vmeng.com with the subject line REGISTRATION Registration is limited to 300 attendees, so be sure to register early. _______________________________________________________________________ * Name: * Email Address: Title: Affliation: Address: Telephone: Comments: _______________________________________________________________________ Local Hotels: Cupertino Inn, 800-222-4828 Pretty much Across the Street. Cupertino Courtyard by Marriot, 800-321-2211 5 Minute Drive Inn at Saratoga 408-867-5020 About 3 Miles See you in Cupertino on October 6 - 9th! Vinnie Moscaritolo Apple World Wide Developer Support DSS/DH: 3F903472C3AF622D5D918D9BD8B100090B3EF042 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.0 iQA/AwUBNgA9BR16LYZvFyoKEQKYAACfXK7uA40tX1DRy44zTaqkesDs5TkAoKS3 Fx/5lcgO9b6Wqfsibdpc1MRz =c+ZP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Clinton still doesnt get it
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous writes: > > Frondeur writes: > > > Why do you believe the perjury case has `reasonable doubt' problems? > > Watch TV and learn the answer. It's only perjury if it's material, > and the judge said it wasn't material. This doesn't speak to `reasonable doubt' which was the subject under discussion. Or are you arguing that a defense to perjury is that there is reasonable doubt that a question was material? Go watch TV and report back with the answer. > > And the abuse of power case seems thin even to a non-lawyer. But > > where does the `executive privilege stuff' come in? I don't see > > that Starr listed that among his possible grounds for impeachment. > > Among the grounds Starr listed was Clinton's attempt to delay the > investigation by raising many legal objections. He claimed privilege, > for example, with respect to Secret Service testimony. Most of his > efforts were ultimately overruled. Yes, but I assumed Mac had included this under the `abuse of power' heading since he explicitly cited that topic in his message to which I was responding, and since that appeared to match one of the broad headings under which Starr classifies his possible `grounds for impeachment': "...that President Clinton's actions ... have been inconsistent with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. " I see nowhere that Starr claims that it was illegal/impeachable for Clinton to have claimed executive privilege. He merely notes that Clinton used it (extensively) along with a bunch of other tactics to delay and impede the investigation. - Frondeur

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RE: Encrypting files.
by Matthew James Gering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP International for file encryption, NTSentry or BestCrypt for virtual-disk encryption. PGP International STFM BestCrypt http://www.jetico.sci.fi/bcnt.htm NTSentry http://www.softwinter.com/sentry.html All are outside the US. If anyone has other good recommendations, please add them. Matt > -----Original Message----- > From: Lars Weitze [mailto:chromedemon@netcologne.de] > Does anyone now a program for WindozeNT to store encrypted > data on harddisk.

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Re: Is nym.alias.net down?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > > Is nym.alias.net down? I've sent a request twice using > a different remailer chain each time yet it still doesn't > reply. It's been about two days since I sent it in. > > I did however create a nym with dongco.hyperreal.art.pl. > Is this service reliable? or will it disppear quickly? Please, try creating a testxxx by direct mail first. Then upgrade to a remailer chain.

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Your new password
by sixdegrees 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Name: Schlomo CyberPoopy sixdegrees password: linkcusp Congratulations Schlomo. You're well on your way to becoming a full sixdegrees(tm) member. Here is your member password: linkcusp. Use it to log-in on the home page at the sixdegrees Web site, http://www.sixdegrees.com. We'll ask you for a little more information to complete your registration, and then you'll be ready to start networking. It's important that you return to the site and log-in. Your membership will not be complete until you do so. Once you've successfully logged in with your password, just go to Personal Profile and you'll be able to choose your own password. Thanks for becoming part of sixdegrees. We're looking forward to seeing you at the site. ==================================================================== PLEASE NOTE: All replies to this address are processed by a computer. If you believe you received this e-mail in error, and it was not your intention to become a sixdegrees member, or if you have any problems, questions or requests send an e-mail to issues(a)sixdegrees.com and someone will get back to you as soon as possible. ==================================================================== E.SI.BAM.1

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Feb. 1, 1996, the US House of Representatives voted to pass the Telecommunications Reform Act. This Act included the Communications Decency Act, which sought to criminalize posting to the Internet any material deemed indecent and patently offensive, with no exception for socially redeeming material. On Sept. 11, 1998, the US House of Representatives voted to release the Referral of Independent Counsel Starr on the Internet. 365 individuals were Members of Congress during these two votes, 196 Republicans and 169 Democrats. Of that total, 284, or 77.6%, voted Aye both times. 185 of the Republicans, or 94.4%, voted Aye both times. 96 of the Democrats, or 56.8%, voted Aye both times. Had the Communications Decency Act withstood judicial review (which it did not), posting the Starr report to the Internet arguably would have subjected the posters to fines of $250,000 and 5 years in prison. The question of who voted for both the CDA and the release of the Starr report is not cut-and-dried, because Congress did not record a roll-call vote for the CDA in isolation, but only for its vehicle the Telecommunications Reform Act. Also, the vote Friday to post the Starr report was primarily a vote to start up impeachment machinery. Nevertheless, if accountability to the voters means anything in this democracy, the Congress members who voted "Aye" on both February 1, 1996 and September 11, 1998 ought to come in for a bit of uncomfortable public exposure. <href=http://www.tbtf.com/resource/hypocrites.html>http://www.tbtf.com/resource/hypocrites.html</a>

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RE: 128 bit or 40 bit?
by Matthew James Gering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> All browsers have the 128 bits encryption inthem, but in the > non-US version it can only enabled by a 'special cert'. So what makes it so "special?" A special CA? What happens when that special CA expires, cannot the user add/modify certs, or does everyone need to patch their MSIE (or whatever) when that happens. Matt

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Encrypting files.
by Lars Weitze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone now a program for WindozeNT to store encrypted data on harddisk. At the moment i use ZIP-Files with a Password on them (I now it is not very secure). I am living outside USA and do not want any software with backdoors ,"masterkeys" or stuff like that. Thanks ChromeDemon -- "One dead is a tragedy, thousand deads are a statistic." Karl Marx e-mail: chromedemon(a)netcologne.de http://chromedemon.home.pages.de http://www.netcologne.de/~nc-weitzela2

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Re: Harald Fragner
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think Harald Fragner has to take you off the list. Talk to him about it. Hope this helps! At 09:14 PM 9/15/98 -0400, John Scott Porterfield wrote: >How do I get off this list!!! > >Bob >

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RE: It's finally over (was Re: Explanation of Harald Fragner and cypherpunks)
by Matthew James Gering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> ---Mark Salamon <mark(a)sixdegrees.com> wrote: > > > > Thanks for the reply. I have now received about 10 such > > replies. We will take them to heart, remove the cypherpunks > > and attempt to deal with the mailing list issue in an > > intelligent way. Most lists and services have dealt with the problem of someone accidentally subscribing or maliciously subscribing someone else in one of two ways: A) send and acknowledgement message with a randomly generated authorization code that requires the user to respond. B) send out a password and require the user to login before account is activated. This works only if you assume the malicious individual will not receive mail sent to that address. This therefore falls down when the address is a mailing list or other distribution point that the malicious individual has access to directly or via archives. What we really need is an automated system that could authorize/deny an address prior to the code/password being sent that would keep track of distribution list addresses and such. Perhaps I'll create one myself soon. Matt

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