December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: rant on the morality of confidentiality
by Wayne Radinsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> dilemmas do not prove a concept does not exist. That's correct. My point is natural selection can explain why the dilemma exists. > there are pretty clear cut cases Natural selection also explains why there are "clear cut" cases, since it assumes our "moral sense" is just our mental accounting of reciprocal altruism: what we've done for others and what (we think) others owe us. > natural selection does however support the idea of altruism. natural > selection does not require each individual seek survival. various aspects > of the genetic code that lead to survival of the species are what are > truly favored. a breed of animals that does nothing but try to kill > each other off leads to a situation where each individual is maximizing > the odds of its own DNA propagating, no? but how long would such a > species survive? and extra credit, to what "animal" am I actually > alluding to here? You are correct: the object is survival of the gene and this can be at odds with survival of an individual. This applies to all animals and even "non" animals; so I have no way of knowing which "animal" you are alluding to. > natural selection is relevant among species that have no intelligence > or intellectual control over their own destiny. it is only relevant to > humans insofar as we wish to behave like animals. Our "intelligence" itself evolved, presumably, because it enhanced genetic fitness in the evolutionary past. Intelligence exists to increase, rather than overcome, inclusice genetic fitness. >>So it is a myth that scientists live to find deep truths or to benefit humanity >>. They may do those things, but their real goal is maximizing their own >>inclusive fitness. > > false, even by your own reasoning, because a scientists DNA does not > necessarily lead to more scientist DNA. sons and daughters of scientists > may be anything they wish to be in a free country. All that is required is that the offspring can survive and reproduce. Scientists use their jobs as "scientists" to fund survival and reproduction. > natural selection among animals. and a pretty scary mind that would > consider us on that level. I agree there are some vague parallels for > human development. but humans do not have children in the mindless way > that animals breed, The use of birth control causes the trait, "conscious desire to have children" (and not use birth control) to be selected. It was not required before, so natural selection gave more weight to sex drive and love of offspring. > nor hopefully do they live their lives according > only to evolutionary instincts, The whole premise of evolutionary psychology is that we live according to evolutionary instincts, it's just that those instincts (and our behavior) are very complex, and that "consciousness" and "free will" are illusions. > but of course letters like yours tend > to make me wonder, and I'm being deliberately ambiguous here by what > I mean by that <g> Of course most people are bothered by the idea that copying genes is the only thing their life (and all lives) are about. Life is totally meaningless if you follow Darwin's logic to its conclusion, and the alternative is religion and belief in the afterlife. I personally believe someday we will see a synthesis of the two, but at the present, which to believe is a philosophical decision. ---------- From: Vladimir Z. Nuri[SMTP:vznuri@netcom.com] Sent: Thursday, January 15, 1998 12:52 PM To: Wayne Radinsky Cc: 'Blanc'; 'cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net'; 'tcmay(a)got.net'; 'vznuri(a)netcom5.netcom.com'; vznuri(a)netcom11.netcom.com Subject: Re: rant on the morality of confidentiality philosophers have struggled with what is moral since the beginning of civilization. at least they are struggling with the question. each new civilization and era gives a new answer to the question, "what is morality", and hopefully each is more evolved than the last, unless humanity is regressing. "what is morality" is obviously something that cannot be settled in cyberspace, it hasn't even been settled by great writers, and there are only mediocre and borderline insane minds in cyberspace <g> >The reason morality is impossible to nail down is because it does not exist al >all in any absolute sense, at least as far as science is concerned. If you dec >lare, for example, that "murder" is "wrong" you are always left with dilemmas, >such as whether soldiers who kill during a war are doing something "wrong". dilemmas do not prove a concept does not exist. there are pretty clear cut cases, and less well clear cut cases. those that have difficulty with the concept of morality will tend to focus on the fuzzy cases and conclude that the whole exercise is a waste of time. >According to the principle of natural selection, all people, including scientis >ts, exist purely to maximize their own inclusive genetic fitness. "Fit" means >that an organism is well adapted to it's environment, so "maximizing inclusive >genetic fitness" means having the maximum number of offspring which are themsel >ves fit. natural selection does however support the idea of altruism. natural selection does not require each individual seek survival. various aspects of the genetic code that lead to survival of the species are what are truly favored. a breed of animals that does nothing but try to kill each other off leads to a situation where each individual is maximizing the odds of its own DNA propagating, no? but how long would such a species survive? and extra credit, to what "animal" am I actually alluding to here? >The underlying reason people benefit by promoting themselves as moral people, i >n general, is because of the benefit of what evolutionary psychologists call re >ciprocal altruism. With reciprocal altruism, both parties benefit if they are >in a non-zero-sum situation. Because most situations are non-zero-sum and the >benefits are so great, everyone has a stake in promoting themselves as a good r >eciprocal altruist, in other words, a good, trustworthy, moral person. This is > how natural selection explains the existence of the concept of "morality". natural selection is relevant among species that have no intelligence or intellectual control over their own destiny. it is only relevant to humans insofar as we wish to behave like animals. >So it is a myth that scientists live to find deep truths or to benefit humanity >. They may do those things, but their real goal is maximizing their own inclus >ive fitness. false, even by your own reasoning, because a scientists DNA does not necessarily lead to more scientist DNA. sons and daughters of scientists may be anything they wish to be in a free country. >The only way out is to believe in the afterlife, and religion, and that life ha >s meaning beyond the genes and material world. Doing so doesn't make moral dile >mmas go away, and you never know, people may just be believing such things for >the benefit of genes, after all natural selection has no real concern for "trut >h". natural selection among animals. and a pretty scary mind that would consider us on that level. I agree there are some vague parallels for human development. but humans do not have children in the mindless way that animals breed, nor hopefully do they live their lives according only to evolutionary instincts, but of course letters like yours tend to make me wonder, and I'm being deliberately ambiguous here by what I mean by that <g>

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Re: proving that one knows how to break RSA
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri Vulis <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: > Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > > Dimitri Vulis <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: > > > Bill Payne was with Sandia national lab (where they quite a bit of > > > crypto work) Bill claims to have discovered a very fast > > > factorization algorithm using shift registers, which he refuses to > > > publish. While I haven't seen the algorithm, I believe he may well > > > be right. > > > > Bill Payne's claim to having discovered a faster factorization > > algorithm than the current state of the art, allows us to invoke the > > oft discussed mechanisms for the author to prove this ability without > > divulging the algorithm, and then proceed to sell the algorithm to the > > highest bidder, whilst minimizing his chances of being killed. > ... > I believe Bill is genuinely afraid that if he published his algorithm, > then he'll be killed. I don't know enough to judge how realistic his > fear is. I've been involved in serious discussions of assassinations > over smaller amounts of money than is at stake here. He displays great > courage by saying anything at all at this point. Oh, please. Payne's so-called faster factorization algorithm was discussed on this list May 13. See the archives under the thread title "Public Key Break Paper". The algorithm is total garbage. Payne is obviously a nut case who is setting himself up for a contempt of court charge.

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a black man responds to one of his inane rants. \ o/\_ Timothy C. May <\__,\ '\, |

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Re: RSA hardware
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green: > The more I think about it, the less sense it makes to me to use a dedicated > hardware accelerator. I have seen $3,000 hardware accelerators that are > outperformed by a PP200. The nCipher device is excellent. 100 1024 bit RSA > signing a minute for $5,000. How much would be a nice multi-processor Alpha > that does about the same number of signings? Or just a stack 10 of Pentiums? > > Before buying an accelerator, make sure to do the math. Eric Young posted > timings for various common CPU's a while back. Keep in mind that there are metrics other than just keys per second for comparison. Often, hardware devices are certified RED/BLACK isolation devices, TEMPEST certified, tamper-resistant, etc. They are also usually easier to maintain than software systems on GP hardware. Also, the major consumers of such devices, the government/military, spend a *lot* more on hardware/software/user maintenance than any cypherpunk. Their computers are usually TEMPEST certified, etc., so their curve is a lot higher up. Assuming efficient markets, the reason so few of these devices are sold outside the military is that they're overpriced except for those in the same situation as the military. though :) I've been thinking of buying a wicked-fast FPGA prototyping board and making my own coprocessor. There are some really nice gate arrays, and David Honig has some fairly wonderful plans for how to use them for things like Blowfish, etc. I've mainly concentrated on high-speed symmetric ciphers, but they'd be applicable to RSA/DH, I believe. For one blowfish implementation, the limiting factor (assuming key setup can be done efficiently) is the PCI bus, I think. - -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNMMyzKwefxtEUY69AQGruwgAgsJTym5TsaFLVGgBXQQpUYwd8Ar2lquU SFM9F1LYLTQjcBIlzh9h3cQdfE2sOkpjENmVGqUvPhyZLwRAC5eWfHL8H/y0giIW 9Y+1xYY1pY3t/O7w5WgYDwye1fzbL5KDz4XEYKX830LWjShfAZhQxahzLbZd+qnd Z6KpjSnylTb9YSp+i5rafgk/i8GnjqFdv5925reexzFBhy/FQi3xwweJWxeRWa+o tNX4G/D7W2r1Lq4Z6Yxbk3dTDddif26UTE12M8EENhhlr/6VCO0zGI59VePUC55w ZeqgUDGviqe/il1EUMIKUfNdSYBJ0Ur5T4TL2lVYDPrZ6q4KjnHPjA== =9ejF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Barry Smith (FBI) to speak on encryption policy
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone going to this? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The following message is forwarded to you by "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> (listed as the From user of this message). The original sender (see the header, below) was "Dr. Alan Sherman" <sherman(a)gl.umbc.edu> and has been set as the "Reply-To" field of this message. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Dr. Alan Sherman" <sherman(a)gl.umbc.edu> >Newsgroups: sci.crypt >Subject: Barry Smith (FBI) to speak on encryption policy >Date: 19 Jan 1998 01:54:28 -0000 >Organization: University of Maryland, Baltimore County Campus >Lines: 55 >Message-ID: <69ubok$lkn(a)news.umbc.edu> >NNTP-Posting-Host: news.umbc.edu >NNTP-Posting-User: sherman >Path: edison.dotstar.net!pull-feed.internetmci.com!news-out.internetmci.com!newsfeed.internetmci.com!204.59.152.222!news-peer.gip.net!news.gsl.net!gip.net!feeder.qis.net!news.umbc.edu!not-for-mail The UMBC Security Technology Research Group presents A Law-Enforcement Perspective on Encryption Policy Barry Smith Supervisory Special Agent, FBI moderated by journalist Peter Wayner 3:30pm - 5:00pm Friday, March 6, 1998 Lecture Hall V (LOCATION SUBJECT TO CHANGE) University of Maryland, Baltimore County http://www.cs.umbc.edu/events/spring98/crypto.shtml The second lecture and discussion in a two-part forum on encryption policy. Journalist Peter Wayner will introduce and moderate the event, which is free and open to the public. In Part I, freedom activist John Gilmore and Fritz Fielding (Ex-Associate General Councel, NSA) gave their divergent views, focusing on the Burnstein case. Barry Smith will articulate the needs of law enforcement to conduct lawful wiretaps; he will advocate the use of key-recovery techniques to achieve this end as a way that provides adequate privacy to law-abiding citizens. Schedule: The event will begin with a brief (10 minute) introduction by Peter Wayner. Following Barry Smith's talk, which will last approximately 45 minutes, there will be an opportunity to ask questions for approximately 20-30 minutes. Questions: Attendees are encouraged to ask questions in advance by sending email to sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu Directions: Take Exit #47B off interstate I-95 and follow signs to UMBC. LH V is on the 100-level of the Engineering Computer Science (ECS) Building, directly behind the University Center. There is a visitor's parking lot near the I-95 entrance to UMBC. Host: Dr. Alan T. Sherman Associate Professor, Computer Science sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu http://www.umbc.edu (410) 455-2666 This event is held in cooperation with the UMBC Intellectual Sports Council Honors College Phi Beta Kappa honors society CMSC Council of Majors IFSM Council of Majors ----------------------------------------------------- -- End of forwarded message ----------------------------------------------------- -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://users.invweb.net/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://users.invweb.net/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html --------------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: One man's Windows are another man's walls.

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Re: proving that one knows how to break RSA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: >Oh, please. Payne's so-called faster factorization algorithm was >discussed on this list May 13. See the archives under the thread title >"Public Key Break Paper". The algorithm is total garbage. Payne is >obviously a nut case who is setting himself up for a contempt of court >charge. We posted the notice about Payne's RSA paper. There's an archive of his (and fellow Sandian Art Morales') NSA suit and links to his papers : http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm Perhaps Bill's a nut case, and if so, he's probably a bellweather of other disaffected researchers in classified work who are being trashed for refusing to continue Cold War violations beyond the original conditions for signing secrecy agreements, and who are being ostracized by those who want the perks to continue. What folks like Payne are going to do with what they learned about what the USG has been up to is a good question. And what the USG will do to them if they start to tell is more so. That's what Payne's NSA suit is about, and it may be more consequential than the all-too-sane Bernstein, Karn and Junger suits. That will depend on what Payne chooses to reveal in spite of secrecy agreements. We may never know what Bill knows about faulty cryptography if DOE settles with him and Morales. Alternatively, he confesses to a fear of flying, for the reasons Dimitri states, based on what he says he knows of the insane accusations and actions of the TLAs when their own comfort and security is threatened by an ex-insider.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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religious discrimination alive and well in NEW Zealand (fwd)
by John Hackworth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmm. freedom(a)freedom-press.co.nz wrote: > this is not a spam > you may not be interested in this religion but the powers to > be are attacking a basic human right. So whats new.? > read how a new zealand couple are being prosecuted for their > religious beliefs > http://www.freedom-press.co.nz > Read the kiwi gemstone file,you may be suprised > just email us for a copy.put" kiwi "in the suject line > or join are mailing list for the latest in govt conspiracies > just type" join" in the suject line > The truth shall set you free (perhaps)

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Fwd: FYI: Jefferson Club: "A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryption"
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 16 Jan 1998 15:58:21 -0800 To: mac crypto list <mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com> From: Vinnie Moscaritolo <vinnie(a)vmeng.com> Subject: Fwd: FYI: Jefferson Club: "A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryption" Sender: <mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com> Precedence: Bulk >>The Jefferson Club is proud to present: >>David Friedman, Professor of Law at Santa Clara University >>to speak on >>"A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryption" >> >>Luncheon >>Wednesday, February 25th >>12:00 noon >>Ming's Villa in Palo Alto >> >>Reserve your place at http://www.ipser.com/jeffersonclub. >> >>A major theme in discussions of the influence of technology on society has >>been the computer as a threat to privacy. It now appears that the truth is >>precisely opposite. Three technologies associated with computers, public key >>encryption, networking, and virtual reality, are in the process of giving us >>a level of privacy never known before. The U.S. government is currently >>intervening in an attempt, not to protect privacy, but to prevent it. >> >>Professor Friedman will explain the technologies and demonstrate that current >>developments, if they continue, will produce a world of strong privacy, a >>world >>in which large parts of our lives are technologically protected from the >>observation of others. He will discuss the likely consequences, >>attractive and >>unattractive, of that change and provide a brief account of attempts by >>the U.S. >>government to prevent or control the rise of privacy. >> >>For a preview of the talk, see "A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and >>Perils of >>Encryption" >>(http://www.best.com/~ddfr/Academic/Strong_Privacy/Strong_Privacy.html) >>Come prepared with questions for Professor Friedman. >> >>For more information or to reserve your place, visit: >>http://www.ipser.com/jeffersonclub >> > > >_ Vinnie Moscaritolo http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 3F903472C3AF622D5D918D9BD8B100090B3EF042 "You can get a lot more with a smile and a gun then a smile, alone." - Al Capone --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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More Software Controls
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Denise Caruso reports today in the NYT on upcoming copyright legislation that would prohibit circumventing any copyright protection on digital works. Quote: Many products on the market would qualify for circumvention devices. These include software that allows systems managers to gain access to computers when users lose their passwords and any device used to test the strength of computer security -- products that cannot be tested without trying to break protection technology. There's also a report on The WWW Consortium's vote a few days ago to include the PICS standard for Web infrastructure and the vote's import for censorship. The report notes that technologists are now making decisions about public policy once dominated by lawyers, and defending the self-serving practice much the same: it's for the public good. http://www.nytimes.com

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