December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>: > How about this alternative which achieves the same functionality and > removes the juicy supeona target: > Turn on hashash database for all mails. That means hashcash gets put > in the database to prevent double spending. .... > So now when you reply to a message, on it's way out via the mail hub, > you remove that hashcash token from the double spending database. > This means that the sender can cache sent hashcash tokens, and re-use > them when after he gets a reply. Doesn't this invite the spammer to Bcc an accomplice with the target ISP ? The accomplice replies; thereby freeing the coin for reuse. > I am told by one subscriber to look at TIS firewall toolkits imap > program. You may have meant "smap". -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

1 0

Encrypted Magic Folders
by Alex Woolfson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello! First of all let me go on record by saying that I really like the idea and the interface you've designed for your product, Encrypted Magic Folders. The interface is easy to use and efficient. Job well done! There are, however, some security concerns I'd like resolved before I would be interested in purchasing your product. You scramble filenames which is an excellent idea. I might suggest that you also scramble the directory names as well. When using the freeware program Directory Snoop 1.1 designed by Kent Briggs (www.briggsoft.com) in Windows 95, I was easily able to find the directories that EMF had hidden. I wasn't able to access them, but I could see they were there *and also what their names were*. I don't know if it is possible to hide these directories from such a program (although, obviously, that would be ideal), but it seems that we should at least be able to scramble the directory filenames so that little information is gleaned about which directories are worth attacking by cryptanalysis and which are not worth the attackers' trouble. On the question of encryption algorithms, let me add my voice to those who have been suggesting that you use strong and tested algorithms like IDEA or Blowfish. I feel very strongly that this is essential to any product that purports to provide true security to its users. If your product were meant to merely keep your kid sister from reading your files, then the security through obscurity your product seems to offer would be sufficient. But your marketing materials suggest that you wish to offer a greater level of security than that. Not being a cryptologist, I consulted with members of the Cypherpunk mailing list to aid me in evaluating the security of your software referring them to the "How Secure Is It?" section of your Help file. These guys really know their stuff. The verdict was unanimous--that the security of Encrypted Magic Folders was not sufficient for anything but the most casual uses. I have included below one of the more thorough and detailed of the replies in the hopes that it will be useful in improving the strength of your software. I would also feel more comfortable if you were willing to have the source code of your product reviewed by industry experts (such as Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Systems who wrote the very well respected Applied Cryptography book as well as Blowfish). If you are concerned about someone stealing your idea, non-disclosure agreements should be able to offer sufficient legal protection. Truly secure algorithms and programs can withstand this kind of scrutiny without compromising their security. Relying on the fact that your company is "too small and obscure" for an attacker to develop an prepackaged attack offers little comfort--if someone really wants to have access to my files, I imagine they'll devote the time to attempt to crack your product--copyright infringement notwithstanding! If you haven't already, I would strongly suggest that your developers read Schneier's book Applied Cryptography. It does a much better job of explaining the difference between true security and security through obscurity. And it's written for programmers who wish to use cryptography in their programs. It's not a bad read, either. :-) I am really interested in purchasing a product like Encrypted Magic Folders, but for such an application, security is obviously the biggest priority. I believe others who have not taken the trouble to write you feel the same way. If EMF makes use of strong encryption and is willing to have the source code of its product reviewed by industry experts, I would be interested in paying for it. For a $60.00 product, I believe it is fair to expect this kind of protection. Yours Alex Woolfson Below is the response of Ray Arachelian of the Cypherpunks list. There is a bit of sarcasm involved, but I trust you'll be able to see beyond it to the valid criticism he makes. I hope you find it useful. On Thu, 4 Dec 1997, Alex Woolfson wrote: > EMF's encryption offers good protection and excellent speed. It > hasn't been broken yet. It is, as far as we know, exportable. THERE > IS NO BACKDOOR. Should you forget your password there is nothing we > can do to decrypt your encrypted files. If it is exportable, then it is weak encryption by definition. The question is how weak. Reading their marketting crap provides more insights in just how lame this is: > Quite a few people ask us how big EMF's key size is. They've learned > from other encryption programs that the bigger the key the stronger > the encryption. This really doesn't apply to EMF. > > We developed our own encryption instead of using a standard because > we wanted EMF to be able to decrypt at the byte level. In this way > we only need to decrypt/encrypt the data your programs require and > not the entire file. In other words: security through obscurity. Smells like snake oil, looks like snake oil, it even has bits of snake scales in it. Heck, if they say that the key size is not important, it's likely very tiny, or regardless of what key size you'd use (if you had any choice), it's such a weak cypher that it wouldn't get you anything. > In theory, because we decrypt at the byte level, the biggest key we > could use would be 8 bits - which is a joke. So instead of > decrypting every hunk of data using the same key, as most other > encryption programs do, we developed an algorithm to vary the key > based on the data's location within the file. In this way we get > both high security and high speed. We are trying to patent EMF's > encryption method. Whoop. so the key is the location of the data? At most, this means a 32 bit key on most file systems, 64 bits on newer file systems. This assumes that your file is long enough for that. But as a key, this is totally useless as the key is the location which is visible to all. Likely they would be wise to "mix" this location key with the passphrase. This offers little more than CBC would. The only difference is that CBC is based on the previous block, where this is based on the location of a byte in the file (which is known) whereas a CBC depedns on knowledge of the previous block. If they did it the right way, they'd use the passphrase to build a lookup table of large keys based on the byte location within a file, but because this depends on your passphrase, your security is still that of the passphrase at maximum. There may be ways to weaken this. > Having said all that, truth is, most encryption isn't "cracked" by > breaking the algorithm, it's done by guessing the password. Brute > guessing of passwords tends to level the playing field tremendously. > We actually have an advantage because we aren't an established > standard. Because we're small and relatively obscure chances are no > one will take the effort to write a password guessing program (which > incidentally would violate copyright and intellectual property laws.) > Even if someone were to go thru all this effort we could easily > change the encryption method for the next update. This is total bullshit. It's Grade A, government approved exportable snake oil. Just because they are small and obscure it doesn't guarantee you any extra safety. Just because nobody has bothered to write a brute forcer for their code doens't mean nobody can do so. And no, this would not violate any of their copyright if the author of the brute forcer proggie wrote it without copying their code. It might violate intellectual property laws if they had a patent on it, but they can't get one since they're going by security through obscurity. They claim to be applying for a patent, but if they do, their code is published and their weaknesses will be displayed. It might violate trade secret laws if someone who has the source or the algorithm shares it, but not if someone reverse engineers it (depending on reverse engineering laws of course.) Just because they could "rewrite" the code in the next update against cracking or brute force attacks does not buy you security. FYI: If you use this crap and someone steals a copy of the encrypted files off your hard drive, it doesn't matter what new updates this company produces. The fact is you used the older breakable version, the attacker has your cyphertext and will decode it. > If we used an established encryption method like DES or Blowfish then > your files would probably have to be fully decrypted when opened, > would exist on disk as unencrypted while you're using them, and then > would need to be encrypted when closed. Translation: We don't use CBC, because that would be more work and slow down our crappy cypher. Deeper translation: break any portion of any encrypted file and you'll likely break the whole thing if not huge parts of it. "Established encryption methods (sic)" use CBC because it adds security. Their algorithms are well published and well known so people can find their weaknesses and publicise them. Whatever weaknesses there are in this thing are hidden from those who can't or won't reverse engineer it. But there are plenty of those who can and will, and have no qualms about releasing it anonymously, or worse: keeping the expolit to themselves so as to exploit those stupid enough to use this lame shit. It only takes one cracker with a good disassembler to reverse engineer their code and find all the holes, and they'll be out of business. If what protects your data is the cypher, and not the key, then breaking the cypher is all you need to do. Heck, I'd bet they use something really shitty like this: (since "key size is not important", and "depends on location".) char code(char *passphrase, char data, long location); { int i; char c; for (i=0; passphrase[i]>0; c^=passphrase[i++]); return (data ^ c ^ (char)(location & 0xff)); } Gee, I probably violated their "intellectual" property by guessing their code, heh. > This has multiple > disadvantages. First, if your computer shuts down while you have > "encrypted" files open, then those files would be unencrypted. This > doesn't happen with EMF as your encrypted files are always encrypted > as stored on disk. The second disadvantage is that it slows things > down tremendously. Not if you use an encrypted disk driver. then, all your data is encrypted all the time. (You get into other issues such as keeping the passphrase or key from falling into the pagefiles, etc...) [Meaningless babble deleted.] =====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos============== .+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see |./|\. ..\|/..|sunder(a)sundernet.com|you once again. I thought you were |/\|/\ <--*-->| ------------------ |hiding, and you thought that I had run |\/|\/ ../|\..| "A toast to Odin, |away chasing the tail of dogma. I opened|.\|/. .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|my eye and there we were.... |..... ======================= http://www.sundernet.com ==========================

1 0

You Could Earn $100 Every Time the Phone Rings!!
by 44096770＠15605.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Double your money to infinity! Let professional salespeople close your contacts! Fortune 5000 is a rock-solid program that pays big checks every Friday! Friendly pros offer great support! You'll get guaranteed lowest prices on over 250,000 name-brand products and services in time for Christmas giving. YOU CAN'T BEAT THIS PROGRAM!!! Call 800 811-2141 code #47990 for the details and start creating your fortune TODAY! Please don't allow yourself to miss this incredible opportunity! Fortune 5000 is head-and-shoulders above the crowd of other opportunities! Pick up the phone NOW while the thought is fresh in your mind and start earning a SUBSTANTIAL income. You will be HAPPY you did! Call (800) 811-2141 code #47990 and say hello to a bright future!

1 0

Re: The Joys of Being Canadian
by Matt Elliott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Cable Company Rep: "What's your Social Security number? >Answer: "I don't have one. I'm Canadian." For my cable company I asked why they wanted it. For a security check when you call in was the response. Does it need to be an actuall social security number? No, just something you can remember when you call up. 012-01-0123 I replied. They were quite happy to use that as my "Social Security Number" in their database. As far as cable goes they don't want your social security number. I wonder how many others would be happy to substitute something. Matt <mailto:melliott@itmail.ncsa.uiuc.edu>

4 3

Super Cool Site!
by lori＠6t9.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I'm Lori. My girlfriends and I have created this way cool site. We would love you to check it out. http://www.6t9.com/dsnm/alpg/ Love, Lori P.S. Being new to this, we were told that if you NEVER want to hear from us again, reply with the subject "Remove" and you won't. That would make us really sad though.

1 0

Re: Identity, Persistence, Anonymity, and Accountability--Part I of II
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/14/97 6:54 PM, Tim May (tcmay(a)got.net) passed this wisdom: >But note that there absolutely is no requirement in the United >States for ageneral form of identification. Non-drivers need not >have any form of I.D. And as we have seen in court cases, a la >Lawson v. Kolender (where a blackman in dreadlocks used to like to >walk the streets of San Diego...the copsstopped him many times and >jailed him for not having I.D. on him...the court ruled that people >don't have to present credentials issued by the state to walk the >public streets). In New Jersey there is a criminal offense called "failure to properly identify" ... I don't know if its ever been tested, or if it is still on the books, but as of ten years ago it was there. I think it was a misdemeanor (in NJ the term is "petty disorderly persons offense) I cannot imagine it as a felony. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJXIij7r4fUXwraZAQEMvAf9FzhcodfycwA3BSV4cB5nPAqyR+6+hguK 9VG1/b7CEvEyZleD1HzRbB7i8+ycwxvtZr959FPpume5LW3eWhSsVGLEb8A9EzW3 FQXqmxa6X6LLUcPIrhfSaO8JQdPV0LXOfXwW7ZZh7s02pUmTRgpXOuM5MdHSf0nG kKTGntI5JbaEmDgvyANXETV4EomZ/0Zm3zJiGw3M9G4aZpFl3LIgFPcOUSY1MwJI TMGbNCS/DveeAhmM2J+oa8DbUwqVYGGhA27YHNve5rtxqkDbobsF9OMY8ssU70D0 K0uHEq+ZoobSlNHHrFP+I52RxXiKtP4blGxn8riYmjBp8H4ih6Hsbw== =41Ml -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "to be yourself in a world that tries, night and day, to make you just like everybody else - is to fight the greatest battle there ever is to fight and keep on fighting" - e.e. cummings

3 2

ENCRYPT XXX PICZ
by kozmo killah 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

D3AR S|RZ, H0W D0 | ENCRYPT NUDIE GIFS? W3RD _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

1 0

Security of Encrypted Magic Folders
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Alex Woolfson" <abdiel(a)worldnet.att.net> Subject: Security of Encrypted Magic Folders >I just downloaded Encrypted Magic Folders--a program that hides Windows 95 >folders and then encrypts them to prevent a disk utility from revealing >their content. In their help file, they try to answer the question "How >Secure is it?"--and, of course, they say *very*, but I can't tell if this is >so or if they're just blowing smoke. Particularly, their claim that key >size doesn't matter. (My mom taught me size always matters... ) If >someone with a stronger cryptography background than me could take a look at >this and let me know, I would greatly appreciate it. >* How Secure is it? > EMF's encryption offers good protection and excellent speed. It > hasn't been broken yet. It is, as far as we know, exportable. THERE > IS NO BACKDOOR. Should you forget your password there is nothing we > can do to decrypt your encrypted files. How do we know this? > Quite a few people ask us how big EMF's key size is. They've learned > from other encryption programs that the bigger the key the stronger > the encryption. This really doesn't apply to EMF. How do we know this? > We developed our own encryption instead of using a standard because > we wanted EMF to be able to decrypt at the byte level. In this way > we only need to decrypt/encrypt the data your programs require and > not the entire file. How do we know this? > In theory, because we decrypt at the byte level, the biggest key we > could use would be 8 bits - which is a joke. So instead of > decrypting every hunk of data using the same key, as most other > encryption programs do, we developed an algorithm to vary the key > based on the data's location within the file. In this way we get > both high security and high speed. We are trying to patent EMF's > encryption method. How do we know this? And why are they trying to patent a mathematical algorithm? (The fact they can do it is irrelevent. Patenting a mathematical algorithm, much like patenting something like XORing pixels on a screen, is stupid.) And is the fact that they're trying to patent it supposed to make us feel safer? > Having said all that, truth is, most encryption isn't "cracked" by > breaking the algorithm, it's done by guessing the password. Brute > guessing of passwords tends to level the playing field tremendously. Cool. But since we have to disassemble the program to figure out how your program really handles keys...how do we know this? > We actually have an advantage because we aren't an established > standard. Because we're small and relatively obscure chances are no > one will take the effort to write a password guessing program FUD and smokescreen. Security through obscurity. > (which > incidentally would violate copyright and intellectual property laws.) FUD and smokescreen. The fact that creating a password program allegidly violates intellectual property and copyright laws in some country isn't going to keep somebody from writing one. > Even if someone were to go thru all this effort we could easily > change the encryption method for the next update. I doubt it's much effort. For example it can take 3 weeks for a group of programmers to write a copy protection algorithm for their new PC game and about 8 hours for a cracker to break it. Further, if they're patenting this algorithm it will be public. FUD. > If we used an established encryption method like DES or Blowfish then > your files would probably have to be fully decrypted when opened, > would exist on disk as unencrypted while you're using them, and then > would need to be encrypted when closed. This has multiple FUD. Decrypt in relatively small pages and cache in memory. Since they've apparently added an encryption/decryption layer between the filesystem and the userspace libraries to begin with this shouldn't be too hard. Well, then again, considering this is Windows which is probably the worst attempt at an operating system this decade maybe it isn't. >disadvantages. First, if your computer shuts down while you have > "encrypted" files open, then those files would be unencrypted. This Not an issue if the operating system and/or encryption program are/is properly designed. > doesn't happen with EMF as your encrypted files are always encrypted > as stored on disk. The second disadvantage is that it slows things > down tremendously. As an example, let's say you retrieve your email > and your email program needs to add today's message to the end of > your 3MB email file. If we used a standard encryption method > requiring the decryption of the file before use then the entire 3 MB > file would have to be decrypted, your 300 byte message added to the > end and then the entire file encrypted again. With EMF, no > decryption would need to take place, and the only data needing > encryption would be the 300 byte message. MUCH faster. Around > 20,000 times faster in this example! Finally something which might actually be valid. > If you still think you'd like to see us use a standard encryption > method like DES or Blowfish, or have any other suggestions, let us > know and we will consider your input in future updates Unless these people have released source this program should be avoided. The algorithm is unknown, they aren't telling what it is or how it works, it hasn't been submitted for review by cryptographers (at least this list hasn't heard about it), and they aren't releasing source so you can see what's going on. They're hyping security through obscurity as a valid security method, while simultaneously applying for a patent on their security method and saying "Well, if it's cracked we'll just change to another algorithm whenever we get around to releasing the next binary-only distribution. Hope nobody gets your data in the meantime." Further, it is designed for use on an operating system which is notorious for insecurity, where everybody and everything is root (except under NT, where you actually have to make some syscalls to get admin privlidges from an unprivlidged account), where nobody releases source for anything, and where there is no source available for the OS so you can modify it to fix security holes or "features," much less add security enhancements of your own. This entire thing reads like this: "We've developed our own proprietary encryption method which nobody has ever heard of. We don't really know how good it is, but you should believe us when we say it's really, really good. In fact it's so good that we're patenting it just like RSA! Nobody will ever be able to break it because our algorithm isn't in wide use and we aren't releasing source! However if somebody actually does break it your data won't be in the open for long because we'll use some other algorithm which is just as good as the one we came up with originally and got a patent on. Hope you didn't need security in that interim and we hope that when somebody breaks this algorithm they'll tell us rather than taking advantage of all the (for them) plaintext data laying around."

1 0

Redmond to Judge [Expletive Deleted]
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- http://www.wired.com/news/news/business/story/9178.html hot off the wire an hour ago! Redmond to Judge - [Expletive Deleted] well, I would expect nothing less than "Fuck You" from Micro$lop --they consider themselves above the law. give Jackson credit for realizing the greater scope of the problem, and for appointing the special master. M$' attitude in and of itself is prima facie evidence of theit market intent --including tossing out the option that OEMs will still be able to but the _original_ version of W95 if they elect not to take IE4. damn white of them boys up there... Analysis: Redmond to Judge - [Expletive Deleted] by Kaitlin Quistgaard and Dan Brekke 4:20pm 15.Dec.97.PST It took two of Microsoft's biggest guns more than 60 minutes to utter a reply to US District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson that most of us sum up in two hard syllables. The second of which is "you." For daring to draw a line last week and forbidding the company to cross for the time being, Jackson was treated to a marathon rebuke from Brad Chase, Microsoft's vice president of Internet marketing, and William Neukom, senior vice president for law and corporate affairs. ... Chase made it clear that neither Jackson nor anyone else would keep Microsoft from readying its planned spring release of Windows 98 - in which Internet Explorer 4.0 and the Windows desktop are inextricably bound. ... Neukom did mention one other alternative that actually merits the name, and one that government the company finds itself at war with might actually recognize as viable: Manufacturers could, he said, install a Netscape browser on their Windows/IE machines. >>> what a fuckin' joke. proves their intent to be a monopoly and fuck the public interest --it's my way, or no way! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQBVAwUBNJXd/LR8UA6T6u61AQG9bQH/fkE3TKRYOmc+y9RZTsLJYjuISYDYqB47 +G0axtsdcumv7Q09bTYOf8b3K36+ik8/RFdngce6HWXDGrrlmtbd4g== =UuqU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: wilkenrules.html
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This entire issue speaks to whether we neeed government or not. The power of the judiciary is part and parcel of the power of Government, and in many cases -this is an excellent example- is all that stands between The Oligarchy and Freedom. Imagine if there _were_ no government per-se, and it was the Disney, or Westinghouse, or GE, or whoever the fuck, corporate security forces taking action on their own against FRB. At 09:08 AM 12/14/97 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: > > JUDGE WILKEN DENIES FCC MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT!!! > > Press Release Follows. To Go Directly To The Full Text Of Judge Wilken's > Decision, Click Here > > > >National Lawyers Guild Committee on Democratic Communications > > 558 Capp Street, San Francisco 94110 > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE > > > COURT REJECTS FCC'S CONSTITUTIONAL CATCH 22 > > United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken has rejected > another attempt by the Federal Communications Commission to silence > Berkeley Micro Radio Broadcaster Stephen Dunifer, founder of Free > Radio Berkeley. > > In a 13 page opinion released on November 12, 1997, Judge Wilken > once again rejected the government's motion for an injunction to > silence micro radio broadcasts by local radio pioneer Stephen > Dunifer. > > In 1995, Judge Wilken rejected the government's first motion for a > preliminary injunction against Dunifer's broadcasts. At that time > the Court found merit in Dunifer's argument that the FCC's ban on > low power, affordable FM broadcasting was a violation of the First > Amendment's guarantee of free speech to all in the United States. > > In a blatant attempt to avoid facing its First Amendment obligations > the FCC then urged Wilken to permanently enjoin Dunifer from > Broadcasting and at the same time argued that she could not even > consider the issue of whether its rules, which prevent him from > getting a license, are unconstitutional. In a Kafkaesqe argument, > the Commission argued that Wilken had jurisdiction to issue an > injunction, but no jurisdiction to hear Dunifer's constitutional > arguments. The government claimed that only the higher federal > courts could consider the constitutional question. > > In her November 12 decision rejecting the Government's position, > Judge Wilken pointed to the fact that the FCC had taken exactly the > opposite position in the 1994 case of Dougan vs FCC. In that case, > an Arizona micro radio broadcaster had appealed an FCC fine (for > broadcasting without a license) to the 9th Circuit Federal Court of > Appeal, and the FCC had argued that the Court of Appeal had no > jurisdiction over the case, and that it had to be heard by the > District Court. The Court of Appeals agreed with the FCC and sent > the case back to the District Court. > > Judge Wilken noted that the Arizona broadcaster had raised the same > constitutional arguments in the Court of Appeals that Dunifer is > raising. The Court ruled that in sending all of the issues in the > Arizona case to the District Court, the Appeals Court recognized > that the District Court had jurisdiction over all aspects of the > case. > > In denying the Government's motion for an injunction "without > prejudice," Judge Wilken ordered the Government to file a further > brief on the question of whether the unconstitutionality of the > FCC's ban on micro radio is a valid legal defense to an injunction > against broadcasting at low power without a license. Dunifer's > attorneys, Louis Hiken and Allen Hopper of San Francisco, will have > an opportunity to rebut the government's arguments on this point. > > In response to pressure from the commercial broadcaster's lobby, the > National Association of Broadcasters (N.A.B.), the FCC has in recent > months been stepping up its campaign of harassment against the > thousands of micro radio stations now on the air in this country. > Hiken commented "The broadcast industry is clearly afraid of these > little community stations which are speaking truth to its power. In > trying to do the N.A.B.'s bidding, the FCC demonstrates that it is > nothing but an enforcement arm of the commercial broadcast industry > and the multi-national corporations which own it." > > The National Lawyers Guild's Committee on Democratic Communications > has represented the Lawyers Guild, San Francisco's Media Alliance, > and the Women's International News Gathering Services as a "Friend > of the Court" (Amicus) in this case. In its Friend of the Court > brief the Lawyers Guild pointed out that FCC regulations make it > impossible for all but the very wealthy to even apply for a > broadcast license. This, they told the Court, is the equivalent of > saying anyone could speak from a soap box in the park, but the box > had to be made of gold. Guild attorney Peter Franck commented "In an > era when Disney owns ABC, the world's largest defense contractor > owns NBC and CNN merges with Time which merges with Warner, and when > 'public' broadcasting is told to get its money from corporations, > micro radio may be our last best hope for democracy on the air > ways." He continued "Judge Wilken's decision is a courageous > rejection of the Government's attempt to use a legal Catch-22 to > avoid facing the fact that its ban on micro radio flies in the face > of the Constitution." > > The legal team representing Dunifer and the Amicae are very pleased > with Judge Wilken's reasoned and thorough decision denying the FCC's > motion to have the case resolved without a trial on the merits. For > almost 70 years, the FCC has catered solely to the interests of > commercial corporate giants, through their mouthpiece, the National > Association of Broadcasters. These are the pirates, who have stolen > the airwaves from the American people, and who represent corporate > interests valued at more than 60 billion dollars. Only the Pentagon, > the Silicon Valley and the transportation industries possess the > financial wallop represented by the NAB and its constituents. > > Judge Wilken's decision represents a vision of what it would be like > for the American people to be given back their own voice. The > decision suggests the likely unconstitutionality of the entire > regulatory structure underlying the FCC's ban on low power radio. It > forewarns of the total failure of that agency to carry out its > statutory obligation to regulate the airwaves in the public interest > -- that is, in the interest of the American people, rather than the > media monopolies that control our airwaves. > > The legal team welcomes the opportunity to have a court identify the > real pirates of the airwaves -- not the thousands of microradio > broadcasters who seek to communicate with the people of their > communities, but rather the billionaire commercial interests that > control the airwaves as if they own them. Is it General Electric, > Westinghouse and the Disney Corporation that have the right to > control local community radio, or is that a right that belongs to > all of the American people, regardless of economic status? > > FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: > > Peter Franck, Counsel for Amicus > 415-415-995-5055 > pfranck(a)hbmvr.com (days) > pfranck(a)a.crl.com(evs, wknds) > http://www.368Hayes.com/nlg.cdc.html > > Alan Korn, Counsel for Amicus > 415-362-5700 > aakorn(a)igc.org > > Stephen Dunifer, Free Radio Berkeley > 415-644-3779 > frbspd(a)crl.com > http://www.freeradio.org > > Louis Hiken > Counsel for Stephen Dunifer > 415-575-3220 > hiken(a)igc.org > http://www.368Hayes.com > > Allen Hopper > Counsel for Stephen Dunifer > 415-575-3222 > lazlo(a)igc.org > http://www.368Hayes.com > > >SEE THE FULL TEXT OF JUDGE WILKEN'S DECISION > > TO STEPHEN DUNIFER/FREE RADIO BERKELEY INFORMATION PAGE > > TO FREE RADIO BERKELEY LEGAL BATTLE PAGE > > TO NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD INFORMATION PAGE > > TO THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD WEB SITE > > TO NLG COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATIONS PAGE > > TO FREE RADIO BERKELEY WEB SITE > >BACK TO LAW OFFICES AT 368 HAYES STREET > > >

2 1