December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

IBM's SecureWay Key Recovery technology
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From <http://www.ibm.com/Security/html/prkeyrec.html>: >At the RSA Conference, IBM announced the details of its highly >anticipated SecureWay key recovery technology. IBM is developing this >technology in response to market demands for exportable strong >encryption required to advance the growth of global e-business. >[ yada yada yada snipped ] I attended this presentation. Basically, what they do is to add two packets to the "channel setup process", one that depends only on the coorespondents, the other that contains the information about this particular session. A problem with this, as I pointed out to the presenters, is that the first packet can be trivially used for traffic analysis. The eavesdropper may not be able to determine who is cooresponding, but they can tell if it is the same people as in a previous conversation. >From <http://www.ibm.com/security/html/wp_keyrec2.html> >In order to minimize the preparation overhead, the recovery information >is prepared in two phases: one phase is independent of the particular >session/archive key being prepared; the second phase is dependent on the >particular key and session parameters. The first phase, which uses >public-key encryption, can be shared across multiple invocations of key >recovery preparation, thus reducing overhead. The public-key encryptions >can be stored for repeated use. > As you can see, IBM suggests cacheing the contents of the first packet, so that you don't have to recalculate it each time. Imagine how easy traffic analysis would be if the identification packets were identical instead of just related. -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> Warning: Objects in calendar are closer than they appear.

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AltaVista Tunnel
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Digital / Microsoft "Driving Force" tour is in our parking lot today and I got the opportunity to have a look around. One of the 'stations' inside the truck is on intranets. They were showing off a product called "AltaVista Tunnel" which I assume is their PPTP product. I say "I assume" because the guy showing it off had absolutely no clue what he was talking about. He triumphantly exclaimed that the encryption was 128-bit, but when I said "128-bit what?" he cowered and muttered that he didn't know and went on with his little speech. The rest of my crypto-specific questions met with equal dark stares. And these are the people setting industry standards... _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ Real programmers programs never work right the first time. But if you throw them on the machine they can be patched into working in only a few 30-hours debugging sessions.

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DES keyspace
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone coordinating (formally or informally) which chunks of the keyspace has been searched for the DES challenge? Yes, I know all the arguments about potential fraud and verification, but it would be nice to have a Web site that informally listed what had been scanned so far (verified or not). Did I perhaps miss something and this is already out there? URLs appreciated if so. If it doesn't exist, I'd be willing to host a site and play coordinator... Joel

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Re: Embarrass a Marylander, go to jail
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Think they are trying to expand the harrassment laws to directly effect the E world, but I would think the laws on harrassment would apply anyhow (provided your in their domain, but then again thats true for all governments...) --- How has the government interfered in your life today?

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DES keyspace
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone coordinating (formally or informally) which chunks of the keyspace has been searched for the DES challenge? Yes, I know all the arguments about potential fraud and verification, but it would be nice to have a Web site that informally listed what had been scanned so far (verified or not). Did I perhaps miss something and this is already out there? URLs appreciated if so. If it doesn't exist, I'd be willing to host a site and play coordinator... Joel

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IBM's SecureWay Key Recovery technology
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From <http://www.ibm.com/Security/html/prkeyrec.html>: >At the RSA Conference, IBM announced the details of its highly >anticipated SecureWay key recovery technology. IBM is developing this >technology in response to market demands for exportable strong >encryption required to advance the growth of global e-business. >[ yada yada yada snipped ] I attended this presentation. Basically, what they do is to add two packets to the "channel setup process", one that depends only on the coorespondents, the other that contains the information about this particular session. A problem with this, as I pointed out to the presenters, is that the first packet can be trivially used for traffic analysis. The eavesdropper may not be able to determine who is cooresponding, but they can tell if it is the same people as in a previous conversation. >From <http://www.ibm.com/security/html/wp_keyrec2.html> >In order to minimize the preparation overhead, the recovery information >is prepared in two phases: one phase is independent of the particular >session/archive key being prepared; the second phase is dependent on the >particular key and session parameters. The first phase, which uses >public-key encryption, can be shared across multiple invocations of key >recovery preparation, thus reducing overhead. The public-key encryptions >can be stored for repeated use. > As you can see, IBM suggests cacheing the contents of the first packet, so that you don't have to recalculate it each time. Imagine how easy traffic analysis would be if the identification packets were identical instead of just related. -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> Warning: Objects in calendar are closer than they appear.

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AltaVista Tunnel
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Digital / Microsoft "Driving Force" tour is in our parking lot today and I got the opportunity to have a look around. One of the 'stations' inside the truck is on intranets. They were showing off a product called "AltaVista Tunnel" which I assume is their PPTP product. I say "I assume" because the guy showing it off had absolutely no clue what he was talking about. He triumphantly exclaimed that the encryption was 128-bit, but when I said "128-bit what?" he cowered and muttered that he didn't know and went on with his little speech. The rest of my crypto-specific questions met with equal dark stares. And these are the people setting industry standards... _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ Real programmers programs never work right the first time. But if you throw them on the machine they can be patched into working in only a few 30-hours debugging sessions.

1 0

Re: Embarrass a Marylander, go to jail
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Think they are trying to expand the harrassment laws to directly effect the E world, but I would think the laws on harrassment would apply anyhow (provided your in their domain, but then again thats true for all governments...) --- How has the government interfered in your life today?

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Re: Dissolving Choke Points
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:36 PM 2/3/97 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >What I have seen is a pretty complete elimination of the signal that >was there. Some might argue that this is "just" because Tim stopped >posting. But so what? The result of moderation was the elimination >of signal. Nonsense. The signal had left long before the moderation began. The steepest drop in signal (not S/N ratio) was between shortly before Perry left and Vulis had completed his takeover. Signal is cause by signal generators. Most top signal generators, other than Tim, had left because of pollution caused by the likes of Vulis, aga, and his homophonic boyfriends. Moderation has nothing to do with the loss of signal other than that signal from Tim was lost. And while I appreciated Tim's essays, they were never the sole source of signal on the list. Tim did not even provide the majority of signal. "Best individual contributor", sure. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Re: New X-Ray Imager
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 AM 2/4/97 -0500, Adam Shostack wrote: > >| A poll last week by the Los Angeles Times found that a majority of people -- >| 58 percent -- said they would curtail some civil liberties if it would help >| thwart terrorism. Thirteen percent said it would depend on what rights were >| at stake. The poll didn't ask people to single out any rights. > > Its worth noting the 'if it would help thwart terrorism.' It is irrelevant if terrorism is indeed be thwarted. The public does not require this to happen. All that matters is to generate the *perception* of increased security, not to increase security itself. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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