December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

sad
by Internaut 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am sad that all the spam from companies will be gone soon. I enjoy thinking that perhaps 10% (or ~120) of the Cypherpunks along with me hit the reply button and type "remove" giving them a great return for their investment (pun intended :). ---------- From: PS[SMTP:pstone@lightspeed.bc.ca] Sent: Sunday, January 12, 1997 02.59 PM To: pstone(a)lightspeed.bc.ca Subject: Saw your post Hi there! I saw your post the other day and thought you might be interested in a decent offer on some excellent information. Start an excellent home business today!!! For a brochure that outlines THE TEN BEST OPPORTUNITES IN BUSINESS TODAY send me a self-addressed, stamped envelope. Mail to : M.K. Press 1310 W.67th Ave. Vancouver. B.C. Canada V6P 2T4 Please write "Offer # 4322" by hand on the envelope to me. Never want to hear from me again? Simple. Hit reply, put <REMOVE> in the Subject field, and send it on back.. Thanks.

1 0

Re: Menwith Hill / NSA
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At DefCon III, someone had a video on these ladies ("granny hackers" was >the comment from the audience) who explore[d] the Menwith Hill NSA base in >the UK. The video was shown twice from what I remember, once in the main >speaker room and once in the video room. If anyone knows anything about >this video then please email me [tobin(a)mail.edm.net] especially if you >know WHO had it, where I could get a copy, etc. Also, I'd like to hear >about any other similar type things. (crypto, NSA, etc) I talked to the guy who made the documentary (Duncan Campbell) an hour or two ago, he's sending me the transcripts when he gets back to the UK. I'll see if I can get his permission to post them to the web. He's been doing this sort of thing for about 25 years, and has some really neat stories to tell about his run-ins with the UK government. Peter.

1 0

Re: Ma Bell
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 97-01-11 15:36:31 EST, mindbenders(a)hotmail.com (LoRd oRiOn) writes: << .why do Telco people and the government blame us hackers for costing them billions of dollars a year to fix the security holes that they have??? >> Considering there is a LARGE workload on the employees as it is.. they dont need more work suddenly that is unneeded. Basically EVERY system has some kinds of security holes. If noone knows about them.. then it isnt a problem. If someone is exploiting them and using money from the company illegaly (free phone service) .. even though it may only be 5 of you doing it.. it has a LARGE potential to become globally exploited by tons of people. So.. they have to invest time and money to research the hole and fix it. Thats why.

1 0

Product Manager for hire.
by Geoff Klein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, coderpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Jan 13 15:45:49 1997 Product Manager with extensive experience in messaging and security is seeking a challenging position in a warm climate. For resume see: http://members.tripod.com/~geoff_cv/ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager http://www.commtouch.com, Tel: 972-9-963445 (ext 130), Fax: 972-9-961053 For my PGP public key send mail with subject: Get Key - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMto8kULv5OMYFK1FAQHChwP/a5d7lG7jD7ULMlfsh5Cfo4DsShbwuTij EB2C/8G0fvg4uGlhMDWr+q2u2R5K5laEM/a9yySn79iBpLQ+viDOphUC5vfTknbo trqggHQUhjlDYftwTAJdnBNXh/XAfGCgoPpHJ4pYOEYs+mVpsla1a9w7SFuQUb18 zKwP1hKlacI= =F8SZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little Timmy's fetal cranium (not much to begin with). O |'| /\ | | Timmy May /\ \-------| / / |-------|

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 13 Jan 97 6:48:59 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 37:22 99.99% nym config(a)nym.alias.net **#*#*++#+-# 20:08 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++-++++ 1:15:41 99.96% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++++++.-++* 2:25:45 99.91% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+* +--+*+** 35:43 99.87% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ------+---- 2:54:30 99.81% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *+******+ ** 4:00 99.67% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +++*+ +* +*+ 35:01 99.61% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ----+++++ -+ 53:56 99.60% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #**#**** ++# 2:26 99.24% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++ +-++ + 1:18:06 99.21% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com +_.--++-++- 4:39:11 99.18% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --- ------- 4:46:40 98.01% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net - --++++ + 1:05:02 97.84% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++ 35:13 95.73% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net + ####++* 39:45 74.33% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Why are 1024 bit keys the limit right now?
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I am just starting at this. I know that part of RSA/PGP's strength comes from > the size key you choose. What prevents someone from writting a 2048 bit key? > Is it because computers can't handle it? Is 1024 top of the prime number > size right now? Am I way off track? 2048 bit keys are quite commonly used but the reason that arbitrarily large keys are not good is because of the amount of time taken to generate the keys then encrypt and decrypt messages with them, PGP uses a hybrid system whereby the rsa algorithm encrypts a one time session IDEA key, a longer RSA key would result in unacceptably long waits for most users when encrypting and decrypting messages. In the end it comes down to a trade off between speed and security and 1024 bits is a sensible compromise for most uses. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

1 0

Re: IMDMP: SOURCE CODE RELEASE ANNOUNCEMENT
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Comment: "What do you mean by 'extensive research'." > Reply: Benchmark tests. Source code comparisons. Documentations of other > algorithms. "Applied Cryptography". So you have read applied cryptography and decided that qualifies you as a cryptographer? > Comment: "I've never even heard of IMDMP before. Is this a joke?" > Reply: UDCM (IMDMP) came out January 1st, 1997. How do you think successful > companies start anyway, with millions of dollars upfront? DataET Research is > a relatively new company. No new company should be dabbling with new algorithms, an assurance of a high probability of security comes with years of attempted cryptanalysis. > Comment: "What kind of industry standard is IMDMP above?" > Reply: 128-bit encryption. Average DES is 128. PGP tops 1024. IDEA goes at > 128. RSA the same. Full security IMDMP is 2048-bit. Any other questions? This is irrelevant rubbish, if there is a cryptanalytic attack on your algorithm a brute force attack becomes unecessary and key size is not of consequence. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

2 1

Re: encryption program
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > > I'm looking for ciphertext analysis tools -- > > > > What analysis tools did you use? Where can I get a publicly available copy? > > > > I just wrote a little c program for frequency analysis, but would > also be interested if such set of tools existed. > > - Igor. The DIEHARD battery of tools, as seen on the Marsaglia random number cd published by Dr. Marsaglia of Florida university, a notable figure in PRNG design and analysis sounds appropriate for your purposes. It performs a number of statistical tests which may be useful, though I personally happen not to trust statistical tests to a great extent under most circumstances. If you cannot find these tools after a web search for DIEHARD or Marsaglia email me and I will send you a copy... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

1 0

Re: RSA over Rubiks Cube
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This problably wouldn't be to cool a thing to do. A fella named Douglas Hopstader(?) wrote a book called Meta-Mathematics (same guy who wrote The Golden Knot). In this book he developed (or showed, forget who should get credit) an algorithm to solve Rubiks cube from any beginning state. It makes for interesting reading, but kills any attempt to use the cube as a cipher machine.

2 1