December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: Just another government fuckover: New crypto regulations
by Brett Carswell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----Original Message----- >From: Toto [SMTP:toto@sk.sympatico.ca] >Sent: Friday, January 24, 1997 12:29 AM >To: Attila T. Hun >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: Just another government fuckover: New crypto regulations > >Attila T. Hun wrote: > >> free speech, which is what we are talking about. supposedly >> absolute freedom of speech in America was in the Articles of >> Confederation and was a major point of the Declaration of >> Independence. free speach was an "intention" of the Magna Carta. > >> ::> books are an intellectual 'solution' to the problem. the real >> ::>problem is the hardware. in order to negate governments and their >> ::>virtually stated intentions of blocking our inalienable freedoms, >> ::>particularly freedom of speach, we must be able to distribute >> ::>universal crypto worldwide, and be able to improve it as the shadow >> ::>governments of the various spook shows improve their ability to >> ::>break our code. > >Dear Mr. Hun, > I see that your post was expunged from the cypherpunks-politically- >correct-outgoing list. > I am assuming that it was as a result of linking crypto to free >speech. >Perhaps you need to fall more into line with the New List Order. > >Toto > >More likely 'grep dimitri '

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If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before....
by DataETRsch＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

{If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} {UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you visited.} {UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate correctly.} {UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} {Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been added.} {UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} {UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} {UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} {This advertisement has also been modified.} Hello, Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. o Includes time and date locking features. o Includes file specific unique encryption features. o Includes file authentication guard features. o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed with popular application and database programming languages and environments such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you very much for your time. Sincerely, Jeremy K.Yu-Ramos President DataET Research Data Engineering Technologies

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4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
by Mike Reiter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT ENDS JANUARY 31 *** Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Preliminary Technical Program) Zurich, Switzerland April 1-4, 1997 Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC For more information, including registration and hotel information, see: http://www.zurich.ibm.ch/pub/Other/ACMsec/index.html ================ TUESDAY, APRIL 1 ================ 4 half-day tutorials in two parallel tracks: Theory Track Practice Track Morning Cryptography CERT and Practical Network Security Jim Massey, Ueli Maurer Tom Longstaff (ETH Zurich) (Software Engineering Institute) lunch Afternoon Internet Security Info-Wars Refik Molva Paul Karger (Eurecom) (IBM TJ Watson) ================== WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2 ================== 09:00-09:30 Introduction and Opening Comments Richard Graveman (Bellcore) Phil Janson (IBM Zurich Lab) Li Gong (JavaSoft) Clifford Neuman (Univ. of Southern California) 09:30-10:30 Invited talk 1: To Be Announced 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:00 Session 1: Fair Exchange of Information Chair: Philippe Janson (IBM Zurich Lab) * Fair Exchange with a Semi-Trusted Third Party Matthew Franklin, Mike Reiter (AT&T Research) * Optimistic Protocols for Fair Exchange N. Asokan, Matthias Schunter, Michael Waidner (IBM Zurich Lab and Univ. Dortmund) 12:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Session 2: Language and System Security Chair: Michael Waidner (IBM Zurich Lab) * Static Typing with Dynamic Linking Drew Dean (Princeton University) * Secure Digital Names Scott Stornetta, Stuart Haber (Surety Technologies) * A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus Martin Abadi, Andrew D. Gordon (DEC SRC and Cambridge) 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:30 Panel 1: Programming Languages as a Basis for Security Chair: Drew Dean (Princeton) Panelists: To Be Announced Welcome Cocktail ================= THURSDAY, APRIL 3 ================= 09:00-10:30 Session 3: Authentication Chair: Ravi Sandhu (George Mason Univ.) * Authentication via Keystroke Dynamics Fabian Monrose, Avi Rubin (New York Univ. and Bellcore) * Path Independence for Authentication in Large-Scale Systems Mike Reiter, Stuart Stubblebine (AT&T Research) * Proactive Password Checking with Decision Trees Francesco Bergadano, Bruno Crispo, Giancarlo Ruffo (Univ. of Turin) 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:00 Invited talk 2: To Be Announced 12:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Session 4: Signatures and Escrow Chair: Martin Abadi (DEC SRC) * Verifiable Partial Key Escrow Mihir Bellare, Shafi Goldwasser (UC San Diego and MIT) * New Blind Signatures Equivalent to Factorisation David Pointcheval, Jacques Stern (ENS/DMI, France) * Proactive Public-Key and Signature Schemes Markus Jakobsson, Stanislaw Jarecki, Amir Herzberg, Hugo Krawczyk, Moti Yung (UC San Diego, MIT, IBM Haifa Lab, IBM TJ Watson, and Bankers Trust) 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:30 Panel 2: Persistance and Longevity of Digital Signatures Chair: Gene Tsudik (USC/ISI) Panelists: To Be Announced Banquet Dinner =============== FRIDAY, APRIL 4 =============== 09:00-10:30 Session 5: Commerce and Commercial Security Chair: Jacques Stern (ENS/DMI, France) * A New On-Line Cash Check Scheme Robert H. Deng, Yongfei Han, Albert B. Jeng, Teow-Hin Ngair (National University of Singapore) * Conditional Purchase Orders John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier (Counterpane Systems) * The Specification and Implementation of 'Commercial' Security Requirements including Dynamic Segregation of Duties Simon Foley (University College, Cork, Ireland) 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:30 Session 6: Cryptography Chair: Mike Reiter (AT&T Research) * On the Importance of Securing Your Bins: The Garbage-Man-in-the-Middle Attack Marc Joye, Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Univ. Louvain) * Improved Security Bounds for Pseudorandom Permutations Jacques Patarin (Bull) * Asymmetric Fingerprinting for Larger Collusions Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner (Univ. Hildesheim and IBM Zurich Lab) 12:30 Conference Adjourns

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Re: Commerce Sec. Hearings and Encryption
by Bill Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca wrote: > Bill Campbell wrote: > > > > I have been watching the confirmation hearings for William Daley, > > and I was amazed at the number of references in the questioning > > to encryption. I have been watching confirmation hearings for a long > > time and have never noticed this much attention being placed on such > > a (formerly?) obscure topic. > > It certainly looks like someone is gearing up for a battle in regard > to cryto. > I find it very interesting that there would be a grand battle over > 'exporting' what is already freely available overseas (and always > will be, despite the export laws). This "freely available overseas" concept is a bit overstated. France and other countries are beginning to come down hard on encryption. (Also note the post from the guy in New Zealand on the hassles exporting from his country.) The US now has a "Crypto Ambassador" roaming the world, and I *don't* think he is encouraging an open common encryption standard. > I suppose that a cynic might > be led to believe that perhaps the anti-export champions' agenda > might be to make more convenient for the average joe to just > give in and accept weak, government approved crypto. Cynic or realist, you make the call. <G> The average Joe doesn't even know *why* he needs encryption...at least not yet. =Bill=

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Re: No Dimitri??
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

drose(a)azstarnet.com writes: > William H. Geiger III wrote: > > >I have noticed that there has not been any post from Dimitri in a couple of > >days. > > Yup. Ditto Tim May. Fair trade? No. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"abostick(a)netcom.com" "Alan Bostick" 23-JAN-1997 23:09:54.72 >In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by >Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended >consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in >next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will >allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on >TV. >Gladwell makes an analogy between V-Chipped TV content and >air-conditioned cars in the New York City subway system in summertime: >" . . . we need air-conditioners on subway cars because air-conditioners >on subway cars have made stations so hot that subway cars need to be >air-conditioned." Similarly, he argues, "the V-chip is likely to >increase the amount of sex and violence on television, not decrease it" >because when viewers can block offensive programming, there is far less >pressure on broadcasters and cable operators to avoid offending. Personally, I'd view this as a positive development. The puritanical types will be busily still protesting it, but without so many parents who (falsely) believe their children will be harmed by exposure to sex, thus dividing their efforts. Normally one would think that advertisers et al might give in to a small number... but advertisers particularly suceptible to this won't be sponsoring anything but G-rated shows anyway. (Of course, I view the V-chip itself as a bad thing, but if it has an outcome opposite in at least _some_ ways to the one intended by the neo-puritans, I can see the silver lining.) >And, for the benefit of those people who don't think the V-Chip isn't in >itself on-topic for cypherpunks, I might point out that Gladwell's >argument applies equally well to mail filtering with procmail recipes -- >or Sandy's and John's list moderation experiment. If the noise level on >the unmoderated list jumps to even higher than we were seeing before >the moderation began, that would provide observational support to >Gladwell's argument. An interesting question... although I'd point out that the degree of social pressure against spamming et al appears to be ineffective. The herd-like public (referring to the parents with their foolish fears and anyone else brainwashed into believing the puritans/fundamentalists) can put pressure on with their buying patterns... as yet such a market system is lacking in mailing lists (except for putting people on filter lists, which probably exacerbates the problem). In other words, there is no particular reason for the spammers et al to desist even if people _are_ receiving their email. -Allen

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RE: No Dimitri??
by Brett Carswell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>drose(a)azstarnet.com writes: > >> William H. Geiger III wrote: >> >> >I have noticed that there has not been any post from Dimitri in a couple >>of >> >days. >> >> Yup. Ditto Tim May. Fair trade? > >It's all part of Dr Dimitri's social experiment. Create two personalities who >appear to hate each other but are the same person. Watch out for the upcoming >series.... > Dimitri L[abia] Vulis styles his facial hair to look more like pubic hair. o o --/-- <~\ Dimitri L[abia] Vulis __\ _/\ \ / > >

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Re: Airport security [no such thing]
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitry Vulius K.O.T.M. wrote: > Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> writes: > > > Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > > > Dr.D. Vulius K.O.T.M. wrote: > > > > Nurdane Oksas <oksas(a)asimov.montclair.edu> writes: > > > > > But think about this: suppose there is a couple, bob(a)household.com, > > > and alice(a)household.com. Suppose that Rev. Mallory does not like bob. > > > Mallory forges a lot of emails like "I can still taste your sperm > > > on my lips", that appear to originate from Cindy(a)phonesex.org. > > > Then, promptly, Mallory sends an anonymous alert to alice(a)household.com, > > > warning her about naughty email activities of bob. Alice gets mad at him > > > and divorces him. > > > How would bob protect himself against such developments? > > > > Frame-ups are as old as time. The ones that work the best are those > > that are the most believable. O.J., for example. Unless Alice is > > unusually flaky or paranoid, she'll consider her options against the > > time she has invested in Bob. > > Here's an interesting twist of Sandfort's moderation policy. > > My article was crypto-relevant and flame-free and was tossed to > cypherpunks-flames. > > Igor's response to my article was also crypto-relevant and flame-free > and was tossed to cypherpunks-flames. > > Dale's response did not quote me, so it made it to the censored list. Is it really true that my response was tossed out as flames? It was crypto-relevant. BTW, this is a more than perfect illustration why rejections based on "shitstrings" are completely inappropriate for moderating. I have nothing again "grey lists", when moderators are alerted when a message containing certain suspicious word arrives (the way it's done in STUMP), but am opposed to autorejections (unless mods are mailbombed). - Igor.

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Changing the Currency
by KALLISTE＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3 Changing the Currency by J. Orlin Grabbe Lemme get this straight. You left home and went to one of them foreign places, got a handful of their money, and it felt like "play money"? But you could still use it in a restaurant, train station, or at the newsstand, right? Okay. But you say it still somehow felt "unreal", and you never were able to shake off that "monopoly money" mind set? Hmmm. Why is that? An American in Paris who gets a 100-franc note with Eugene Delacroix's picture on it, often finds it doesn't kick ass like the US one-dollar bill with George Washington's picture. The Parisian, on the other hand, may feel that the watersnip on the 100-guilder note looks downright ridiculous, while denizens of Amsterdam might prefer the bird image to Sir Donald Sangster's ugly face on the Jamaican hundred dollar bill. The Swiss 50-franc note depicting Konrad Gessner (1516-1565) doesn't say anything about "In God We Trust," but on the other hand it doesn't display the obnoxious "Counterfeiters will be Prosecuted" found on the Russian 100-ruble note (vintage 1993). Money is funny. That's why more than ten years ago when the Federal Reserve was thinking of changing the US currency, it formed focus groups in an attempt to gauge public reaction. It had a company called Market Facts go mall-trolling for potential participants. They went to the Seaview Square Mall in Ocean, New Jersey; the Buena Park Mall in Orange County, California; the Eastland Mall in Charlotte, North Carolina; and the Fox Valley Center in Aurora, Illinois. The report is entitled "Reactions to U.S. Currency Redesign: Analysis of Focus Group Discussions," and was submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on September 21, 1983. The discussions were recorded, and- -to make sure every bit of information was properly gleaned--groups were also observed in a conference room through a one-way mirror. In general the groups stated that while they did not care about the appearance of money, "they argued not to change it. There was considerable concern that our money would look 'fake' or 'foreign.' Participants also wanted to know why the government would want to change the appearance of the currency." The groups were divided into two categories: "General Public" and "Heavy Currency Handlers". Someone who took orders at McDonald's would fall into the Heavy Currency Handler category. The later groups were strongly of the opinion that money was "dirty"--not in the Michael Sindona sense of turning "dirty" money into "clean" money--but rather in the "dirty," "shabby," "shoddy," and "worn" sense. Some said the US currency was the dirtiest in the world. By contrast, a person in one of the General Public groups noted that money has "the denomination on all four corners." Some of the Heavy Currency Handlers thought it might be a neat idea to have different colors for the different denominations, to make it easier to make change. But more frequently it was remarked that "people don't like change" or "the government should leave well-enough alone." Today we know that the real rationale for currency change is to make the currency detectable by currency-detection equipment in airports (and possibly other places)-- in order to detect money launderers or anyone else carrying large amounts of currency. But the publicly- stated rationale is the misleading "prevention of counterfeiting." In this light, it is interesting that numerous questions were directed at attitudes toward counterfeiting. Many of the group participants thought counterfeiting was a serious problem, but "the majority wanted to know how much counterfeiting actually costs the public each year before taking a position on whether or not currency should be changed." None of the participants admitting to any inclination to actually counterfeit money themselves, even if they could do so without detection, but about half of them said they would pass along counterfeit bills if they received them. The other half thought that passing bogus bills would be morally wrong. But not all of the latter would "turn in bogus bills to the authorities. A few participants recounted stories of persons being hounded by the FBI to recall where they received the counterfeit bill--viewed as a deterrent to reporting counterfeit bills. This group opted, rather, to quietly destroy the bill and take the loss." The report concludes that a Counterfeiting Threat should be used to sell the idea of currency changes: "The extent of counterfeiting and, thus, the importance of adopting a new form of currency must be widely publicized. Without precise knowledge of the severity of the problem the public may assume that the benefits of adopting new money do not outweight the costs." The report doesn't mention any special information discovered by observations made through the one-way glass. January 23, 1997 Web Page: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/

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No Subject
by satan_is_a_hacker＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone has any text files on the following topics please send them. I have many files if any one else needs them. PGP Making decryption tools Anarchy Satan Anything underground

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