December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Technical difficulties with AP [AP NOISE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Aside from details like dead bodies, vendettas, and government suppression, there are technical complications with Assassination Politics that make it more than the simple job Jim Bell is imagining. Some of them provide ways to defend against AP, and turn it into more like Extortion Politics. [Do I _really_ want to bring up more discussion of AP? Not sure, but if it's clear that it won't work very well, it'll be less likely for the government media to freak about :-)] Let's look at the critical part of the problem - paying the assassin. The model we've generally been using is that the players are the victim, the escrow agent who manages the system, an enthusiastic public, and the assassin or assassins who are competing for the jackpot. I can see three approaches to identifying the correct payee: 1) Payee provides physical evidence to the escrow agent - the traditional approach doesn't work here: since the escrow agent is anonymous, so you can't mail him the victim's wallet or finger with well-known fingerprint or whatever. 2) Assassin leaves physical evidence at the scene which the news media would be likely to report, which payee confirms with escrow agent, presumably committing in advance (e.g. after the event, the payee sends a key which allows the escrow agent to decode the encrypted message that said "I'm leaving a note on the body saying 'Jacques De Molay is Avenged - Assassin's Guild Member #32767'.") Works fine for the first couple of assassinations, but after a while the police will catch on and stop revealing kinky details to the media. 3) The main solution has been the gambling deal - it's just a lottery on the date of death of the victim, which presumably the payee will win because he knows when the assassin will strike. For a lottery to be effective, prospective assassins need to be able to determine how much the jackpot is and who the victim is, so they can place their bets and be the closest winner. But the prospective victim can also play, individually or as part of an insurance pool (which is especially valuable for victims like "the first IRS agent to be assassinated".) Obviously you don't want to just bid up the price on your own head, so it needs to be accompanied by publicity that the IRS Agents' Benevolent Association is placing a large number of small bets every day to maximize the chances that _they_ will collect the money rather than the assassins. If the times that the bets are for are published, you can beat this, but you also invite speculators to be small bets just before and after your bets, so it becomes a mishmash and perhaps a race condition. If the times aren't published, the assassin can make lots of bets surrounding the planned date of the hit, which is also a warning to the prospective victim to be careful if the bets on his demise start increasing rapidly. This does make the AP lottery somewhat of an extortion deal - by advertising that someone is a target, you're forcing them to continually make lots of bets. But if they've got any way of tracing money, even partially, it'll help them find the escrow agent, who can then be targeted for justice of one sort or another. You're also forcing the assassin to make lots of bets, though in a jackpot system the successful payee will recover most of it. To some extent the defense can be fought if the escrow agent wants to establish a minimum bet, say $100, which an assassin can afford to make a few of for the targeted day, but the victim can't keep paying too much. This also reduces the since of the potential better pool, and therefore reduces the jackpot and the attractiveness of the job to the assassin. Lots of people might be willing to spend $5 to contribute; $100 bets are much fewer, especially if there are enough targets to successfully overthrow a government. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Re: [CRYPTO] (was: sig/noise ratio)
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > > Items crypto related but missing the [CRYPTO] header could be > > reposted by well meaning souls. > > > > Other appropriate headers could of course be used. > > > > Brian Yeah, It`s sad that it`s got to this stage now but I support the idea anyway, I`ll start prefixing all my cryptographic code or technical postings with the headers. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Mousepad RNG's?
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I just downloaded a copy of the beta version of Datafellows > Windows 3.1 SSH and it asked to move the mouse around to > generate some randomness. In reading Applied Crypto, it > mentioned that there is no such thing as generating > randomness from a personal computer unless something like > a Geiger counter is used. Is there any way to create a > fairly random sample from the mouse? Should one use lots > of jerky movements, or take ones time with it? What applied crypto would have said was that one cannot generate randomness on a computer without reference to an external source, a mouse is as good as any, the real problem is generating random numbers using PRNGs (Pseudo random number generators) which are algorithms that produce statistically random data that may be predictable, in the words of John Von Neumann "Anyone who considers aritmetic methods of generating random numbers is in a state of sin" In brief, a mouse output would be acceptable, just move the mouse any old way around the screen and the data will be random enough for your uses... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: active practice in America
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <199609290133.UAA00319(a)smoke.suba.com>, on 09/28/96 at 08:33 PM, snow <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> said: A Person going by the name Attila said: > to put it another way: in criminal procedings: I would rather >be considered guilty, until proven innocent; than I would be >presumed innocent, until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If you were the person being _tried_ for a crime, you would rather have to prove that you COULDN'T POSSIBLY have commited the crime as opposed to having to have the government PROVE that you DID DO it? you bet --the objective of the defense is to cast aspersions on the government prosecuters --in other words, create that doubt. you do not need to prove your innocence unconditionally, just "taint" the prosecuter a bit. however, in many cases you are guaranteed a trial by a jury of your peers. as for peers --look at OJ, and the reverse weighting of the Santa Monica jury v. downtown. > a nation whch can base a conviction on conspiracy to commit a >crime, or permits circumstantial evidence to close the gap towards >'beyond a reasonable doubt,' has lost any pretense of understand- > ing the heritage of common law: the Magna Carta. Of that, there is no denying. the example I have always used: three men were drinking in a bar across the street from a ripe looking bank. they sit there and plot a knockoff. one gets stinking drunk and passes out on the floor. the other two go across the street to be arrested for the attempted heist. the police arrest the drunk on the floor. why? "conspiracy to commit the crime!" and the penalty is the same: 7-20 years in the federal slam. --unless you are socially disadvantaged and claim heroin addiction; then you make it to the street in as little as 18 months and wipe the tail within 7 years, not 20. the rule was the offender must be less than 25, it may have been raised. or, you could hire an expensive member of the boys' club and might trade someone elses body for your freedom.... that's justice in Amerika, folks! you like it, right?

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Re: What about making re-mailers automatically chain?
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: gcg(a)pb.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Sep 29 04:06:38 1996 > Would it be a good idea to have a re-mailer "randomly" decide whether > to > send the mail to the destination or to another re-mailer. If all > re-mailers performed this way, not even the sender would know the path. > The chain could be short sometimes and long others. Granted, there is > a > possibility that every mailer decides to chain instead of sending the > message to the recip, but some clever counter tag could keep the number > of > links to a certain maximum. The "randomness" of this would aid in > traffic > analysis, and of course each mailer that decides to chain the mail > would > encrypt under the next mailer's pub key. Any thoughts? I dunno about that one. Even if the message itself is encrypted, every remailer has to have the address of the final recipient for your plan to work. And if you have cleartext for that message (oops!) then any remailer operator could read it. More traffic is of course a good thing, but I'm just kinda iffy on the concept. dave - ----- David E. Smith, P O Box 324, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail with subject of "send pgp-key" for my PGP public key "Madness takes its toll . . . please have exact change ready." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMk48IzVTwUKWHSsJAQEMugf5AYs0epJSF5ukk5aKvttFXJTHnBzvCtQH aCgxJnnv6bQGQm2fu8Ot7C9UgFNE8NTHJaPHFAkR21/YgwvhUUNhbUrHgz5zZMJ1 oY3jJJgIyLJsyw/+bsHHQc9oDl5VBr+V8xVQBWNR45N0vHx6wWwH5ZjmhBHEfJcg 97CDvygXh6nYJKQplRJ49wYYT29PMg0dONrQSXtYcH5sAhtPEkTzgIKqg0O3MVen tGG11Vl+0ghK2RIwJCoWKMXsqmJexP06+5AdeOLwHsc0QmPkuweKMvWSkF1R0ubR chHFaGlmduT0zNyGB4gIiWl71DYA2EgGSbxOZaGtEa57gJ8tFHVl1g== =PVbP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: crypto anarchy vs AP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:21 PM 9/29/96 +0200, Gary Howland wrote: >jim bell wrote: >> >> On a related issue, GPS (global-positioning system) contains a de-accurizing >> mis-feature called S/A, which adds a little error to the location as >> detected by a receiver. Ostensibly, it was added so that this could be >> turned on in wartime, to deny the enemy the ability to make 10-meter fixes. >> Turns out that it was kept on all the time, probably because if it WASN'T it >> would become politically impossible to de-accurize the system even in wartime. > >Apparently S/A (selective availability) was turned *off* during the Gulf >war. "Military Intelligence" in action. Yes, because of lack of enough S/A-capable military receivers... They were stuck with using the commercial, off-the-shelf kind. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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PET_ard
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sci, 20 Sept 1996: "Redefining the Supercomputer" The word is petaflops, computer jargon for 1000 trillion computations per second. Think of it as a year's labor for a powerful workstation compressed into 30 seconds. Think of it, also, as 1000 times the speed of the current computing benchmark, a trillion operations a second -- teraflops -- which is on the verge of becoming a reality at Sandia National Laboratories after 5 years of effort. Now the federal government's high-performance computing program is aiming for a petaflops, and researchers are exploring new technologies, sketching new architectures, and pondering the software challenge of harnessing this staggering computational power. The NSA is a petaflops enthusiast, says a researcher, but "we're not allowed to think about their applications." ----- http://jya.com/petard.txt (20 kb) PET_ard

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Re: Workers, Public Schools, Tradesmen, and Justice
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 27 Sep 1996 13:01:13 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >My conclusion is simple: Tell people if they don't work, they won't eat. If >they do something others are willing to give them money to do, they won't >get money. They won't get "entitlements" from the government (= taxpayers, >= those who are working, = me and thee). Tell them that a college education >should only be pursued if one has a "calling" to be an engineer, a >programmer (and probably not even that, judging by what I see), a doctor, a I've noticed that many places are concerned more with things like creativity, adapability, drive, etc when hiring a CS grad. I've found that having a resume that shows these kind of traits well overcame the lack of a degree (I'm working on that). There was a thread about this in comp.lang.cobol awhile back. >lawyer (on second thought, don't ever suggest they become lawyers), and so >on. The old way was that your HS provided what the mythical average person needed to go about life. College was for the more "complex" careers. >And make it easier to hire people, instead of harder. (And if one hires a >maid, and the maid steals, cut off her hand. We've lost sight of justice, >and people think that ripping off the rich is their kind of justice. This >needs to change.) You don't even need to be that harsh. Chain-gang work to pay off stolen property would be more effective, if for no reason other than that you'd get your money (or property) back. >Psychologists and similar psychobabblers call it "tough love." If one >always "enables" an addict, a layabout, a shiftless worker, with excuses >and handouts, the behavior does not change. To save a person, sometimes >harshness is needed. >This is why crypto anarchy's starving of the tax system is good. It may >"kill" some number of people, as nearly any new idea does, but ultimately >it will put things back on track. And you have to look at it from another point of view: If it would ameliorate the problems in the future for the majority of the population, it'd be worth a bit of discomfort now. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: crypto anarchy vs AP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:06 PM 9/26/96 -0500, snow wrote: >Mr. Beck said: >> Been reading the AP thread, and thought I'd donate some of my views. > >> the Internet. You'd just cause the government to panic, and this >> would have negative effects, it would take ages for them to calm down, >> and the laws they'd pass in the mean time would mean a near certainty >> of mandatory GAK as a condition to switching the Internet back on. >> (Before someone takes me to task for the impossibility of switching >> the Internet off, it all depends on the level of government panic. >> More specifically perhaps they would disconnect key backbones, and >> ISPs briefly while they rushed into effect a few presidential decrees >> outlawing non GAKed crypto, anonymous ecash, remailers, PGP, DC-nets, >> etc.) > > This would be cutting their own throats. There is SO much commercial >and government traffic going across "The Net" that many businesses would >scream bloody murder, and the government would have MASSIVE trouble with >it's agenda. Yes, that "they'll cut off the Internet!" talk doesn't seem to be very practical. Society very quickly develops dependency on inventions. Try to take away their computers and they'd scream; take away their telephone and it'd be worse! Give Internet another couple of years and 50% of big business would be severely impacted should it be cut off. Wait five years and the world would practically stop rotating without Internet. On a related issue, GPS (global-positioning system) contains a de-accurizing mis-feature called S/A, which adds a little error to the location as detected by a receiver. Ostensibly, it was added so that this could be turned on in wartime, to deny the enemy the ability to make 10-meter fixes. Turns out that it was kept on all the time, probably because if it WASN'T it would become politically impossible to de-accurize the system even in wartime. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Key-Escrow
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a question. There seems to be a lot of excitement over the key escrow stuff da gubermint is trying to install. Couldn't one burn off maybe 10 ** 200 keys and say, hey gubermint dude, these are like, gonna be my keys. Wouldn't this place them into a brute force search if they wanted to play with your info? Doing this will likely add to the tax burden for all dem disk drives needed to store them numbers. :( If ya can't do that, then they must be gonna sell key space like da radio spectrm - which means some number is gonna mean something to someone somewhere - yum yum say the hackers and the crackers. I'm thinking there will be a way no matter what happens....

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