December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: (INFO) Leahy/Goodlatte introduce crypto bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:17 PM 3/5/96 -0500, Voters Telecommunications Watch wrote: Dear Mr. Sadfar, By now I'm sure you've read a few items that I posted not only to you, but also to the cypherpunks mailing list, as well as the NWLIBERTARIANS(a)teleport.com list. I believe you have made a grievous error in your position apparently supporting the Leahy bill. As you presumably understand by now, based on your description of the bill it contains an extraordinarily serious flaw, in that it makes a new crime concerning the USE of encryption. Ostensibly, this is "reasonable," but I've already presented a scenario on Cypherpunks (also posted to you; as I write this it may not yet have appeared there, but I copied you) in which the government uses this provision maliciously to go after anonymous remailers. While that was merely a specific example, almost any service that protects the identity of its customers and allows them network access is potentially at a serious risk, because the US government has been known to fabricate a crime (for example, the "Amateur Action" BBS case from a few years ago) in order to make criminals out of non-criminals. As you have quoted it, Leahy's bill allows the government to, in effect, "stalk" a service provider (anonymous encrypted remailer, anonymous digital cash bank, Internet access provider, etc) and create a crime that involves the provider well beyond the standards described in this bill. The government can CREATE a crime, "to order" as it were, and snare the service provider in the net, despite the fact he has done nothing wrong. (In fact, he could be "guilty" even if there was no way, short of going out of business, to avoid the "crime.") This, I hope you agree, is totally unacceptable, but despite this, you said: >This provision only applies to you if you are using encryption to >specifically foil a law enforcement investigation AND the communication >relates to a felony AND you are using the communication to commit the >felony. VTW feels this is a fairly narrowly drawn statute that is not >likely to be easily abused. Frankly, you made an error, and "it was a doozy!" But what I fear is that you will "dig your heels in" and hesitate to admit it, and continue on calling this "a good bill." You _would_ be right about that, except for the specific portion that is referred to above. (In addition, as Padgett Petersen noticed on Cypherpunks, that portion of the bill seemingly contains an error of phrasing, although we can't tell and we are depending on your quoting of that bill. Please verify that the quotation you made was accurate, and please carefully read that portion to see if you can identify the problem both Mr. Petersen and I observed. Since it just about reverses the entire meaning of the paragraph, it is vital to know what the actual bill said and meant.) I strongly recommend that you _DRAMATICALLY_ change the tone of your support: Please make it clear that your support for this bill is ENTIRELY conditional on removing the offending section. (I see little or no problem with your description of the rest of the bill, except for a few items I mention below.) I certainly invite any challenge you'd care to make to my reasoning and logic: If you feel I'm wrong in my estimation of what the government could do with that portion of the bill, say so and back up your analysis. If, on the other hand, you recognize that I'm right, or at least on the right track, I think you have a certain moral responsibility to ensure that this "wolf in sheep's clothing" doesn't get by the shepherd. Remember, in your press release you said: >VTW believes this legislation is an excellent initiative. It would be far more accurate to say, "This legislation COULD BE an excellent initiative, if a short section were removed." >We predict that the White House will do everything in their power to >prevent Senator Leahy from liberating PGP. He will need your help to >push forward. If this is REALLY true, then he will have to listen to our suggestions, right? People listen WHEN THEY HAVE TO CONVINCE YOU OF SOMETHING. Failing to make Leahy aware of what we consider terribly wrong with that bill would be irresponsible. If Leahy REALLY wants the bill passed, and "all" the potential supporters insist on the removal of the offending section, he will have no choice but to do so, since it has already been widely predicted that the administration will oppose it. If, indeed, they will oppose it, they will oppose it REGARDLESS of whether it contains that bad spot or not. >Over the next few months, VTW will be coordinating a coalition of >names, many of which are already familiar to you. This coalition will >ask you to call and write to Congress, expressing your opinion, and >threatening to back it up with the ultimate legitimate weapon of >democracy, your vote in this election year. While I do indeed intend to vote in this election year, as you may be aware I believe there are other weapons the public will eventually be able to use against recalcitrant politicians and government employees of all types. The government is presumably well aware of my position, and it would certainly not be unexpected if they were desperately trying to avoid what I consider to be an inevitable conclusion. This particular bad section, in what is probably an otherwise-good bill, seems tailor-made to fight against developments that I think this society and "our" government can't avoid, and shouldn't avoid. I'm not asking you to endorse, or for that matter even acknowledge, my theories. However, you should at least take notice of the fact that Congress' motivations are clearly to maintain its power over the citizenry, and they will presumably act in predictable fashion to achieve this goal. We've already got them on the run; they can't pass Clipper and they knew they couldn't prosecute Zimmermann, and their position on ITAR is resoundingly criticized by individuals and industry alike. Most people agree that these rules have to change; it would be a tragedy if we "gave away the store" just to get a few trinkets. The fact is, this bill didn't have to contain the offending section, and it doesn't have to keep it. If we make our absolute opposition to that portion clear, who will stand up and support it? Only those people within government who secretly want this bill to pass, that's who! ____________________________________________________________ >A FEW QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS > >Q: Wasn't Goodlatte one of the bad guys on the Communications Decency Act? > Why is he sponsoring this bill, and can we trust him? >A: Goodlatte did indeed introduce the fatal amendment that made the House > version of the Telecomm Bill unsupportable. Nevertheless, VTW has found > that a Congressperson's vote on one sort of bill is little indication of > his or her stand on others. VTW wil closely examine any change in the > language of the bill throughout its Congressional life. Well, frankly, it looks like SOMEBODY managed to sneak in a pit into the cherry pie. (or a worm into the apple!) I wonder who could have done this? What do you want to bet that there aren't any fingerprints on it?!? >Q: Does this create a new obligations for key holders to disclose keys that > they wouldn't have to comply with before? >A: No. In fact, this bill makes it harder for a law enforcement official to > retrieve a key from a key holder, by requiring a wiretap request instead > of a simple search warrant. In my opinion, key escrow agents should be required to inform THEIR CLIENT, the actual user of the key, BEFORE giving the key to the cops. They should also be obligated to fight any such request if the key holder requests it. (Remember, if key-escrow is really voluntary, then it is a contract between the encryption-user and the key escrow agent, and the encryption user should be able to put whatever conditions he wishes on that relationship. Presumably, he would not have entered into that relationship unless he was able to control the disposition of the key.) Furthermore, the cops should not be allowed to do any decryption of any material wiretapped before they possess the key itself. In summary, I think you really need to revisit your support for this bill. It is only a short distance away from being a good bill, but that is a trip we must make if we are to protect and even expand our freedom. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT5aHPqHVDBboB2dAQEACwP/eDky+Gi0kebbAWPYO9dX9HCQTzac3m3v YVyW4iEtGrQE78/Hmi4M2m9l4sDA3qOaFZtFhImRc4JVVWNy1Yp8JzTPbjESiB4M Q3ppLV7S9sQmYQnHIHbpJu9YVQ/j+cMIwp9tOI0FNLbXIKWhZz4t+6bfiqJWUgZK awsbDpXjYaU= =3HJl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Leahy bill nightmare scenario?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:19 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Dan Weinstein wrote: >> Second, if what they're charging is the hindrance of an >> felony investigation, it isn't clear to me why they would be >> limiting the charging of that "crime" to only those actually who >> have committed a felony. (logic isn't the normal mode of thought for >> a government employee, you realize.) > >I agree with your concerns here, but I find it hard to believe that >the courts would allow a broader interpretation. Unfortunately, what you find "hard to believe" I find easy to believe. Remember, if this bill is passes, it doesn't merely affect YOU, it affects ME. So I suggest the burden of proof is on YOU to show that these provisions aren't going to be maliciously interpreted by the courts. >> Third, all they have to do is to "suspect" the person of a felony, >> and a >> "felony investigation" starts. That would presumably make him >> guilty of the Leahy bill's provision, regardless of whether he is >> actually participating in the crime supposedly being investigated. > >Here you are dead wrong, the bill specifically states: "in furtherance >of a felony." Its like those laws that let them charge someone with >murder in the first if someone dies while you are commiting another >felony. They must prove the original felony before they can get you >on the murder one. The real purpose of this provision, as I read it, >is to give longer sentences to criminals that use crypto. I'm not a lawyer, but I assume neither are you. Please explain the LEGAL DEFINTION of "in furtherance of a felony." If you can't, then you simply don't know how far they will go. And you're depending on the reasonableness of the government for the interpretion. >> Fourth, I gave what I considered to be a clear example of the >> hypothetical misuse of an encrypted remailer by the cops, one that >> would arguably make the remailer operator guilty of some >> "reasonable" anti-kiddie-porn statute. At that point, _he_is_ the >> target of the investigation. Unless you can show that this kind of >> action by the government is impossible, I consider it to be not >> merely possible but almost certain to occur. > >Again, the problem I see with your scenario is that I don't believe >that the courts will interpret it that way. What you think is irrelevant. Most people probably didn't realize what the government did in the Amateur Action BBS case was "legal," either. But they did it anyway. > My interpretation is that >if they serve a warrent and I don't decrypt for them and they can >prove a felony, then I will be subject to the listed punishment. Are you assuming that you have the key? Remember, if you run an encrypted anonymous remailer, and assuming you do it honestly, you won't be keeping records as to the source of the note. Thus, if they "serve a warrant" and you CAN'T decrypt the message (or tell them where it came from) then why aren't you already guilty? Remember, the wording of the proposed law doesn't require that you have full knowledge of the crime involved, merely that you act "in furtherance" of it... If you don't possess the key, but you explicitly ran your remailer so that you never it, just so you couldn't relinquish it, you have structured your operation too thwart any investigations. You are ALREADY guilty. This may not sound reasonable, but the government no longer (if it ever did) considers "reasonableness" to be an impediment to their actions. >> Fifth, it isn't clear what amount of knowledge is necessary to >> "trigger" this clause, especially in its current flawed state. >> Since ISP's and encrypted remailers might know, in general, that >> their systems can and probably are being used for SOME criminal >> activity, even if they can't identify it or the user, or decrypt it, >> etc, a broad interpretation of the resulting law could easily >> de-facto prohibit any business practices (i.e., allowing users to >> use encryption) that prevents full-scale monitoring and/or tracing. > >I disagree, it states you must "willfully endeavor" to use the >encryption as a means of obstructing the investigation. To me, this >means that it is the motivation for using the encryption. Question: What, exactly, is the motivation of a person running an anonymous remailer? His motivation is clear: To allow people to send anonymously untraceable messages. Assuming he's of ordinary levels of intelligence or beyond, he is aware that somebody may some day use his system for illegal purposes. You're going to have to explain why a court _CAN'T_ interpret this as being in violation of the law. > If I set >up an encrypting remailer for the purpose of allowing free exchange >of ideas, I don't believe I would be liable under this law. Your optimism is touching. It is also vastly misguided. >The >only way I could see a remailer charged under this is if he had solid >evidence that a specific user was violating the law, and took no >action. Gee, I wish you were right, but my experience with government thugs says that they will do anything they think they can get away with. >> This is only the beginning of the problems with this section. If >> you can explain why nothing I've described could possibly occur, I >> welcome a contrary explanation. > >I see some real problems too, but I do not see the problems with this >provision to be enough to condemn the entire bill. I don't "condemn the entire bill." I would, however, reject the entire bill if that provision remains. And morever, if we make a serious attempt to have it removed, the more they resist removing it the more we should insist it go. >I would like to >see this portion of the bill ammended to make it clear that only >those actually involved in commiting the felony would be held >responsible. There would still be a problem. What's the definition of "actually involved in committing the felony"? Are you aware, for example, that manufacturers of small plastic screw-top vials have been prosecuted and convicted simply because their vials could be used to hold small quantities of drugs such as cocaine and crack? This was a case from a few years back, BTW. I wish I could remember the cite. If you're not aware of these things, WAKE UP! Your optimism disgusts me, because it is entirely unrealistic and based on a rose-colored-glasses view of the government. >> But I would also ask this: Why, exactly, do we need this section? >> We've already been told that the opponents of this bill will fight >> it tooth-and-nail under its current wording; if that's the case then >> the presence of this section is inadequate to appease their >> unhappiness. Therefore, we shouldn't include it in the bill at all; >> it does no good. >> >> Any explanations, Dan? > >You are talking about the fringe, this, I think, was added as an >attempt to bring in those that are in the middle. Why would "those that are in the middle" object to a bill which is little more than a re-statement of rights we already believe we have?!? > That is, Those >that see the need to prevent the use of encryption as a means of >obstructing justice, but feel that we should also have a right to >privacy. There is no viable middle ground here. Any tool can be abused. > To say that there is no delema here is ridiculous, crime is >a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing >with. On the contrary, my opinion is "The _government_ is a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing with." Fortunately, I've found a solution, and the government is trying as hard as it can to prevent it (and "crypto-anarchy" in general) from taking root. > I think Leahy realizes that this provision will be about as >useful as the "use a gun, go to jail" laws, but wants to give those >in the middle to say that they bill will help prevent crime. Ha ha! That's rich! There is no reason that a "pro-encryption" bill has to contain any general "anti-crime" clauses. The average person is afraid of burglars, muggers, murderers, rapists, car thieves. When is the last time the average person was the victim of a crime whose investigation could be "thwarted" by the use of encryption? If you can't think of an example, you've just proved my point: This provision is entirely irrelevant to the average citizen (at least in a "positive" way) and can't be considered a "win" for him. >> Jim Bell >> jimbell(a)pacifier.com >> >> Klaatu Burada Nikto > >Good movie. I'm working on the real-life sequel. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUG+9fqHVDBboB2dAQFd+QP/SwSs1R7dV7tStxg9Hs7Sf9X+q6rWNfa/ d9xWPRpCS81TRhRnpKUxqJu0HZsGQphaEyPRLm1G4f6Z/ZCWsnzR+0XNv6H+FPMG QKSbCLmgGxnfNEWQmB3BDDJS0KEkNGs6slUvcUS9aRBuKbW6Optu3rYgM/7DCPAq M1QkmlpC2EU= =YeFw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Artist self censorship (Was Chinese net-censorship) Noise
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) said: >before taking >a picture he usually asks himself about how this picture is percived, something >the he never thought twice before the FBI raid. > >Mr. Avon should think twice before commenting on self censorship does not >exist, for that could be the difference from having the door kicked in by the >black ninja turtles with the FBI or toning down your work. OK. *THAT* might be interpreted, wrongly, as self-censorship. But words have a *precise* meaning, which unfortunately, I sometimes miss in the english language. The opinion I wrote was in the *context* of the interaction of an artist with a purchaser. In that context, what govern the events is consensuality: everybody acts *uncoerced* to his best advantage. In the case you cite, the *context* is very different. But still, I would not call it "self-censorship". I do not have, on the top of my head, any precise term for it, but maybe FUD, fear of physical violence, survival tactics while harrassed by a thuggish assaulter, etc., would apply... I did not think twice, I thought about it several hundred times... Your comment is *very* interesting. It point out how peoples can so easily blank out contextual information. Forgive my bias but I personnally makes a big distinction between the volitional initiation of physical violence (or menace of) and other situations where it is absent. Regards! JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUF6K8iycyXFit0NAQFoBgf/Tt0zFCaRNJFBwZcxsV/v5ABnjjnAtqoT EDF0OA7+UogWT1MXL8RP58tQ2vTwUWJ1PdK/gdnwlkjpwxC0i4gRx1HpnCLOjRlL UgkUKu5qiyIWKd6upCYCMd1NCbqaffHjWr3pWxVFE/zPaCQ7mlrZZV4QBeV/bKbU djt70BQTa7WFvQwZWkVO7QcxOawjzItyZErusdEIvPz03MqbcqSaQu0NgtEy/Zwu 82CSF10uTL96TzjXm1icASiquDk8Tj+go8WqC1FZ8uK3kFHDDkEuLqzXdtG6sJKK hV4PPfehyjXXXB2CADmXMnXZVLkWU0x5Ig7l/bdOETrPhfl07Di9tQ== =1OeX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

1 0

Re: art-stego
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a very good idea. I wish I'd thought of it. Just bear in mind that this form of steganography is getting further away from conventional hiding, and into "pure plausible deniability." In fact, one need not even make a serious attempt to hide the encrypted bits: just call the encrypted file "art" and be done with it! (I'm not saying stego is worthless, just that there's a slippery slope one can get on, with one extreme being this fiction that "this is not an encrypted file, this is _art_!") At 7:18 PM 3/4/96, Jim Miller wrote: >The recent discussion "Chaff in the Channel" got me thinking about an >alternative to hiding random bit streams in picture files. The goal of >steganography, as I see it, is to provide plausible deniability. The Yes, all those critics who point out that steganography (not to mention stenography) is an example of the rightly-maligned "security through obscurity" are missing this point, that steganography arises in situations where the mere act of communicating is itself actionable. (Get caught in Berlin during the war with invisible ink or microdots and get hanged the next morning, whether or not the SS can read the traffic.) >problem with hiding bit streams is that you can never be sure if the >opponent has developed an analysis technique to prove a particular file >contains a suspicious bit pattern. Yes, this is why I suggested (some years back, originally) that noise be deliberately added to even images not intended for communication, as "chaff" to confuse traffic analysts. Your approach is a better one, as the "art stego" market, while small, could be self-sustaining. >The alternative to hiding bit streams is to not hide them. Use them to >generate pretty pictures. For example, modify a fractal image generator >to accept a bit stream as input. Use the bit settings to influence the >values used to iterate the fractal function. You don't have to use >fractals, any function that produces pretty pictures would probably work >as long as there was a way to extract the bit stream from the final >picture. Brute force would probably work fast enough for humans. > >One possibility is a screen saver that produces an "infinite" variety of >pretty pictures by generating a pseudo-random bit stream and using it to >help generate the next background picture. Occasionally, the picture >might be so cool you will want to send it your friends or post it on the >Net or just keep it around to look at. > >The goal is to create an innocent reason for passing around unique images >that contain random bit streams so we don't have to worry if somebody >finds the bit stream. If you live in a country that doesn't outlaw >abstract art you have plausible deniability. Now it's just up to someone to implement this. I don't expect this to be a huge market--remember what's happened to all those Mandelbrot images that were once the rage--but there's a chance it will get established as one of those "cool" apps that are tres trendy for a while. I still would expect that when the Hamas leaders in Gaza are picked up for questioning and "ArtStego" is found on their systems, along with various "abstract artworks" on their disk drives, that Mossad will not be fooled. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Another Motivation for the CDA (Federal Sentencing Guid
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 9 Mar 1996, "Dave Emery" wrote: >The article also points out that in a state with a 7% black population 43% of the >three time losers are black. Right on, bro! This is the kind of institutionalized racism that we all deplore! In fact...hey, wait a sec. Hmmm, 7% of the population; what was the percentage of black rioters in the "motorist" Rodney "Why can't we all live together?" King "peace demonstration"? Yo, homes: of the 50K gang members in L.A., what percentage is non-black? Give it a f... (oops) I mean, gosh darn rest. ObCrypto: Perry, please consult Dave Emery. Thanks! --David M. Rose

1 0

Re: Assasination Politics
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 04:51 PM 3/8/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"jimbell(a)pacifier.com" "jim bell" 13-FEB-1996 14:53:40.39 >>From: Me >>> A. My previously mentioned problem with a limited but non-libertarian >>>organization. > >>I don't deny that such an organization might spring up. (Anti-abortion >>activists are the group which come most immediately to my mind, BTW. I'm >>not in sympathy with them; quite the opposite.) I've never claimed that >>this system is totally immune to such abuse, in the same way that the seller >>of a gun can certify that it will never be used to commit a crime. +__________^^^ Ooops! my error, I meant "can't." > I understand and agree with the gun argument. However, it's still a >matter of whether Assasination Politics will overall be better or worse than >the current system. The one thing that disappoints me about the result of my presentation of this idea is that I haven't heard any intelligent arguments quantitatively arguing that things will be worse. Other proponents simply agree that the system would be better; most of the opponents don't take the trouble to quantify their objections. >If better, then I'll support it if it becomes necessary (I >still hope for peaceful (or at least relatively peaceful) change - hopefully, >it has not become necessary for the Declaration of Independence's justification >of revolution to be reused). If worse, I won't. I won't try to stop you from >doing so, however (currently, there's no way that I could, for instance). What's interesting is that you see this; yet there are a number of opponents who can't seem to realize that what THEY want (or, for that matter, what _I_ want) may be absolutely irrelevant to what is actually going to happen. > Incidentally, by "support" I am meaning making suggestions for >technical improvements. Admittedly, the degree to which I can do so is limited >by my lack of technical knowledge, but I believe I have thought of some >workable refinements. These are the kind of discussions I'd most want to have. I understand, however, that anybody might hesitate a bit to appear to be actively encouraging such a system. That's why I've decided my best function is to be the initiator of the idea, and the primary educator. Somebody else will actually develop the system, probably without telling me anything. > As well as the obvious problem of unethical assasinations, there is >also that of a negative reputation being given to various cypherpunk-liked >ideas (anonymous remailers, fully anonymous digital cash, etcetera) if someone >notices this. Perhaps, but most (non-net-using) people are so unaware of encryption as to make this irrelevant, I think. >>> Moreover, Jim Bell is ignoring the other sources of propaganda than >>>government in convincing the average person that someone is doing something >>>wrong (when, by my ethics at least, they aren't) - such as religion and >>>various organizations like the PFDA. > >>Again, only a tiny fraction of the population needs to participate... > > However, if more of the population participates, they may do stupid >things like using an organization that might strike at them - just as they >currently support a government that can crack down on them. The minority of >intelligent people - the tiny fraction needed for this to potentially work - >isn't a factor for this part. In other words, I'm more worried about too _many_ >people - the wrong people - participating rather than too few. Well, there's not a great deal that we can do to prevent it. Five years ago, I'm sure the then-users of the Internet were fearful of all the newbies to come; even today, we may subtly fear those to come. In other words, once WE'RE on the lifeboat, we don't want anyone else to show up! >>Since "Assassination Politics" is based on a combined-donation system, even >>people on a subsistence wage could contribute; a quarter here, a dollar >>there, pretty soon it turns into real money. > > That is an argument against it. Do you want the people who give to >televangelists being able to more directly have people killed than in the >current system (when at least you've got votes by others to take care of the >problem)? Unfortunately, the same system of ethics that would make one's >targets the right ones also excludes the targets (non-governmental figures) >that can create the problems under this system - like the PFDA leaders. Have you forgotten what might happen to those same televangelists? While I'd sure like to be able to design a system where only the "right" people die (by my own opinion), I'm under no illusion that this would be anything other than a dictatorship under "Jim Bell" or whoever happened to be in control. I think I've done a fairly good job of designing (anticipating?) a system that will do a lot of good, hopefully without doing a lot of bad. There may be nothing I can do about the negatives, unfortunately. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUHG/vqHVDBboB2dAQHitAP/VT/c++g81sgzDPHh2d6wcSmmHgQQg0Rz Vr3sQt2RYoEZBdLG267IxQw0aYAQvQv2KARD7A+nlbXlM7XR6xQYdjhXQ47hEel0 OBG//UI3XcA8TcdIqOuREi1T+AAWpYYyTz1YpGGR1oMZp6Mv/jjHoZ6f6i2XGY6u sjHfSLcd5Dg= =ICpg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Assassination Politics(tm) was V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >At 10:42 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >>(1) Assassination Politics (AP) will be most useful to a fired-up group of >>people who want to silence a single person. Madeline Murray O'Hare comes >>to mind. (She was a Texas atheist who challenged school prayer and won.) I quote this text as an example of an ongoing thought process in the analysis of the AP scheme. A little statistical mechanics would not hurt here. The above example shows *one* possible interaction between two entities, each having their own charac- teristics leading to a given inter- action. But in all theses examples, the specific variables that is forgotten is the time variable. What will be the *dynamic* characteristics of such a system. - the above paragraph describe an interaction in a given direction. - what are the others interactions that could *speed up* the above process - what are the others interactions that could *slow down* the above process Any analysis of the problem that blanks out the probability of occurence (which happens in the time domain) of each partial reaction cannot describe the outcome of the scheme. Proponents of such a scheme should stick a bit more to crypto... Ehhhh... What can I say? Physics is everywhere :) JFA B. Sc. physics A physicist is a guys/gal that cannot help but see a dance floor in a crowded bar as an interesting thermodynamical system... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUGK/MiycyXFit0NAQFZeAf+JzOfyxmQHBw5E6ATx4dYUMXabUTTbt1r 5ifyuwYPQ9Urwz3ONHbOOI7O2CRkBcHfvYalIFvKFwKH4oQGsf/s2mGqKDi1bVX7 hUwk5oKTFPYeBHnrI2i4LglQPiBQMJJsi+ISkKujtCnE6UHR8XHjuPfnQ1FV8amA o5KF8HJlkVgKMCEiJSsHGBmVQl/WbhM8JIJnPy+iteC+d0wEljr9tCMIxJJ6JWza r4dzLAP9VPDoSkhK7qSh5AWUVp2Wh0v3p9M4wuE7WzI+Gbha0KgKht9ZEZOx3oVH SuA0yZ+zfVVib1x4UedG/9rKQ5m0fiYDqJ8xPOWMPXTmo2Ecqad9zA== =DSc6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

1 0

Minor challenge: Running IIS on NT Workstation (fwd)
by Just Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Meanwhile, back in my other life... any ideas? This could save small business a lot of money. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- To: hackmsoft(a)c2.org I was at Microsoft the other day and one of the sales guys told me that there is a fix for the IIS (Internet Information Server) that makes it run on Windows NT Workstation. There is something in the registry that the application checks. He backed out from giving me the fix. I guess they want to sell more NT Server than Workstation. It maybe something you may want to watchout for.

1 0

Re: FCC & Internet phones
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:47 PM 3/9/96, Mutant Rob wrote: >Yes... but the Internet is not like HAM radio. The FCC has no >jurisdiction outside the US, and it would cause various problems >for them to try to regulate the use of IPhone or how ISPs operate. Question of how practical enforcement would be haven't been big in a lot of the legislation we've seen coming out of various capitals, so I doubt the situation for bureaucratic rule-mongering would be much different. The WP article said that has ACTA has "asked the [FCC] to stop this kind of communications and study how to regulate it," probably--and not surprisingly --in that order. It looks like another case of trying to saddle ISPs with impossible enforcement burdens, though in this case one that a lot of ISPs might not mind so much, given the bandwidth that netphone usage eats up (cf. xs4all, I hear, has forbidden users to run CU-SeeMe). Q: Is it practically possible to find netphone traffic on a generic network at any level above the source and target addresses? Ted

1 0

Re: TCP/IP Stego (was CU-SeeMe)
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-03-08 15:17:39 EST, you write: >The difference between the two methods is, as I said before, exactly >the same as the difference between TCP/IP and UUCP. Hiding info in >images or sound files works fine for "email" or file storage but has >no chance of being an interactive protocol, sometimes you need to >get things done in real-time. Haven't you ever heard of IPhone, Nautilus, or PGPfone? Jonathan Wienke

1 0