December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In the "real world" there is nothing to prevent someone from forging > your real signature on a check or document or from disguising themselves > as you and taking your place at an important business meeting. The > digital equivalents can be slightly more secure, but nothing is ever > perfect. > > jim > Heh. Whoops. I may be a beginner but I'm not THAT green. I shoulda known better than to use that exact wording. Please excuse the inappropriate wording, all. Sincerely. Quentin Holte. ( aka Charles Choi. ) You are all the Buddha. - Last words of Buddha. If you see the Buddha, kill him. - Zen proverb.

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PLEASE REPLY!!
by uunet!in2.uu.net!gatech!newsfeed.internetmci.com!news.emeraldis.com!usenet＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did this message make it out to the "real" world?? Please reply to this message if it did. Thankyou. *David*

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did this get out?
by uunet!in2.uu.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!lamarck.sura.net!rs7.loc.gov!news＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is this getting past news.loc.gov? These opinions are my own, not those of the Library of Congress. Howard Sanner hcs(a)hsan.loc.gov sanner(a)mail.loc.gov

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This is a test..no reply
by uunet!in2.uu.net!news.sprintlink.net!news.rain.org!sandy.sandpiper.com!usenet＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is just a test...please do not reply

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Re: Zona Labs Was: Cambridge [MA] Cops Assault Mother for Photo
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is only relevant to cypherpunks as it involves child porn hysteria and abusive cops... Let me start by saying the attached message from warwick.com is wildly incorrect: * Zona film labs employees did not lead the child away until afterwards. The police grabbed Angeli, beat her, choked her -- while her child was just a few feet away. * The mother flipped when the Cambridge cops said she was going to be locked up and her child taken away. * The lamp was knocked over when the Cambridge cops wrestled her into the back room. * Zona film lab employees willingly participated in this sting operation and willingly lied to Angeli. Last week, I went to Angeli's attorney's office and saw the (unpublished) pictures that the Cambridge cops and Zona thought were "child porn." They're not "child porn" -- any more than the similar photos my grandparents have of me and my cousins naked in a bathtub when we were three years old. I urge you to check out Bob Chatelle's web site at http://world.std.com/~kip/, which says what actually happened with the Angeli case. I've attached an excerpt from his pages below. -Declan Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 4-Mar-96 Re: Zona Labs Was: Cambrid.. by news(a)warwick.com > Ayse Sercan wrote: > > > At any rate, if I were the mother, and my kid was being led away by a > > clerk who could have been the very pervert who thought that those nude > > pictures meant child pornography, I'd certainly do everything in my power > > to protect my child from such an individual. > > That's rediculous. The mother did not flip because Zona led the child away. > The mother flipped when asked about the photos. This caused Zona to not > want the child to see argument. The mother just has serious problems in > general. She feels justified in trashing the place and throwing the lamp, > which is why she refused the punishment and took 30 days in jail. She, > in the presence of her child, was wrong to get violent. She has a lack of > control. >From http://world.std.com/~kip/ Toni Marie Angeli, for a Harvard photography course, decided to make her four-year-old son Nico the subject of her final class project, The Innocence of a Child's Nudity. After discussing the project with her professor, Angeli began her project with a few shots of Nico and made the fatal mistake of taking her roll of film to Zona Photographic Labs on Rogers Street in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Zona owners were "alarmed" and called the Cambridge police, who went to Zona, looked at contact sheets prepared by Zona without Angeli's authorization, and decided that the pictures were "gross." Zona and the Cambridge police set up a sting operation, requiring Zona employees to lie, so that the police could come to Zona and confront her about her "pornography" when she came to pick up her negatives. On November 2, Angeli went to Zona, accompanied by Nico and by her husband, Luke D'Ancona. An altercation ensued when Angeli realized why the police were there. Angeli was handcuffed, manhandled into a back room, beaten and choked. During the scuffle a lamp was knocked over, and a picture fell off the wall. A hollow core door was also damaged when Angeli kicked out as she was being escorted to the police van. Angeli was never charged with child pornography, but she was charged with disorderly conduct, malicious destruction of property under $250, and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. (The police claimed that Angeli threw the lamp.). Angeli's trial began on January 24, 1996, and a verdict was brought in on January 30. She was acquitted of the assault-and-battery charges, but convicted on the two other counts. The judge sentenced her to pay damages, to 50 hours community service, and to 18 months of probation. Angeli refused to sign the probation contract, stating that she wished to make no admission of guilt. The judge then sentenced her to 30 days at MCI Framingham. We are currently trying to raise money to pay for her appeal.

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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

eggplant writes: >How about...only paying for the initial investment of the phone program and >hardware. No more costs to pay, get rid of long distance charges >all-togther. Two problems: 1- Chaum did not have the clue to pick up on this when two cypherpunks (who shall remain nameless...) pitched this and several other ideas to involve ISPs in jump-starting ecash almost two years ago, so why would he figure it out now? 2- The phone companies (actually ACTA, the telco lobby) petitioned the FCC on Monday to regulate the Internet phone software companies. IP phone systems themselves may need to move underground just to escape regulation. OTOH, there is nothing to prevent people from building their own systems once some free software is out there... On another related note the IRS is not getting someone what concerned about the opportunities the Internet offers people to avoid taxes according to the Treasury department's international-tax counsel. The government will "maintain toll booths on the information superhighway." (WSJ, 3/6/96) jim

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EFF on crypto bills
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[In reply to Shabbir's message. -Declan] ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- From: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> Message-Id: <199603062155.NAA22301(a)eff.org> Subject: Re: NYT: Encryption compromise bill introduced To: shabbir(a)vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 13:55:07 -0800 (PST) Cc: declan+(a)cmu.edu, fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu, jim(a)rsa.com In-Reply-To: <199603062014.PAA02169(a)panix4.panix.com> from "Shabbir J. Safdar" at Mar 6, 96 03:14:01 pm > The Leahy bill is actually much better than Stanton lets on. Take a > look at it, it affirms Americans' right to choose whatever algorithm or > technique they'd like, as well as takes great pains to go on record to > say that Congress treaded very carefully to preserve Americans' right > to not use key escrow algorithms, and if they did, not to use escrow > agents. You don't get much more of a guarantee than that. Sure you do: Goodlatte's more direct prohibition on the Exec. branch mandating Key Escrow. What's the problem here? We know Goodlatte's version, on this provision at very least, is better. Why can't we just agree that it is, and support that? Goodlatte's bill isn't competing with Leahy's, they were introduced simultaneously in different chambers, and are intended to get the same message across. I can't see a problem with saying "we like this particular phrasing better, let's have it in both versions." The entire point of all this is to have the same bill on both sides of Congress anyway. It can either happen early, or (on the off chance it ever gets that far) in conference committee. Here we have a large say. In conf. cmte. we have almost no say. Again, what's the problem? What are we arguing about? > Regardless of the ulterior motives of the White House, key escrow > programs are still voluntary as read on the books. The best we can > write into a law is to have our rights reaffirmed. Leahy has given > this to us in spades. I disagree. A better thing we can write into law is to simultanously have rights reaffirmed, and send a more direct message to the Admin that it cannot tread here. > Let's not soft-pedal this legislation. Let's not hard sell flawed parts of it, when fixes are not just available but already introduced as "live" legislation. > Leahy and Goodlatte are going > head to head with the White House to undermine the strongarm export > tactics of Clipper and Son of Clipper. They've stuck their necks out for > us, we need to back them up. Certainly. > Just wait until the White House starts to act in reaction to this. It's > not going to be pretty.... No kidding. I expect either an attempt to mandate escrow, a worsening of the export controls, and/or an all-out assault on American's rights to encrypt at all, or without some kind of worse-than-GAK registry or licensing. If not all of the above. -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Online Activist </HTML>

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VTW on crypto bills
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- From: shabbir(a)vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) To: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> cc: declan+(a)cmu.edu (Declan B. McCullagh), fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu, jim(a)rsa.com Subject: Re: NYT: Encryption compromise bill introduced Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 15:14:01 -0500 Sender: shabbir(a)panix.com The Leahy bill is actually much better than Stanton lets on. Take a look at it, it affirms Americans' right to choose whatever algorithm or technique they'd like, as well as takes great pains to go on record to say that Congress treaded very carefully to preserve Americans' right to not use key escrow algorithms, and if they did, not to use escrow agents. You don't get much more of a guarantee than that. Regardless of the ulterior motives of the White House, key escrow programs are still voluntary as read on the books. The best we can write into a law is to have our rights reaffirmed. Leahy has given this to us in spades. Let's not soft-pedal this legislation. Leahy and Goodlatte are going head to head with the White House to undermine the strongarm export tactics of Clipper and Son of Clipper. They've stuck their necks out for us, we need to back them up. Just wait until the White House starts to act in reaction to this. It's not going to be pretty.... -Shabbir J. Safdar * Online Representative * Voters Telecomm. Watch (VTW) http://www.vtw.org/ * Defending Your Rights In Cyberspace Stanton McCandlish writes: >> Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 13:26:39 PST >> From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) >> Message-Id: <9603052126.AA19534(a)RSA.COM> >> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >> >> >> I'm in favor of the Bill because it specifically prevents, by law, the >> US Govt from mandating key escrow. > >This is only true of the Goodlatte bill. The Leahy bill just explicitly >does not mandate GAK. Goodlattes does this, and goes further, preventing >the Administration from doing so. > >Needless to say, we'd like to see the two bills merged, and the better >features of each kept. > >> I anticipate that the Administration, led by the intelligence and law >> enforcement interests, will vigorously lobby against this bill... > >Right. We don't expect it to pass, but it could be an important step in >raising the issues. > > >-- ><HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish ></A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org ></A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation ></A><P> Online Activist </HTML>

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Re: Another Motivation for the CDA
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 08:45 AM 3/6/96 -0500, Mutant Rob wrote: >Timothy C. May wrote: >> >> Given that Sen. Fineswine is one of the strongest supporters of gun >> confiscation, and that she had this to say about the Telecom Bill:[..] > >Felons may not own a gun unless granted a waiver by certain judges. They >also lose the right to vote, BTW. > >I think you're reading too much into motives, Tim. I don't think that >most in congress are capable of thinking that elaborately, and besides, >if someone is convicted of violating the CDA for saying "fuck" online, >that is the type of felony that one can get a judge's waiver for... I am NOT relieved at hearing this. If one must have a "judge's waiver," then that means he probably can "request" whatever other conditions he chooses to put on his waiver. The government still has a motivation to make every crime a felony, down to and including jaywalking and speeding tickets. (Don't try to tell me "they can't turn speeding tickets into a felony." The term "felony" is defined, and can be RE-defined, to whatever the legislature wants at any time. Naturally, this won't occur all at once; it'll happen in "reasonable" stages.) All the more reason to adopt a system that will rid us of these parasites forever. KnowhutImean? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto Something is going to happen. Something.......................Wonderful! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT3R4PqHVDBboB2dAQGOKAP/aLqcF1rK+sXHS2rFMHWhtOUw/0Su8J2l Cpk5GhmEJxGnBK4LKszhl/jX982AMDIRRrop5k0z1l4ezs1cnI0fwzniNwYWluG0 qjmcJ/rkEmPrA5cKwj9dqxsKi+lex1pApNOmogICkLdzUZgHrj6wAEmLKzqiNDiU 7XJdtbsMSFY= =7sEd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Ignore
by uunet!in2.uu.net!news.cais.net!news.cais.com!news＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 9 March 5, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) Bills To Relax Crypto Export Controls Introduced by Leahy, Burns, Goodlatte, Others (2) Subscription Information (3) About CDT, contacting us This document may be redistributed freely provided it remains in its entirety ** Excerpts may be re-posted by permission (editor(a)cdt.org) ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) BIPARTISAN BILLS TO EASE ENCRYPTION CONTROLS AND PROTECT INTERNET PRIVACY INTRODUCED IN SENATE AND HOUSE A bipartisan group of members from both houses of Congress today introduced legislation to lift many export controls on strong encryption hardware and software and affirm the rights of Americans to use whatever form of cryptography they choose. The bills, sponsored by Sen. Leahy (D-VT), Sen. Burns (R-MT), Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA), Rep. Eshoo (D-CA), and others, represent a major step towards breaking the stranglehold on encryption technologies which for years has denied computer users access to vital privacy-protecting applications. The "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996" represents a rejection of the Clinton Administration's invasive and unworkable "Clipper Chip" and "Clipper II" key escrow policies. Under the guise of promoting so-called "voluntary" encryption standards, these Administration efforts have sought to use export controls to compel the adoption of key escrow encryption domestically, and have left Internet users without adequate privacy and security. By relaxing export controls on "generally available" cryptographic applications such as PGP, popular Web browsers, and other programs, the Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996 would encourage the development and use of strong privacy protecting technologies. Major provisions of the legislation would: * Ease export controls on encryption products, allowing the export of 'mass market' or 'generally available' cryptography. This would include products such as PGP or many of the popular Web browser programs. * Affirm the right of Americans to use any encryption domestically. The bills explicitly prohibit the government from imposing any limits on the domestic use or sale of encryption. * (Senate version only) Provide protections to those who choose to store their encryption keys with third parties by creating criminal and civil penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of keys and strict requirements for law enforcement access. The bill does not in any way affect the ability of any person to use encryption without a key escrow function.. The legislation also contains several provisions which CDT believes require further clarification and consideration, including controversial language that would create a new federal crime for the use of encryption to willfully obstruct a law enforcement investigation. CDT will work with Senators Leahy and Burns and Representatives Goodlatte, Eshoo, and other interested members to address these concerns as the bill makes its way through the legislative process. The full text of both the House and Senate versions of the bills, along with other relevant background information, is available on CDT's Crypto Issues World Wide Web page: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ CDT believes that the House and Senate encryption bills are an important step forward in the ongoing attempts to build better security into the information infrastructure through the widespread availability of encryption. Congressional action is particularly welcome as the Administration has continued to impose a flawed approach to encryption based upon export controls, key length limits, and key escrow policies all aimed at slowing the adoption of strong cryptography in the U.S. and throughout the world. While CDT believes improvements can be made in both bills, they establish a solid framework for building a comprehensive, global cryptography policy. CDT believes the bills deserve careful consideration and support. We look forward to working with Senator Leahy, Senator Burns, Rep. Goodlatte, Rep. Eshoo, individual Internet users, public interest advocates, and the computer and communications industry to develop a cryptography policy that protects privacy, security, and competitiveness on the Global Information Infrastructure. SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION: WHAT THE BILLS WOULD DO The House and Senate bills both modify Title 18 of the U.S. Code to clarify the status of encrypted communications, access to those communications by law enforcement, and the liability of third-party key holders. The bills would: * SIGNIFICANTLY EASE EXPORT CONTROLS: The bills would remove all export restrictions on "mass market" or publicly accessible encryption software and similar hardware -- that is, products that are generally available to the public and sold for installation "as is," or that are in the public domain such as PGP or some popular web browsers. (For example, products commercially available "off the rack," or freely available to the public via the Internet, would all be exportable.) Other encryption hardware would be exportable to countries where hardware with similar capabilities is already commercially available. The bills also allow export of other encryption software if it is currently exportable under law for use by foreign financial institutions. * PROHIBIT ANY RESTRICTION ON THE DOMESTIC USE OR SALE OF ENCRYPTION: The bills would affirmatively prohibit any government restrictions or attempts to mandate the domestic sale or use of any type of encryption. * IMPOSE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED KEY DISCLOSURES: (Senate Version Only) The Senate bill would lay down privacy guidelines to protect those users who choose to store their keys with third parties. The bill would impose civil and criminal penalties for the unauthorized release of decryption keys or other decryption assistance by third parties who individuals have entrusted with their keys. No privacy protections and only limited restrictions for law enforcement access currently exist for those who choose to store their keys with trusted third parties. * PROVIDE LIMITS FOR ACCESS TO KEYS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT: (Senate Version Only) The Senate bill would also spell out limits and guidelines for law enforcement access to the keys of those users who have chosen to store their keys with third parties. Today, encryption keys held by third parties could be released to law enforcement with nothing more than a subpoena. Under the Senate bill, third parties could only provide assistance to law enforcement in decrypting communications if presented with a court order. The bill also limits the scope and duration of such assistance. Decryption keys for stored communications could be disclosed with a proper court order or subpoena. * ESTABLISH A BROAD "PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION" FOR U.S. TRAVELERS: The bills would allow U.S. persons to use any form of encryption in a foreign country, establishing a less restrictive form of the "personal use exemption" recently published by the State Department. The provision is intended to accommodate "U.S. citizens and permanent residents who have the need to temporarily export encryption products when leaving the U.S. for brief periods of time". While the intent of this provision is clear, CDT believes that the language of the bill should be further clarified. * PROHIBIT THE USE OF ENCRYPTION TO CONCEAL THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY: Finally, the bills would criminalize the use of encryption to willfully obstruct justice. Anyone who "willfully endeavors" to use encryption for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, or preventing the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to a Federal felony would be subject to criminal penalties. CDT believes this new federal crime is unnecessary since it duplicates obstruction of justice crimes that are already available to prosecutors, and is unwise since it might be interpreted to discriminate against users of encryption. BACKGROUND - BILLS ADDRESS LONG-STANDING FRUSTRATIONS WITH U.S. ENCRYPTION POLICY Congressional action comes as Clinton Administration encryption restrictions continue to jeopardize the security of computer users. Encryption tools, which scramble electronic communications and data, are widely viewed as the key to providing security and privacy and encourage commerce on the Global Information Infrastructure. Individuals need encryption in order to trust the GII with confidential data such as financial transactions, medical records, or private communications. Businesses need encryption to provide individuals with privacy protections they need and to protect their own proprietary information as it flows across vulnerable global networks. The lack of good encryption today has left computer users vulnerable to the prying eyes of hackers, corporate competitors, and even foreign governments. Current Administration policy restricts the export of "strong" encryption hardware or software products with keys greater than 40 bits long. (The length of encryption "keys" is often used to indicate the security of a system.) Export controls actually influence the entire GII -- both domestically and internationally -- due to the difficulty of distributing and interoperating products with different strengths of encryption. The level of security permitted under the export controls, and hence the level of security largely available to domestic users as well, has been judged woefully inadequate by many experts. Even the most recent Administration "Clipper II" proposals would only allow the export of moderately stronger encryption, and then only with "key escrow" restrictions to guarantee U.S. government access to individual keys -- restrictions which raise real Constitutional issues and are bound to fail in the competitive international marketplace. In recent months, groups from across the political spectrum have increasingly criticized the Clinton Administration's restrictive export controls. In November 40 companies, trade associations, and public interest groups wrote to Vice President Gore calling the latest Administration proposals flawed and inadequate. Last month a report by the CEOs of 13 leading U.S. technology companies found that U.S. industry stands to lose up to $60 billion dollars per year by the year 2000 due to restrictions on the export of cryptography. And several weeks ago a group of noted computer security experts released a report calling for the deployment of dramatically longer encryption key lengths of at least 75 to 90 bits. The House and Senate bills give voice to this growing drumbeat of criticism demanding a radical departure from the flawed approach of the Clinton Administration's current encryption polices. CDT looks forward to working with members of Congress to push for a more comprehensive U.S. encryption policy that reflects the privacy and security needs of computer users. FOR MORE INFORMATION More information on the cryptography policy debate, including the text of the Senate and House bills, is available on CDT's Cryptography Issues Web Page: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ For More Information Contact: Center for Democracy and Technology +1.202.637.9800 Daniel Weitzner, Deputy Director <djw(a)cdt.org> Alan Davidson, Staff Counsel <abd(a)cdt.org> ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by more than 9,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.9 3/5/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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