December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:11 PM 2/21/96 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >* Coderpunks -- number theory, DES, Haval, C/C++/Java, IETF and TCP/IP >stuff, digital signatures, crypto libraries and APIs, Diffie-Hellman, >BSAFE, RSAREF, etc. > >* Cypherpunks -- nuclear bomb triggers, why women are more free under the >will of Allah than in Western decadent societies, movie reviews, SS >Obergruppenfuhrer Zimmermann, Zambian newspapers, alien bases in >Antarctica, Himalayan treks, etc. Pretty much, yep. The only part of this that really annoys me is that there isn't currently any real place to talk about actual crypto matters from a user's point of view. Sure, I can carve out space for myself on my own Web pages to talk about the things that interest/concern me - and I have - but it's tough to find anyplace to _learn_ in any way except random experimentation. And sure, if I could read C well enough to puzzle through the remailer code and had the UNIX knowledge necessary to compile and run one myself, for instance, I could answer all my questions about remailer operation. But I don't. And I wish I didn't have to. Unfortunately, there seems to be a huge gap between the tiny handful of people who create the stuff and the bulk of us who are merely interested in using it. At this point, I acknowledge that I'm reinventing Alan's screed about how "cypherpunks teach" should be as true as "cypherpunks write code". If more people don't work on bridging the aforementioned gap, smart people of good will who happen to be occupied enough with other things not to be able (or interested) to become themselves good programmers and cryptographers are SOL. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave Merriman writes: > could someone point me at the 'specs' for Mixmaster remailers? > I'm after how messages are sliced, diced, repackaged, and shipped, etc. http://www.obscura.com/~loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html Funky things are apparently happening with the obscura DNS records etc. due to some equipment moves Lance is doing, so you may or may not find this convenient to retrieve at the moment. -Lewis "You're always disappointed, nothing seems to keep you high -- drive your bargains, push your papers, win your medals, fuck your strangers; don't it leave you on the empty side ?" (Joni Mitchell, 1972)

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 22 Feb 1996, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >I'm sufficiently impressed with the arguments against name credentials > >that Carl Ellison has made that I'm looking seriously into systems > >that don't do any sort of conventional certificate binding at all... > > ... and I bet, Wei Dai's contentions to the contrary, that they'll be > *cheaper* to use than those which do certificate binding, all other things > being equal. You got my position completely backward on this. I've always supported Carl's arguments in the past on this issue (for example see the tread "subjective names..."). You may be thinking of what I said about the cost of defeating traffic analysis. The natural state of the Net seems to be a kind of semi-anonymity. Trying to push it in either direction (complete traceability or anonymity) is costly. Wei Dai

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IPG Sales <ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net> wrote: > See my reply to Tim Phillip - it is checked extensively > > If the algorithm sucks, prove it - please read the messages back and See my comment below. [..] > > [..] > > > In general, you will find the kernel of the propgations consists of 64 > > > equation sets of the form: > > > > > > Bi=(Bi+Ci MOD Di) Mod 256 Large prime numbers > > > ENCRYPTEXTi=OTP[Bi] XOR PLAINTEXTi Encryption > > > OTP[Bi]=ENCRYPTEXTi Makes the OTP Dynamic > > > > Bah. Looks to me like simple garbling, only using a large stream. > > > > Encrypt a stream of zeros with that method, and you'll get repeated > > strings of OTP[Bi]'s. An unsophisticated high school student could > > crack that.

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In list.cypherpunks, ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net writes: > Who said that we are expanding OTP's - I believe you did, when you stated that your "OTP" (and I am only using "OTP" in this case to point up your misusage of the term, and not to claim that what you are doing is any such thing) is used to seed your "RNG" (another misnomer). > we are using them to drive RNG's > please read my mail back and forth with Derek and Roy Silvernail, Do remember that the majority of my mail has not been copied to the list. > I belive that both of then recognize that an extremely large key, 2 > to some large number, let us say for the time being 2 to 12288 bits > can be derived from a OTP when generated- Not a chance, slick. A One-Time Pad is well defined within the art, and your PRNG system is no such thing. I will thank you to not postulate what I may or may not recognize. - -- Roy M. Silvernail -- roy(a)cybrspc.mn.org will do just fine, thanks. "Does that not fit in with your plans?" -- Mr Wiggen, of Ironside and Malone (Monty Python) PGP public key available upon request (send yours) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSwTVhvikii9febJAQEtpgP+MqcESnrisA8tYT+GulGamEhMIa9gTKAn Dc1ylyG4pgMRW+osZnnBJcWeZq8Yx7aTzteTmkNYmpXZP9liVaySSOVce36ORG4X BnRO2OGLI3JD8ssgMbifxbZay/00bDdCuMthGnXA+xKAW27p9i9tHLrPIyJhdjZa Jd3rHWCqwCc= =Cx0p -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Assassination Politics" Part 8 The following article appeared in the Sunday, February 4, 1996 issue of Asahi Evening News, in an article written by columnist Paul Maxwell, page 6. He writes a regular column about the Internet for this newspaper. "Networks: Paul Maxwell" "Dial Internet for murder" 'The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." (Shakespeare, Henry VI). A startling and controversial idea has surfaced on the Internet recently--fear with me for a moment while I explain it. It is based on two technological developments: digital cash and encryption software. Briefly, digital cash is a system for transferring funds from one person to another on the Net. For this system to be as good as cash, the transactions must be capable of being conducted anonymously, just like in real life. (You go into the Seven-Eleven, buy a Cafe Latte, and nobody knows your name or your credit history. The purchase is not recorded in a database of your consumer preferences.) Several competing schemes for digital cash have been launched, but the one that eventually gains universal acceptance will surely have this anonymity feature. The second innovation is a kind of software called public-key encryption. It allows you to send a file or an email message that is "locked" in such a way that it can only be opened by the intended recipient. The recipient, however, cannot open it until given a "key." This "key" may then be used to encrypt a return message that can only be opened by the original sender. Freelance visionary and tinkerer Jim Bell has been following both of these developments for the past few years. Recently, he asked himself a couple of tough questions: "How can we translate the freedom afforded by the Internet to ordinary life?" How can we keep government from banning encryption, digital cash, and other systems that will improve our freedom?" Suddenly, Bell had a revolutionary idea. ("Revolutionary" is the word he uses, and it fits.) You and me--the little guys, the ordinary working people of the world--could get together, all pitch in, and pay to have every rotten scoundrel in politics assassinated. And we could do it legally. Sort of. Bell imagined an organization that would award "a cash prize to somebody who correctly 'predicted' the death of one of a list of violators of rights, usually either government employees, officeholders, or appointees. It could ask for anonymous contributions from the public, and individuals would be able to send those contributions using digital cash." He explains that "using modern methods of public-key encryption and anonymous digital cash, it would be possible to make such awards in such a way so that nobody knows who is getting awarded the money, only that the award is being given. Even the organization itself would have no information that could help the authorities find the person responsible for the prediction, let alone the one who caused the death." Are you following this? Let's say that we, the public, decide we've finally had enough of [insert name of villain]. Ten dollars from me, ten from you--suddenly there's a million dollars in a fund. The money will go to the first person who can "predict" the date, time, and circumstances of the villain's death. Obviously, this information is only known in advance by the assassin. He sends an anonymous, "locked" message. He kills the villain. He sends the "key" to the message. He has, without ever revealing his identity, "correctly predicted" the murder. The "key" that he has provided is then used to "lock the award money in a file that is then publicly posted on the Internet. Only the person who originated the key may open the file and claim the digital cash. In other words, public anger could finance cash awards for assassinations. The organization that collected the money and announced a list of possible targets would never know about a crime in advance, and would never know the identity or whereabouts of a criminal. It would not technically be guilty of conspiracy or complicity. Jim Bell has thought about this a lot, and feels that the idea is technically feasible, practical, even foolproof. Suppose for a moment he's right? What are the implications? World leaders live with the threat of assassination every day of their lives. But at the local level, this could really have an impact. And the "target" list wouldn't necessarily to politicians--any offensive public personality would be fair game. Picture yourself a year from now, sitting around with friends. Somebody says, "Remember when Juice Newton got whacked?" And you say, "Yeah--best ten bucks I ever spent." Satisfying as it might be to declare war on asinine pop singers, Bell has a more civic-minded suggestion: Let's kill all the car thieves. He reasons that a very small number of career criminals are responsible for nearly all car thefts. If one million car owners in a given metropolitan area contributed just four dollars a year, it would create $10,000 a day in "prize money" for the "predictor" of any car thief's death. "Assuming that amount is far more than enough to get a typical car thief's 'friends' to 'off' him," he writes, "there is simply no way that a substantial car-theft subculture could possibly be maintained." Jim as high hopes for his plan--he thinks it could eventually lead to the end of political tyranny. But if you don't like this idea, he has others. In a recent email exchange, I asked what he was doing now. "I recommend that you rent the movie, "The Day the Earth Stood Still.," he answered. "I'm working on a similar project." [end of article]

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 18 Feb 1996, jim bell wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > At 10:25 PM 2/18/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > > I've been kind of busy recently (the reason I haven't responded to > >the more recent Assasination Politics stuff), but I'm curious what > >your method is for achieving simultaneous explosions. > > > "Multiple very thin flexible hollow tubes (1 mm ID? teflon?) filled with a > homogenous liquid > explosive (for example, pure nitromethane), length accurately cut to produce > the exactly desired delay. Kept separated from each other by foam spacers > to avoid inter-fiber detonations. Detonated from a single cap, with an > intermediary chamber of liquid explosive to stabilize the shock front, the > detonation wave travels along each tube simultaneously at (presumably) > identical velocity." This method is so dependent on the uniformity of the initiator (the cap in this instance) as to be nearly useless. Normal blasting caps do not detonate with the uniformity required to initiate each of the tube paths at the same time. In the off chance that you contemplated surrounding the cap with liquid explosive of a sufficent type, (which still wouldn't assure proper uniformity with any certainty as the liquid explosive is as likely to detonate slightly off left to right as up to down) you still have extremely difficult problems to overcome. 1> Interference from the milling shape and accuracy of the openings to the tubes containing the liquid explosive. 2> Mild to obscure impurities in the liquid explosives causing differences in velocity with respect to other tubes. Even small changes in pressures within the tubes might cause enough timing problems to make uniform initiation of the primary high explosive assembly impossible. 3> Interference from the milling shape and accuracy of the terminus of the tubes containing the liquid explosive. 4> Overpressure in the device causing premature detonation of the near portion of the high explosive assembly. All of these might cause enough timing error to prevent uniform pressure and thus prevent uniform compression and make supercriticality impossible. Remember, kryonic switiches are necessary even when dealing with the speeds of electric conductivity. The velocities of even hydrazine based explosives are signigicantly lower. The margin for error is similarly lower. Plutonium gun is still the easiest method for the home grown nuclear device, even if it requires more fissile material. > It's a race, designed so that the detonation waves reach their targets (the > foci) at > the same time. If the detonation velocity was, say, 5,000 meters per > second, an accuracy of 0.5 millimeter in length would produce a delay > accuracy of 100 nanoseconds. > > Whatcha think? > > Now where did I put that pit... <G> > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > > Klaatu Burada Nikto > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- [...] > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn(a)schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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Re: A Challenge (perhaps!)
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I know it doesn't exercise key technology and relies on the secrecy of the >algorithm (which from my very limited knowledge on cryptography I think makes >it almost doomed from the start (?))... Yes, it does. Without the slightest insult of any kind to your friend, the problem is that the vast majority of "new" algorithms have actually been invented time and time again long ago. And the vast majority of those have been shown to have vulnerabilities. Phil Zimmerman writes about this in the PGP docs. It is overwhelmingly likely that your friend has, no doubt with the best of intentions, stumbled across something that has a simple flaw he doesn't know about. Further, secrets are hard to keep. PGP works _because of_ its publicity, not in spite of it. When the algorithm must be kept secret, every little thing must be watched. Just a few months ago, someone cracked the encryption on Microsoft's Win95 registry database by taking a snapshot of the contents of memory at a key moment. Other hacks break other efforts at secrecy. In fact, no sensible user should trust anything to a secret algorithm. I may not be able to tell the difference between Diffie-Hellman and Lillian Helman...but I can go talk to those who can. If the coders and evaluators I trust tell me there's a problem, I can go hunt up another solution. Doing anything else buying a pig in a poke. Now, there are a lot of not-sensible users out there. Slick marketing can result in a bundle being made. But it's not the best way to go. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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mixmaster info?
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hate to bring up the topic of privacy/crypto (yech! :-), but could someone point me at the 'specs' for Mixmaster remailers? I'm after how messages are sliced, diced, repackaged, and shipped, etc. Dave Merriman ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> For privacy tools: http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/1148

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IPG OTM expansion
by SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a guess as to IPG's "OTP" expansion algorithm. The clue is the prime wheels. It reminded me of something I read in Kahn that was originally done with paper tape. Take two random streams, A and B. Their lengths are relatively prime. Let's use 1000 and 999. An expanded stream C is computed thus: C[i] = A[i % 1000] ^ B[i % 999] C thus does not repeat until 999000 values have gone past. Using more than two relatively prime wheels will produce very large streams. The key, of course, is that *the entropy does not increase*. I am sure that this sort of expansion is vulnerable to attack. It certainly does not warrant the name OTP. Am I close, Ralph?

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