December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Odd rounds in Blowfish
by ab411＠detroit.freenet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ This is an article that I just posted to sci.crypt ] In describing Blowfish Bruce Schneier mentioned that it achieves avalanche after the 3rd round, and after each two subsequent rounds (5, 7, 9, ...). (I understand 'avalanche' to mean that each bit of the key has affected each bit of the data being encrypted. Do I understand correctly?) He also mentioned the possibility of decreasing the number of rounds in Blowfish from the current 16, in order to improve the speed. My question is, would it be sensible to do it with an odd number of rounds? If 10 rounds were a consideration, then why not go on to 11 to get the 5th complete avalanche? Or perhaps it would suffice to stop after 9 rounds, after the 4th complete avalanche? Is a whole number of avalanches a desirable feature? Would an odd number of rounds throw a spanner into the key schedule? Also, how would this relate to the modified algorithm, Blowfish-SK? I think I have now made my lack of expertise amply apparent. :-) [ ObNoise: does it take Nukes to end the jim bell/Alan Olsen flamewar? ] [ ObRating: this post is rated G because it does not contain the words shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, or tits. ] Hoping these are not stupid questions, -- David R. Conrad, conrad(a)detroit.freenet.org, http://www.grfn.org/~conrad Hardware & Software Committee : finger -l conrad(a)grfn.org for public key Key fingerprint = 33 12 BC 77 48 81 99 A5 D8 9C 43 16 3C 37 0B 50 No, his mind is not for rent to any god or government.

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Re: V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> One thing the V-Chip gives us is the argument: Now that parents have the > ability to control what their children watch, the government should turn > responsibility over to them and butt out. We should turn the argument into something about how the V-Chip is a crappy idea and go from there to a system of filtering which can be used negatively (to filter out offensive or lame programming, commercials even) and positively (notify when a program comes on). --- "Mutant" Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) for a copy of my PGP key.

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

merriman(a)arn.net ("David K. Merriman") asks: >At 10:27 AM 02/11/96 GMT, postmaster(a)warehouse.mn.org (Postmaster) wrote: >>The user this message was addressed to does not exist at this site. Please >>verify the name and domain in the original message that follows. >>Message was addressed to: SAMUEL.KAPLIN(a)warehouse.mn.org >> >Anybody besides me getting these things? Thanks to SMTP not anymore I'd hope. Noise will be noise. Cheerio...

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Spin Control Alert (LI Newsday, 2/12/96)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Know your enemies: There's an op-ed in LI Newsday by Cathleen A. Cleaver ("directory of legal studies at the Family Research Council..." in LI Newsday today. Serious pro-CDA spin here. Justifies the bust of Amateur Action BBS, ignoring that they were set up by the gov't, and then insists the CDA only prohibits making porn accessible to kids. Calls anti-CDA folx "free-speech zealots" and "friends of the porn industry", claims the courts can determine merit on a per-case basis, and claims objections to CDA are really from "arrogance and greed... Most Americans do not have access to the Internet. The on-line elite would like to keep it that way..."

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Mail at the office
by brianh＠u163.wi.vp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello; I would like to know if there is anyway to keep a record of what is happening on my machine at work. I have had all my personal e-mail deleted twice now over the weekend. My employer has no problems with the employees recieving non work related e-mail. I'm on a unix enviroment. I have written a simple program to let me know who logins on my machine, but it doesn't provide enough information anymore. I have talked with the sys.admin but he doesn't know what to do either. I have tried to find a sniffer thats already compiled for i can not compile anything here, but have had no success. Any help or pointers would be Greatly Apreciated please reply by private e-mail so the noise level doesn't increase on my account. Sincerly, Brian brianh(a)u163.wi.vp.com -- UNTIL WE MEET AGAIN :-)

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Re: Unknown address
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:27 AM 02/11/96 GMT, postmaster(a)warehouse.mn.org (Postmaster) wrote: >The user this message was addressed to does not exist at this site. Please >verify the name and domain in the original message that follows. >Message was addressed to: SAMUEL.KAPLIN(a)warehouse.mn.org > Anybody besides me getting these things? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMR3p3sVrTvyYOzAZAQFvogQAmgrbguXgm3WLe9cWrcLVS3MSi5lG7ixP 2QOTmHzJULZOlbsaNQiPfclPpZzCEkamSXqgf6rA/+gJ0ENIZ1RH3ffUZOCGCHci +HzM8gcK6itFchYacV5+q4dg53QReSKblVB3TSS5wqLBvUkoLAgEtJhcm4kcLzYp w3fWBTC0QFc= =UHEO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> For privacy tools: http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/1148

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Re: Yeah, Yeah But what are we gonna do!
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Richard Harris wrote: > > It may just be me but ... > > i) This in-fighting and bickering doesn't seem very productive Agrrreed. > > ii) What are we gonna do about the CDA? Does the phrase "Cypherpunks write code" sound familiar....? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMR6aJCoZzwIn1bdtAQGpcgF/SiecyUgW49ll3vqo8G7FPQ2gkVa+6S+D DBgE2qAdam0lUjJ0WKr+h93APxJUbeSP =O1UN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ShowView?
by otto＠cc.jyu.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was told by someone on the list that ShowView (the GemStar-made European equivalent of VCR+) had been cracked. Unfortunately, he didn't remember any details, and I couldn't find anything with the standard ftp/www search tools. Pointers, anyone? -- /* * * Otto J. Makela <otto(a)cc.jyu.fi> * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ /* Phone: +358 41 613 847, BBS: +358 41 211 562 (V.32bis/USR-HST,24h/d) */ /* Mail: Cygn.k.7 E 46/FIN-40100 Jyvaskyla/Finland, ICBM: 62.14N 25.44E */ /* * * Computers Rule 01001111 01001011 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 12 Feb 96 6:49:07 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ######*#*### :31 99.98% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu --*###*#-### 9:13 99.96% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org ----..--__. 18:30:36 99.53% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org *--..--__- 19:44:38 99.50% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----+-+..-- 3:57:36 99.47% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net ***+****#* 7:14 99.46% c2 remail(a)c2.org ** ****+*** 17:56 99.41% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net -++-++++++ 56:24 98.99% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ##-##** #.# 7:26 98.64% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org **-******* 6:39 98.64% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *--+----*** 31:13 98.32% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++++++++ 42:53 98.25% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ##*###*### :36 97.66% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ********** 7:57 95.59% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ---_..--. 20:05:32 93.23% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *+*** 7:00 93.03% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***#+# ***## 1:58 99.76% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi __.-_ . * 30:35:19 87.17% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net *#-# ##* 1:22:28 86.88% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de +..-+-+ 4:33:06 57.50% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com 2:46 -3.30% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Free end-to-end encryption code?
by willer＠carolian.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a side project, to support remote mail and news pickup through the Internet to my company's servers (through a firewall), I've been slowly writing an end-to-end encryption program. Essentially, the idea is that the client program (say, a mail program) connects to a client "reflector", which lives on the same person's machine. The client reflector connects to a server reflector, which perhaps lives on the firewall. The client and server talk to each other, the client is authenticated, and the session key is agreed upon. Then the server reflector connects to the server process (say, smtpd, probably on some machine inside the company's net), and an encypted session is obtained. This doesn't protect against the machine's memory being watched or anything like that, but it does provide a good amount of security for packets over the Internet, just like the end-to-end type of encryption software described in Applied Cryptography. Now, this is my first code with any real encryption in it, and I'm trying to tackle key negotiation protocols and so on, while at the same time utilizing RSA, IDEA and MD5. In my research, I found that a number of firewall vendors have such a system available, either implemented in hardware or software. What I want to know is: Is there any code like this available somewhere on the net that does this stuff? I would hate to have to reinvent the wheel if I don't have to, given my limited amount of spare time.

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