December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Sun speaks out - but not to the cypherpunks
by todd＠lgt.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >In article <v02110101acaf51651ef9(a)[204.156.156.4]>, >Todd Glassey <todd(a)lgt.com> wrote: >[ lines marked > > are from fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) ] >> Pardon the flame but I really have just about heard enough of this BS... >[...] >> >> The area where we can (must) build trust is the computing base. >> >> Traditionally, this has been the OS, but in the case of java, it is >> >> the java interpreter (such as netscape 2.0 and hotjava). The browser >> >> is now the TCB (trusted computer base) for all practical purposes... >> > >> >Read: The Java interpreter is supposed to be a TCB. >[...] >> >Who here truly believes that the implementations of Java meet the >> >requirements of a TCB? >[...] >> Dr. Fred, you seem to spend a lot of engery slamming Java and HotJava. >[ ... flame deleted ... ] > > >No, here I think Dr. Cohen's comments are right on the mark. > >The Java interpreter *is* supposed to be a trusted computing base. >Do we have any reason to believe that this trust is well-placed? > >(If you don't agree, go through the Orange Book evaluation criteria, >and pay special attention to the assurance sections...) >- --- >[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature >means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the >signature and forwarded.] > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 >Comment: Gratis auto-signing service > >iQBFAwUBMIwG2CoZzwIn1bdtAQEpowGAgHiyk0tTQk5SO/3TR5EZRMFmUy/TjQmu >NbYIt0R/Tf0g9xWbolm5XN0alu947uJs >=UZH0 >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Sorry abopt the above flame-war I caused. My point was almost benign in and of itself. Yes, the Java concept is sound, No, the currently available implementation has some real architectural considerations that must be addressed in order that we can build a stable and secure platform atop it. My real issue is that there is so much time spent on this list knocking the individual spokes that make up this wheel we call Electronic Commerce, that it is more and more costly to filter out the technology from the background noise. Still because of the value of that technology, I and others are forced to spend precious hours reviewing all that comes across our desks. Bluntly being an active member of several Security and Payment Mechanism working groups I view some 150+ pieces of email a day and sometimes get frustrated by the amount of noise, or the roar in the background, about what are to the largest percentage of us, meaningless dribble... Still there is the occaisional golden nugget that makes it all worth while.. Again My apologies to have stirred up this mess. I will retreat under my desktop from the mele' that seems to be unending. Todd Regards, T. S. Glassey Chief Technologist Looking Glass Technologies todd(a)lgt.com (415) 324-4318 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQB1AwUBMFu5E6gNRnWhagU5AQHI+gL+Mwpcd3lAWd8FF06qcG6rnLhIYveHW71a XC7xh1T0uu8qnYX31yMp17OG28jWpKUbWec1IM9/eXOi+gInA7rKICWczV8zo9Z0 0puxjRRN7yO4KfRb3cPpk+r0p6pDg01Y =bTYb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Crypto's Role in Evil?
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 9 Oct 1995 11:20:41 -0700 I'm late getting to my mail backlog. >From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >It's clear that cops cannot protect people, only try to catch the perpetrators. I heard a particularly scary quote from Director Freeh last Sunday on NPR's Weekend Edition (I believe that was the show -- segment A-1) in which he declared "our job is to protect the people". If that were the FBI's job, then we'd have to look at it as one does to a loving parent and give it all the authority and respect a child gives a parent. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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Re: Does your software?
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>My get-only server is available in source form, is 80 lines long and >thus easily understood, has been shown to meet security properties, is >now in the process of being mathematically proven to meet those >properties, and is published in a refereed journal which can be used to >confirm its contents in detail. Hence, I do provide secure distribution >through purely physical means. > Uh, proofs only go so far. There was one Cornell CS professor who was a real devotee of "proving" your programs correct. He even published one of his proofs in a "refereed" journal. Big whoop. It still had an error. Proofs can help identify flaws, but they can never rule out all flaws. That's why their name is so bogus. I wouldn't be surprised if you could prove that the Finger daemon, which is sort of like a really low-level GET-ONLY HTTP server, is also safe. In fact, your math proving ability could probably even prove the pre-Robert Morris finger daemon is safe and secure. If programmers don't think of preventing finger requests longer that 512 bytes then why should the head-in-the-clouds program provers? - Peter >-- >-> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net >Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236 P.S. "FC" is your log in and "FC is found inscribed in the writings of the Unabomber. Coincidence?

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[NOISE] Re: Hack DigiCash: Payee Anonymity
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ObCrypto: Slim to None, peripheral at best. At 07:55 PM 10/24/95 +0100, some annoying nym wrote: >Now all we need is to do is get some specs on how DigiCash's software works >so that we can code this. I expect that this method will become quite >popular. To withdraw DigiCash, one must come up with $250 to start, sign a >bunch of forms, etc. I suspect that most people would rather change money >in lesser amounts, probably under $50. This opens up a huge market for >Blacknet money exchangers. I would gladly pay Tim's Internet Cash Exchange >a commission to exchange $50 worth of greenbacks for Digicash instead of >dealing with Mark Twain and shelling out $250 to start.. Irrelevant point: To open an account as a consumer, not a merchant, and solely for DigiCash use, only $11 (!) is required. Although I'll agree with the bunch of forms part. Damn, I wish I understood legalese... Dave - ----- David E. Smith, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0x92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ Sorry, the full signature is on strike pending DigiCash salary negotiations -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMI1uAgwyfvCScyE5AQHvpAP+MrQ0vflUe6q7uyXa0PHlyMttf50StEdX eYsXOlN9wLWH9yF6Wkvx8kXQS9sOE7anMYEk42VvwETq3y1EduP3dYAvSW2h7EG2 X4z0wsUT1l3drcq5ieeakA1nwGmHuQdMgPNaPZ8pvIGluTGobKAvta4Ea0MHy8HY YdvbDA4w0x0= =69WP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Weekly Type-II Remailer List
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Packet Radio - KG5RG(a)WA4IMZ.#SETX.TX.USA.NA WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by mkpgp, a Pine/PGP interface. iQEVAwUBMI0i8qghiWHnUu4JAQFyRgf8CRcpz+KPl84PGWpZGG5X0gdsjheBdV+f Kk3RJzj48tadeeV3AGXy1u+W+S8W+BRjAqu52TGD97i38N9CemltHYn+zU+M7tNN MY/gV7TGBqhOsCs7jOxH9XovyI59DI9rDVft6FIrHLBlSYsM73v6wApXAwEmVhXl WgPMJotkQZOmekMvo4Z2qGJMqMpB5tgzIHqOB+i/Y1w65bG+31KqYiaudr2nGxuX KV09GwGk4993eYIoZIQLCEBAyxI+j5/tymQEk7hc6veaZG4FkuBo5cp6OnFiexTD JrDE8g5Cx/JAGRa5FST9faQb8cjIUqOov8YPrcOcF7/54e+bIUmLcQ== =3CrR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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80 bit security from 40 bit exportable products
by baldwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Long ago vendors should have put encryption into network layer products, but for a variety of reasons that effort was delayed or discouraged. One effect of this lack is that almost every layer of the network stack is adding its own encryption. For example, the HTTP session layer added S-HTTP and the TCP transport layer added SSL. Soon we will have network layer encryption with IPsec. The vendors for each layer can export a product that uses ciphers with 40 bit keys. A user can then combine multiple products to get more than 40 bits worth of security. For example, a web client might fetch an S-HTTP page over an SSL protected link via a firewall that supports IPsec tunnels. That's three 40 bit keys protecting the data over the internet link (of course, this may not be equivalent to a 120 bit cipher, that depends on the details of the cipher systems and independence of the key setups). Interesting possibilities. --Bob Baldwin

3 2

Re: MD5 weakness ? [was Re: Netscape Logic Bomb detailed by IETF]
by Steve Bryan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr. Frederick B. Cohen writes: >In the case of the trust being placed in MD5 by Netscape, the assumption >being made (without adequate support as far as I can tell) is that an >MD5 checksum cannot be forced, through a chosen plaintext attack, to >yield checksums of 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, ... on up to enough primes to >allow the known plaintext attack that gets the RSA private key used to >authenticate messages. As far as I am aware (and I may not be aware of >everything) there is no reference work to support this assumption. If >the assumption is wrong, then the whole SSL can fall to a selected >plaintext attack launchable (presumably) through those general purpose >Java aplets we have heard so much about. With a mailing list this large and diverse one can reasonably assume a range of interests and expertise. What I don't understand is your agnostic stance on something as apparently basic as MD5. If computer security is your purported area of expertise why have you not reached any firm conclusions about it? I understand that rigid conclusions are unsafe (eg they'll never prove Fermat's last theorem) but it is not like every question is equally open. Do you have a realistic attack on MD5 or is this sophomoric claptrap? How do you propose to generate messages with specific message digests? Assuming you could somehow, how do you proceed to use that information to your advantage? So let's say I have a message digest and I'm retrieving the allegedly corresponding message which you have the opportunity to alter to your heart's content. How would you proceed, even in principle, to defeat MD5? I realize I might be assuming too much when I posit that I have the true MD5 for the message but my understanding is that you feel that MD5 might be vulnerable. I've given you all the known plaintexts. Is there a next step? +---------------------------------------------------------------------- |Steve Bryan Internet: sbryan(a)gofast.net |Sexton Software CompuServe: 76545,527 |Minneapolis, MN Fax: (612) 929-1799 |PGP key fingerprint: B4 C6 E2 A6 5F 87 57 7D E1 8C A6 9B A9 BE 96 CB +----------------------------------------------------------------------

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(fwd) Chaum vs. Stein
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: www-buyinfo <www-buyinfo.allegra..att..com(a)mail.checkfree.com> From: Andrew Barrett/CheckFree Corporation <Andrew_Barrett(a)checkfree.com> Date: 24 Oct 95 13:38:40 EDT Subject: Chaum vs. Stein Mime-Version: 1.0 Wanted to save my 'me too' until a time I could piggy-back it onto something a little more pithy (and I DO mean 'little'). Robert, thanks for taking the time and energy for filtering cpx and forwarding the best. David, thanks for providing the forum. Now that _that's_ out of the way ... I've just been handed a registration booklet for The Bank Administration Institute's Retail Delivery '95 conference December 2-6 in Atlanta. Notable speakers include The Bill, MasterCard CEO Eugene Lockhart, Visa International CEO Edmund Jensen, Intuit CEO Scott Cook and Checkfree CEO Pete Kight (among others). Featured on page 6 is a "Fireside Chat: The Financial Marketplace of the Future" moderated by Lou Dobbs... How warm and fuzzy. What really caught my eye was a panel discussion on Internet Security scheduled for that Wednesday. The panelists are David Chaum, Cybercash CEO William Melton, and FV CEO Lee Stein. If anyone goes, tell us all how it went! Kicker - the postal frank is of the "non-profit organization" variety. BIA's site is at http://www.bai.org --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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No Subject
by mixmaster＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To All, A theme I have been thinking about lately is a virtual data haven using a m from n secret splitting scheme via a DC Net for access and hosting the entire process via HTML and W3. The salient feature would be database objects split in such a way that participating sites would possess no more than 1 encrypted slice of any particular encrypted object. Some redundancy of storage is built into the design and participating site give up local storage to store other slices of the datahaven. At no time is the site hosting able to make correlations of slices to plaintext traffic because the split is done on the users workstation and the placement of the slice on the individual slice on the member datahaven site is accomplished with encrypted remailer tech(probably Mixmaster 2) and CGI or java scripts. The idea here is to be able to store ANY information on the net not just what the local bluenoses approve of. anon

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MD5 concerns, was Re: Netscape Logic Bomb detailed by IETF
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> channel. I think that Netscape uses an MD5 checksum which the members > of this list seem to place unlimited trust in (incorrectly in my view, This is the second time you've implied that an MD5 checksum might not be as secure as we think. Could you share your thinking on this? I had believed from reading the algorithm that it's not possible to predict how a change in the input will affect the checksum. Given a modified version of netscape for example, how would you change some non-critical portion of the code to get the same checksum that the original should have. I suppose that give n bits of non-critical space in the code, (non-critical meaning that changing them will have no effect on the execution of the code, and assuming that you don't want to change the length of the code), that you could try all possible combinations of those bits, or 2^n trials and see if you get the correct MD5 checksum. If you do, then on average you'd actually only have to try 2^(n-1) trials. What if you don't? What would you do then? MD5 produces a 128 bit output, and it would seem likely that this would be hard. As far as I know there are no known attacks for any MDx algorithms in spite of Ron's worries about MD4. It's a subject of on-going research though, and it is only "conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, or to produce any messages having a given prespecified target message digest." (RFC 1321) So, if you have newer information, or pointers to any papers, (other than the ben Boer and Bosselaers papers), could you let me know? Thanks, Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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