December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PRZ "battle lost"
by Gordon Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:00 PM 1/12/96 -0800, "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> wrote: > >is there an alternative? yes, but it involves fewer lawyers than are >in the US today. > >however I don't see lawyers as the problem, but a symptom of something >deeper: the tendency of people to resort to legal action to settle >even trivial disputes. Very true. Up here (Canada), we have _much_ less of the "use the courts as a weapon of harrassment" phenomenon. But, I don't believe we have a (much) lower percentage of lawyers than you do. It's part of the mindset. Somehow, over the course of several generations, you folks have become an entirely too litigious lot for your own good. The result is was PRZ just came through and the multitude of cases that the Church of Sceintology is involved in. How to fix it? Beats me. However, I think it will probably have to start with the judiciary. Justices from all levels of your court system will have to put their collective feet down and stop allowing this kind of nonsense. I don't know enough about the inner workings of the legal systems to know if this would be all that's needed. Perhaps some new legislation would also be required. Whatever happens, it can only be for the better. In the meantime, could you get your damn lawyers off my tv? ;-) We don't let our lawyers do that. They've only been able to advertise at all in the last 10 years or so. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Help! Help! The paranoids are after me! iQEVAwUBMPcDkXNDC2/K0TjxAQHLaAf/Q4d3CUrcANLozJGR/uv5JsVyq8c+uhxy cKvsA/oxHPVTUynvUkqG8av0zhXl0t9hdOoi5RC7Q6jmNrYGvj3cSEXY/VN2EDR8 +4wVPxHQ7Mt3G4ffeR6Qe3hPU3Q/fHXGL7rLoJOD3IDI3LgC+K57Com5KJfXQVGe 7lpbnKSoCiny3pEbanCMMhrp8sZVM00B6oH2Hh6hIMaVEFpBao/ncyGUBiZLkmSr PLqlU7bTk81BicrMka0ep28KQwOF8lyGYCN1dxq64UCuBe02VATIZ/GnStQFa/YZ dwTpZtqM7SgDibkEnRwuKeonXd06oyWba0/f1QQm/Y1Cjglw8YAwXA== =VB/L -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request.

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Offshore Banks and Asset Protection
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:57 PM 1/12/96, Rich Graves wrote: >Every issue of The Economist (and I'm sure lots of other publications) >has ads for this kind of thing. > >Anyone know a reference for ranking the "legitimacy" of these services >and seminars? I'd assume that many of them are scams that will gladly >take your money overseas, but you might never see it again. > >Probably follow up offline, because cpunk relevance is a bit tenuous. I'll follow up on the list, because it's a topic of interest (or curiousity) to several, and I favor writing for the list. I looked into "asset protection" [see note below] using offshore banks (Carribean, Channel Islands, Europe, etc.), and bought a couple of books on this. And I subscribed to some Net newsletters. I'm not an expert, and have not chosen (yet) to "protect" my assets by moving them offshore. I think the assumption that most of the ads in the back of "The Economist" are scams which will take your money is wrong. The banks will take your money, but most probably will return it on demand. And the seminar companies will in fact teach some things. However, they may be "scams" in a gentle sense: they won't provide easy solutions that many of us will feel fully comfortable with. By this I mean that one is hit with dozens of competing claims, by reports that the IRS and FinCen are infiltrating these banks, that treaty negotiations will soon close these tax havens, and all sorts of stuff like this. Things which do not inspire confidence. (In fact, the report that these back-of-the-Economist ads are "scams" is perhaps part of this disinformation/rumor campaign.) Like a lot of things, it may all be clearer once one has actually gone ahead and done something with these offshore banks. I don't personally know anyone who has, which adds to my uncertainty. [Note: Many advisors call their schemes "asset protection," rather than "tax sheltering" (or "tax evasion"). The idea is to put assets beyond the reach of tort judgments. For example, a doctor may fear the incredibly large "deep pockets" lawsuits that American society encourages, so he transfers a large fraction of his net worth to an offshore bank. He reports income from these assets to the IRS, so he is not a tax evader, just someone who has partially "judgment-proofed" himself (to use the term Duncan and Sandy use). This is not illegal, currently. Lots of issues to consider.] --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Microsoft's papers on NT C2 thang
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Oops, signature is only valid if the > 80 column line is preserved] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'd appreciate it if someone could critique these papers for me, probably off the list. [Note that 198.105.232.5 is just one of the IP addresses being load-balanced by www.microsoft.com. The servers seem to crash a lot with the current Gibraltar beta, so if one IP address doesn't work (like .5 isn't responding to pings right now), try another and it will work.] - -rich - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 12 Jan 1996 11:22:38 -0600 From: Richard P. Bainter <pug(a)arlut.utexas.edu> Newgroups: comp.security.misc, alt.security, comp.os.ms-windows.networking.misc, comp.os.ms-windows.networking.windows, comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.networking Subject: Re: Microsoft continues to mislead public about Windows security bugs (a bit long, with references) In article <t6d9w0JfFigb089yn(a)oslonett.no>, Rune Moberg <mobergru(a)oslonett.no> wrote: >>This is true. In fact NT was never C2-certified as any kind of network >>server at all, but only as a standalone workstation. >I read a statement made by MS, that it doesn't matter, because if NT is >proved to be C2 secure in a standalone configuration, then it's secure >on the network as well. You believe everything MS tells you?! How naive. >C2 security, AFAIK, also requires that the server is protected (controlled >access). Once you have physical access to a machine, you could open it, >put in a floppy or hard drive, and access anything you'd like to on the >machine in question (with a disk editor, or with a fresh installation of >the OS in question). Atleast that's the only way I can think of to break in >on a NT Server. Otay, let me see. The server is protected if you aren't hooked up to a network. That implies *nothing* about the fact when a network is plugged into it. If I'm sitting at the console and have to enter a password to do things, doesn't mean I have to enter one from the network when I mount the entire disk. (Even if that is not the true case.) There are orange, red and blue books. This is all well pointed out on: http://www.windows.microsoft.com/TechNet/boes/bo/winntas/technote/security.… What has Microsoft actually passed? I had heard it was only Orange book C2 and not Red book C2. Micrsoft also points it out on: http://198.105.232.5/NTServer/c2bltn.htm Ciao, - -- Richard Bainter Mundanely | OS Specialist - OMG/CSD Pug Generally | Applied Research Labs - U.Texas pug(a)arlut.utexas.edu | pug(a)eden.com | {any user}(a)pug.net Note: The views may not reflect my employers, or even my own for that matter. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPcRpI3DXUbM57SdAQFbWgP9HrpdsuC/p3iURubYobgXRXlvlmrRgJot 5kDBCOrDHRtyjXQj7n0CLU6TsEpTLR2ZfTGNUrKoc2lE1q0+PSzF4WpOyywNKULw StB8d+0n0NPuN2Bcbb7mO0M0VbE9khL5CYrcfWB5FR6JPfXU18cfSTXCROgGu4U9 ASvbxOkVLeM= =L7so -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Reminder, Jan 13 noon-6 p.m. Bay Area CA mtg
by mrm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Name: monthly Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting Date: Saturday January 13 Time: 12 p.m. - 6 p.m. Spot: Sparcy's, Building 21, Sun Microsystems Food: Bagels provided; feel free to bring lunch to munch The agenda is still forming. So far, there are two speakers lined up to talk about Mark Twain ECash. (Lucky Green and Sameer.) It might be interesting to have general discussions of ... CompuServe, where the censorship wave is going, and what to do in response Timing attacks on RSA algorithms So, can we all now band together and invest in PGP, The Company? What's needed in crypto APIs? What do you love or hate about current sets of APIs? (your favorite topic here ...) See you tomorrow, Marianne p.s. directions to Sun's B21: Take 101 South to Amphitheater Exit. Go to the end of the ramp and turn left on Charleston. This road is also known as Garcia. After about 1/3 mile, turn right onto the first city street on your right. In about 2 long blocks or so, you'll see purple signs for Building 21 of Sun Microsystems. The meeting is held in the cafeteria.

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Re: Novel use of Usenet and remailers to mailbomb from luzskru@cpcnet.com
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:22 1/12/96, Alan Bostick wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >If "digital postage" is ever implemented, this sort of >distributed-origin mailbomb-through-a-remailer would be stopped >immediately. All the messages that the horny net geeks send would >necessarily contain the same postage stamp, and the remailer would >notice this right away -- and throw away messages containing the used >postage stamp. > >One more motivation for e$-like digital postage for remailers. I am not sure that postage would solve this problem. The geeks would individually pay for it. Still, nominal postage would solve a lot of the problems that plague remailnet. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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News Release
by Philip L. Dubois 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Yesterday morning, I received word from Assistant U.S. Attorney William Keane in San Jose, California, that the government's three-year investigation of Philip Zimmermann is over. Here is the text of Mr. Keane's letter to me: "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California has decided that your client, Philip Zimmermann, will not be prosecuted in connection with the posting to USENET in June 1991 of the encryption program Pretty Good Privacy. The investigation is closed." The U.S. Attorney also released this to the press: "Michael J. Yamaguchi, United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, announced today that his office has declined prosecution of any individuals in connection with the posting to USENET in June 1991 of the encryption program known as "Pretty Good Privacy." The investigation has been closed. No further comment will be made by the U.S. Attorney's Office on the reasons for declination. Assistant U.S. Attorney William P. Keane of the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Jose at (408) 535-5053 oversaw the government's investigation of the case." On receiving this news, Mr. Zimmermann posted this to the Cypherpunks list: - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My lead defense lawyer, Phil Dubois, received a fax this morning from the Assistant US Attorney in Northern District of California, William Keane. The letter informed us that I "will not be prosecuted in connection with the posting to USENET in June 1991 of the encryption program Pretty Good Privacy. The investigation is closed." This brings to a close a criminal investigation that has spanned the last three years. I'd like to thank all the people who helped us in this case, especially all the donors to my legal defense fund. Apparently, the money was well-spent. And I'd like to thank my very capable defense team: Phil Dubois, Ken Bass, Eben Moglen, Curt Karnow, Tom Nolan, and Bob Corn-Revere. Most of the time they spent on the case was pro-bono. I'd also like to thank Joe Burton, counsel for the co- defendant. There are many others I can thank, but I don't have the presence of mind to list them all here at this moment. The medium of email cannot express how I feel about this turn of events. -Philip Zimmermann 11 Jan 96 - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPDy4WV5hLjHqWbdAQEqYwQAm+o313Cm2ebAsMiPIwmd1WwnkPXEaYe9 pGR5ja8BKSZQi4TAEQOQwQJaghI8QqZFdcctVYLm569I1/8ah0qyJ+4fOfUiAMda Sa2nvJR7pnr6EXrUFe1QoSauCASP/QRYcKgB5vaaOOuxyXnQfdK39AqaKy8lPYbw MfUiYaMREu4= =9CJW - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- I'd like to add a few words to those of my client. First, I thank Mr. Keane for his professionalism in notifying us of the government's decision. It has become common practice for federal prosecutors to refuse to tell targets of investigations that the government has decided not to prosecute. I appreciate Mr. Keane's courtesy. Let me add my thanks to the other members of the defense team-- Ken Bass in Washington D.C. (kbass(a)venable.com) Curt Karnow in San Francisco (karnow(a)cup.portal.com) Eben Moglen in New York (em21(a)columbia.edu) and Tom Nolan in Palo Alto (74242.2723(a)compuserve.com) Bob Corn-Revere in D.C. (rcr(a)dc1.hhlaw.com) was a great help on First Amendment issues. These lawyers are heroes. They donated hundreds of hours of time to this cause. Each is outstanding in his field and made a contribution that nobody else could have made. It has been an honor and a privilege to work with these gentlemen. Mr. Zimmermann mentioned a lawyer named Joe Burton (joebur(a)aol.com) of San Francisco. Mr. Burton deserves special mention. He represented another person who was under investigation. To have made this other person publicly known would have been an invasion of privacy, so we didn't. We still won't, but we can finally acknowledge Mr. Burton's enormous contribution. Whether we were getting paid or not, the rest of us at least received some public attention for representing Phil Zimmermann. Mr. Burton labored quietly on behalf of his client. He took the case pro bono and did an extraordinary job. He is a lawyer who exemplifies the finest traditions of the Bar and the highest standard of integrity. I am proud to know Joe Burton. The warriors at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)-- Marc Rotenberg, David Sobel, and David Banisar-- and at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) provided financial, legal, and moral support and kept the public informed. They continue to do so, and we all owe them thanks for it. Those members of the press who recognized the importance of this story and told the world about it should be commended. Undeterred by the absence of sex and violence, these reporters discussed the real issues and in so doing served the public well. Many other people, lawyers and humans alike, made invaluable contributions. My assistants Alicia Alpenfels, Suzanne Turnbull Paulman, and Denise Douglas and my investigator Eli Nixon kept us organized. Rich Mintz, Tom Feegel, and Nathaniel Borenstein of First Virtual put up a Web site and aggressively supported the Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund. Another site was built by Michael Sattler of San Francisco, and he and Dave Del Torto (also of S.F.) let me stay in their homes. Thanks also to MIT and The MIT Press: Hal Abelson, Jeff Schiller, Brian LaMacchia, Derek Atkins, Jim Bruce, David Litster, Bob Prior, and Terry Ehling. And there were many others. Finally, I offer my thanks to everyone who contributed to the Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund. People all over the world gave their hard-earned money to support not only Phil Zimmermann's defense but also the cause of privacy. It is impossible to be too pessimistic about our future when there are so many of you. Now, some words about the case and the future. Nobody should conclude that it is now legal to export cryptographic software. It isn't. The law may change, but for now, you'll probably be prosecuted if you break it. People wonder why the government declined prosecution, especially since the government isn't saying. One perfectly good reason might be that Mr. Zimmermann did not break the law. (This is not always a deterrent to indictment. Sometimes the government isn't sure whether someone's conduct is illegal and so prosecutes that person to find out.) Another might be that the government did not want to risk a judicial finding that posting cryptographic software on a site in the U.S., even if it's an Internet site, is not an "export". There was also the risk that the export-control law would be declared unconstitutional. Perhaps the government did not want to get into a public argument about some important policy issues: should it be illegal to export cryptographic software? Should U.S. citizens have access to technology that permits private communication? And ultimately, do U.S. citizens have the right to communicate in absolute privacy? There are forces at work that will, if unresisted, take from us our liberties. There always will be. But at least in the United States, our rights are not so much stolen from us as they are simply lost by us. The price of freedom is not only vigilance but also participation. Those folks I mention in this message have participated and no doubt will continue. My thanks, and the thanks of Philip Zimmermann, to each of you. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPdHw7Z7C+AHeDONAQFR+QP/SJFD1DsIqUZhl5s8dtnUfe8l5a0YAWsa jOGvaK6gNpi1L4McEkb8Y4hOlI4n+X8HuRnzHai0UmSjAT6zHQmfN9UVbP27fYBR xKw1nTzEziHsbmHTua+fDvsWrsWa+A5hBxS7UAQkepDWtlc2EUCB1v5aOyGwnuco ppXLLSDHh1g= =N8iF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Zimmermann case is dropped.
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Julian Assange wrote: > >The more important point being missed of course that Phil has and no >doubt will continue to make certain elements of the U.S government >quite miserable indeed. ...and I'm sure they'll be watching VERY closely to see how version 3.0 will be distributed....

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Re: News Release
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:37 PM 1/12/96 -0700, you wrote: [stuff from Phil Zimmermann deleted for space.] [other stuff by Dubois, Zimmermann's lawyer, deleted for space.] >There are forces at work that will, if unresisted, take from us our >liberties. There always will be. But at least in the United States, our >rights are not so much stolen from us as they are simply lost by us. The >price of freedom is not only vigilance but also participation. Those >folks I mention in this message have participated and no doubt will >continue. My thanks, and the thanks of Philip Zimmermann, to each of >you. Dear Mr. Dubois, Thank you for your efforts on the behalf of Phil Zimmermann. You are to be praised. However, you should recognize that at best, all you have done is to reduce the harm done to him (or would otherwise have been done to him), which admittedly is a good and right thing for you to have done. However, I refer you to the 1964 movie, "Dr. Strangelove," whose title character stated that "deterrence is the art of making the enemy FEAR to attack." In my opinion, we (the ordinary members of the public) cannot consider ourselves to have won this encounter until the REAL enemy here, the government employees who targeted Zimmermann, FEAR to attack ("legally" or otherwise) people like Zimmermann. Ask Mr. Zimmerman about my essay, or I'd be happy to email it to you. Sadly, he did not appreciate its simplicity and potential effectiveness, and maybe you won't either, but someday it may protect your freedom in ways you can't currently even imagine. Jim Bell -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPg1cvqHVDBboB2dAQGv7wP+JTKihlMH0zeDGq1bsWK04nTe6zAkpemL 1jMbl7/6J8MSbPQPVgL7fzP3TfQHRmIwAhAZzd7cf440jAgQ4MvQxsDqMkrESky6 jTL+h3j79Lnt8WMd63cCWa2mn++2etMy4XRCkiK59ft187qGGpwitsHIzF8tKsQL mm2K084tpO0= =PY58 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Reach out! Update 01 (CypherPurists trash this)
by Sudduth, Larry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I know this is way off topic, but I wanted to apologize to all anyway for my last posting with the RTF crap in it. I tried unsuccessfully to correct the RTF problem as a result of previous list discourse, and fervently believe that it is fixed now. If not, I guess I'll find out about it. Anyway, thanks for your forbearance, and now for some noise.) The merchant must have been so impressed by the pent-up market demand for the "How to Beat and Kill Your Ex-Wife and an Unlucky Innocent . . . And Get Away With It" video, that the ordering procedure has been changed to a toll number. I'm sure the merchant desires potential customers to call collect, after all who in the world would pay money for the privilege of buying a product? I believe the new number is 0-818-879-0614, remember to say "operator" when prompted, so you can request a collect call. I have up to now always been greeted by a busy signal, so fear that I could have to validate the above number by calling the toll-free number (see original noise below) again. If one wants to directly dial the toll number, one can suppress one's phone number from being reported to the merchant via Caller ID by dialing *67 prior to the call, at least here in Bell Atlantic land. Check with your telco to be sure. (Interstate support for Caller ID is currently spotty so this could be a non-issue.) This strategy should be employed if one is leery of being on the receiving end of future direct mail campaigns offering products similar to the "How to Beat and Kill Your Ex-Wife and an Unlucky Innocent . . . And Get Away With It" video, just for discussing the particulars of the video with one of the merchant's staff. Direct mail campaigns target people who've previously inquired (and not necessarily bought) by phone. As an aside, I know y'all knew that your number (i.e., the number dialed from) is always reported to the recipient at an 800 number, and that this cannot be suppressed. After calling the toll-free number several times, I was able to write down the new telephone number for ordering the "How to Beat and Kill Your Ex-Wife and an Unlucky Innocent . . . And Get Away With It" video. It took several attempts because I kept encountering pens with no ink in them in my desk. The recording doesn't really describe the video at all, just refers to the oh-jay video. I haven't heard the actual title of the video, since I couldn't get through to a human at the merchant's telephone number. Since calling it the oh-jay video sounded so darned impersonal, I took a stab at a seemingly appropriate title. >William T. Rainbird wrote January 12, 1996 2:12 AM >I know this isn't a typical posting for this group, but I thought I'd >point out that O.J. Simpson has a video for sale, to further exploit his carnage. >You can buy it by dialing 1-800-OJTELLS 1-800-658-3557 it is a FREE CALL >(for you). I guess that means the MERCHANT PAYS for the calls, even if >NOTHING IS ORDERED... > >Please repost and tell your friends! -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= SudduthLM(a)SecureC2.com The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author only, etc. y, etc.

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Re: (none) [httpd finding your identity]
by doclulu＠infobahnos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: Rich Graves <llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: (none) [httpd finding your identity] At 11:28 96-01-12 -0800, you wrote: >On Fri, 12 Jan 1996, sameer wrote: > >> > > control what information is passed out to the other end. >> > > Specifically, I'd like http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/prog/snoop.pl >> > > to come up nearly blank.) >> > >> > We do not send the HTTP 'From:' header. I will look into where >> > they are getting the user name and location from. There is really >> > nothing I can do in the Navigator to stop them from getting your >> > IP address or DNS name. >> >> I beleive that it uses finger. If you really want to prevent >> people from finding out where you're coming from, use the >> anonymizer. Not at CMU? Don't worry. > >On most UNIX machines or a Mac or PC running most common talk clients? >Worry. Not just finger, but also identd will identify you. I think Eudora >Pro has an identd option, too. > >-rich > > On Win 3.1 using Netscape 1.22, you can improve your 'lack of output' by removing in the PREFERENCES menu: Your Name: Your Email: Your Organization: The bad side is that you cannot mail from Netscape without filling the Email entry with a valid Email address and putting an anonymous address (ex.:an123456@anon.penet.fi) would cause http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/prog/snoop.pl to report your REAL hostname with your anonymous username (ex.:an123456@myhost.com) so if privacy is a must and you cannot use the anonymizer, this could reduce your output to your computer type and operating system and your browser and version number. For my part, after removing my Email, it was all that was left (-: ( It will stay that way... ) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPhL8l0tVeSYE8qJAQFN9AQAgXcbJzhqbExyvVA+5VZXojCuUGxJsH0e qhmSmn9I6vInIzfJNoUi1I5tdwVqOFaheFTh6XPYjVIRnCNx4g0u3z2Mjx8V2B0a O66XsFFX3tgCHizIVFkXJ1rzOXRDXCBb4joo+500MOWi77GgfHBMd1F3IBTcS2i6 8QZshD4gF0U= =9rLo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eric Francoeur | "One of the things Adolf Hitler E-Mail: doclulu(a)infobahnos.com | and Bill Clinton have in common http://www.infobahnos.com/~doclulu | is that both were democratically PGP Public key available at website | democratically elected leaders." | -Dr. Dimitri Vuli 1995.

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