December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CHA_cha
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Worth Magazine, October, 1995, has a longish, easy-reading, supportive article on David Chaum and digital cash. Virtually alone among E-money thinkers, Chaum insists on creating anonymity for all transactions -- building a tamper-proof system that works just as "real" cash always has, from cowne shells to $100 bills. The key, he says, is this: Without the spender's say-so, no one should be able to trace who paid whom for what, whether a transaction takes place online or in a swipe of a card at a coffee shop. It's a libertarian approach in tune with Chaum's roots in freewheeling communities such as Berkeley and Amsterdam -- but it is anathema to control freaks like the FBI, the IRS, and corporate information marketers. Chaum says every digital-cash system but his has the potential to be abused or compromised -- and the math seems to bear him out. His competitors, however, insist their plans will prove plenty secure in practice. They dismiss Chaum as an incorrigible purist, a brilliant mathematician and innovator whose political views are hindering his chances of success. Like many in the digital elite, Chaum, an unabashed utopian, does want to create a new world. To him, electronic money is just the first consumer use of an arcane field he hopes will transform society: cryptology, the science of secret codes. In cyberspace, these codes can prove a powerful way of shielding a person's identity -- or of verifying an identity without giving away extra information. Armed with personal computers and good software, says Chaum, ordinary people will finally have the power to do and say things without being tracked by Big Brother. CHA_cha (31 kb in two parts)

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Re: cypherpunks press releases/contact list: YES!! DO IT!!
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Perry E. Metzger" There is this widespread and wholely misplaced affection for "cypherpunks". We aren't a company or an organization. This is a mailing list, and occassionally a seminar series in places like NoCal. It isn't a "group". .............................................. And you of all the cpunks, Perry, are the most affectionately considered. :>) Actually, those who want to become official spokewheels should consider that the cypherpunk agenda is to promote anarchic (i.e. individualistic, self-responsible) action. That is, that the individual who chooses to act in a 'cypherpunkish' mode does so at their own risk by their own motivation by their own decision and their own discretion. Not everyone on the list subscribes to this ideal of complete independence; furthermore, for anarchist types to identify with a "group" would be inconsistent with the philosophical attitude of the "members", who come-&-go as they please. However, it would be an amazing event to see VZ Nuri-logical (Cypherpunk Extraordinaire) on TV, saying something like, "Yes, I fully and completely subscribe to the Cypherpunk agenda: black markets, anarchy, overthrow of governments. National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." <g> (It would be a *cold* day in Hell!) .. Blanc

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Status of Netscape Bug Exploit (suggestions needed)
by Ray Cromwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok Folks, here's what I got so far... 1) a URL that can place a specific value in the program counter (gdb) select-frame 2 (gdb) info frame Stack level 2, frame at 0xefbfbc30: eip = 0xefbfbc30; saved eip 0x90909090 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ called by frame at 0x90909090, caller of frame at 0xefbfbc14 Arglist at 0xefbfbc30, args: Locals at 0xefbfbc30, Previous frame's sp is 0xefbfbc1c Saved registers: eax at 0xefbfbc2c, ecx at 0xefbfbc28, edx at 0xefbfbc24, ebx at 0xefbfbc20, ebp at 0xefbfbc18, esi at 0xefbfbc14, edi at 0xefbfbc10, eip at 0xefbfbc0c, ps at 0xefbfbc08 2) A piece of exploit code on the stack near the PC (gdb) disassemble 0xefbfbc10 0xefbfbc40 0xefbfbc27: nop 0xefbfbc28: nop 0xefbfbc29: nop 0xefbfbc2a: nop 0xefbfbc2b: nop 0xefbfbc2c: nop 0xefbfbc2d: nop 0xefbfbc2e: nop 0xefbfbc2f: nop 0xefbfbc30: nop 0xefbfbc31: nop 0xefbfbc32: nop 0xefbfbc33: nop 0xefbfbc34: nop 0xefbfbc35: nop 0xefbfbc36: nop 0xefbfbc37: nop 0xefbfbc38: nop 0xefbfbc39: nop 0xefbfbc3a: nop 0xefbfbc3b: nop 0xefbfbc3c: nop 0xefbfbc3d: nop 0xefbfbc3e: nop 0xefbfbc3f: nop 0xefbfbc40: nop 3) exploit code that calls the kernel syscall() with SYS_exit (benign exploit, causes your browser to exit) The problem? To make a syscall under BSDI2.0, I have to execute an lcall 0x7,0x0 with 1,0 on the stack. However, to exploit the netscape bug, you can not embed 0x0 in the URL. No problem I thought, I searched Netscape's executable for any kernel calls, and found an lcall 0x7,0x0 at 0x257fee. But I can't do a 32-bit direct jump without a zero, in the instruction (the 32-bit address is 0x00257fee), and I can't do a relative jump from 0xefbfbc30+ If you can come up with some 386 assembly under BSDI2.0 which can invoke syscall() in the kernel without any embeded 0x0 bytes in the code, you can share a Hack Netscape T-Shirt with me. If it turns out to be too hard under BSDI, I'll gladly assist in producing exploits for Windows or another operating system. One trick I thought up for embeding zeros in the code is to self-modify the code using XOR ADDRESS,ADDRESS where ADDRESS is a byte on the stack within the code. Anyone have any better ones? -Ray

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Time Keys, Some Secure Ideas (by Alias: Jay Hyden)
by Anonymous Remailing Service 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Time Keys, Some Secure Ideas << The weakest attack on a time key based system is to spoof the computer that keeps track of time into releasing encryption keys i.e. change the clock. Perhaps this could be avoided by hardware inaccessability, say a computer system taken to, and setup on the Moon by those corporation that are already planning to place VR rovers on the lunar surface. Any Earth bound system would be vulnerable to physical attack. Here are some ideas for such a system: o 7 clocks with absolutely no way of reseting them. Perhaps a system that will only let you tell it which clock is the most accurate, and only if you prove you are the proper authority and only if 4 other clocks are on the same minute. o Redundant hardware and power collection and data transmit /receive systems, flash ROM hard drives for storing secret keys and neccesary programs and files. Built to last several centuries if possible. o Key pairs could be generated on Earth, a time of release instruction and perhaps an optional other public key a (return at future date encrypted with this key option.) The package is then encrypted with one of the lunar systems keys, then transmited to the Moon. A verification could be encypted and sent back to insure data integrity. o Other security checks in place would insure that the data was transmited to the Moon by the proper authority, i.e. the Corp. charging for this service. Additional backup logic that would insure that proper power and protocol exist for transmitions from the lunar system. o The key pairs are witness generated, then sent to the lunar system, then the secret key is destroyed on Earth. The public keys become a one way hash to the future until the time designated by the key's owner has elapsed. Then the lunar system would transmit the owners secret key to Earth. o Upon time released instructions the lunar system would transmit the secret key, (encrypted if optioned) upon demand by a known packet radio method. So if the Corp. authority did not exist in say, 100 years, the data could still be retrieved by standard packet radio. People who want to write to ONLY their great great grand- children or the future world in general would have a forum. Jay /"""""\ ~~ ,--------------------------------------------, ~~ /"""""\ /__ - _-\ ~~ ( End HEMP Prohibition! This is an open chal- ) ~~ /-_ - __\ :@ (*)~(*) ~ ( lenge to Historians. Name examples of where ) ~ (*)~(*) @: :%/--~ ))~: ~ (& when the cultivation of legal hemp was harm-) ~ :~(( ~--/%: \__"-==-===* ( ful or destructive to a society in any way! ) *===-==-"__/ (:"\_)_/ (<jay.hyden(a)alpha.c2.com> PublicKey on Servers) \_(_/":) .//:%:%:\. '---------------------------------------------' ./:%:%:\\. =000o====o000===================================================000o====o000= | | | | | | | | | | | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMGiLha7iRhcfEZiZAQEn0QP6A8cUmI0MHs866Mu/Ao4mFqr89F8tT3oP KeafNdSWJt8/pOlVZzQxV8P8S8dCkXwBgJJQaQ6tigqtD2+9fK1HEaWi3ZBAVgB+ CwLhqouwds2A5+l9riQfqAT+4yrSbeNR+bH3xyYa8zZSTzp5DB1tJEbWls6Kjr/w hxmFYrf6oSk= =oHrR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP and FBI?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's some sort of documentary on WBAI 99.5 FM out of NYC now. They're talking about PGP and right wing militias... the guy being interviewed called PGP a "one time pad system" and doesn't understand it... *sigh*

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chaos cryptography
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all - saw this in New Scientist and thought you might be interested (I guess it's more stenography than cryptography): ========== "Secret signals hidden in chaos ...John Hogan of the Engineering Mathematics department at Bristol showed the BA how such unpredictable systems can be used to protect sensitive information. His team mixed the information with chaotic electrical signals, transmitted the result, and then extracted the hidden message. Hogan and his team modified simple electrical circuits to generate unpredictable signals and hid within them a recording of "Land of Hope and Glory". When the two identical circuits are connected, said Hogan, the outputs instantly synchronise so that anything added to the transmission stands out. "It's like magic." he said. If anyone intercepted the signal and fed it through a loudspeaker all they would hear is a loud hiss. This makes the system suitable for hiding confidential information - once, that is, the system is perfected. At present, a decoded message sounds like a scratchy 78 recording although it is still recognisable, said Hogan. So far the researchers have succeeded only when the two circuits are connected by wire a few cm long. They are now trying to replicate the results in circuits that are seperated by long distances and connected by a radio link. They also want to see if it can be modified for use with digital equipment." ============ Sherry ps I wonder how close to real noise the "hiss" is.

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Fax encryption software
by Jonathan Blake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw this article in alt.privacy. Anybody think the described encryption actually is worth looking at. Xref: netcom.com alt.privacy:29325 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!uunet!in2.uu.net!news.deltanet.com!lkf0166 From: clav(a)deltanet.com Newsgroups: alt.privacy Subject: Re: FAX Encryption Software Date: Mon, 18 Sep 95 12:39:53 GMT Organization: Delta Internet Services, Anaheim, CA Lines: 59 Message-ID: <43k3nv$m9(a)news1.deltanet.com> References: <43hvft$n2b(a)news1.deltanet.com> <43ii1t$210(a)nntp.crl.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: lkf0166.deltanet.com X-Newsreader: News Xpress Version 1.0 Beta #3 Dear Mr. Chaos, We are talking about a 72 bit engine that is more than sufficiently strong for time sensitive general business purposes. In addition it does not rely merely on simple factoring but a process called graphical encryption that adds additional difficulty to an attack. I would like to see if your cracking abilities are anywhere near your abilities to return an uninformed answer. I invite you to try your skill. David _________________________________________________________________ _____________ In article <43ii1t$210(a)nntp.crl.com>, acollier(a)crl.com wrote: >clav(a)deltanet.com wrote: > >>ANYONE FOR A CRYPTO-STRONG, YET EASY TO USE FAX/EMAIL SECURITY >>SOFTWARE PACKAGE FOR BUSINESS OR OTHER USE??? > >>Aliroo Ltd. has developed a Windows, eye-to-eye fax/email >>encryption package called PrivaSoft. > >>Unlike any previously devised system, this method protects, with >>only 4 mouse clicks, fax and email transmissions in electronic >>and even paper form - FROM THE TIME YOU CREATE A MESSAGE UNTIL IT >>IS READ - NOT JUST WHEN YOUR FAX IS BEING TRANSMITTED. > >>You can encrypt a message, and then fax or email it (via plain >>old standard fax machine or fax modem), print it to paper or save >>to a disk file. > >>It is fully licensed, without restriction for export, by the U.S. >>Department of Commerce. NO PGP WORRIES. > >Also no worries about security - if DOC says you can have it, you can bet >that NSA has seen to it that it is cryptographically weak, or else uses a >key escrow system (where sombody else can get to the keys), and as insecure >as any other non-published method. For all we know, they may be using a >cereal box decoder ring set up. > >>Email me for a free copy which will be sent to you via email or >>snail mail post. It is fully functional (not crippleware) and >>enables you to try our system out before purchase with 8 free >>page scrambles. It retails for $130 per installed computer. >>Looking for end users and distributors. > >>Thanks, >>David > > -- To subscribe to Graphology-L send e-mail to: listserv(a)netcom.com / subject: leave blank message: subscribe graphology-l(a)netcom.com <your internet address> To get the Graphology-L FAQ send e-mail to grafolog(a)netcom.com / subject: hwafaq / no message ^

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Re: Yet Another Alarmist TV Show About Child Molesters on the Ne
by James Caldwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 25 Sep 95 at 0:06, Hroller Anonymous Remailer wrote: It's called the Hegelian Diclectic(sp?) first postulated by William Hegel (an ass) in Germany approx the 1600's as a method for social change when none could otherwise be achieved. > And the trashing will continue. It is the classic scenario. > Feed the media negative press clips about the entity you wish > to discredit (here, the Net), e.g.: > 1. All those pedophiles out to lure your children; > 2. Big coverage on catching some of those pedophiles; > 3. First page coverage on breaking Netscape's code with the > headlines that your sensitive information such as your > credit card numbers, etc. can be retrieved (ignoring that > the reason was to show Netscape's poorly structered code > would allow this and, therefore, preventing it before it > could happen); > 4. Expect cryptology to crop up in the Oklahoma bombing trial. > There already has been articles of those involved having > allegedly used that *damned* Net to correspond.

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Re: chaos cryptography
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Hi all - saw this in New Scientist and thought you might be interested >(I guess it's more stenography than cryptography): ^^^^^^^^^^^ Yes, chaotic communication is preferred by secretaries around the world. They follow their dictates. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Coercion-proof remailers (solved?)
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For a while I've been talking about the importance of a robust infrastructure for anonymity, including coercion-resistant remailers. Here is an approach that appears to eliminate the problem of after-the-fact coercion. Existing remailers chain messages by using a fixed public/secret key pair in each remailer. This leaves them open to after-the-fact compromise from the sender end. If you capture a message as the sender sends it, you can later get the key of the first remailer, and decrypt the first layer. You can then proceed on down the line to the recipient. This creates a motive for an attacker to coerce remailers, and it means the value of the remailers' keys continually increase as more messages are sent. Instead of using a fixed key, the sender can perform a Diffie-Hellman exchange with the recipient at each point in a message's passage. This eliminates the coercion problem, since there is no permanent key to steal, but allows a corrupt remailer to see where the message is going. If the first remailer is corrupt, the whole path is compromised. The next step is to make sure there is no first remailer. The sender S generates a message and header requesting mailing S to the recipient R. The sender splits it into two pieces using / \ a method that requires both pieces to recover any data. Then he 1 2 adds a header to each piece requesting remailing to remailer 3. \ / He sends one piece to remailer 1 and one piece to remailer 2. 3 The transmissions are protected by DH exchange and encryption. | Remailers 1 and 2 each send their pieces to remailer 3. These R transmissions are also protected by DH exchanges. Remailer 3 combines the two pieces, recovers the header requesting remailing to R, and sends the recovered message to R. This approach is secure against after-the-fact coercion or key theft, because there is no persistent key to recover. It is also secure against any one of the three remailers being corrupt. If 3 is corrupt, it sees both pieces as it combines them, and knows they came from 1 and 2, but does not know where 1 and 2 got them from. If 1 is corrupt, it knows that a message from S went to 3, but it has only half of the split message, so it can't find out where 3 sent it to. If any two of the three are corrupt, the path is exposed. It is possible to add more levels. This one uses seven remailers, /S\ and can survive any two being corrupt. Some questions I don't / | | \ know the answers to: What is the best possible arrangement of 1 2 3 4 remailers, so that the highest percentage of them have to be \ / \ / corrupt before the path is revealed? If any continuous line 5 6 from S to R is corrupt, the path is revealed. And if any two \ / remailers in a 'triangle' are corrupt, the whole triangle is 7 corrupt. For example, 1 and 2, 1 and 5, or 2 and 5. | Is there a better arrangement, reusing some remailers, that R allows the message to remain secure with a higher number of corrupt remailers in the path? Mike

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