December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Public Awarreness of Security
by Martin Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On October 11, 1995, John Markoff of the NYTimes writes: "Newly publicized weaknesses in the basic structure of the Internet [snip] .. advantage of the fault-finding talents of the Berkeley researchers and other like-minded experts, the company announced a contest today called Netscape Bugs Bounty [snip]" On October 11, 1995, Joan E. Rigdon of the Wall Street Journal writes: "The software industry is starting to sweep the bugs out of the closet [snip] ... Netscape is trying to systematically tap the intelligence of the hackers instead of randomly waiting for them to find mistakes. [snip]" Both of these stories bring out not only the flaws in the Internet and software to use the Internet, but also the work going on both at the software developers as well as that by groups such as ours that are active in identifying the risks. Congratulations to the Cypherpunks Martin G. Diehl

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Re: Basic Flaws in Internet Security and Commerce
by Herb Sutter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:33 1995.10.10 -0700, Patrick Horgan wrote: >Paul said: > >> A fine piece of work. The ideas expressed in this paper should scare >> the hell out of everyone who uses NFS for any serious applications, >> which for a fact includes most banks and all investment banks and >> brokage houses. In this particular area I KNOW what is at risk. >> Again, I congratulate the authors on a first-class effort. > >I agree, it's a good job of publicizing these holes, but (not to take >anything away from these guys, I'm sure they know this), these are not >newly found holes. These attacks on NFS have been known and exploited >for years and are well known within the security community. To repeat a comment I made in sci.crypt... the described hole applies equally well to a program (virus or other) that sits on a workstation and intercepts calls to OS file services. This is particularly pernicious on platforms like PCs, but are there any platforms that don't have this potential flaw? The main question, in my mind, is: How can a user know he is even running the app he thinks he's running? Once you have an attacker who can intercept OS file system calls, it seems to me you can know -nothing-... checksums are no use, signatures are no use, nothing is any use at that point -- including keeping your authent software on a floppy, write-protected or not, since it can simply be patched as it's read in, or the system may just execute a different program altogether. In fact, if it's properly done, there may not be any way to even detect that the system has in fact been subverted. So: If you can't trust your path to your own file system, what can you trust? (And this is without even talking about things like firmware upgrades and BIOS patches and all sorts of other potential approaches.) Can we do no better than simply assume the local workstation file system can be trusted? Herb ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Herb Sutter 2228 Urwin, Suite 102 voice (416) 618-0184 Connected Object Solutions Oakville ON Canada L6L 2T2 fax (905) 847-6019

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Mean Men in the Middle
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the MITM is really mean, he can overcome some of the suggestions I offered for how credentials can be used to defeat him. First, he could cause the user to download bad software. PGP, Netscape, and other secure programs could be patched to have holes. Even the checksum program could be altered so publishing checksums won't help. With this attack he would not even need to substitute keys; he can just make sure that the fake PGP picks guessable session and secret keys. Alternatively, he could defeat the use of key certificates which bind names to keys by the simple strategem of substituting the name of the user when he substitutes his keys. If Alice has all of her posts appearing under the name of "Bob" unbeknownst to her, then if Bob is the MITM he can get a certificate and publish it. All the messages which refer to "Bob" get changed to refer to "Alice" as they are passed from the net to her, similar to the key substitution which would also have to be done. If Bob's name were a bit unusual this could be done with a simple script. So even fully valid key certificates may not be effective against MITM attacks of this type. Hal

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Re: Hal's Third Challenge?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:05 PM 10/10/95 +0100, Piete Brooks wrote: >It seems that microsoft was the one to go for, as they too use 40 bit for >each session .... If someone can generate the CRACKing code and someone can >donate an example, I'd be DELIGHTED to arrange another BRUTE ! Could you at least run a server that's not doing anything so that those of us who want to install and test our clients can at least see if they work and go into "sleep" mode? DCF

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Re: spam detector algorithm?
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg Broiles writes: > I've been mulling over algorithmic/computational ways to spot spams > for some time now. I think I might've come up with a way to represent > messages (and compare representations) that would be useful to remailer > operators who don't want to let spams (where "spam" == many messages with > identical or very similar content) through their remailers. [many details elided...] > Any thoughts about this? Interesting? Stupid? Like I said, my math is weak. > My intention is to try to cobble up a 2d version of this to see how it runs > but I thought I'd see if anyone can point out why it can't work, or if it's > useful enough that someone with a better math background than I've got > wants to take this idea somewhere better. It sounds like you are liable to start reinventing parts of the field of information retrieval. The automatic construction and comparison of vectors of document parameters, as you suggested in the part I omitted, is one approach that has met with some success. (The common problem is, given a set of query attributes or a model document, to find relevant documents matching the query or similar to the model document. A variety of relevance measures has been considered.) I can't give you any specific pointers, but I advise you to check out existing implementations of these and other techniques for information retrieval before you spend too much time writing new code. FWIW, I _do_ think that such tactics would be very effective in combatting much of the spam served up these days. > One side effect to the deployment of spam detectors may be that the remailer > pinging services will need to move to using encrypted packets. [...] > My impression is (speak up if I'm wrong) that requiring encryption for the > ping packets wouldn't be an enormous burden on the pinging services because > the new generation of software sends fewer pinging packets such that the > CPU time required isn't an issue. Last time I looked, Raph's software already encrypts ping messages to remailers that have PGP keys. I assume you intend to perform the spam check after removing the optional outer layer of encryption on each incoming message. Perhaps the ping messages would survive unscathed if you only applied the spam scan to messages larger than some minimum size. I haven't seen too many 1 or 2 line spams. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Re: Hal's Third Challenge?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:45 PM 10/11/95 +0000, Magnus Logi Magnusson wrote: >Im interested too... if there is a 32 bit client for NT/Win95 (or a single >thredded one for Win32s) capable of reporting automatic to the >server/local server, I could probably throw in c.a. 40-50 pentiums and a >lot more 486 (and a few HP/Sun/Alpha) :-) Anyone working on self-reporting >win32 client? > Try: http://www.brute.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/pub/brute/w32clnt.zip DCF

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No Subject
by nobody＠flame.alias.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Two years ago, I pointed out that getting a single message past > the man in the middle isn't good enough; you have to convince your > readers that the key they received on one channel is more accurate > than the key they're receiving on all the other channels. > But if they'll believe that, they may also believe the man in the middle's > announcement that the key in your name on all the keyservers is > wrong, and the correct key is the one he's putting out. > Can't win either way, but it's still important to get the key out. > > My current key is 0x54696D4D; the fingerprint is > 4D 65 44 75 53 61 21 2F 41 73 55 64 85 6D 21 7F. but this is not Tim May's key, his key is: pub 1024/54E7483F 1992/11/20 Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> 11-20-92 Key fingerprint = 8C 79 1C 1B 6F 32 A1 D1 65 FB 5F 57 50 6D D3 28 And this one is signed by these people: pub 1024/54E7483F 1992/11/20 Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> 11-20-92 sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> sig 8F898631 Scott Collins (512) <Scott_Collins(a)genmagic.com> sig E972F011 E. Dean Tribble <tribble(a)xanadu.com> sig 4C131F57 Tim Oren <oren(a)apple.com> sig F5257117 <tomj(a)wps.com> sig 85197FB5 John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> at level two in the web of trust are these people: pub 512/F5257117 1992/09/28 <tomj(a)wps.com> sig B1331439 Randy Bush <randy(a)psg.com> Tom Jennings <tomj(a)fido.wps.com> sig DA0EDC81 Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig F572C6A7 Jim Cannell <Jim.Cannell(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org> sig 0BD91A2D Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig F5257117 <tomj(a)wps.com> Tom Jennings <tomj(a)fidosw.fidonet.org, 1:125/111> sig ADF733A9 Jesse David Hollington <1:225/1.1@fidonet.org> sig 4D077463 Steve Matzura <steve.matzura(a)f203.n2603.z1.fidonet.org> sig E7F23D95 Mike Laster <1:170/300.23@fidonet> sig DB910037 Barry Kapke <96:101/33@dharma> sig 5B77854F Depository #1 [Public Keys] sig 08F811DD Marcos R. Della <mdella(a)polyslo.calpoly.edu> sig 212EC54B Guy Martin 1:143/269 (guy.martin(a)f269.n143.z1.fidonet.org) sig F572C6A7 Jim Cannell <Jim.Cannell(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org> sig BDFB1F2D George Gleason <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> sig 8F898631 Scott Collins (512) <Scott_Collins(a)genmagic.com> sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> sig E972F011 E. Dean Tribble <tribble(a)xanadu.com> sig 4C131F57 Tim Oren <oren(a)apple.com> sig 85197FB5 John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> sig DA27EC35 Wes Perkhiser <wes.perkhiser(a)weise.omahug.org> sig E7960501 Paul Schencke <1:135/340@fidonet.org> sig 9DB252DF Mike Riddle sig 734B9A59 Christopher Baker <1:374/14@fidonet.org> sig B1B6B823 GK Pace @ 1:374/26 <gk.pace(a)f26.n374.z1.fidonet.o pub 1024/85197FB5 1992/11/08 John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> sig 5ACB1C6D (Unknown signator, can't be checked) sig 15100C27 (Unknown signator, can't be checked) sig DA0EDC81 Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig 0BD91A2D Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig 9F9F38BB Mark Eichin <eichin(a)athena.mit.edu> sig 5B415621 Mark Eichin <eichin(a)paycheck.cygnus.com> sig 66CE89B7 Mark Eichin <eichin(a)cygnus.com> sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> sig BDFB1F2D George Gleason <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> sig 8F898631 Scott Collins (512) <Scott_Collins(a)genmagic.com> sig 0245C435 Dave Krieger <dkrieger(a)netcom.com> sig 4C131F57 Tim Oren <oren(a)apple.com> sig E972F011 E. Dean Tribble <tribble(a)xanadu.com> sig F5257117 <tomj(a)wps.com> sig 71946BDF Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> If you knew any of the level 1, or level 2 signatories personally and had exchanged keys face to face, you'd have some assurance. Also this level 3: pub 1024/DA0EDC81 1994/07/25 Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig ED2354B9 Ulla Sandberg <ulla(a)stupi.se> sig 9C57B951 Peter Lothberg <roll(a)stupi.se> sig C7A966DD Philip R. Zimmermann <prz(a)acm.org> PRZ, as your PGP distrbution is probably signed by this key, unless you've inspected the source personally, you're relying on this key anyway. Level 4 would be a big web as lots of people fan out from PRZ.

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Re: PKP Lawsuit progress report
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roger Schlafly sez -=*|| \/ > > (3) There will be a hearing on the patent validity (and a couple of > annoying technical legal issues) at 10:00 am, Dec. 6, 1995, in the > court of Judge Spencer Williams, Federal Bldg, 280 S. First St, > San Jose CA 95113. The US court clerk is at 408-291-7783. It is > open to the public. Thanks for letting us know. I'll be there unless they chain me to my desk at work;) Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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Re: Man in the Middle Revisited (but not for the last time)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:38 AM 10/11/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Nope. au contraire, negatory. I *do not* care if the entity calling itself >"Hal Finney" is being surrounded by an MITM. Only "Hal Finney the Key" can >read messages I encrypt to the public key I got from him long ago, so if >the "Hal + MITM" can do so, they are effectively one and the same. Not a new problem BTW as in the old joke: "The Iliad wasn't written by Homer but by another guy of the same name." For the non-classically inclined, this is a joke because we don't really know anything about Homer anyway. Maybe he was a blind poet. Maybe he never existed. DCF "Who wonders why his local B&N StuporStore has 1/2 of one section of one shelf unit dedicated to classics and shelf unit upon shelf unit dedicated to the gender-disabled, to women, to native americans, to new age mysticism, and other garbage. Particularly since those interest areas represent the losers. Who's interested in losers? (We know they're losers BTW because we're *reading* about them in a capitalist store. If they'd won there'd be no reading and no store."

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Re: Netscape & Fortessa
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:12 10/11/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >I wasn't aware of that -- I believe that this may have happened >because those of us who cared didn't attend the zoo in Stockholm. The >meeting was a complete joke, with the Microsoft people and others >making it clear that they didn't intend to follow the process. Many of >us who cared decided to do better things with our time instead of >showing up in the aptly named Weapons room for the second session. Unfortunately, I wasn't in Stockholm. I just follow the discussion on the mailing list. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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