December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: airport security
by Bob Bruen, MIT Lab for Nuclear Science 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Futplex writes: >DCF writes: >[re: shwoing picture ID to board commercial flights in the U.S.] >> I wonder how many have challenged this. >Any pointers to news articles or govt. press releases that actually state >some rationale for the ID checks, however spurious ? >> I suppose they are trying to discourage people from buying tickets in >> false names so that the databanks can be more useful to the authorities. >It's bad enough that it is "illegal" (at least according to some recent ARC >flight coupons of mine) to sell or otherwise transfer your tickets to someone >else. I'd love to see them try to justify crap like that. Without actually agreeing with the FAA, the reason you can't have a name other than your own on your ticket, as well as why you are required to be in your assigned seat on take-off and landing is because if there is a plane crash, they need to be able to identify an otherwise difficult to identify body. This does have some relevance to airport security if a plane is blown up. Sorry about this, Bob

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Re: crypto export from the UK
by jbaber＠mi.leeds.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> wrote: > Could people in the UK please tell me what the crypto export > laws are like there? I know someone who wrote some really great crypto > code in the UK but isn't willing to distribute it because of crypto > export laws... I was under the impression that it was legal to export > crypto from the UK. I believe that the laws regarding the export of crypto from the UK are very similar to the ITAR regs in the US. However our Government seems to take the view that putting crypto software on the net is not exporting it, the exporting is done whenever anyone from an export restricted country downloads the software and is done by them rather than by the person who made the software available. Strong crypto is therefore openly available from a number of places in this country, particually sable.ox.ac.uk at the university of Oxford. Of course IANAL and the government may change it's mind about the interpretation of these things but I would expect that your acquaintance would be perfectly safe distributing his software via sable (the ftp site (and its predicessor) have been distributing crypto software for a number of years and I have not heard of any problems). Jon C. Baber jbaber(a)mi.leeds.ac.uk http://www.chem.surrey.ac.uk:80/~ch02jb

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How was the Federal thing?
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Can someone please offer a suummary of the Federal Courthouse thing? Love Always, Carol Anne...now hooked on "Court Cypherpunk" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMIbw3IrpjEWs1wBlAQGbnwQAjzxulfm3DEporCzZic9Jb6Isq1Jvx8yU M0y/e7npkNc+lVJ5M+aieFiGBormWsiYvAzGBqhK4H9OXs2J+HQX5sDs4LO9jqLj 52x5yc8djJN1opMdmi9g+V5/A8MzpBz32v9QzbRrZAAcRwWf9r9BK9edfvlhWqko fZk8kv1F+8s= =CrJS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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SciAm's Crypto Stego Pushup
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Scientific American, November, 1995 Doing Business on the Net By Anne Eisenberg Like the leaves of autumn, those resolutely noncommercial days on the Internet when ads were anathema are dwindling fast. Nowadays the Internet's World Wide Web has so much commercial promise that it has spun off an association called the HTML Writers' Guild (http: //www.mindspring.com). You can hire one of its members literate in Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML is the language of the Web) to create dramatic "home pages," sites on the Web where a growing number of businesses advertise their wares. "We're there for the same reason we have banks in malls," one Citibank executive explained. "It's where people congregate." Web ads are quickly evolving into arresting combinations of sound, text and vivid, point-and-click picture links called image maps. Computer science students who were once stern critics of business on the Net now eye the ads appreciatively, so long as they are not "in your face" -- inserted where people have no choice but to look at them. Besides, commercials may one day pay for Net services, much as they now underwrite programs on radio and television. And the ads are convenient: click on the icon, read about the product and order, all in one step. Many companies arc poised to put not only advertisements but entire catalogues on the Web as routinely as they now list their services in me Yellow Pages. After all, if e-mail could hatch a generation of letter writers by eliminating the bother of envelopes and stamps, surely commerce should blossom when paper catalogues fall, and we all start buying straight from the screen. For business to thrive, though, people will need a secure way to pay and be paid on the leaky Net, where messages containing credit-card numbers can be intercepted as they travel from machine to machine. And all those prospective shoppers, entrepreneurs and micromerchants will want not only secure payment mechanisms but also a choice -- cash, check or charge -- before they hit the convenient, brightly colored order links. Inspired by a vision of untold millions buying and selling on the Net, companies and banks (among them Chase Manhattan, Citibank, CyberCash, DigiCash, Mondex and Microsoft) have joined what is being called the Gold Rush of 1995, as they race to become the Great Central Biller in the Sky. No victors have yet emerged, but early leaders are probably going to provide security in the form of public-key, (PK) cryptography, ingenious algorithms that use pairs of unique numerical "keys" for encoding and decoding messages. If you use PK software for an online shopping trip, you will have your own pair of keys, one public and one as private as the identification number you use to get cash from an automated teller machine. When you order, your program will automatically encrypt the information with your private key. When the company uses your public key to decode the order, it will know without question that the message was generated by you -- the match is the digital signature that authenticates the transaction. Companies in turn will encrypt messages to you with your public key; the messages will be secure, for only you can decrypt and read them, using your private key. Netscape and other new Web browsers -- software that lets you travel to linked Internet resources without typing complicated addresses -- are known as encrypting browsers; they are ready to help you shop securely on the Net. Some will even come with built-in PK signatures. Whether the cryptographically cloaked digits of e-money will bestow privacy in addition to security is another, far more contentious matter. When people start using e-wallets instead of cash to rent a video or lend a friend $20, fertile new areas for infringing on privacy will bloom. Electronic dossiers can be compiled by automated systems that track spending habits. Many people will not want the details of their daily lives collected and stored in, say, consumer preference data banks, joining the folders that already document their health and credit ratings. Only a few of the emerging electronic payment systems address privacy issues. The untraceable digital cash closest to hand is probably Chaumian cash, named in honor of David Chaum, founder of DigiCash and of the cryptographic protocols that underlie his anonymous digital-money technology. Chaum's patented e-cash is an adaptation of PK cryptography that includes one-way privacy for the payer. The bank can verify that the money is genuine but is blinded from identifying the source. This means you will be able to prove you have made a payment when you need to, but the bank cannot flick a switch to retrieve the records of your travel and entertainment preferences and add them to its data-mining operations. The terminology of electronic commerce reflects the clash of cultures that has come about as the youthful language of the Net meets the austere discourse of banking. The jaunty "e-" prefix has attached itself firmly to Nettish talk of the e-wallets and e-purses that we will soon be using to make our e-payments. But bankers resist this linguistic cheeriness. They substitute "digital" for "electronic" whenever possible and never shorten it to "d-" when they speak of the digital time stamps and digital signatures they will soon offer us to authenticate our digital payments. And cryptography (known affectionately as crypto on the Net) is still a four-syllable word at the bank, where it is against nature for managers to be linguistically fond of any action that commits them to untraceable communications and exchanges. We will know the new, hybrid field of electronic commerce is truly on its way when banking ads on the Web offer "strong crypto" and even, as a backup, steganography (the science of hiding the existence of messages in, say, microdots or sound files) for telephone chats with loan officers. On the Net, of course, this service is already known as stego. ----- Anne Eisenberg (aeisenb(a)duke.poly.edu) conducts her e-business at Polytechnic University in Brooklyn, N.Y.

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Re: DalSemi: Add-Only Memory for Storage of Digital Cash (fwd)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:46 PM 10/19/95, Nathan Loofbourrow wrote: (quoting someone else...) > > Perhaps someone with more semiconductor physics background > > can correct me, but my understanding is that some kinds of nuclear > > radiation can be used to erase OTP EPROMS. I suppose this might damage Sure, x-rays can erase EPROM cells. (Not the dosages found in airport x-ray machines, anticipating the usual question someone raises when they hear this.) > > the crystal lattice badly enough to render the device useless in > > some bit positions or reduce data retention time a lot, but I sure > > wouldn't bet any security on devices out there not being > > arbitrarily reprogrammable (thus using bits to represent digital > > coins in a wallet that get reset when they are spent is not a > > good idea). The details of whether one can x-ray (or gamma-ray, etc.) erase a one-time programmable (OTP) device without semi-permanently damaging it depend on a lot of factors. Generally, an EPROM-based OTP device will erase under irradiation before it is damaged. (At least this was my experience. Your erasage may vary.) >You might want to take a look at the paper I mentioned, then: I >believe that irradiation of the OTP EPROM to return all bits to "ones" >is too blunt a tool to do you any good. A virgin EPROM has a value of >zero in the suggested scheme. And, as mentioned, flipping random sets >of bits is strongly likely to get you caught. Whether a floating gate empty of electrons ("erased") is considered to be a "zero" or a "one" is wholly dependent on conventions in the design....one manufacturer may treat "erased" bits as zeroes, another as ones. (The sense of the charge may invert several times on the way through the sense amplifiers and decoding logic.) Bottom line: I'd take a bet that I could bulk-erase a Dallas Semi chip without damaging it permanently, even if lacked a transparent lid. But I wouldn't take a bet that I can then reprogram it so as to spoof another such chip. Continuing on to some other points: >I seem to remember PROMs actually undergoing physical, rather than >electrical, state changes (that were presumably nonreversible). Am I >recalling old technology, or am I just plain mistaken? There are several kinds of "programmable read-only memories" (PROMs): * Fusible-link PROMs, in which a silicon, nichrome, or other fuse is "blown" by passing an appropriate current through the fuse. These are indeed nonreversible changes (though a failure mechanism is for fuses to "grow back"). And there are variants involving "anti-fuses." * _Erasable_ PROMs, in two main categories: - UV-EPROMs, or just EPROMs, in which a dosage of UV light through a transparent window (quartz or sapphire) erases the EPROM cells. This works by the UV photons supply enough energy to the electrons stored in isolated ("floating") polysilicon gates so tha they leave the floating gates and are conducted away. Programming is done by forcing electrons to be avalanche-injected onto the floating gates. - EE-PROMs, or EEPROMs, or "E-squared PROMs," in which UV light is not needed. A suitable electrical bias can cause a cell to be erased (i.e., to allow electrons on floating gates to leave). * And there are all sorts of wrinkles, variants, and other issues: - Transparent lids vs. no lids. EEPROMs obviously need no transparent lids. Even EPROMs may be built without transparent lids, if the intended use is for customers to program them _once_ and only once ("OTP"). - Bit-erase vs. block-erase. Whether individual bits in an EEPROM can be erased without neighboring bits being erased. A design issue. (Obviously UV-EPROMs are only used in block-erase situations, where the block is the entire memory.) Intel built a "Key-PROM," circa 1983-5, in which the innards were somewhat encrypted against outside-reading. My electron-beam testing lab was able to image the internal states of these devices and so bypass the encryption. (But it was enough for casual use to foil certain types of copying.) I hope this helps. Semiconductor physics is its own specialty, like crypto. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [NOISE] Re: Postscript in Netscape
by pdlamb＠iquest.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) wrote: >> > The point I have been trying to make that many on this list seem to ignore >> > again and again, is that Netscape makes the security claims. If you don't >> > provide effective protection, don't make the claim. If you want to make >> > the claim back it up with something other than media hype. >> >> We are working on clarifying our security claims. Here is an >> example from the San Jose Mercury news on Aug. 17, 1995: >> >> "We have said for a long time that given the right amount of >> computer power, that a 40-bit key encrypted message could be >> decrypted," said Mike Homer, Netscape's vice president of marketing. > > "We" - I take it you are now speaking officially for Netscape? So how come > Netscape doesn't even know how about Integrity shells and yet claims to > be able to design secure systems for money transfers? <flame=on> Give it a rest, Doc. You give all the rest of us Ph.D.'s a bad rep with this crap. Of course, if you went to that 4-year vocational school to get an M.D., I guess that's understandable. If you are so illiterate that you can't read the ascription (it says right up there, "said Mike Homer, Netscape's vice president of marketing"), then why do you (a) waste bandwidth and our time to go through this drivel, and (b) flame one Netscape employee for not knowing everything you know? If there are all of 5+ refereed publications in this area, how about giving references? It would take up less space than your recurring venom eruption! Or couldn't you understand the papers, given that you couldn't understand the news clip... <flame=off> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzACleQAAAEH/2+41W3bZPuWU1gv6A0bq3a57bgCiCAbU1QY41f+NI1I8i/+ a/L314RIpCR0iCZhsNMHNI9rVovsbmOQE4Cf9YYL3cClUoE2VAsLOi9LAjlN8qYc kmAqpsGQ39eaKrnlC/0lxJtFZgypT4m9UIsTU986y3gyy+ZTWwxtbDaLBEdsTiH/ e+zosoBiXmwWYY1n+5yvaKLGMUwa20AKdoRCUgqhJQpkW0nAvItU6WhaqxwH6JXp KCNsuP6k8FBmcKZfSSvUphSOIJnARAq9K9UPhj5BeAy1vKZ416jfgeYQUTxHQOMT rTiQOYR/oAR35gBpGYg6p1lu6Ma5eDPtpBPadUUABRG0IFBhdHJpY2sgTGFtYiA8 cGRsYW1iQGlxdWVzdC5jb20+ =DZzp -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Oppenheimer Quote Regarding Government Secrecy and Public Policy
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rather liked this quote regarding the development of the super in the 1950s. J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, July 1953, p. 525. [We must have] candor on the part of the officials of the United States Government to the officials, the representatives, the people of their country. We do not operate well when the important facts, the essential conditions, which limit and determine our choices are unknown. We do not operate well when they are known, in secrecy and in fear, only to a few men. The political vitality of our country largely derives form two sources. One is the interplay, the conflict of opinion and debate, in may diverse and complex agencies, legislative and executive, which contribute to the making of policy. The other is a public opinion which is based on confidence that it knows the truth. Today public opinion cannot exist in this field. No responsible person will hazard and opinion in a field where he believes that there is somebody else who knows the true, and where he believes that he does not know it. ------------------------- Regards, I hate people when they aren't polite - Talking Heads Joseph M. Reagle Jr. http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88

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ABA guidelines no longer read-only
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am informed by the webmaster of the page holding the guidelines that the Section leadership has authorized him to make the text downloadable and that he will make it available in various formats very soon. This desirable result was, however, in no way helped by what I am also informed was juvenile and in at lest one instance threatening email sent to the parties involved. That the mail identified itself as originating from members of this list -- and in response to my message announcing the site existed -- can only have the result of devaluing any comment I and other people on this list may make. Not a pretty sight. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's hot here. And humid.

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Tabling Results for Primes Considered Hard
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:29 PM 10/19/95, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: >And how secure is the hash? It it possible to create values that will >hash to each prime (or something else that does the job)? Is the hash >something we can figure a way to precompute using massively parallel >processing so that we can then provide a set of codes which will produce >the desired results? (etc.) There are a lot of primes. Parallel processors will not help much. (These are deliberately understated points, natch.) With even such "small" RSA moduli as 200 digits, made up of primes of roughly 100 digits each, the computed hashes of these numbers would fill the universe many times over. (There are estimated to be about 10^75 particles of all types in the entire universe, so each particle would be "responsible" for storing the results (?) for about 10^20 or more primes.) There may be many more flaws and points of attack in Netscape and SSl, but precomputing hashes of the primes is not one of them. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: SciAm Bye-Byes Privacy
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Scientific American, November, 1995 > >Rights of Privacy > >Technology has its eyes on you > >But the search for personalization in a high-tech world >may create an uncomfortable situation in the global >village. Villages are safe places but not very private >ones. Mrs. Grundy, peering from behind her lace curtains, >did stop housebreakers. but she also tried to halt many >other things of which she disapproved. There are signs >that Grundyism is returning to Britain. For those who have neglected their education: 1798 Theater --- "Speed the Plough" by English playwright Thomas Morton, 34. "Be quiet, wull ye [says farmer Ashfield]. Always ding, dinging Dame Grundy into my ears-What will Mrs. Grundy say? What will Mrs. Grundy think?" DCF

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