December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and fails?
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Rollins writes: > If this is the file that the Co$ is trying to crack, then what the > is being asked for is a pass phrase that can be handed to the Co$ > that will pass the PGP valid key check and still not decrypt the > data to anything usefull. Well, I don't have the PGP 'conventional' encryption format memorized, but there is probably a constant after the IV that is prepended to the data. The constant is used to determine if the key is correct. Since the conventional encryption runs in CFB mode and there is a full block of random IV at the beginning of the file, it is extremely unlikely that a key could be found that would properly decrypt only the first two blocks while leaving the rest unreadable... > If Larry Wollersheim does have the valid key. It would be a simpler > process to know what fake key to use and work it backwards through > the MD5 to arrive at an ascii string to produce the fake key. Not really. Even if you could find an IDEA key that would produce the desired output it would be hard to find a passphrase that would produce that key when hashed. One of the properties of one-way hash functions is that it is difficult to find a plaintext that produces a given hash. Hence the term 'one-way'.... Even if you did find a passphrase (which, if MD5 is strong, would require something like 2^64 operations), it would likely be long, have 8-bit chars, and would be impossible to type in. It would be tough to convince anyone that it was the real passphrase. andrew

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Text tracking
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 11 Sep 1995 owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com wrote: > Hal Finney wrote: > > > I'm not sure how to do it for software, but for novels it > > should be easy to fingerprint. Every couple of pages the > > author writes a sentence twice in different forms. This would > > not take a great deal of extra effort on the part of the > > author. > > Perhaps. Some authors might be offended by the idea that > using a different form of a sentence doesn't affect the work. Examples of "text tracking" in documents where language specificity is important (legal, scientific) are typically marked with changes in the justification scheme, i.e. the number of spaces to the right, number of lines to a page, number of pages total, etc. etc. Clearly it is much more difficult to apply in digital schemes, but consider that in order to modify the scheme to avoid traceback to the distributer, one of two conditions must exist. 1> The distributer must be close to the initial release point. (If not, then all documents ABOVE the distributer in the chain will be text tracked, and all the documents BELOW the distributer will not. Clearly this will brand the distributer). 2> The distributer must be entirely outside the 'legal' distribution scheme. Remember also that uniform modification of text tracking methods is itself identifying unless several 'illegal' distributers are using the same sanitizing method. The same way you can get surgery to have fingerprints removed, but the resulting scars make you all the more identifiable.

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Re: cryptography eliminates lawyers?
by dsc＠swcp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn wrote, >But won't clients insist on proper credentials in one form or another? Yes. >Doesn't the practicality and accountability of a centralized authority >(or several authorities) provide the best answer to this? No. >Who is going >to accept my signature promising that I did indeed get a law degree and >pass the bar? Very few. Certification can be from multiple private and government organizations and might vary depending on the type of legal service (or other lawyer service) needed. Licensing can only be done by an entity that can use physical force to prevent buying and selling legal services. >I don't see how the net will eliminate the basic need for highly >qualified professionals and the proof that they have credentials. It won't. The needs might shift a little but they will be there. >Perhaps diplomas and such will be transfered into digital signatures for >the institutions, but I can't see how this "cracks" any "monopoly." >Perhaps the monopoly is shifted to those who have diplomas, rather than >those "licensed to practice" but so what? It might "crack" government enforced monopoly. Should a market monopoly survive some form of crypto-anarchy it would be in the form of a certification entity that does such a good and efficient job that it is very hard to break into the business. Not so bad if it happens, but much more honest, efficient and softer-edged than "licensed to practice". I suspect that people have needs for varying levels and varying specializations so that several kinds of certifications may develop and might be supplied by multiple entities. I suspect that many people would want a certification that a lawyer meets the usual licensing requirements of the outside world. Who knows, maybe that would be the most popular kind. But it won't be the only kind. Dar =========================================================== Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com Fax: +1 505 898 6525 http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html ===========================================================

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Re: cryptography eliminates lawyers?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 13 Sep 1995, Dar Scott wrote: > Black Unicorn wrote, > >But won't clients insist on proper credentials in one form or another? > > Yes. > > >Doesn't the practicality and accountability of a centralized authority > >(or several authorities) provide the best answer to this? > > No. > > >Who is going > >to accept my signature promising that I did indeed get a law degree and > >pass the bar? > > Very few. > > Certification can be from multiple private and > government organizations and might vary depending > on the type of legal service (or other lawyer service) > needed. Didn't I just say this above? A centralized, or several centralized authorities. I guess the center of my question is, how can you apply Web of Trust to e.g. a university degree. Who cares what Bob and Alice think my degree is in, the client only wants to know from the institution. Licensing can only be done by an > entity that can use physical force to prevent > buying and selling legal services. I believe you are incorrect, but I guess my main concern is your characterization of "Physical force." I am assuming you mean coercion, and not that you will be jailed or such (though this may be the case). I would argue that as long as coercion exists (violence of any type, physical or not) you have a licensing authority. Take the hollywood blacklist. No one actually pushed around suspected pinko screenwriters (well, at least, if anyone did, it was incendential) but they certainly faced a great deal of persuasive motivation. Look at the committee as the licensing authority here. (Licensing you as a non-communist as it were). If several governmental and private authorities were in the practice of certifing that Bob has a law degree from Tremont University, and that he is competent to practice in D.C., and given that the citizens of D.C. will look for these credentials, isn't this a license? Afterall, Bob has to pass some test or requirement to get the signatures. Isn't this coercion in your definition? Can't the multiple authorities set common or near common guidelines? Rather, don't they HAVE to in order to have their signatures worth the electrons they are transmitted with? If you take the exteme position you seem to, there's an antitrust case here. Am I not "licensing" my key signature to people provided they pass my key signature criteria? Am I not doing violence by withholding my signature and the benefits it might convey for certain "terms?" In this definition, all trusted authorities are by definition licensing. Either their signature is worth nothing, and thus they are not coercive by witholding it, or it is worth something, and thus to be non-coercive they must give it to anyone who asks, rendering their signatures worthless. This is the trap of the licensing argument. The evil is not licensing, which I think serves a real purpose, but created convenience fees, taxation through the withholding of licensing and the use of other government largess. I wrote a massive piece on this and sent it to the list about a year and a half ago. With interest I will repost it. The real question is how you decide what an authority to license is. Is it to be dictated by government? Or by market forces (i.e. the reputation of the licenser). > > >I don't see how the net will eliminate the basic need for highly > >qualified professionals and the proof that they have credentials. > > It won't. The needs might shift a little but they > will be there. Then why will lawyers, or a 'professional monopoly' be broken? > >Perhaps diplomas and such will be transfered into digital signatures for > >the institutions, but I can't see how this "cracks" any "monopoly." > >Perhaps the monopoly is shifted to those who have diplomas, rather than > >those "licensed to practice" but so what? > > It might "crack" government enforced monopoly. Now you are getting more specific. > Should a market monopoly survive some form of > crypto-anarchy it would be in the form of a > certification entity that does such a good and > efficient job that it is very hard to break > into the business. Agreed. Again, what does this do to lawyers? See my above comments on what constitutes a license. > Not so bad if it happens, > but much more honest, efficient and softer-edged > than "licensed to practice". I'm not so sure. There will be a tremendous amount of corporate power in these authorities, and if (as you seem to be saying a few paragraphs up) it is hard to break into the trusted certification business, there is a monopoly again. > I suspect that > people have needs for varying levels and varying > specializations so that several kinds of > certifications may develop and might be supplied > by multiple entities. Like the several state Bars? Hint: An attorney licensed in Deleware has a much different speciality likely than one licensed in Alabama. > I suspect that many people would want a > certification that a lawyer meets the usual > licensing requirements of the outside world. > Who knows, maybe that would be the most popular kind. > But it won't be the only kind. So you have estentially admitted that a central authority is required? Or will be more often used? So is this a license or what? Looks like one to me. If your defintion of license is simply who does the coercing, I think you should reconsider. > Dar > > =========================================================== > Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 > > Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 > 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com > Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com > Fax: +1 505 898 6525 > http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html > =========================================================== > > >

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re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P. Trei writes > "CYPHERPUNK" considered harmful > I would like to propose that we, the 'cypherpunks', are making a > strategic error, which will make it far more difficult to achieve the > goal we share. > Our error lies in our approach to encouraging the widespread use of > crypto. It is an error of hubris - overweening pride. > We too often think of ourselves as an elite - smarter and better in > various ways to our non-cpunk neighbours. We refer to these others as > 'Joe Sixpack" and other such derogatary terms. I think thsi is confusing two separate things. The need to publicise and encourage the use of crypto is important to many of us and lots of us do this in various ways (web pages, magazine articles etc). The other aspect of the cypherpunks is writing code, discussing protocols etc, some of which is fairly arcane stuff and is by necessity the interest of an "elite" (as you put it). I think the success of this list lies in the mixture. > I suggest that we drop the term 'cypherpunk' - it has the wrong > connotations to get our ideas into the mainstream. I don't have a > perfect replacement yet: I'll come clean and say that initially the term "cypherpunks" made me cringe (and still does, maybe 'cos I'm a brit ;-) ;-) but I certainly remembered it and it stuck in my mind enough to get me interested in this stuff in the first place. In short, don't ditch the name because if nothing else it *is* memorable, much more so that some more comventional tag. However, you do make some bloody good points about not alienating more conservative people by coming over all crypto-anarchist (or whatever your particular bent is) when encouraging/publicising the use of crypto. The "why use crypto" questions and answers was a good example of how to appeal to a more conservative viewpoint. When trying to find out about crypto intially on the WWW I was rather overwhelmed by the number of political rants and a bit underwhelmed by the lack of solid info. This situation has improved a lot in the last 2 years but still needs work IMHO. [An aside to Web page maintainers... <whinge> Another thing to consider (for Web sites in particular) is that people from _all over the world_ will be reading it. If your site is a fairly central one, bear in mind that a lot of rants about congress trampling all over the Nth amendment mean bugger all to a lot of us furriners, and come over as a bit parochial. I'm not saying a local perspective is a bad thing, just that it shouldn't be the only thing. </whinge> ] my 2c worth Sherry

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MS-Word macros disassembler/cracker?
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was on the Info-Sec mailing list and appears to be a request for help in cracking some sort of execute-only wrappers on MicroSoft Word-for-Windows macros, the concern being that the macros need to be defused if they're malignant. If anybody wants to, they may respond right to: njb(a)csehost.knoware.nl <Niels J. Bjergstrom>. . . . . >All the macros are made ExecuteOnly, meaning that they are compiled or >encrypted so that the Word macro interpretor can execute them, but they >cannot be listed or edited. Does anyone reading this list happen to know >where we can find a cracker or disassembler for ExecuteOnly Word macros? It >is of vital importance that we are able to read malignant Word macros, and >any help will be appreciated. . . . . >macro vira to us at the email address below. And I repeat: We are very >interested in obtaining a cracker for the Word macro language >encryptor/compiler. We haven't looked at this yet. For all we know it could >be very simple, but any info is appreciated. > >Niels > >-- Niels J Bjergstrom, Ph.D., m/ISACA Tel. +31 70 362 2269 -- >-- Computer Security Engineers, Ltd. Fax. +31 70 365 2286 -- >-- Postbus 85 502, NL-2508 CE Den Haag London: +44 181 519 8011 -- >-- Netherlands Email: njb(a)csehost.knoware.nl -- >-- PGP Public key available on request - please use when mailing vira --

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Factoring Software (fwd)
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just saw this on Usenet, was wondering who knows this guy. Obviously not a cpunk or it would have hit the list right away. Not in the mood to run code on my account without knowing that I know what it will do. From: bobs(a)mathworks.com (Bob Silverman) Newsgroups: sci.math,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,sci.math.num-analysis,comp.arch.arithmetic Subject: Factoring Code Date: 13 Sep 1995 09:22:38 -0400 Organization: The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA 01760 Lines: 41 Distribution: inet Message-ID: <436luu$3lu(a)puff.mathworks.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: puff.mathworks.com Several people have requested factoring code recently. After thinking about it I have decided to offer a deal. I do not have the machine resources I once had, and have some numbers that I would like factored. They are in the 80-90 digit range. My code will do an 85 digit number in about 500 hours on a single Sparc-10. The code is perfectly parallelizable, so 40 machines will do 85 digits overnight. Run time for QS can vary by a factor of 2.5 depending on how "rich" the number being factored is in small quadratic residues. I will make available my complete Multiple Polynomial Quadratic Sieve code, along with instructions, to anyone who will factor at least one of these numbers. This code includes the siever, the code to combine large primes, the matrix solver (a naiive Gaussian elim over GF(2), but one which solves a 25K x 25K system in 15 min on a single Sparc), and the code to multiply everything together and find the factors. I will also throw in a routine which reads the output file and scans for bad relations. Sometimes, when running on many machines, I/O errors creep into the output files. A machine can go down when writing a record, or there can be a network problem etc. I also have a program which excizes bad records in the output files And one which sets up multiple sub-directories with the proper data files so one can run in parallel. Also included is a program which scans the output files in these multiple sub-directories and counts the number of relations found. There is also a program to predict (fairly accurately!) how close to done you are based on output from the counting program. This code will also include a decent collection of fast, very portable multiple precision routines. All this is for the taking if you guarantee to factor just one number for me. - -- Bob Silverman The MathWorks Inc. 24 Prime Park Way Natick, MA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMFd5fsLa+QKZS485AQELHAL/QS2LizHGSzT7h3b8cU78GiR9QLoaQ6zf FEEyt8XRDFqlUe7CKFfDKB1SPPviAZeBPM4XDfswfvfXpKNLamZQUNc7VYgzPIC0 3knFeQf2A/zWuGBZQp/TM0xBcwKW5lW7 =Zyke -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://bert.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Death threats ALWAYS pgp signed * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company *

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"Who knows this guy?"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:39 AM 9/14/95, don(a)cs.byu.edu wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Just saw this on Usenet, was wondering who knows this guy. Obviously not >a cpunk or it would have hit the list right away. Not in the mood to run >code on my account without knowing that I know what it will do. > > >From: bobs(a)mathworks.com (Bob Silverman) >Newsgroups: >sci.math,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,sci.math.num-analysis,comp.arch.arithme >tic It's funny, this thing about names and reputations. You see, I know the name "Bob Silverman," and his company, Mathworks, a whole lot more than I know the name "don(a)cs.byu.edu". Mathworks was heavily in the news last fall during the Pentium debacle (including someone I used to know from Intel, Cleve Moler). I've only seen the posts of "don(a)cs.byu.edu" since 8-29-95, just the last two weeks. (I don't claim to have a complete archive, as I delete a lot of stuff. But this is the earliest don(a)cs.byu.edu post I can find.) Certainly I am not impugning the reputation of don(a)cs.byu.edu, just noting the irony of him asking for if anyone knows who Bob Silverman is. Strange days. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Key Escrow as Law Enforcement's *Worst Nightmare*
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Be careful what you ask for--you might get it." (Albanian Proverb) I'll summarize my post with my last line: In short, key escrow could be law enforcement's worst nightmare, as it truly opens up the Web as a worldwide, distributed file system. At 6:31 PM 9/12/95, S. Keeling wrote: > I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you >to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to >patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your >hard disk. The first thing they do is make a copy of everything, so >they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying >around all over the place, don't you? This is a main reason why "key escrow" is a double-edged sword for Law Enforcement. That is, it is not an unadulterated "win" for them. Consider the easy availability of a "key escrow" system (I'm deliberately avoiding calling it either SKE, or CKE, or GAK) in which files may be locally encrypted with the files, local decryption software, etc., stored locally--but with efficient fast-erase methods (ranging from the oft-mentioned "thermite charge" to a more user-friendly overvoltage to fry the motherboard (for example, just to make the point). (My point is not to speculate on what a "dead man switch" might look like, but merely to look at the implications of widespread key escrow and data destruction tools.) Key escrow, with the keys deposited safely with one's "Family" (in both senses of the term), and/or with one's lawyer, and/or in offshore locations) could make the use of dead man switches much "safer." A numbers game operator can rest easy in flushing his computer, knowing key escrow and remote storage exists. "Remote storage"? Sure, the Web offers easy and transparent ways to split files up and store them in various locales. Kind of makes "search warrants" a problem, doesn't it? The promise of the Web, to many of us, is that URLs essentially make the machines accessible via the Web into a kind of huge, distributed file system. Remote sites can already be used for storage, obviously. The Web offers a new degree of automation of the process, with many interesting possibilities. An interesting project would be build tools similar to ftp for automatic backup of files to remote locations, perhaps locations that accept "deposits" for a fee. (In digital money tokens, even.) The tool could do multi-part splitting, and could encrypt the files. Keys (and the locations of the parts) could independently exploit the kind of "key escrow" mentioned above. So, a raid is made on a site. The files are not found there, as they have been automatically filed on other sites, with the key/location info escrowed with escrow agents who are not cooperative with search warrants, subpoenas, etc. (It may be sufficient for a person to "remember" the N sites, as the sites may be uncooperative enough so as to make it impossible for the law enforcement people to "demand" access to files. I can discuss this furhter. While not "secure" in a strong crypto sense, in practice this will be pretty effective--after all, the pieces are similar to offshore bank account access info, and law enforcement is pretty much powerless to get N countries/banks to cooperate on a blanket search.) In short, key escrow could be law enforcement's worst nightmare, as it truly opens up the Web as a worldwide, distributed file system. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: An opportunity not to be missed
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Wed, 13 Sep 1995, David C. Lambert wrote: > >> I propose that we get some likely candidate (actually, a similar candidate >> to the one above) to advocate the benefits of anonymity on the net. Is Wavy Gravy running his "Nobody for President" campaign again this time? After all, Nobody's going to balance the budget, and Nobody's going to get the government out of your bedroom, and on the internet, Nobody can tell if you're a dog or not :-) #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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