December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FBI seeks huge wiretapping system
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In today's San Jose Mercury, online edition. Forgive me if this has already been passed around. -=- FBI seeks huge wiretapping system BY JOHN MARKOFF New York Times The FBI has proposed a national wiretapping system of unprecedented size and scope that would give law enforcement officials the capacity to monitor simultaneously as many as one out of every 100 phone lines in some high crime areas of the country. Such a surveillance ability would vastly exceed the current needs of law enforcement officials around the country, who in recent years have conducted an annual average of less than 850 court-authorized wiretaps -- or fewer than one in every 174,000 phone lines. The plan, which needs congressional approval for the money to finance it, would still require a court warrant to conduct wiretaps. Still, the proposed expansion of the government's eavesdropping abilities raises questions among telephone industry executives as to why the FBI believes it may require such broad access to the nation's phone network in the future. And privacy-rights advocates see the specter of a Big Brother surveillance capability whose very existence might encourage law enforcement officials to use wiretapping much more frequently as an investigative tool. ``A proposal that envisions some form of electronic surveillance for one of every 100 telephone lines would be frightening to many people,'' said James Dempsey, deputy director at the Center for National Security, a public policy organization in Washington. ``I think law enforcement needs to be honest with the public about what its intentions are.'' Generally, FBI officials contend that an advanced, high-capacity monitoring system will be necessary as more of modern life and business -- and crime -- takes place as voice or computer conversations over digital phone lines. On digital lines, communications are transmitted in electronic pulses represented by the 1's and 0's of computer code. Such communications are harder to monitor than with the old-fashioned analog lines in which conversations are transmitted as electronic signals corresponding to audible sound waves. An FBI spokesman declined to elaborate on the bureau's perceived need for such an expansion of its wiretapping abilities. ``The full implementation is absolutely essential for law enforcement and public safety,'' said Mike Kortan, an FBI spokesman in Washington. ``We are in ongoing discussions with the communications industry. Therefore it would be inappropriate to comment further at this point.'' The plan, which was published in the Federal Register on Oct. 16 but has not drawn much attention yet outside law enforcement and industry circles, is the first comprehensive outline by the FBI of the surveillance capabilities it will require under the controversial Digital Telephony Act that was signed by President Clinton in 1994. The law was adopted in the closing hours of the previous Congress after the administration overcame telephone industry resistance to the extensive network equipment changes that will be required to permit digital wiretapping. In order to overcome that opposition, the administration promised that the government would allocate $500 million to help upgrade industry networks. Whether the law will ever go into effect is an open question, because it requires a federal appropriation, to be paid for out of criminal fines and penalties, that Congress has not yet authorized. The budget legislation now pending on Capitol Hill has no proviso for the digital wiretapping money, although the House budget bill included a wiretapping allocation until last week. The House measure was deleted after objections from several freshman Republicans, including Rep. Bob Barr of Georgia, a former federal prosecutor, who said that he objected to the way the money for wiretapping would be raised and that he had concerns about how the FBI might use such a sweeping surveillance ability. But some lawmakers say the Clinton administration, which has vowed to veto the current federal budget bill, saw little point in pushing for inclusion of the financing for the wiretapping at this time. And others note that money for the digital wiretapping plan, presented as a tough anti-crime measure, could be difficult for lawmakers of either party to oppose outright. The FBI and the Clinton administration are expected to continue seeking funds in the future. The scope of the FBI plan has startled telephone industry executives, who said it was difficult to estimate how much it would ultimately cost to carry out the capacity increases. The officials are worried, however, that if federal funds are not forthcoming, the government may attempt to shift the financing burden to the rates that businesses and consumers pay to use the telephone network. ``The difficulty in this process is going to come down the road when they ask us to redesign our entire systems and not pay us,'' said Larry Clinton, associate vice president for governmental affairs at the U.S. Telephone Association, an Washington-based industry lobbying group. ``If they try to make rate payers pay for this we will run into serious and perhaps even constitutional problems which we hope to avoid.'' The FBI plan, as filed in the Federal Register, calls for designating each local telephone as falling under one of three categories. Category I would be made up of urban areas, where most electronic surveillance currently takes place. In these regions, telecommunications carriers would be required to make available up to 1 percent of their network capacity when sought by law-enforcement officials. In lower-crime urban and suburban areas, designated Category II, phone companies would need to make available up to five-tenths of a percent of their network lines, while the predominantly rural low-crime Category III areas would require 0.25 percent. For many of the most densely populated metropolitan areas, like New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, there are tens of millions of phone lines. The FBI document contends that in such places, the demands of digital wiretapping may make it necessary to intercept tens of thousands of phone calls at once. Some industry officials said they were at a loss to understand how the government expected to make use of such requirements. At an industry gathering last year, telephone industry executives discussing the Digital Telephony Act could not think of an example of more than seven wiretaps ever being run from a single phone company office at any one time, according to Ron Peat, director of federal legislation analysis for the Pacific Telesis Group, the San Francisco-based regional Bell company. Some technology experts said that the FBI's projected needs, which the bureau said were based on historical records and on demographic data and market forecasts, reflect a growing belief by law enforcement that electronic surveillance will rapidly increase in importance in the digital age, where most communications will take place using an array of mobile computerized devices. ``These are staggering numbers,'' said Mark Rasch, director of information security law and policy for Science Applications International Corp. in McLean, Va. ``Either they do a lot more wiretaps than they now admit, or they plan on doing a significant larger number of wiretaps in the future because of the fear of domestic terrorism.'' -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: lp (134.222.35.2)?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by perry(a)piermont.com ("Perry E. Metzger") on Sun, 05 Nov 12:13 PM >Quit looking for the spooks where they aren't. You >should always assume your line is being tapped if you >are saying something you don't want heard, anway. True, it's not Smokey behind the billboard, blinked at you by oncoming headlights, it's the sensors in the roadbed that reads your tag -- when it leaves your home-ain, then at the remailer donkeystops, then at your recreational stash-house, at the pedo-filmery, at the Semtex-Pantex workhide, at the digi-wallet-copyfast, right into ananonymous Ken-Barbie's e-slot. TLA-Smokey is friendly, maybe intra-humanly let you off with a warning, not the anonymous high-techery, it responds only to its friend, the tag -- tracing, storing, mutating the whinefleshers, 0's by 1's. That's the how, maybe, but for who or what or why? Or is it just machines feeding machines incomprehensibles?

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DIR_ty$
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-30-95. In slave to Orlin Crabbe's "The Money Laundromat," The NYPaper has a Page One lead story: "Cali Drug Cartel Using U.S. Business to Launder Cash. 105 Firms Suspected. Trade Related Schemes Said to Have Moved $3 Billion Through Companies." DIR_ty$

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Meeting: Nov. 4 in Austin, TX
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, A reminder to those in the central Texas area on Saturday (Nov. 4, 1995) from 6-8pm. The Austin chapter will be meeting at Ted's Greek Restaraunt on the 400 block of Congress (next to Oscar Snowden's). We will be trying to wrest control of the last couple of tables in the rear. Issues we will be discussing: * Further interests of the members and forming working groups. * Make further arrangements to start doing PGP key signing services at the end of the monthly EFF meeting. * Discuss doing a 1-hour video on the basic ideas and issues of cryptography and current society. * Invitation from CT-LUG to come to their next build-up which is scheduled for Nov. 18 but is tentative for now. If all works well this may be an opportunity to play with some re-mailer software under Linux. Hope to see some of you there! Jim Choate ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com

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whose watchin the watchers
by Stephen Whitaker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following is an exerpt is from Jim Warren's listserv, GovAccess 183. Are there folks on this list who have insights or definitive information on this topic? Are there ways for someone with access to modify router tables to constantly create alternate paths at other routers which would serve to end-around any such snoops? ***********begin_included_text************************* &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Is Someone Already Watching All International Net Traffic? The following is the transcript of an actual communications trace that a friend ran, while I was sitting next to him, watching -- reprinted here with his permission. He did a "traceroute" of two messages that he sent from his machine in Switzerland (he'd telneted into it while we were at a computer conference in California). Traceroute automatically reports each Internet node through which a message passes, as it proceeds from origin to destination. He did two traceroutes. The first was from Switzerland to an addressee at Netcom in San Jose, California. The second was from Switzerland to an addressee in Israel. Date: Fri, 21 Apr 95 02:54:58 +0200 From: kelvin(a)fourmilab.ch (John Walker) To: jwarren(a)well.com Subject: Traceroute > /usr2/kelvin> traceroute netcom11.netcom.com traceroute to netcom11.netcom.com (192.100.81.121), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets 1 eunet-router (193.8.230.64) 2 ms 2 ms 2 ms 2 146.228.231.1 (146.228.231.1) 326 ms 345 ms 307 ms 3 Bern5.CH.EU.NET (146.228.14.5) 447 ms 408 ms 364 ms 4 146.228.107.1 (146.228.107.1) 127 ms 37 ms 36 ms 5 Zuerich1.CH.EU.NET (146.228.10.80) 37 ms 38 ms 175 ms 6 (134.222.9.1) 65 ms 109 ms 252 ms 7 lp (134.222.35.2) 196 ms 179 ms 405 ms 8 Vienna1.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.1) 191 ms 179 ms 313 ms 9 fddi.mae-east.netcom.net (192.41.177.210) 336 ms 204 ms 303 ms 10 t3-2.dc-gw4-2.netcom.net (163.179.220.181) 182 ms 251 ms 187 ms 11 t3-2.chw-il-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.220.186) 305 ms 586 ms 518 ms 12 t3-2.scl-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.220.190) 537 ms 693 ms 797 ms 13 t3-1.netcomgw.netcom.net (163.179.220.193) 698 ms 549 ms 754 ms 14 netcom11.netcom.com (192.100.81.121) 890 ms 1922 ms 1696 ms > /usr2/kelvin> traceroute jerusalem1.datasrv.co.il traceroute to jerusalem1.datasrv.co.il (192.114.21.101), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets 1 eunet-router (193.8.230.64) 2 ms 3 ms 2 ms 2 146.228.231.1 (146.228.231.1) 933 ms 853 ms 874 ms 3 Bern5.CH.EU.NET (146.228.14.5) 1040 ms 450 ms 525 ms 4 146.228.107.1 (146.228.107.1) 453 ms 424 ms 188 ms 5 Zuerich1.CH.EU.NET (146.228.10.80) 64 ms 61 ms 47 ms 6 (134.222.9.1) 80 ms 312 ms 84 ms 7 lp (134.222.35.2) 270 ms 400 ms 216 ms 8 Vienna2.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.2) 660 ms 1509 ms 886 ms 9 dataserv-gw.ALTER.NET (137.39.155.38) 1829 ms 1094 ms 1306 ms 10 orion.datasrv.co.il (192.114.20.22) 1756 ms 1280 ms 1309 ms 11 ... Notice that both messages went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1 and then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" -- then through the same Vienna, Virginia (USA) site ... and thereafter, on to their destination. I.e., the second message went through Virginia to get from Switzerland to Israel. The whois servers at the InterNIC and at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information report, ``No match for "134.222.9.1". '' and `` No match for "134.222.35.2".'' Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia? --jim &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& ***********end_included_text*************************

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Re: Escrow system design query
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is no one "key escrow backbone network" There's a link on my page @ www.best.com/~geeman to the Key Recovery Demostration Program, and the infrastructure study task group ... have a look there at what's going on. At 08:03 PM 9/14/97 -0400, Michael Wilson wrote: > >Does anyone know of a solid document out there in the web that actually >describes the proposed key escrow backbone network? After wading through >considerable junk in the search engines (my, but the net is wordy on the >topic), I didn't turn up anything that looked like architecture. >MW > > >

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e$: The Movie
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcing e$: The Movie 11/6/95 Almost a year ago, I noticed that traffic was tapering off on one of the digital commerce e-mail lists I'm subscribed to, www-buyinfo, which is run by Dave Kristol at ATT. So, every once in a while, I started zinging relevant crossposts over there from cypherpunks, a famous crypto list with about 20-25% e$ content. I started getting actual fan mail for this, so I kept doing it. Now, it seems that, say, 85% of all of the traffic on www-buyinfo is my cross-posting from cypherpunks. Dave says there are 500-600 people worldwide who have stayed on www-buyinfo during all this time, so it seems like I can claim at least some of them as an audience for what I'm doing, with no promotion of the list at all, except word of mouth. We've even had several discussions on the list about whether I should continue doing it, and every time we've done so, the answer has been a resounding "yes". However, www-buyinfo does have a charter, and even though what I'm doing drifts the charter substantially, I'm restricted in what I can put there. It's not fair to Dave or the subscribers for me to turn their list into my private spam channel. Also, Dave has said repeatedly that he's interested in re-tooling www-buyinfo into something more technical, so, at some point, the party's going to be over, and we'll have to pack up our tents and move on. Meanwhile, I've also taken to writing on the net, and more recently, speaking to professional groups, on the topic of e$, and I have gotten very good response to that as well. An edited version of one of my longer net.rants is in this week's InfoWorld, for instance. That one got me fan mail from all sorts of people (like Guy Kawasaki, Stewart Alsop, and Adam Engst, for instance) when the original version appeared first in the apple-internet-users list a while back. I've managed to have a lot of fun with this stuff. One of my suggestions on cypherpunks started ecm, the secondary market for Digicash's beta-test digital cash certificates. I had so much fun talking about digital commerce with Peter Cassidy, a freelance writer for Forbes ASAP, Wired, and the Economist, that the two of us started the Boston Society for Digital Commerce, a luncheon group that meets once a month to talk about this stuff. BSDC has about 40 members now, and our second meeting is on Tuesday. So, I've decided I'd jump into this with both feet. A friend of mine at Apple Computer, Vinnie Moscaritolo, has volunteered his time to put up a web site about e$. It's pretty much live, though still under construction, at its temporary home of http://www.webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/rah/ . Vinnie is now in the process of hooking up a small stand-alone machine, to live somewhere else on the net besides in Apple's domain, which will house this web-site along with three mailing lists, all of which will be archived and eventually web-searchable. Over the next few weeks, we'll be starting up these lists and announcing them here. They are: * _e$_: A discussion list on digital commerce and financial cryptography and their consequences. This list will be for people who have a strong understanding of markets of all kinds, who understand the consequences of strong cryptography and digital certificate technology on public networks, and who want to make money in this environment. We welcome Entrepreneurs, Analysts, Cryptographers (Amateur and Otherwise), Free Marketeers, small-"l" libertarians, and, even (horrors!) a crypto-anarchist or two. * _e$pam_: My personal spam-channel to the universe. ;-). Pretty much what I do now with www-buyinfo from cypherpunks, only with all the net.sources I can find. It will have the same content touchstone as e$ will, but it will consist entirely of filtered information from secondary sources. In other words, it won't say "e$spam" until I say it says "e$spam". At some point, e$spam will have filter-fodder in it -- or some other method will be set up -- so that people who are already subscribed to one of the lists I'm filtering won't have to see things twice. We're still working on that. * _Ne$ws_, a newsletter with original content from myself and various other authors, in the same vein as Adam Engst's TidBITS, but focused on the subject of e$. I figure that there are enough different ways to pay for both my time and the resources necessary to make this work that it's now worth spending a little of my own time and resources in order to get all this started. Certainly the market for information and commentary on e$ isn't getting any smaller. I'm looking at a sort of "creep, crawl, walk, run" scenario for funding all of this. The first stage will be to solicit sponsorships, both in-kind and in plain old money. The second will probably be to determine whether subscriptions to any or all of the e$ lists or archives would ever make sense. Finally, with the advent of real digital cash on the net, and with First Virtual proving e$ trades can be done by anyone, it may be possible to do some kind of e$ micropayment-as-you-go system for things like subscriptions, web-archive access, and the like, so I'm looking at that also. Obviously, I'm don't want to price myself out of the market with all of this, because, like anything else on the net, anyone can come along and do exactly the same thing for less money, and then I'm out of business. I do think, however, that what I propose to do is worth money to the people who want it, and so I'm going to figure out how to get paid to do it. Well, that's about it. Watch this space for details, and wish me luck! Cheers, Bob Hettinga, impre$ario-to-be -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJ04K/gyLN8bw6ZVAQG+2QQAowzLfmH5paNaZgrAdlEeSH9YcKysW07A B7QxbQhP9WIat2rMIA4HoIioQr+Xo5RZ3oOO+btSksHNnV1P3Q2Ca49BJxdMsQd7 GhdGoUv2/C150mH13crc3cZuOCChfisjYHM8So2XsuVjKex4ETZecDLfSn+b4yzl mtfJvZQ3e1o= =2vLb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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FC98 Call for Participants
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- C A L L F O R P A R T I C I P A N T S Financial Cryptography 1998 (FC98): The world's only financial cryptography conference, exhibition, and workshop. FC98 Conference February 23-26, 1998 FC98 Exhibition February 23-27, 1998 FC98 Financial Cryptography Workshop March 2-6, 1998 The Inter-Island Hotel Anguilla, BWI Conference Reservations: <http://www.fc98.ai/> FC98 is currently sponsored by: - --------------------- Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.shipwright.com> Hansa Bank & Trust Company Limited, Anguilla <http://www.hansa.net/> C2NET <http://www.c2.net> If your firm would like to sponsor FC98, please see below, and contact Julie Rackliffe, the sponsorship manager, at <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org> for further information. What is FC98? - ------------- FC98, the world's only peer-reviewed conference on financial cryptography, will be held Monday through Thursday, February 23-26, 1997, at the Inter-Island Hotel on the Caribbean island of Anguilla. In conjunction with the conference, the Inter-Island Hotel will also be the site of an intensive 40-hour workshop for senior managers and IS professionals the week after the conference (March 2-6), and a concurrent exhibition of financial cryptography products and services during the entire week of the conference itself, February 23-27. The goals of the combined conference, workshop, and exhibition are: - -- to provide a peer-reviewed forum for important research in financial cryptography and the effects it will have on society, - -- to give senior managers and IS professionals a solid understanding of the fundamentals of strong cryptgraphy as applied to financial operations on public networks, and, - -- to showcase the newest products in financial cryptography. In addition, time has been reserved in the afternoon and evening for sponsored corporate presentations, functions and activities, and for business networking. Conference participants are encouraged to bring their families. The Conference - -------------- Ray Hirschfeld, the conference chair, has picked an outstanding group of professionals and researchers in financial cryptography and in related fields to review the papers for this conference. They are: Chair: Rafael Hirschfeld, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Co-Chair: Matthew Franklin, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA Matt Blaze, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA Antoon Bosselaers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Yves Carlier, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland Walter Effross, Washington College of Law, American U., Washington DC, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Alain Mayer, Bell Laboratories/Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Moni Naor, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel Frank Trotter, Mark Twain Ecash/Mercantile Bank, St. Louis, MO, USA Doug Tygar, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Moti Yung, CertCo LLC (formerly: Bankers Trust E-Commerce), New York, NY, USA The actual agenda of the conference will be determined by the papers the program committee selects. The conference committee is selecting papers in what it considers the union, rather than a strict intersection, of the fields of finance and cryptography. For last year's program please see <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/>. Original papers are being solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general, including: Anonymous Payments Fungibility Authentication Home Banking Communication Security Identification Conditional Access Implementations Copyright Protection Loss Tolerance Credit/Debit Cards Loyalty Mechanisms Currency Exchange Legal Aspects Digital Cash Micropayments Digital Receipts Network Payments Digital Signatures Privacy Issues Economic Implications Regulatory Issues Electronic Funds Transfer Smart Cards Electronic Purses Standards Electronic Voting Tamper Resistance Electronic Wallets Transferability Proceedings of Financial Cryptography 1998 will be published by Springer Verlag in their Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series. For further information on the submission process, please see the program committee's web-page at <http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC98>. Last year, the conference was been covered by The New York Times, Institutional Investor, the Financial Times, Wired Magazine, NHK Japan, and other media. In addition, financial cryptograpy and several of last year's conference participants and sponsors were the subject of a cover story in a September issue of Forbes Magazine. If last year's interest in this conference is any indication, it is probably a good idea to register for FC98 and make your plane and hotel reservations as soon as possible, as conference, workshop, and exhibit space is extremely limited, and we anticipate selling out all three events. The price of a pass to the conference sessions and exhibits is US$1,000, with discounted rates for full-time academics and students of $250 and $100 respectively. You can pay for your FC98 conference ticket with Visa or MasterCard, or any of a number of other internet commerce payment protocols, at the regstration site, <http://www.fc98.ai/>. The price includes breakfast and lunch. Internet connectivity will also be provided at the conference site. The Exhibition - -------------- The FC98 Exhibition is an exclusive trade show for financial cryptography products and services. The trade show floor will be open from 9:00 am to 5 pm the entire week of the conference Monday through Friday, February 23-27. In addition, the conference facility will be open for commercial presentations and demonstrations in the afternoons Tuesday through Thursday, and all day on Friday. Each booth will have high bandwidth access to the internet, and will get 3 conference passes. Booth prices start at $5,000 US. Please contact Julie Rackliffe at <mailto:rackliffe@tcm.org> for further information. As space is limited, please reserve your space as soon as possible. The Workshop - ------------ We are again honored to have Ian Goldberg as the leader of the FC98 Financial Cryptography Workshop, which will run one week after the conference, March 2-6, 1998. Ian, the cryptographer at Berkeley who is now famous (in articles in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and Forbes) for breaking several financial cryptography transaction protocols, will be running an intensive, 5-day workshop for senior managers and technology professionals. While the workshop is still being developed, and will depend on the skills of the planned participants, Workshop topics will include, but not be limited to: Overview and background of cryptography Survey of existing and proposed Internet payment systems Details on some specific payment systems Issues involved in setting up a secure Internet site A step-by-step walkthrough of setting up a digital bearer certificate mint. Ian has recruited a strong roster of instructors with credentials similar to his own, and, as he plans to maintain a 5-1 student/teacher ratio, the size of the Workshop will be restricted and advance registration will be required. Further information about the Workshop can be found at: <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~iang/fc98/workshop.html> The planned price for the workshop is $5,000. This covers lab space, hardware, network access, software, meals, and, of course, 40 hours of instruction and structured lab activity. The lab itself will be open 24 hours a day. Sponsorship Opportunities - ------------------------- FC98 offers sponsorship opportunities at all levels. Businesses are encouraged to be an exclusive sponsor for lunch or dinner in conjunction with a networking/recreational activity of some kind. Sponsorship provides corporations with a unique opportunity to get their message heard by the best people in the field of financial cryptography, and to gain unprecedented exposure for their business. Sponsorships start at $10,000, and include one booth, discounts on additional booth space, 5 conference passes, mention of your company in all FC98 communications (like this one), and a sponsored lunch or dinner and networking/recreational activity for the conference participants. In-kind sponsorship is also available, with opportunities for companies to provide networking, bandwidth, software, hardware, radio packet modems and equipment, as well as web-design and print services, and transportation. The sponsorship contact is Julie Rackliffe <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org>. Air Transportation and Hotels - ----------------------------- Air travel to Anguilla is typically done via San Juan, Puerto Rico, or St. Maarten. There are several non-stop flights a day from various US and European locations to St. Maarten. Connection through to Anguilla can be made through American Eagle, or through LIAT, not to mention a short, inexpensive ferry service from St. Martin to Anguilla. See your travel agent for details. American Eagle Airlines has agreed to increase their flights as needed to accomodate any extra traffic the conference brings to the island. There is also discussion of a "crypto-plane" charter making a transcontinental run from San Jose to St. Maarten by way of Las Vegas, Minneapolis, and JFK/New York. We're still working on it. Let Robert Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com> know if you're interested in this idea. Anguilla's runway is 3600 feet, with a displaced threshold of 600 feet, and can accomodate business jets. Anguilla import duties are not imposed on hardware or software which will leave the island again, so, as long as you take it with you when you leave, you won't pay import duties on the things you bring. Hotels range from spartan to luxurious, and more information about hotels on Anquilla can be obtained from your travel agent, or at <http://www.fc98.ai/>. Registration for FC98 - --------------------- Again, to register and pay for your ticket to FC98 see: <http://www.fc98.ai/> For information the selection of papers for FC98 see: <http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC98> If you're interested in exhibit space, please contact Julie Rackliffe: <mailto:rackliffe@tcm.org> If you're interested in sponsoring FC98, also contact Julie Rackliffe: <mailto:rackliffe@tcm.org> If you're interested in the FC98 Workshop for Senior Managers and IS Professionals, see: <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~iang/fc98/workshop.html> See you in Anguilla! The FC98 Organizing Committee - ----------------------------- Vince Cate and Bob Hettinga, General Chairs Ray Hirschfeld and Matt Franklin, Program Chair and Co-Chair Ian Goldberg, Workshop Director Lynwood Bell, Exhibition Steering Committee Chair Julie Rackliffe, Exhibition and Sponsorship Manager FC98 Sponsors - ------------- Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.shipwright.com> Hansa Bank & Trust Company Limited, Anguilla <http://www.hansa.net/> C2NET <http://www.c2.net> See Your Name Here: <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNCGBf8UCGwxmWcHhAQEoYgf/eP6QCIlmcMWQBYTu5i55frK/rsCTNDlX ipirMoHRHDmFdvJaGaxST6t5VebImTnArLJ3he+52aBNqVaq+v+kUSKS50ebe0G6 fN27/LpIqiGCFgswnjW7AcHAfosJTSRWhdZHvUVCgMi22gq2GVkQD6tPCK/1TueI +t4XAax1IOr1IlKpJkTA6XxUUTt8zn/byzS2IMQAhERFaSeqH1ngTrX0xottMRS0 7dKQ2aL/IHbcYRFad3thLFlzWCz4CwO9YsX94gc5kLkxdenZWMv+k+FsynIJPdRB S1+dtqiGIdfiehp3cxptD1H1QCPqvygS88pXGb5Q6zTs8y634vzjoA== =K3Bb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: whose watchin the watchers -- I GOT THE EXPLANATIONS OKAY
by jwarren＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:19 PM 11/05/95, Stephen Whitaker wrote: >The following is an exerpt is from Jim Warren's listserv, GovAccess 183. > >Are there folks on this list who have insights or definitive information on >this topic? > >Are there ways for someone with access to modify router tables to constantly >create alternate paths at other routers which would serve to end-around any >such snoops? > >***********begin_included_text************************* > >&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& > > >Is Someone Already Watching All International Net Traffic? > >The following is the transcript of an actual communications trace that a >friend ran, while I was sitting next to him, watching -- reprinted here >with his permission. > >He did a "traceroute" of two messages that he sent from his machine in >Switzerland ... Folks, I've received ample explanations/corrections to my naive paranoia. The following will be posted in GovAccess.184, within an hour or two. Many thanks. --blushing-jim Jim Warren, GovAccess list-owner/editor (jwarren(a)well.com) Advocate & columnist, MicroTimes, Government Technology, BoardWatch, etc. 345 Swett Rd., Woodside CA 94062; voice/415-851-7075; fax/<# upon request> [puffery: John Dvorak Lifetime Achievement Award (1995); James Madison Freedom-of-Information Award, Soc. of Professional Journalists - Nor.Cal. (1994); Hugh Hefner First-Amendment Award, Playboy Foundation (1994); Pioneer Award, Electronic Frontier Foundation (its first year, 1992); founded the Computers, Freedom & Privacy confs, InfoWorld; blah blah blah :-).] === EXPLANATION OF WHAT GOVACCESS IS & WHERE TO FIND ITS ARCHIVES === GovAccess is a list distributing irregular info & advocacy regarding technology and civil liberties, citizen access to government - and government access to citizens, covert and overt. To add or drop GovAccess, email to Majordomo(a)well.com ('Subject' ignored) with message: [un]subscribe GovAccess YourEmailAddress (insert your eaddr) For brief description of GovAccess, send the message: info GovAccess ===this will be posted in GovAccess.184=== Enlightenment Regarding European Net Traffic Flowing Through Numbered Sites If I'm gonna let my net-surveillance paranoias burn brightly, I better learn more about the technology. Which is to say, I goofed: In #183, yesterday eve, I flamed forth about how a friend traced his messages from Switzerland to San Jose CA and to Israel -- and discovered that they "went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1 and then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" -- then through the same Vienna, Virginia (USA) site ... and thereafter, on to their destination." With beady eye and suspicious mind, I then entoned, "Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia?" Well, half a dozen net-*literate* technoids quickly corrected the errors of my ways: >Date: Sun, 5 Nov 1995 08:25:17 +0100 >Subject: GA183 booboo >To: jwarren(a)well.com >From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) [apparently an anonymous remailer --jim] >Organization: RePLaY aND CoMPaNY UnLimited >XComm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting >XComm: Report misuse of this automated service to <postmaster(a)REPLAY.COM> > >Jim-- > Great work, but you've got to be more careful. ... > >I ran it by Cypherpunks and, within a half-hour, got ... [among others] ... > >From: Richard Huddleston <reh(a)wam.umd.edu> >Date: Sun, 5 Nov 1995 01:55:09 -0500 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, nobody(a)REPLAY.COM >Subject: Re: lp (134.222.35.2)? >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >134.222.0.0 is a Class B network, so if you do 'whois' on 134.222.0.0 >(instead of the individual IP addresses) you find: > >European Unix Users Group (NET-EUNET-X25) > Kruislaan 413 > NL-1098 SJ Amsterdam > NETHERLANDS >... and >X-Pgp-Fingerprint: 01107BAB1C85F1B49358D98FEAD4339E >Date: Sat, 4 Nov 1995 23:01:42 -0800 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Stephan Somogyi <somogyi(a)digmedia.com> >... >>> Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia? > >Oh please. > >The probable reason that the InterNIC doesn't know about the >132.222.0.0 networks is because they're in Europe. If you search for >either of the network numbers of the IP addresses mentioned above in >the RIPE database <http://www.ripe.net/>, you will find that they >belong to the EUnet backbone. > >After pinging 134.222.9.1 successfully, I telnetted to it and it >claimed, quite plausibly, that it's a device (presumably a router) in >Amsterdam. I am currently unable to ping 134.222.35.2; this, however, >fills me with no dread whatsoever. > >Stephan Somogyi Senior Editor Digital Media and >Date: Sun, 05 Nov 1995 13:42:55 -0800 >From: John Fricker <jfricker(a)vertexgrp.com> >Subject: Return of Paranoia and Vienna > >Using nslookup to reverse resolve 134.222.15.2 reveals it to be >"Oslo1.NO.EU.net" and 134.222.9.1 to be "Amsterdam4.NL.EU.net". > >Now this doesn't mean they are not nefarious, packet sniffing spy-boxes >since I doubt the spooks would name their routers >"cloak-and-dagger1.cia.gov". > >It still is strange that it is cheaper for UUnet/EUnet to route traffic >across the Atlantic to get to Isreal instead of developping a continental >backbone. In many ways the architecture of the Internet is still rather >primitive. > >john fricker >dir research and development >The Vertex Group, Inc. followed by >Date: Sun, 05 Nov 1995 13:23:06 -0800 >From: John Fricker <jfricker(a)vertexgrp.com> >Subject: Paranoia and Vienna > >Now, Jim I think you're a touch paranoid here. And after reading the >latest about the FBI wire tap bill I don't blame you ;) > >134.222.0.0 is in the EU domain so most likely both of those routers are >European. The packets then went into UU Net Technologies Vienna hub. I did >a traceroute from me to 193.8.230.64 and went through two EU.net routers >in Vienna, VA. Vienna must be one fiberous town! Sure would make for a >nice little listening post for nosy ears. I don't know off hand the >relationship between EUnet and UUnet but I would guess that they are more >than just friendly. Microsoft bought a minority interest in UUnet which >inspired UUnet to grow rapidly. (Now there's another tidbit for paranoia!) === Oh ... sez I <blusing>. So the remaining question was -- why would a msg from Switzerland go through Alternet in Virginia on its way to Israel? I asked several of the [many] folks who enlightened me re the numbered sites, and within minutes, got back: >From: Tim Pozar <pozar(a)kumr.lns.com> >Date: Sun, 5 Nov 1995 11:28:44 -0800 (PST) > >... >> So the only remaining question is ... why should a Swizz msg go thru >> Alternet in Virginia in order to get to Israel? > >A number of links go through there. Most of this is tied up with >politics and policies with the links that go over to Europe and >little to do with the NSA. ... Which leaves me without any inflamatory paranoia at all ... except to wonder about those "politics and policies" that cause traffic from and to European sites to flow through a site near the NSA and CIA. === To which, I just received this additional response -- email traffic's hot 'n' heavy (sender prefers to be anon :-): Almost certainly just a matter of available capacity or administrative issues. There may be higher bandwidth routes available from both of those points to the U.S., rather than directly to each other, so the traffic is routed that way. There are often administrative issues too--that is, sometimes the direct routes are controlled by some company or group to which a different net doesn't subscribe, and they have to route differently, through entities that they both subscribe to or have agreements with (e.g. Alternet). This happens a bunch in Europe (and here for that matter--it's part of the reason that some traffic from L.A. to S.F. used to route through Atlanta or NY or similar places--and still can (depending on the service providers). The topology of the net is "logically" sensible, but not necessarily geographically so... --spooky jim, who can't tell a carburator from a crankshaft, net-wise &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Net Police, Take Note: Net is the Fastest Self-Correcting Human System I Know On the upside of the above notes is that they [again] illustrate how quickly the net corrects erroneous postings -- which is my answer to all those who howl for censorship or content-control of the net, "because it distributes incorrect information." It does -- but it also distributes, uh, "vigorous" corrections to any iota of intended or naive imperfection in a posting, at least to the extent that such postings receive significant circulation on the net. (And if they don't, then they are little different than the erroneous information that people exchange by voice and phone, every day.) And woe be unto the reputation of anyone who appears to have posted *intentionally* incorrect or biased-incomplete information -- who get vigorously torched in the process of getting corrected. :-) I think it was John Perry Barlow who observed that, the best way to get a question answered on the net, was to post it in the form of an erroneous statement. --jim

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Re: lp (134.222.35.2)?
by wiltship＠iccu6.ipswich.gil.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Anonymous writes: >> > Notice that both messages went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1 and >> > then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" >[...] >> > Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia? > A hopcheck from here puts these sites in amsterdam nl. cheers peter Flight to Quality Wiltshire Productions Pty Ltd Brisbane, Queensland, Australia Intl Voice 61 7 3376 3535 Intl Fax 61 7 3279 4027 Email wiltship(a)gil.com.au PGP Key ID 3E584C7D PGP Fingerprint 01 03 FB F4 BE F8 2B F3 5D 84 6B 69 37 80 FE 10

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