December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Mixmaster posting poll
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am about to release Mixmaster 2.0.2 This version will not contain the Socket code, but will have a bunch of bug fixes. One of the things I am modifying is the posting to news feature. Mixmaster supports posting through either a local inews program, or through a mail-to-news gateway. There seem to be two flavors of the latter: group.name(a)gateway.com and mail2news(a)gateway.com Newsgroups: group.name I really only want to support one of these standards. Which is more standard? Is there a trend towards one becoming the dominant standard? The next version should be out within 48 hours. -Lance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMFZ+PvPzr81BVjMVAQEa2Qf/d9a3UTzan5gLB/GN/n+DaMSvDLRVJ96V JpH4F+5SO+UQgdxoSAup9+/l+Q11A4O1ZjxpELVEh6e/7U8HjzrGQHCXGIMfzxkt DufouYDViio8cQ7w1Y4OLqlqaD10OUJ5Chrzm013mc7PzFBgF5eb6rf8S4TdGEYg Ly92xWgYHHk8EwhviYxqdBAGnSSTykEkY9E5WHLca+Lt+5ejox1uMEirq6I4rRVZ UBhfiVQhRsD2eKRUx/a3D3eVnuj0jS8+4i3ibcpUDxm+8WY76zGzmz67y66MzaDo 0E0fFK1VeCwrBoNqFJSLYY5e17c7T6hI3mWJYaZFOLL7H3rGsYUcHw== =BdWR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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NYT on GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. D7. Technology / Peter H. Lewis On The Net. Privacy for computers? Clinton sets the stage for a debate on data encryption. In terms of its ability to raise the nation's blood pressure, the debate over data encryption has not yet reached the same levels as gun control. But last week the Clinton Administration appeared to set the stage for an equally divisive debate over the degree to which businesses and individuals have the right to keep secrets when using telephones, computers and other forms of electronic communications. In two days of public hearings last week in Gaithersburg, Md., home of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Administration introduced its long-awaited proposals to relax restrictions on the export of cryptographic software. The Administration drew a line in the virtual sands of cyberspace, signaling that it is willing to permit Americans to put stronger cryptographic locks on their electronic data only if a spare key to those locks is made available on demand to law-enforcement agencies. There looms the conflict. Although the debate is about export controls the "export" issue is irrelevant in today's era of global electronic networks. Placing a common privacy program on an Internet computer in Austin, Tex., is effectively no different from sending a shrink-wrapped copy of the program to Moscow. The real issue is how much privacy the Government is willing to allow its own citizens, and the latest word from the Clinton Administration is that the right to electronic privacy, like the right to bear arms, is not absolute. Cryptography is the science of secret writing. In this digital era, it applies not just to notes, but also to telephone calls, money transfers, bank and credit card records, electronic mail, faxes and other computer files. The Clinton Administration's goal is to allow Americans to use the strongest possible cryptographic technology, while at the same time preserving the ability of law-enforcement agencies to perform court-authorized wiretaps as part of the effort to catch drug dealers, terrorists, child pornographers and other miscreants. In other words, it favors strong cryptography, but not too strong. The strength of cryptographic software is measured by the length of the software key necessary to encode and decode a message. The longer the key, the harder it is for an unauthorized user to decipher the message. In recent years, the Government has generally permitted Americans to export cryptographic software with key lengths up to 40 bits. Experts say that 40-bit keys are secure from casual snooping, but will fall quickly to a determined codebreaker. Last week, after more than a year of intense analysis, the Government introduced what it said was the best possible compromise. Under the new policy, companies can export encryption algorithms using 64-bit keys, which are much more secure, but only if spare keys are given to "escrow agents" who would make them available to lawenforcement agents under standard legal procedures, similar to legal wiretaps authorized by a judge. Otherwise, the 40-bit limit continues to apply. Such a "key escrow" scheme is anathema to many privacy advocates who fear Government abuses. The Government first proposed a key escrow system with its so-called Clipper Chip, a technology that failed to win acceptance even as a voluntary standard. The new scheme is somewhat more palatable than Clipper. Key escrow is still unpopular with American computer and software companies, which say it prevents them from competing against foreign companies that have no similar constraints, and with many multinational corporations, which say it prevents them from working with foreign companies that do not especially care for the idea of Uncle Sam holding the keys to their data banks. "If this was intended to be any sort of compromise, I don't think it achieved its end," said Whitfield Diffie, a Sun Microsystems enginePs who attended the meetings. "I didn't see anybody who was enthusiastic." Raymond G. Kammer, deputy director of N.l.S.T., suggested that the hearings last week were intended to elicit public comment, and that the Administration's final position on cryptographic policy were still under analysis. But the emergence of key escrow issues at the N.l.S.T. proceedings suggests that key escrow is emerging as a nonnegotiable demand by some factions of the Clinton Administration, especially the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, led by Louis Freeh. "If this fails," said a figure familiar with the Administration's thinking on the proposed change in cryptographic policy, "it's going to lead to a very divisive debate. And the irony, for libertarians who oppose key escrow, is that if it fails, I am convinced that Louis Freeh cannot be true to his job without proposing domestic controls on data encryption." "He's not going to give up without a fight, and neither is the Justice Department," said the figure, who spoke on the condition he not be identified. Others say they do not think the Clinton Administration has yet arrived at a concrete position, even after more than a year of study and debate. "I don't think it's a final offer," said John Gilmore, an engineer at Cygnus Support, a computer company in Mountain View, Calif. "It looks to me like a weak strawman, a first offer, a proposal to dance." The question is whether American citizens and businesses have the patience to wait for the music to start. And the issue may be moot, anyway because the Internet is no more controlled by the United States than is the United Nations. "The Internet Architecture Board has specifically decided to ignore export controls in designing the security infrastructure for the next generation of Internet protocols," Mr. Gilmore said. "The Internet of 1998 will provide automatic, secure, and fully private communication, without key escrow, internationally." In other words, the Internet community is already planning to jump over the new line in the sand drawn last week by the Administration. Cryptogrophy that is stronger than the Government's proposed system will be built into the Internet by a dozen countries, and American companies and individuals would be foolish not to use it. At that point, millions of Americans will come into direct conflict with Government policy, and the popular gun-control bumper sticker may be replaced by one that says "If cryptography is outlawed, only outlaws will have cryptography." [End]

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Community ConneXion & its new look
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Community ConneXion is in the process of upgrading its web presence and image. If you'd like to keep abreast of developments, check http://www.c2.org regularly-- most of the changes are in terms of focus & marketing angle, but new services should be appearing soon as well. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Network Administrator FAX: 510-601-9734 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Whitehouse "dissident
by damion.furi＠the-matrix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TCM|We don't believe in "security through obscurity," do we? The notion that we |are "safe" if the White House, or (horrors!) Janet Reno herself, are not |reading our list or the Web sites on various issues, is the same kind of |security the ostrich thinks he has with his head in the sand and his butt |in the air. Maybe so, but we don't have to like it. And I don't. But it's not so much their access, per se, that I object to. It's their potential intentions, all things considered, and the fact that they aren't at all open about such monitoring. TCM|If you want to be unheard by the Feds, and the White House, and the FBI, |and GCHQ, and Mossad, etc., then don't post publically. If you want your |own access to Web sites kept private, push for the development of Web |proxies ("Web remailers"). Mix or Flame is fine. :) furi(a)the-matrix.com pgp-public-key(a)demon.co.uk C1225CE1 RADical 1 Systems - Multi-Platform Custom Programming, Service, & Support

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Re: Whitehouse "dissident" and net monitoring
by Kari Laine 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: lindat(a)iquest.net (Linda Thompson, American Justice Federation) > > The National Security Agency presumably can monitor > >subversive communication on the Internet without leaving any > >trace by "sniffing packets" at traffic nodes. Well they are just doing what their charter says they should be doing - gathering information. > > It turns out that computers from inside the White House have > >kept pretty good tabs on information available on Whitewater, > >Vince Foster, and Mena at a few key repositories on the World- > >Wide Web, a subset of the Internet. I think that's because White House workers has access to net and of course they are surfing like all the rest of us - they are just people you know :-) If that would be part of something hard level information gathering I assure you they would not leave so clear traces. > >Office of the President between August 28 and August 31. If the > >White House is showing a similar interest in other sites on the > >World Wide Web, that would amount to a monitoring operation of > >considerable magnitude. So are you saying White House by itself checked out those places or are you saying that *people* working inside the White House happened to be interested issues available on those sites and accessed them. And so what it is public information when it is on the WWW - isn't it? > > In light of this information, I have the following questions: My guesses are > >(1) Does this constitute "casual browsing" by White House staff, or > > is it, in light of the considerable time and effort spent during > > regular business hours, part of a monitoring or intelligence operation? Probably both > >(2) For what purpose is the information transferred to the White House used? Probably to read it and maybe learn something from it :-) > >(3) Does the White House keep information from these web sites on file, > > and does the White House keep a file on the persons responsible for > > these web sites? Hell I am keeping my own records and on the other hand I am in the process to get/buy/snatch/built a system where I could automatically scan all the newsgroups with some kind of AI system and to keep an eye on certain FTP, GOPHER,WAIS, WWW and so on to keep me bether informed. This partly because this information from interne is getting out of proportion AND quite a big part of it is just rubbish and wasting your time. > >(4) Is the April 9 statement by David Lytel of the White House Office of > > Science and Technology to Amy Bauer of Copley News Service that the > > administration does not monitor anti-Clinton activity on the web still > > operative? Probably they do and they really should. If I was Mr. Clinton (which I luckily am not) I would want my adjudats to prepare a report for me each morning summing up all the possible comments round subject Clinton and The USA from NET: That would be very precisious source of feedback to finetune your acts. And that information is real time. Totally another thing which somehow belongs to this subject should intelligence bodies watch for the net. I am middle reading Spycatcher book. Btw I don't understand all the hype rouund it and I would say in that book there is not enough substance to ban it's printing in certain countries. Anyway again in that book it becomes clear that the most riskiest part of the agent and therefore on of the best way to unweil them is to concentrate on their communications with the coordinators in that particular country or on the communication directed to country behind the operation. So clearly to make agents more succesfull their coummication is the one needing new techniques - how about internet? It is accessible almost everywhere and you can get an account without giving your real identity. By using certain sites you just call in from telephone box give few information or in some places none and you are ready for almost totally untraceable communication. I bet they are using it already a lot to replace clumsy readio communication. Don't get me wrong I vote for freedom of speech(whitch is getting slimmer), privacy (witch there is not much left), no regulation on encryption (which is not going to be) but I don't like these things used against my country's security and steal our intellectual property. Based on this I tend to think every self respecting intelligence organization must have those taps otherwise they are not doing their job properly. > "When even one American -- who has done nothing wrong -- is forced by fear > to shut his mind and close his mouth, then all Americans are in peril." > Harry Truman Truman might have been one of the best presidents US ever had but talk is talk and deeds are deeds. Comments and reasoning is totally my own imagination my employer would propably disabprove them and certainly not they don't represent my employers opinions. Be carefull out there ... Best Regards Kari Laine Kari Laine buster(a)klaine.pp.fi LAN Vision Oy Tel. +358-0-502 1947 Sinikalliontie 14 Fax +358-0-524 149 02630 ESPOO BBS +358-0-502 1576/1456 FINLAND

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ADMIN: How to find out if you have been culled from the list
by hugh＠ecotone.toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If I (or any software I write) remove a user from the <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> list the users entry now gets appended to the culled.users file. Since I was keeping a list anyway, I have set it up so that anyone can email/download the list of recently culled cypherpunks via majordomo. If you stop getting your CP drug for too long, before sending a note to the list(shame!) ask for this file to see if I culled you. If you forget how to get a file send a help message to <majordomo(a)toad.com>. Here is a quick (emacs) example of how to get the file: To: majordomo(a)toad.com --text follows this line-- get cypherpunks culled.users end and the file will show up soon. This is a very boring file (dates and email addresses). You might want to save this message away, so you will have it to reference if need be. Now, you get back to writing that great crypto/UI package! ||ugh Daniel Sometimes Postmaster Always Majordomo Potty Trainer <hugh(a)toad.com>

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Re: GAK/weak crypto rationale?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by futplex(a)pseudonym.com (Futplex) on Wed, 13 Sep 2:11 AM >Your paraphrase of Nelson's statement strikes me as >remarkable. Doesn't "we are not concerned with bad >people using crypto among themselves" run completely >counter to all the hyperbole about terrorists planning >OKC II with PGP ? Does anyone have an exact quotation >? At any rate, sign me up as a "bad person".... "Bad people" is my euphemism for Mr. Nelson's "terrorist" -- which brought snorts from the audience. Yes, his statement about not being concerned with crypto use among terrorists was surprising. On a verbatim transcript: Mr. Ed Roback of NIST, the KE meet director, said that a complete transcript of the proceedings will not be published, only a summary report at some point, and then, after the September 15 session, some version will appear in the Federal Register for public comment. The summary report should appear eventually at the NIST web site -- the CSSPAB site has reports for prior KE sessions in the annual reports. See <http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/csspab/94-rpt.txt> for 1994, and similar for earlier years, on key escrow documents. To amplify what Tim said, the CSSPAB site has very interesting docs.

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Scientology tries to break PGP - and
by Henry W. Farkas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 12 Sep 1995, S. Keeling wrote: > I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you > to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to > patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your > hard disk. The first thing they do is make a copy of everything, so > they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying > around all over the place, don't you? Acutally, I have *everything* laying around all over the place but I suppose that's off-topic. They have to decrypt the file sometime if they want it's "contents". I use the -w option when encrypting. After encryption, the "dummy" file (would be) embedded and the plaintext is wiped. The only "secret" key is the "fake" key. The "real" key is under the blender in the kitchen. (If I get busted and they search under the blender I will write back if I'm in a position to do so. Not that I have anything to get busted for of course. :) Don't back up plaintext and what is the problem here? Where will they get the "real" data from? What does it matter where the decryption takes place? And no, I don't have backup tapes laying around; I use a Zip Drive! :-) =========================================================================== Henry W. Farkas | Me? Speak for IBM? Fat chance. hfarkas(a)ims.advantis.com |------------------------------------------------ hfarkas(a)vnet.ibm.com | http://newstand.ims.advantis.com/henry henry(a)nhcc.com | http://www.nhcc.com/~henry - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PGP 6.2.2 Key fingerprint: AA D0 F5 44 C1 8C 11 52 B3 80 34 1C CE 38 EC 53 Public key at: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu, and other popular key servers. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Brought to you by Henry's Hardware: Home of the Pretty Good Hack "We're not fast, but it's not bad, and we're cheaper than the guy down the street!" =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta iQCVAwUBMFbWVqDthkLkvrK9AQFxlAP+P3blN7wD42aUNctsCF9QALqsRdGHPsdo B6ALA72dqVYXGIsW9M3DVxXAM2WAosHl2rDKXbTrXwirxCJQBPkYQLT9Vdzl8nyJ hb0uNb2zo9xQ8ImM/dCuUqGazW2tnnAXuHZ9KkwDAQFDwDpNtjkHYCSDRgKmPmWO fUjGpsVViU8= =3JI5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and
by ab411＠detroit.freenet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Henry W. Farkas <hfarkas(a)ims.advantis.com> writes: >On Tue, 12 Sep 1995, S. Keeling wrote: > >> I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you >> to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to >> patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your >> hard disk. ... >> they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying >> around all over the place, don't you? > >They have to decrypt the file sometime if they want it's "contents". > >I use the -w option when encrypting. After encryption, the "dummy" file >(would be) embedded and the plaintext is wiped. ... And the idea is that on decrypting with the 'wrong' key, it outputs the dummy file rather than the real plaintext, correct? > ... Don't back up plaintext and what is the problem here? >Where will they get the "real" data from? What does it matter where the >decryption takes place? ... Why would they use your copy of the program to decrypt the file? They could just use a version that lacked this 'feature'. Of course, they still couldn't get at the real plaintext unless you gave them the key, but you are right back to the same old standoff where they say, "Give us your key," and you (try to) say, "No." -- David R. Conrad, conrad(a)detroit.freenet.org, http://www.grfn.org/~conrad Hardware & Software Committee -- Finger conrad(a)grfn.org for public key Key fingerprint = 33 12 BC 77 48 81 99 A5 D8 9C 43 16 3C 37 0B 50 No, his mind is not for rent to any god or government.

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Majordomo results: (NOISE) Re: White House MONITORS Web Pag
by majordomo＠europages.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- >>>> This is NOISE ! **** Command 'this' not recognized. >>>> >>>> DAMION FURI writes: **** Command 'damion' not recognized. >>>> > Maybe so, but we don't have to like it. And I don't. But **** Command '>' not recognized. >>>> > it's not so much their access, per se, that I object to. **** Command '>' not recognized. >>>> >>>> Why the hell do you care ? Someone has a home page for something on the Web. **** Command 'why' not recognized. >>>> Someone at the White House looks at it. So what ? You object to the fact **** Command 'someone' not recognized. >>>> that somebody in the government has a Web browser and *gasp* uses it to read **** Command 'that' not recognized. >>>> stuff on the WWW ??? **** Command 'stuff' not recognized. >>>> >>>> > It's their potential intentions, **** Command '>' not recognized. >>>> >>>> You take moral offense to what you think someone else _might_ be thinking ? **** Command 'you' not recognized. >>>> Sounds like you believe in thoughtcrime. Banned any good books lately ? **** Command 'sounds' not recognized. >>>> >>>> > all things considered, and **** Command '>' not recognized. >>>> > the fact that they aren't at all open about such monitoring. **** Command '>' not recognized. >>>> >>>> This is absurd. You expect the White House to issue a press release every time **** Command 'this' not recognized. >>>> a staffer clicks on a URL ? **** Command 'a' not recognized. >>>> >>>> "WASHINGTON (UPI) The Clinton Administration unveiled plans today to **** Command '"washington' not recognized. >>>> add several new sites to the White House bookmarks list. At a hastily **** Command 'add' not recognized. >>>> arranged press briefing this morning, Defense Secretary William Perry **** Command 'arranged' not recognized. >>>> told reporters that the changes would be implemented in close **** Command 'told' not recognized. >>>> consultation with NATO allies. There was little immediate reaction **** Command 'consultation' not recognized. >>>> from Capitol Hill. Members on both sides of the aisle said they **** Command 'from' not recognized. >>>> needed time to study the proposal in detail." **** Command 'needed' not recognized. >>>> >>>> Someone please tell me this is just an extremely premature April Fool's joke... **** Command 'someone' not recognized. >>>> >>>> -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> END OF COMMANDS **** Help for majordomo: This is Brent Chapman's "Majordomo" mailing list manager, version 1.93. In the description below items contained in []'s are optional. When providing the item, do not include the []'s around it. It understands the following commands: subscribe <list> [<address>] Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>. unsubscribe <list> [<address>] Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>. get <list> <filename> Get a file related to <list>. index <list> Return an index of files you can "get" for <list>. which [<address>] Find out which lists you (or <address> if specified) are on. who <list> Find out who is on the named <list>. info <list> Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>. lists Show the lists served by this Majordomo server. help Retrieve this message. end Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature). Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "majordomo". Commands in the "Subject:" line NOT processed. If you have any questions or problems, please contact "Majordomo-Owner".

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