December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Java and Safe-TCL security
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The safe-tcl mailing list has not been active for a few months. I think a lot of interest has transferred to Java. One problem is that safe-tcl was oriented around email, so it lacks facilities for accessing web pages. I agree with Ray that the security of safe-tcl leaves something to be desired. I implemented a safe-tcl mail filter which would automatically run incoming mail scripts which were in safe-tcl format. This would be a generalization of a remailer, so that users could write scripts which would determine when the remailing would occur, etc. However I ran into a number of problems, particularly related to persistent storage (e.g. disk file access). This is a hard problem for a "safe" system to solve. One solution is to just forbid it, but beyond that you need to have rules about how much disk space a script can use, whether they can access each other's space, etc. There are some nice applications if they can do so, for example the telescript model where two software agents come together and exchange some information. Another tricky issue is if you are going to let the script talk to the outside world via email or tcp connections. How do you prevent abuse of this feature (sending junk email, or connecting to a web page and entering bogus data into a form)? But again, without this capability the script is pretty much limited to drawing pretty pictures on your screen, which isn't very useful. Here is one message I sent to the safe-tcl list earlier this year describing some of these problems in a little more detail. Note that there were also several bugs in the implementation which left security holes, things being checked in the wrong context and such. This is similar to what Ray was citing. Hal > From owner-safe-tcl(a)CS.UTK.EDU Fri Feb 10 22:30:35 1995 > X-Resent-To: safe-tcl(a)CS.UTK.EDU ; Sat, 11 Feb 1995 01:22:02 EST > Date: Fri, 10 Feb 1995 22:21:28 -0800 > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > To: safe-tcl(a)CS.UTK.EDU > Subject: setconfigdata and delivery time > Status: R > > The spec appears to allow delivery-time scripts to do setconfigdata. > This is a mechanism for a script to store persistent data. One application > would be a telescript-like interaction between scripts. Some data could > be stored by one script and later read by another. More interesting, a > script could even store some script, perhaps some or all of itself, into this > persistent store. That script could then be read and eval'd by a later > script. This way scripts could in effect call subroutines in each other, > providing somewhat similar functionality to telescript's procedure calls > between agents. > > At activation time the user gets asked whenever a script does > getconfigdata, although oddly not when a script does setconfigdata. > Also, the .safetcl.conf file is written on any getconfigdata after the > user has supplied or confirmed a database value. This will have the > side effect of writing out any setconfigdata values which have been > previously set by the script. > > At delivery time the current implementation will not ask the user since > there is no user to ask, which causes the writing out of the config data > base never to happen. So there is actually no way for a delivery time > script to set a persistent value right now. It would be easy to change > the code to allow delivery time scripts to set persistent values with > setconfigdata. > > However, this does open up a possible avenue for abuse. There is > presently no limit on how much data is written with setconfigdata. And > actually if the idea above were used where scripts put themselves into > the database for later running then the database could legitimately be > quite large. The problem would arise if a script abused this capability > by filling the disk with junk database entries. > > Maybe something is needed analogous to AutoConfirmMailHook to determine > whether a given SafeTcl_setconfigdata should be able to go out to the > disk. It would want to be given the data as input and possibly also > the size of the current database. Maybe there should be a counter of how > many times the current script has written to the database (or perhaps the > hook could retain this information itself). > > Two other points: as mentioned before the use of the database to retain > "system" information conflicts with its use for this purpose. If > database entries like "mailer" or "external-site" are changed and saved > to .safetcl.conf, that could break later invocations of swish. I think > this system data should be somewhere else (or else there needs to be > another form of persistent store for scripts). > > Secondly, the code right now checks the SafeTcl_evaluation_time > variable in the restricted interpreter to decide whether it should ask > the user. This is not reliable as the untrusted script could change > SafeTcl_evaluation_time. In other places the code checks > SafeTcl_InterfaceStyle and if it is empty then it doesn't ask. That > seems safer. > > Hal Finney > hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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fnords
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Request-Remailing-To: wilcoxb(a)nag.cs.colorado.edu Subject: Why I don't sign all my mail Latent-Time: +0:00 Cutmarks: #-- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bryce - you write: > Thanks for the info, Bill. I have a question: why are you > sending e-mail in the clear and without authentication? > I don't expect that anyone would want to forge mail from you > to me, but I would be pleased if I could be a little more > certain of those things, and besides "Think of it as a form of > solidarity." Convenience, mostly. Encryption and signature are semi-different issues. If I clear-sign something, and you don't want to check it, it doesn't cause you any trouble, but for most people, getting mail that's encrypted takes extra work, especially if they're following proper security procedures for their PGP implementations (not running it on insecure systems, not leaving passphrases in cleartext for autosigners, etc.) Think of proper security as "solidarity with people who need real security" :-). (Yeah, I also run PGP on insecure systems, mainly for signature-checking, but I do use separate keys that have words like "insecure" in the userid strings.) The big issues are convenient interfaces with my email system. Private Idaho's gotten good enough that if I want to send encrypted/signed/etc. email, I can grab the mail I want to send into the clipboard (or compose it inside PI), add headers for who to send it to, pull down a couple menu items, and it pops into PGP; when it's done, another menu choice dumps the completed message back into Eudora, and the next version can send it out directly if I prefer. On the other hand, moving mail _from_ Eudora _to_ PI is still a couple actions (separate cut/pastes for the body, address, and Subject:), so I don't usually bother. The other convenience problem is key-handling for people whose keys I don't already have. PGP is too slow on a PC to haul the entire keyserver database into my pubkey files. So either I have to send email to a key-server (non-real time, especially since I do most of my email off-line), or use finger. Unfortunately, your key wasn't on the keyservers, and I don't have a decent PC finger client now that I'm using Trumpet Winsock instead of Netcruiser (the finger client I use doesn't allow cut&paste to the clipboard, screen-grabs didn't get me text, and I did eventually get most of your key information by doing several "telnet you@machine 79"s until one of them got the data before the session closed :-) Ugly... And then there's the key validation problem - your key isn't signed by anyone except yourself (yeah, ok, mine's only got signatures from previous keys of mine, which have signatures from expired keys from the people who signed mine :-) So my signature isn't as meaningful as it could be, since you probably can't validate it, and I can't guarantee having a valid public key for you to send you anything important. So I guess I need to go get my keys signed by a couple people, and so do you, and the next code project on my wait-until-3.0 list should probably be a recursive key-signature digger... Meanwhile, Private Idaho is at ftp.eskimo.com/u/j/joelm/, and it's now working with ViaCrypt-for-Windows as well as PGP 2.6.* for DOS. Thanks; Bill Stewart stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQBVAwUBMCMPB/thU5e7emAFAQFYPAH7BXuxp0BCWKg8v/Uv6QzUQKSix3Zff3Kw FzBeSgDNN9KrOHEaUmemDXcBmcRabyeZyxrFTcgypvwADai1SYA45w== =Ht4c -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- #-- #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- # Crypto in 3-4 lines of perl --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/

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Re: There's a hole in your crypto, dear Eliza dear Eliza...
by Andrew.Spring＠ping.be 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >How do I know PGP IS secure? I don't. That doesn't mean I don't use it or Doesn't the NSA certify the security of cryptosystems? I wonder what they'd say about PGP? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMB/gUI4k1+54BopBAQEozAP/dTYfpk4aENquuhdmmAqWKFtHhcPFsj47 BL6F9QpA61eGaJ8T8hiuBlq9RBj8KYtQ0881CwLmiSztv1+uJxWWS11hb26l0zeD tZ3I9JXgFJSC4Pkv2i84D5VbnFfL0W+7yWFsgJUgg++c9UUDVW7xcwSmUfVrqgE+ hVuFyCK/cDM= =NXYL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Thank you VERY much! You'll be getting a Handsome Simulfax Copy of your OWN words in the mail soon (and My Reply). <Andrew.Spring(a)ping.be> PGP Print: 0529 C9AF 613E 9E49 378E 54CD E232 DF96 Thank you for question, exit left to Funway.

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EU Data Protection
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could I bother the members of this list with a request that anyone who has a copy of (this week's or a recent) Computerworld, look and see if I'm quoted in an article by Mitch Betts on the European Union's humorous decree on Euro-wide data protection. I was interviewed last Thursday. The decree (July 24th) threatens to cut off data flows to any nation that doesn't adopt Eurosclerotic data protection standards. It will be quite humorous when their Visa and ATM authentications start to fail. DCF "Member of the "unorganized militia of the US" who was going to make it to Waco in '93 but couldn't afford the 5,000 gallons of fuel for the turbine of his M1A1."

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Re: NYETSCAPE
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a copyrighted article, >Copyright 1995, Nathan Zook. All rights reserved. Nathan discusses his suggested directions for elder-controlled filtering of kids' net access. (Could be parents, or schoolocrats in loco.) >The system is of necessity ISP-based. Home-based systems are subject to attacks That's probably necessary; it's certainly the efficient way. A third approach is Exon's "Censor the whole net, unless perverts can find ways to talk to each other without any chance of kids hearing them", which is morally unacceptable. The interesting question is how much overlap develops between this and emerging reputation/filtering services for adults, for which the filtering criteria are interestingness-related rather than offensiveness-related. > [ multiple rating services ] Yep. For market reasons, as well as moral, aesthetic, and practical ones. >The NYET-software runs as superuser on the ISP's machine. [...] >The parent sets the configuration file to permit and deny access to >various parts of the net. And any kid who can break that dialog (e.g. by tapping the parent's session to get the parent's password) won't be stopped by any wimpy restrictions :-) An important consideration is that filtering has to be application-specific. Some sites can be cut off entirely (presumably *.penthouse.com), but most filtering needs to be more granular, and has different time-scales. You're certainly not going to block access to the whole Library of CONgress just because there are a few dirty book titles in the on-line card catalog. For instance, ftp files and static web pages are pretty easy to rate and filter if you've got a herd of adults to go surfing them. Dynamic web pages are tougher - do you default to open access, closed-unless-rated, or just use a no-dirty-words-and-no-pictures blocker? Usenet - some newsgroups obviously would get blocked, some would get individual articles filtered by humans, and technical groups would probably with automatic filters to censor certain posters and certain words, with occasional human monitoring to detect the occasional uses of comp.nerdy.detailed or comp.binaries.eniac for posting pornography or whatever. Filtering does slow down conversation, but enough paid moderators could probably keep up. But what about chat-programs, IRC, etc.? You really _can't_ censor that stuff in real-time and have a meaningful flow of conversation, except for trivial dirty-word filters which can be exonized around. Sure, you could have adults watching to say "Hey, cut that out down there!", and making sure channel names don't have politically incorrect words in them. And maybe you can have kids-only chat rooms - but what happens when the kids either start talking like Beavis and [Exon'd]head, or start talking about (gasp!) sex or (double-gasp!) sexual orientation? Do you tell their mom? And then there are wide-open technologies like telnet (which can do almost anything) and email (slower, but goes everywhere) - do you try to restrict those? One major technology that would be needed for this sort of application is authentication, whether it's digital-signature-based or just automatic packet-labelling with applications that maintain labels, so that you can be sure who posted what within PoliticallyCorrectNet, know whose mom to call if little FooBar has been misbehaving, whose posting privileges to block or reading to restrict if their mom grounds them, or, on the positive side, to encourage people to take responsibility for their postings and remind them that this kind of service only works if everybody agrees, up-front, to be Good Citizens. But how do you manage this technically - require outgoing connections to all go through proxies? (You need firewalls anyway.) But do you require connections from users to go through an authentication proxy before connecting to internal destinations as well, or is it adequate to use IPv6 with mandatory authentication and only add proxy service where it's needed? And what about encryption? (And stego? Do some of those MIDI postings have NASTY WORDS in them if you play them BACKWARDS? Oh, no!) We probably need to understand the politics of this sort of service to find a way to position encryption as a Good Thing, probably as part of the authentication system - there's a very high risk that it'd either be banned, or at least Clipperized with a hierarchical authentication system. Of course, if you're banning encryption, or just trying to monitor what's going on on the net, there's the language problem - English and Spanish are a start, but it's probably hard for the average ISP to have the right mix of people to tell whether an IRC channel is really speaking Finnish or Hawai'ian or Tuvan or whether it's just stego. This is probably a Good Thing - while some services will probably restrict the languages that people post in (either because they're Real American monoculturalists or because they're providing a heavily-monitored service and don't have the bucks for 5000 languages), others will be pushed toward encouraging responsibility instead. >I feel it necessary to reiterate the importance of the government >waiting for a market solution to this problem. Yeah! #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- # Crypto in 3-4 lines of perl --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/

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Re: There's a hole in your crypto...
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Andrew Spring wrote: <snip> >>How do I know PGP IS secure? I don't. That doesn't mean I don't use it or > >Doesn't the NSA certify the security of cryptosystems? >I wonder what they'd say about PGP? Their consultant, Prof. Dorothy Demming(sp?), has been asked this very question about PGP, and she deftly avoided comment on both PGP and IDEA. [I believe this was on NPR, but I'm not certain.] The emergence of NSA from absolutely secret agency to semi-public status (writing letters, P.R. concerns, opening a museum, etc.) at the same time as the general availability of what's considered by many [including me] to be strong, free, cryptography "for the masses" is interpreted by many [including me] as an implicit NSA comment on the availability of strong crypto in general, and on the availability of PGP in particular. JMR <snip sig.> - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh iQCVAwUBMCEc4m1lp8bpvW01AQG/xQP/YJDZekZBS2S9behLbFEVKdGcMgxagji7 r54EZa7mzQOObtGbi8ucnKZFm0ut7puxcNfJgaGcMmboEaeyo/vlOYeICDBaouLY I5/RJQwLjiBPcSWeDTSVDbiH4dvszaKrwYo/xC5WA8pv2kbZFEdou5HpHiiof0dV cTCvF4j90oo= =sNKQ - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray "The people will again respect the law when the law again respects the will of the people." Jim Ray, Campaign '92 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Key id. # E9BD6D35 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Support the Phil Zimmermann (Author of PGP) Legal Defense Fund! email: zldf(a)clark.net or visit http://www.netresponse.com/zldf ________________________________________________________________________ - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMCEg2CoZzwIn1bdtAQH2IQF/e+BP6NnoaQxHgm8bsZQpOLqW5rb4xcMa aHrUYlP3bYDwv49HYRlz+GQMDTCm2OII =QYNV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Pat Robertson Fears E-cash?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I read in the New York Times that a lot of fundamentalist Christians fear >the e-cash revolution because they believe that eventually everyone will >be required to bear a tattooed bar code on their right hand which >would contain all a person's information: name, d.o.b., birthplace, >etc. Such a tattoo would also be used to deduct e-cash from a person's >"account" when they made purchases. It's still a bit of a stretch; >they're using the book of Revelations to back up this theory. Ah, the perils of book entry. And they had the inventer of digital bearer certificates right there to talk to. Tsk. Tsk. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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NSA, NRO, and Keeping Secrets
by tcmay＠sensemedia.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:50 PM 8/3/95, Childers James wrote: >I'm afraid I don't follow. Are you saying that the NSA is assuming a more >public role because (apparently) stong crypto is now widely available to >the public? I don't see the connection between A and B if this is what >you are claiming. > >Unless they're gearing up for a PR campaign... I wonder how the NSA has >been portrayed in Hollywood in the past. I've just seen them mentioned in >one movie I can think about ("Crimson Tide"). Anyone else know of references? The NSA has been mentioned in many recent movies, even in television shows (like "The X Files"). I haven't been keeping a list, but the last Clancy movie, "A Clear and Present Danger," had references. And in more than one movie the reference to "NSA agents" doing various things is made. The NSA has a high profile today. "No Such Agency" is clearly marked as an exit on the Baltimore-Washington highway, and of course even has a museum open to the public. Even the National Reconnaissance Organization is public knowledge, partly because of the Burrows book "Deep Black," and partly because of the controversy over the huge building out near Dulles Airport. Some things are mostly secret, though. The cover of Consular Operations was almost blown some years back by former agent Ludlum, but ConsOps has faded back into obscurity. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)sensemedia.net | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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ALERT: House to Vote This Week on Net-Censorship Bills (fwd)
by Dorothy Voss 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 1 Aug 1995 17:43:34 -0400 From:editor@cdt.org To: policy-posts(a)cdt.org Subject: ALERT: House to Vote This Week on Net-Censorship Bills HOUSE TO VOTE THIS WEEK ----------------------- The House of Representatives will vote late Thursday or Early Friday (Aug 3 or 4) on whether to add the Cox/Wyden Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act as an amendment to the House Telecommunications Reform Bill (HR 1555). The Cox/Wyden amendment is a direct attack on the Exon/Coats Communications Decency Act (CDA). House passage of the Cox/Wyden amendment is the last chance we have to defeat the Exon/Coats CDA. If the House fails to pass Cox/Wyden, the Exon bill will likely become law. We must act now to head off this possibility. Please take a moment to contact your member of Congress and urge them to support the Cox/Wyden legislation (described in the alert below). The attached alert is from a coalition organized by the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) which includes CDT, EFF, EPIC, and other online advocacy organizations. This may be your last chance to make your voice heard on this critical issue, so please call before Friday August 4. ======================================================================== CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE EXON/COATS COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (SEE THE LIST OF CAMPAIGN COALITION MEMBERS AT THE END) Update: -Latest News: House vows to vote on Telecomm bill (which includes the CDA) this week before recess! -What You Can Do Now *** THIS IS YOUR LAST CHANCE TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE. *** *** THE HOUSE WILL VOTE ON THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY *** *** ACT THIS WEEK. IF WE LOSE, IT WILL BECOME LAW. *** CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT July 30, 1995 PLEASE WIDELY REDISTRIBUTE THIS DOCUMENT WITH THIS BANNER INTACT REDISTRIBUTE ONLY UNTIL August 14, 1995 REPRODUCE THIS ALERT ONLY IN RELEVANT FORUMS Distributed by the Voters Telecommunications Watch (vtw(a)vtw.org) ________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS The Latest News What You Can Do Now What is Cox/Wyden? (HR1978) Chronology of the CDA For More Information List Of Participating Organizations List of the House of Representatives ________________________________________________________________________ THE LATEST NEWS This week the House of Representatives will choose between ANTI-FREE-MARKET PRO-CENSORSHIP LEGISLATION (the Exon/Coats Communications Decency Act) and ANTI-CENSORSHIP PRO-PARENTAL-CONTROL LEGISLATION (the Cox/Wyden Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act - HR1978). THIS IS YOUR LAST CHANCE AS A CITIZEN TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE. IF WE LOSE THIS VOTE, THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, ALREADY PASSED BY THE SENATE, WILL BECOME US LAW. The vision of a cyberspace ONLY FIT FOR CHILDREN will become reality. The Communications Decency Act will be offered by supporters of conservative pro-censorship groups THIS WEEK. They will try and amend HR1555 to include the Communications Decency Act and remove any other net-friendly language such as the Leahy/Klink study. ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. THERE'S NO TIME FOR EMAIL OR SNAIL MAIL. CALL OR FAX YOUR REPRESENTATIVE NOW. 2. Find your rep (instructions below) and urge them to oppose the Communications Decency Act and support parental control legislation (the Cox/Wyden "Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act" HR1978) Figure out who your Rep is; feel free to use the following sample. ** See Instructions Below On How To Obtain Your Rep's Phone and Fax Number ** SAMPLE PHONE CALL (Y=You, S=Rep's Staffer) <ring ring> S:Rep. Snark's office, may I help you? Y:Hi, As your constituent I'd like to urge Rep Snark to oppose Internet censorship legislation such as the Exon/Coats Communications Decency Act and support parental control bills such as the Cox/Wyden Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act - HR1978. S:Anything else? Y:Yes, where does Rep. Snark stand on this issue? S:Rep. Snark supports HR1978. Y:Thank you! Take the response you get and mail it to vtw(a)vtw.org. We'll be totalling up the responses and counting votes. Send it to us with the subject line of "house call". $ Mail vtw(a)vtw.org Subject: house call I live in Ohio and I called Rep Snark. Snark's staffer said he favors HR1978 too! . Mail sent... $ SAMPLE FAX Dear Representative Snark, As your constituent I'd like to urge Rep Snark to oppose Internet censorship legislation such as the Exon/Coats Communications Decency Act and support parental control bills such as the Cox/Wyden Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act - HR1978. Sincerely, <your address> 3. Ask your Internet Service Provider or Sysop to put the following message into their "message of the day". We also encourage you to forward the following short announcement to relevant mailing lists where a copy of this alert would be too long for the list. 8/1/95: The Communications Decency Act (CDA) will be voted on by the House of Representatives this week. IT IS CRUCIAL THAT YOU CALL YOUR REPRESENTATIVE NOW. To get a copy of the alert, send mail to vtw(a)vtw.org with "send alert" in the subject line, gopher -p 1/vtw/exon/alert gopher.panix.com, or URL:gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/00/vtw/exon/alert 4. Forward a copy of this alert to your friends until the "freshness date" above. THIS IS CRUCIAL. WE NEED TO GENERATE CALLS OF SUPPORT OR THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT WILL BECOME LAW. 5. Congratulate yourself! You've done your part to save cyberspace. ________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO FIND YOUR REPRESENTATIVE'S PHONE AND FAX NUMBER: 1. If you don't remember your representative's phone number, send email to reps(a)cdt.org You will automatically receive a list of all 435 members of the House of Representatives with phone and fax numbers. 2. OR, call the Capitol Switchboard (+1.202.225.3121) and ask to be connected to your Rep's office. If you don't remember who your Rep. is, the operator can tell you when provided with your zipcode. ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT IS COX/WYDEN? Cox/Wyden (HR1978) is legislation intended to prevent the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from imposing content regulations on cyberspace and encourage private sector development and deployment of parental control technologies. Throughout HR1978's history, civil liberties advocates from ACLU, CDT, EPIC & PFAW have examined the bill and recommended modifications to ensure that the bill does not negatively impact your privacy or civil liberties. Although several questions still remain, Representatives Cox and Wyden are committed to addressing these concerns. As the legislation moves to the House/Senate conference committee, civil liberties advocates will continue to submit changes to the Representatives' staffers throughout the conference process where the House bill and the Senate-approved Communications Decency Act are reconciled. ________________________________________________________________________ CHRONOLOGY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT House vote to occur before Friday August 4, 1995. Jun 30, '95 Cox and Wyden introduce the "Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act" (HR 1978) as an alternative to the CDA. Jun 21, '95 Several prominent House members publicly announce their opposition to the CDA, including Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA), and Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR). Jun 14, '95 The Senate passes the CDA as attached to the Telecomm reform bill (S 652) by a vote of 84-16. The Leahy bill (S 714) is not passed. May 24, '95 The House Telecomm Reform bill (HR 1555) leaves committee in the House with the Leahy alternative attached to it, thanks to Rep. Ron Klink of (D-PA). The Communications Decency Act is not attached to it. Apr 7, '95 Sen. Leahy (D-VT) introduces S.714, an alternative to the Exon/Gorton bill, which commissions the Dept. of Justice to study the problem to see if additional legislation (such as the CDA) is necessary. Mar 23, '95 S314 amended and attached to the telecommunications reform bill by Sen. Gorton (R-WA). Language provides some provider protection, but continues to infringe upon email privacy and free speech. Feb 21, '95 HR1004 referred to the House Commerce and Judiciary committees Feb 21, '95 HR1004 introduced by Rep. Johnson (D-SD) Feb 1, '95 S314 referred to the Senate Commerce committee Feb 1, '95 S314 introduced by Sen. Exon (D-NE) and Gorton (R-WA). ________________________________________________________________________ FOR MORE INFORMATION Web Sites URL:http://www.panix.com/vtw/exon/ URL:http://epic.org/ URL:http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/ URL:http://www.cdt.org/cda.html URL:http://outpost.callnet.com/outpost.html FTP Archives URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/policy/freespeech/00-INDEX.FREESPEECH URL:ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Alerts/ Gopher Archives: URL:gopher://gopher.panix.com/11/vtw/exon URL:gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Alerts Email: vtw(a)vtw.org (put "send alert" in the subject line for the latest alert, or "send cdafaq" for the CDA FAQ) cda-info(a)cdt.org (General CDA information) cda-stat(a)cdt.org (Current status of the CDA) ________________________________________________________________________ LIST OF PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS In order to use the net more effectively, several organizations have joined forces on a single Congressional net campaign to stop the Communications Decency Act. American Communication Association * American Council for the Arts * Arts & Technology Society * Association of Alternative Newsweeklies * biancaTroll productions * Californians Against Censorship Together * Center For Democracy And Technology * Centre for Democratic Communications * Center for Public Representation * Citizen's Voice - New Zealand * Cloud 9 Internet *Computer Communicators Association * Computel Network Services * Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility * Cross Connection * Cyber-Rights Campaign * CyberQueer Lounge * Dutch Digital Citizens' Movement * ECHO Communications Group, Inc. * Electronic Frontier Canada * Electronic Frontier Foundation * Electronic Frontier Foundation - Austin * Electronic Frontiers Australia * Electronic Frontiers Houston * Electronic Frontiers New Hampshire * Electronic Privacy Information Center * Feminists For Free Expression * First Amendment Teach-In * Florida Coalition Against Censorship * FranceCom, Inc. Web Advertising Services * Friendly Anti-Censorship Taskforce for Students * Hands Off! The Net * Human Rights Watch * Inland Book Company * Inner Circle Technologies, Inc. * Inst. for Global Communications * Internet On-Ramp, Inc. * Internet Users Consortium * Joint Artists' and Music Promotions Political Action Committee * The Libertarian Party * Marijuana Policy Project * Metropolitan Data Networks Ltd. * MindVox * MN Grassroots Party * National Bicycle Greenway * National Campaign for Freedom of Expression * National Coalition Against Censorship * National Gay and Lesbian Task Force * National Public Telecomputing Network * National Writers Union * Oregon Coast RISC * Panix Public Access Internet * People for the American Way * Republican Liberty Caucus * Rock Out Censorship * Society for Electronic Access * The Thing International BBS Network * The WELL * Voters Telecommunications Watch (Note: All 'Electronic Frontier' organizations are independent entities, not EFF chapters or divisions.) ________________________________________________________________________ End Alert =======================================================================

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SSLeay - Whats the story...
by Jason Weisberger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Maybe I miss it, but when did this arrive? Is anyone testing it?

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