December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Monkey Wrench into the works
by Sean Roach 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 12:54 AM 8/28/97 -0400, David Jablon wrote: > >James, > >You're rebuttal to Myron's message is simplistically >elegant, but just as wrong as the original posting. ... >On 8/27/97, James A. Donald replied paraphrasing Ben Franklin, >(who really knew very little about cryptography): >>What one man knows, nobody knows. >>What two men know, everyone knows. >>Shared secrets just don't work. Perhaps a more accurate, though less clean statement would be. What YOU ALONE knows, nobody knows. What YOU and ONE other person, EVERYONE MIGHT know. Each additional person who is in on the secret opens up the possibility of leaks. Although I deleted it for space, you mentioned Doctors. A lot of people are afraid to tell thier doctors everything that the doctors need to know to do thier jobs because the patients are afraid that, as illegal as it may be, the patients medical history may end up in the hands of insurers, employers, prospective employers, and numerous other people who may want it but shouldn't have it. My dad was at a seminar where a new Scholastic Aptitude test was being introduced. He or someone asked if this information was going to be used to rate the schools. He was assured that no, it wasn't for that. A few years later, Oklahoma schools were being rated on the average score on that test, after eliminating those in chapter 1 programs. My dad's beef was that the smaller schools couldn't afford to maintain some of those programs and would thus, on average, score lower than they should. The example of a secret getting out, however, is clear. The "secret" was given to the wrong sub-department, and not by the schools.

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Re: GAK
by terrell＠sam.neosoft.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 3 Sep 1995 21:25:26 -0400 (EDT) >From: Brian Davis <bdavis(a)thepoint.net> >Subject: Re: GAK >On Fri, 1 Sep 1995, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> At 10:56 PM 9/1/95, Buford Terrell wrote: >> >> >If you've ever watched Not_at_all_Funny Home Videos or any of the >> >American Urinal school of tabloid television, you soon start feeling >> >that the real threat to privacy is not the guvmint, but all of >> >the yoyos with their little cam corders running around pointing them >> >at people. >> > >> >Security cameras in ATMS and at airline ticket counters do more >> >to threaten you privacy than do FIBBIE wiretaps, and PGP won't >> >protect you from them. (and usually neither will the courts). >> >> I absolutely agree with this, though this doesn't mean I'll stop worrying >> about the government's plans for key escrow (GAK), about limits on key >> lengths, or about other efforts to thwart strong security. > >I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here. I am curious to know, >however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under >any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat >and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the >judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it). > >In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of >non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable?? > >EBD > In my case, it's simply a matter of principle: the government has no right to know what I'm saying. Search warrants may allow them to get to "things" that I have, but the First and Fifth amendments make words sacred. If the government can eavesdrop on my conversation, then my speech is no longer free. A review board consisting of cypherpunks has no more right to listen to my private conversations than does the FBI, so I would not agree to that proposal either. --buford

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Re: ASN.1 and Kerberos version 5
by Carl Ellison 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>Date: Sat, 2 Sep 1995 13:55:38 -0400 >From: jis(a)mit.edu (Jeffrey I. Schiller) >I'll say it. I was the person who pushed for the use of ASN.1 in Kerberos >version 5. I had this disease at the time that made me think that ASN.1 was >a good idea. I got better, unfortunately we have been living with the >results of my braino for quite some time now... poor Ted. Jeff, I'm collecting lists of ASN.1 problems as well as better solutions. If you'd care to contribute.... Otherwise, I'll post the results when they're firmed up. I got some *great* material from Burt Kaliski at the P1363 meeting and that needs to be folded in, so I know it's not soup yet. - Carl

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fast modular reduction
by Wei Dai 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

During the Crypto' 95 Rump Session, Josh Benaloh of Microsoft Corp. presented a new modular reduction algorithm that he and I developed. It is faster than the Montgomery method by about 10 to 15%, and is more general and easier to understand. The central idea is that it is easy to reduce a number to an equivalent one that's just one "block" (machine word) longer than the modulus, by repeatedly subtracting off the highest block, and adding back something that's equivalent, but smaller. In the following pseudocode, B is the radix in which the numbers are represented (2^32 for a 32-bit machine), n is the length of modulus in blocks, U is B^(n+1) mod the modulus, X is the number to be reduced, k+1 is the length of X, and Y is the result. 1. Y = X 2. For i from k down to n+1, repeat steps 3 and 4 3. Y = Y - Y[i] * B^i + Y[i] * U * B^(i-n-1) 4. If Y >= B^i, then Y = Y - B^i + U * B^(i-n-1) Tricks can be used to eliminate step 4, and to reduce Y to n blocks using one single precision division, and n more single precision multiplications. The algorithm will hopefully be written up more completely soon. Wei Dai

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Re: Collection of personal info
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 10:15 PM 9/6/95, Rob Lowry wrote: >Beyond having the willies.. This is more than just scary, it feels like >rape when you think about it for awhile. Everything you buy, on credit, is >recorded and sold to someone who wants to know your secrets. Everytime >you make a banking transaction, someone is watching and compiling the >data. > >Is there any legal recourse to get your name removed from the sellable list? >Or is it too late and we can not save even the vestiges of our privacy? Rob, I have entered this posting of yours into the "BlackNet Dossier Service" I operate. Sounds creepy and scary, eh? Well, it's part of freedom. The "legal recourse" you mention about having your name taken off lists kept by people or agencies ultimately involves visits by the authorities to private homes (like mine) to verify that the data are being "properly collected" and that no "illegal or incorrect data" are being stored. If someone wants something kept secret, the solution is to keep it secret. If someone doesn't want their postings going into my 220 megabyte file of postings, they shouldn't send them to me. Or they should adopt a digital pseudonym, unlinkable to their True Name or any other nyms they may have. Things are much simpler and less stressful when you don't look to the law to fix things. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Collection of personal info
by dr261＠cleveland.Freenet.Edu 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>letting it happen, and using cash instead of credit, is the smart answer I'm somewhat surprized at how much of an issue this is. The federal government prints up nice green paper for us to pay for things with. It's annonymous (to a large extent), univerally accepted (most of the time), fairly untracably (unless you really want to), easily available, doesn't collect interest, free to use, etc. No one is forcing anyone to use credit cards, etc.. Then again, being a kid, I have never bought anything with anything other than cash on the spot... -- Tobin Fricke (aka LightRay) The Digital Forest BBS (714)586-6142 dr261(a)kanga.ins.cwru.edu KE6WHF Amateur Radio, 1:103/925 fido

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Hey
by XwitTDis96＠aol.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

SUBCRIBE-ME

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Fade to Black... / Re: Socio-Economic Cults (Re: Cypherpunk Cults)
by Anonymous 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

John Smith wrote: > A Japanese man holes up in his house and shoots at those who try to > take him away. A Caucasian man outside shoots back, fearing that the > Japanese is a spy, whose information will lead to Japanese victory in > the war. Both men are shooting, both fear for their lives. And in > each case, the fear could arguably be justified, based on the > information available to each man at the time. A black man holes up in his car, shooting at a white cop wearing the same uniform as the guy who shoved a toilet plunger up his ass the day before. The cop shoots back, fearing that the black man is a drug dealer who will molest his children, plant a bomb on an airplane, and evade taxes. Both men are shooting, both fear for their lives, and both hate what the other man represents in their mind and life experience and would like to see him dead. The Jap picks them both off, from a rooftop, and lives happily ever after. ILoveAHappyEndingMongel

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Re: Notes from NIS&T Key Escrow Export conference.
by tcmay＠got.net 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 7:59 PM 9/7/95, Pat Farrell wrote: >>"If keys are escrowed, what purpose does a 64 bit limit serve?" > >This question was asked, it seems like a zillion times, but >probably no more than four or five times. > >It is a bit of a belt and suspenders idea. But it also shows how >scared they are about real encryption. > >It is clear that this meeting is a shame. Everyone in industry ^^^^^ Sham? Or shame? Or, likely, both? Your account of the meeting merely confirms my worst fears. But don't they say the Chinese character for "crisis" also means "opportunity"? (Sort of the way the English word "oversight" has two very different and opposite meanings.) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Key Escrow Papers
by John Young 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

We have scanned several of the handouts at the NIST Key Escrow Issues Meeting of September 6 (not present Sept 7). Perhaps someone, Pat Farrell or another, would be willing to make them available on a homepage or ftp site. If so we will send them over. If nobody volunteers we will send them by our puny e-mail contraption. Here's what we have ready to send: 1. The outlines of meeting topics of Raymond Kammer of NIST and Michael Nelson of the White House. (7kb) 2. Discussion Paper No. 4, "Example Potential Solutions for the Draft Export Criteria for Software Key Escrow Encryption," which offers example solutions for each of the ten criteria. (7kb) 3. The Business Software Alliance's dissenting blast at the government's key escrow proposal and export limit. This paper was loudly applauded. (19kb) 4. Trusted Informations Systems's "Thoughts on the NIST Escrow Issues Meeting Discussion Papers." (27kb in 2 parts) 5. TECSEC Incorporated's "Private Escrow Key Management: A Method and its Issues." (13kb) 6. Dorothy Denning's "Comments on Draft Criteria for Software Key Escrow Exportability" and "Comments on Issues for Key Escrow Agents." (8kb) Two other papers will be scanned later: 7. National Semiconductor's "Commercial Cryptography Ideas for Success" (9 pp. of large type) This contains graphics of the CAKE program and a "Proposed NIST Escrow Certificate Heirarchy" which cannot be easily distributed by us, so we offer this by fax. 8. TECSEC's "The Merger of Technology and Cryptographic Key Management" (6 pp.). Note 1: It was Michael Nelson of the White House who said that the reason to maintain the 64-bit limit for export was because the key escrow methodology had not yet been proven reliable and that the security agencies insisted on the relatively weak system in case key escrow failed. Note 2: At the B-2 breakout session there was strong debate on a proposal for a "Criteria Zero": Before addressing any of the details of Criteria 3, 4 and 9 as presented to us, Group B-2 registers its view that export under general license of strong encryption should not require key escrow. A vote on the proposal was 7 yes, 7 no and 13 absentions. It was not reported to the plenary session.

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