December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Mixmaster@obscura.com back with new keys.
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mixmaster(a)obscura.com is back. Obscura crashed last weekend, taking all data with it. The remailer is running again but the secret keys were lost. This remailer is running Mixmaster 2.0.1 and the latest Ghio type1 remailer for cypherpunk messages. Here is the mixmaster key: mix mixmaster(a)obscura.com db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 258 AATL25WGQY5CMM0/xBjYtuN6IT75h+aBQwwKqZZc isOrqdsl8HWAzARrB0iAtcr34c2qqPBzSRNa5UE8 d3jOYu/wp9K9M5abUSRogcDl7gkPlqxc+e72SdKd 2Gdgib8VDGVLpJdaPk4uSY/pkmsYB30OaQH3W8dU PPciTvSJKAYcTQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- and here is the pgp key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQBtAzAGIaQAAAEDAJpPdFihCI1Cfpc8njkqOSma/GVvS5nodpTnnff3B3RuZWJN bEvxC3s8TATo6f5JdXqOkZBXQCK+aHke4LKw+MGNNXBYeWH60NZ0IihVThHeyYqL f4ZQNJHlMlFfDrQEgQAFEbQqTWl4bWFzdGVyIFJlbWFpbGVyIDxtaXhtYXN0ZXJA b2JzY3VyYS5jb20+iQEVAwUQMAnzn/Pzr81BVjMVAQEzRQgAk3ansqZb2y8orEim 0igHJpA22J15l6tu5ZihHpnBbXJEqdDKvsp6P/LG+ZDBXa8bGGg7RxZ1xXFqVWSO kkv9iqcoMWB14VHzC5A6MckhkpUGqPt+HMyUEW/JnGzZ202Z4aaVXOjXMsLf5jo1 VIp94/8nQen+QJThpJLmaNGgl8z60skyXzbtoz93Wy6IZAQYYImeswSrYukO1wC6 FXy0/a3AkDjd7mJiCtA2m7tTxCZr2EBlSu4VemG1APmCTjh2f/wyXNU1iXmTDb7N QcplTAwpROrdvtBeslE+bzYqWZqipcFHHyW9W6YUVIr18cojt6k5GEVzI9WCEgAO v+kA1YkAlQMFEDAJ82xVZJN3Wse4ZQEBc7gD/izVs3+jXs3Ze+U+ZVmfO6guUcMU RB4VsNS6n5BHRm6KS7qXCXxHYc0tehkuHVuGD0riSaS232P0NNmp1D4dzXtUVQCY BZfMbWX4EooqHGGRAoqPGZuke8pZYfVGARUKFQB8+zqKGhCum8z1sbUPUgzR5bie Un9sktwsWEJEIcNoiQB1AwUQMAnxfeUyUV8OtASBAQF/5gL+OksEqwyBE+pUZCmN 1AXAmKlRxkd6gybJJl8lXOOa4KVGmSEroYW8pac+TlraJb6j90LvbqJ+7PHuMtHT 84uRna183HDqKOd6NMdwTTimE6ZGueGBB7mwIysaTU8oCZ66 =0s+r -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -Lance -- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Re: ECM list.
by Bryce Wilcox 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > For example, you might be holding $85.73 in digicash (having played the > various slot machine pages, maybe bought a sky photograph from the Bradford > telescope). That's just about right. > What would it take for you to buy more digicash? How about to sell it? Right now I am thinking of e$ as a "collectors item" or a fun thing to brag about in some distant year. I'm offering US$1.00 for e$15.00, but I will quit offering that price once I run out of US$ or decide that I have enough e$! I think that the ecm market is probably composed of very few people who mostly want to buy, and is therefore not a high-volume market! If the ecm market got a link from the DigiCash home page (which I'm sure it could do) then you would probably get lots of people who just got their free e$100.00 and who are willing to sell part of it after having experienced the wonders of the slot machines and the "e$0.01-per-move tic-tac-toe" games. Could we set up a WWW version of the ecm market, listing latest offers to anyone with a WWW browser? Things might really pick up-- at least for us buyers! I'm also considering other strategies for gaining e$-- offering a service on the DigiCash "cybershops" page, or just going to all my e-mail using friends, showing them how to get their free e$100.00, and then begging them to give me half of it. (Finder's fee? Friendly gift?) Possibly I shouldn't have posted the above and given my e$-collecting competitors the idea, because eventually DigiCash is going to quit giving out freebies! Hopefully my friends will get on the ball and acquire their freebies before that point! :-) [mental note to add some of said friends to the Cc: line...] Bryce P.S. Oh great. My "friends" are asking for the $1.00 for e$15.00 deal... signatures follow /=============------------ Bryce Wilcox, Programmer [THIS SPACE FOR RENT] bryce.wilcox(a)colorado.edu ------------=============/ E-mail is between you and me-- use PGP! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBMAoTRZCUT4gUihHlAQEBMgQAueueOvkxSsVRBS20k49zUhOr8wa/CKcD vqsKLhHoeWhrXuYMKV5KTGgQ86TLwiu5n1C0fjomcJ+86UT1Py09i+yfeBj956hH sMFoGHgu4jKtQPZ94FsmsCzfDXPF6htnuOnQYjSrAydckomZoiQfPICDFRGeiSTp FbXeDMRMrMs= =1z8A -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Mods to Dining Cryptographers: legal questions...
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:02 AM 7/15/95 -0500, Phil Fraering wrote: >I'm sorry if I was a little mysterious about my reference to >another use or mode of a DC-net; I'd _love_ to tell the rest of >you flat-out, and put the idea in the public domain, but I'm >not sure I _CAN_. ..... >Are there any patents on Dining-Cryptographers networks that could >interfere with the placing in the public domain, or the patenting, of >an improvement to the network system? Case 1 - you want to be able to patent your stuff yourself. Case 2 - you don't. For Case 1, I can't help you much, but US patent law lets you apply for a patent on something within one year of publication (most other countries don't allow that - if you publish before applying, you don't get to patent it.) So publish. For Case 2, publish. You could get fancy and use surety.com's date-stamping service to keep a copy of what and when you published. If the material you've developed was already invented, and patented, by someone else, it's still ok to publish it, you just can't use the stuff (except for research, etc.) (I've been burned by this one; I _thought_ my idea seemed obvious enough that somebody else should have already thought of it first :-) So if you're trying to put something in the public domain, you may want to put a footnote in it saying that you're not making any claims about other people's previous patent applications, etc. So, anyway, what's your new idea? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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Re: Deployment
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > So, anyone want to volunteer to port Privtool to Windows ? > Uh, pardon my ignorance, but what is privtool, and why is it > a good thing to port it to windows? > (As compared to the task of integrating PGP into microsofts > mail tool.) It's an open-system mail tool resembling Sun's mailtool with PGP support added. Open-system tools are one of those vanguard things :-) (So are convenient GUI-development tools.) I no longer have a nearby Sun machine to play on, so I haven't played with it, but if it's got a well-done interface it's worth porting or stealing concepts from to include in other systems. I've heard that Microsoft's new mail tools are far less brain-damaged than the Microsoft Mail I've grown to know and hate, which assumes any message that's more than a few lines will be an attached document with maybe some optional intro and leftover mail headers, and chokes on messages with more than 30K of text in the body (choking badly on more than 64K). (Apparently, part of the reason for this evil is the fault of Visual Basic and/or Visual C++, which are convenient GUI development tools...) On the other hand, integrating it into Free Eudora for Windows would be pleasant, if that's doable (I forget it source is available.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:59 PM 7/16/95 +0100, Andrew Spring wrote: >RICO question: i thought that the idea of RICO is to confiscate assets of >racketeers that are derived from criminal activities. PGP and remailer >software is distributed free. so would RICO seizures even apply (yes I >know this doesnt' always stop the FBI)? You _were_ using that software on a _computer_ weren't you? Guess it's one of your racketeer's tools, so we'll have to take it for ourselves, er, um, for evidence and protection of national security.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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Re: A Chronology on crypto bans
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:08 PM 7/16/95 -0400, Dave Banisar wrote: >Someone asked why is there such a flurry recently on banning crypto in >recent months. This is not a recent issue. There have been almost non-stop >attempts for the last 15 years. True, though there have been more and louder calls for banning crypto as it becomes more widely used, and as the Internet and electronic commerce make its use more relevant. The number of cats running around outside of bags has been increasing, so the effort of the politicians to herd them back in has become more and more noticeable. A lot of it has been good public relations but the Good Guys as well - back in the late 70s, when I started following it, crypto was mostly for spooks, bankers, and academic math nerds*; PGP and the government's persecution of Phil have made a lot of people aware that the stakes are high and the Bad Guys are serious, and the Clipper Chip sounded enough like "The Feds want to tap my phone" that the general public could understand, a bit, that this was something that affected them... It's also been technology - real crypto needs computers, and computers have gone from million-dollar room-fillers that you might use at work or university to appliances you can buy at WalMart, like tv sets, which your kids use for school, if you don't count game machines, which your kids can buy at K-mart... Suddenly a third of the country's got a machine they can do real crypto on, and for 10 bucks a month they can be on a world-wide email network. And it's mostly the _rich_ third of the country, who might want to do their home banking somewhere a bit less taxing than before. Oh, yeah, there's also drugs - folks might want to use the Home Shopping Internet for more than just fake jewelry :-) * at the time, I was an academic math nerd designing banking networks at the phone company, and my department also did studies for spooks... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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NSA and NatSec Looks
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a pretty good recent overview of NSA -- history, organization, operations and, best, facilities -- at: URL: http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/irp/nsa/ This is part of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) web site, cited here by Jim Gillogly in connection with the VENONA papers. There are links to a bounty of other information on national security and governmental secrecy. Among many sweetmeats, the homepage on "Cyberstrategy" may be of interest (John Pike's project): URL: http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/iswg/cyberstr.html

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.taylored.com This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp. hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp reord mix post"; $remailer{"tower"} = "<remailer(a)tower.techwood.org> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. 21 Apr 1995: The new version of premail (0.33) is out, with direct posting, perl5 and better MH support, and numerous bug fixes. Last ping: Mon 17 Jul 95 6:00:03 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *+*+****+*** 14:18 99.99% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com +++++++++++* 49:27 99.99% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net ********--** 1:32:17 99.99% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++++++-+++ 57:13 99.99% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org -------+--- 1:44:52 99.99% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+*+**+*+*** 13:59 99.95% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl -..--.-.---- 12:41:56 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu .**+*#*###*- 54:07 99.90% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net --------+- 1:12:09 99.89% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *****#*##### 2:18 99.82% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *****#*#*#*# 3:02 99.82% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -**+** ++*** 20:02 98.62% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org -**-**++*--- 1:17:43 98.56% c2 remail(a)c2.org -*++++++-++ 42:52 98.03% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -..--.-_ -- 14:50:37 97.80% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com _ --...... 17:04:28 96.35% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de #-#+# 1:52:55 96.09% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ++***# +*-++ 12:53 94.98% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi --+++-- --++ 2:59:39 92.16% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org -_++_.-+--+ 15:25:46 91.39% rahul homer(a)rahul.net *++*+++*##+- 10:33 99.94% tower remailer(a)tower.techwood.org 6:44 1.46% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Proposed SS#/Federal Job Licensing DOS Attack
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On another subject entirely... I have naturally been concerned about the Feds' proposal to set up a national job licensing system. In order to protect us from hordes of illegals, they have suggested that employers be required to check SS#-True Name matches before employment could begin. This amounts to requiring federal permission for the 55 million annual job changes. Initially, it is supposed to be restricted to checking SS# validity, name match, and non multiple use. Later (as with driver's licenses) they will add restrictions having to do with tax compliance, child support compliance, library fine compliance, etc. After all, we wouldn't want tax evading, deadbeat dad, library scofflaws working in Amerika, would we? This suggests am interesting Denial of Service (DOS) attack. If you published your own or others' SS#-True Name pairs on a public forum (currently completely legal BTW), multiple use could be encouraged, the TrueNames would become unemployable, and interesting litigation would result. If done enough, systemic breakdown would occur. I am anxious to see the regs (they are just at the talking stage) to see how they handle "exceptions" like thus. DCF "Who in spite of the fact that he has changed jobs since November 1986, has yet to fill out an I-9 form. He *loves* contract employment."

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Re: Free The World Web Server project.. :)
by dursi＠lola.phy.QueensU.CA 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Expecially if the form letter generated would be randomly selected > >from parallel word streams. For example: > [...] > > You get the idea. > Rather than spend five minutes writing something on your own you'd end > up something that looks totally fake. I believe that what is going on > would be discerned by a staffer in moments. Well, it would be just as easy (although, admittedly, somewhat less convenient to the users) to have the web page such that the users could type in the letter, with some ``suggested text'' (perhaps randomly generated as above), perhaps even as the default; then it's just a matter of editing a few sentances, and maybe adding a paragraph or two... then click, and it's off. It wouldn't be as convenient as just-click-and-a-letter-will-be-sent, but it's still more convenient than having to write the letter yourself, which means that it'll generate more traffic... - Jonathan - --- Jonathan Dursi | "Never attribute to malice dursi(a)astro.queensu.ca | what can adequately be explained | by stupidity." - Hanlon's Razor -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.i iQBVAgUBMAp5/BJH45PFiKyNAQGYJQH/Uo3k45i73U8qQA1/y5LeXPso07LAPCwo 5i0xkFudoK2/Q5H7Gm7xmygNXIkckhuK/X/kJvdCf2khRluP8y/c7w== =jwye -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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