December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Silly technical question from a non-technical person
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm be piceing together things on this list that I have only a passing understanding of (at a code level). If it costs $10,000 to crack one 40-bit key (putting aside whether we agree on that price or not), could not the software be designed in such a manner that it is able to check, say, 10,000 keys at the same time? Ie, it computes a key, and then checks it against the array of data to see if it fits any of them, and then goes on to the next one. Maybe that would be an interesting test. Randomly compute say 10,000 sessions and they try to crack them all at the same time. Theoretically, it would reduce that $10,000/crack cost dramatically. Of course, I could very well be wrong.... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMDOByjokqlyVGmCFAQHFeAP9Hi9rXt1Ij4+nXISXMdfQL7TglB5T0p5P o80KP3PExZ7BqPVrLK9at831SOOVBIN2qzkFcLo7VTOfsrtc95Oyit6Kkk6+PBQQ 4dmuTjbBtRTFi92a4r5RAIXBlLYaATGSZGI3UUSE4m/PoeOWwAhjl/sweu/g/1Q2 ZsRCz9wefR4= =HlUL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++) ULU++ P+ L++ E---- W+(-) N++++ o+ K+++ w--- O- M+ V-- PS++>$ PE++>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++ e++ h r-- y++** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: Breaking DES anyone? (was: Breaking RC4-40 for less)
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> writes on cpunks: > > Another approach is to do lots of keys simultaneously - so you set up > > this distributed effort which is continually re-sweeping the 40 bit > > keyspace, say every couple of days or whatever. You can sweep for > > more than one key at once at very low incremental cost, an extra key > > costs close to nothing. So say you are searching for 1000 keys at > > once [...] on average a key will fall out every 3 minutes. > > I don't see how you can sweep for more than one key at once at low cost. > Because of the salt, every possible SSL encrypted message has to be swept > independently. You can't sweep for two messages' keys at once because the > input to the MD5 is different even for the same 40-bit key. Agreed. I was not being clear and mixing various things in one post. I was talking about 3 different systems: 1) export SSL 88 + 40 2) pure RC4-40 (hypothetical - possible microsoft / other apps) 4) DES (56 bits, can it be done) In the part you quote I was talking about pure RC4 40, I'm not sure which applications fall into this category, but it is one thing we have yet to determine. Perhaps Microsoft Access falls in to this category? Other microsoft applications / other vendor applications? someone needs to do the microsoft equivalent of a FOIA to extract this info. Anyone have any Microsoft software with encryption that they could quiz Microsoft tech support about? For export SSL it does not work for the reason you describe, the 88 bit salt effect. For DES I think it does work (attacking many keys at once), but then my understanding of DES is limited, but as a block cipher, presumably you can just brute keys in a straight forward manner? If so you can try multiple keys at once, unless there is some salt effect involved with typical CBC 56 bit DES operation too? Depending on the relative costs of the parts of the block cipher, a) key-setup b) block / stream decrypt pure RC4 is designed so that a) is vastly more expensive than b). How does this pan out for DES? DES (and RC4) are designed for fast encrypt / decrypt, but is there an appreciable key setup phase? I have these figures courtesy of Andy Brown: > Using Eric Young's very fast libdes code, and using the supplied speed > test program I get the following output on a Sparc 20 (1 processor): > > Doing set_key for 10 seconds > 582771 set_key's in 9.83 seconds > Doing des_ecb_encrypt's for 10 seconds > 989184 des_ecb_encrypt's in 9.85 second > Doing des_cbc_encrypt on 8192 byte blocks for 10 seconds > 982 des_cbc_encrypt's of 8192 byte blocks in 9.92 second > Doing crypt for 10 seconds > 37101 crypts in 9.89 second > set_key per sec = 59284.94 ( 16.9uS) > DES ecb bytes per sec = 803398.17 ( 10.0uS) > DES cbc bytes per sec = 810941.94 ( 9.9uS) > crypt per sec = 3751.37 (266.6uS) So what is a brute DES program on multiple keys with CBC mode (is this the most common mode?) going to look like in terms of calls to these various calls? The set_key looks slow compared to the DES cbc bytes per sec, even if you have to cycle a couple of blocks to get to your known plaintext location. Am I on the right tracks? It seems to me that you gain considerably by doing multiple keys even with CBC and random IV due to relatively fast block decrypt as compared to key setup. > If digital cash in micro amounts became practical, people could be paid > to let the "idle cycles" on their computers be used for this kind of > highly parallel application. (Some people have speculated that graphics > rendering would be another suitable choice.) It would be interesting to > see what the market price of cycles became in such an environment. That > would give a better benchmark for the cost to break keys. I think this would be an interesting way to determine the market value of idle cycles, and likely lead to cheaper figures for breaking things than are touted (by newspapers, and people to whose advantage it is to estimate generously the cost). Adam

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Silly technical question from a non-technical person
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If it costs $10,000 to crack one 40-bit key (putting aside whether we > agree on that price or not), could not the software be designed in such a > manner that it is able to check, say, 10,000 keys at the same time? Ie, > it computes a key, and then checks it against the array of data to see if > it fits any of them, and then goes on to the next one. Hmm yes and no. - For pure RC4-40 yes. - For export SSL no. It has what is effectively an 88 bit salt (familiar with unix password salts? like that only 88 bits). - For full 128 bit SSL, yes, but 128 bits is a rather large even if you have a few million keys to try at once with speed up gains. 2^128 is a biiig number. - For DES I think so, asked for others opinions, this might be the next one to die, big project but possibly doable with lots of keys at once Adam

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Dumb question (Re: RSA T-Shirt)
by George T. Talbot 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry to bother the entire list with this...anybody got the e-mail address of the USA seller of the 3-lines of Perl RSA T-Shirt? I haven't received mine yet and I can't find the e-mail address. Again...Sorry for adding to the traffic. ---------- George T. Talbot <george(a)phat.com>

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Re: First known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

don't forget GhostMarks! :) matt ---------- From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> To: "Marcel van der Peijl" <bigmac(a)digicash.com>; <mark(a)unicorn.com> Cc: <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; <ecm(a)ai.mit.edu>; <steve(a)webmedia.com> Subject: Re: First known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks Date: Thursday, August 17, 1995 11:59AM At 6:39 PM 8/17/95, Marcel van der Peijl wrote: >> Anyway, if anyone knows of an earlier transaction of cyberbucks for physical >> goods than this (at 15:00 GMT 17th August 1995), then please let me know. > >As far as I know, the first transaction took place when I (while >testing) bought a postcard from GlobalX, the first ecash store to >open besides our own (and mine). It is stored in the 'DigiCash >museum' next to early prototypes of all kinds of smartcards, >emulators, wallets etc. > >This must have been around October last year (or August? Can't make >out the postmark). Hundreds of cards were shipped by several shops, >and stickers, lotteries, etc. Check the 'physical objects' section >on http://www.digicash.com/shops/categorical.html > >Maybe you should restrict the 'first known' claim to 'first known >purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks traded at the ECM'. > >Sorry! Also, there are other potential claims for this sort of thing. Based on varying extents to which the "electronic money" is really secure, is cryptographically interesting, etc. For example, more than two years ago on this list (I think it was spring of '93, but it could've been spring of '94) there were a flurry of transactions involving the "MagicMoney" and "TackyTokens" of Pr0ductCypher and others. I recall Black Unicorn and others talking about transactional exchanges involving sixpacks of beer or soft drinks. I could check my archives, but you get the point. And before that, there were "HExmarks" being used on the Extropians list. There was a nominal conversion rate to real dollars, and at the time I left that list, I had more HExmarks than anyone else. And dozens of token-based systems, coupons, LETS systems, etc. Not to mention the various commercial smartcards and "e money" systems. Granted, most of these are not "Chaumian," which is what most of us think of us as digital cash. Claiming credit for being first is a tough issue. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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More on Netscape
by Sean A. Walberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess most everybody has seen the response that Netscape put on their page, but did people check out the "for more info" link (http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/key_security.html) It says that the commerce server supports (among others) DES and DES3 (same as 3DES?). They list the key sizes as 64 and 192 bits respectively. My question is, isn't DES 56 bits? (with an 8 bit salt that would be 64 I guess), but isn't DES3 112 bits, not 192? Just wondering... Sean o-------------------o----------------------o-----------------------o | Sean Walberg, | Tech Support | Pas_al, _obol, BASI_, | | sean(a)escape.ca | escape communication | PostS_ript, T_L... | | Mail for PGP key | 925-4290 | C fills all the holes | o----------------] http://www.escape.ca/~sean [--------------------o

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new o'reilly security book
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Date: Tue, 15 Aug 1995 14:08:44 -0700 From: Sara Winge <sara(a)ora.com> Subject: New "Computer Crime" book from O'Reilly FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE August 15, 1995 TO REQUEST A REVIEW COPY, CONTACT: Sara Winge sara(a)ora.com 707/829-0515 O'REILLY RELEASES HANDBOOK ON FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME SEBASTOPOL, CA--"Computer Crime: A Crimefighter's Handbook" is a resource for anyone who needs to know what today's computer crimes look like, how to prevent them, and how to detect, investigate, and prosecute them if they do occur. It contains basic computer security information as well as extensive guidelines for investigators, law enforcement, managers, and computer system administrators. The book has been reviewed by representatives of the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Justice, local police departments, district attorney's offices, and law enforcement abroad. "Computer Crime" describes the varieties of computer crimes and profiles the computer criminal, using techniques developed for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. It outlines the vulnerabilities of computer systems and discusses personnel, operational, physical, and communications measures that can be taken to prevent computer crimes. In addition, it contains a thorough treatment of effective methods for investigating and prosecuting computer crimes, ranging from the supplies needed for criminal investigation, to the detection and audit tools used in investigation, to the presentation of evidence to a jury. # # # Computer Crime: A Crimefighter's Handbook By David Icove, Karl Seger & William VonStorch, with Consulting Editor Eugene H. Spafford 1st Edition August 1995 464 pages, ISBN: 1-56592-086-4, $24.95

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nontoxic neuron interface built
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

for all of you eagerly awaiting the day you can literally "jack in" to cyberspace.. ------- Forwarded Message Date: Wed, 16 Aug 95 13:44:34 -0400 Subject: FW: 'Cyberpunk' neural interface? - - ---------- From: James McDaniel X-MsXMTID: red-14-msg950816203742MTP[01.00.00]0000009e-34570 The following item is taken from: http://www.hep.net/documents/newsletters/pnu/1995/pnu-236.html James - - -------------------- PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News Number 236: August 7, 1995 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben Stein A SILICON DEVICE FOR TRIGGERING ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY IN A NERVE CELL has been constructed, opening possibilities for two-way, non-toxic communication between computer chips and nerve cells. Previous devices for stimulating nerve cells were metallic devices generating ordinary electric currents. Not only do such devices have corrosion-prone electrodes, but their currents create electrochemical byproducts and heat that could damage the nerve cells and themselves. The silicon device, constructed by researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Biochemistry in Germany, contains a "stimulation spot" that triggers neural activity simply through the rearrangement of electric charge. Insulated by silicon oxide, the stimulation spot has a size (between 10 and 50 microns) matched to that of a leech nerve cell to which it is connected. A voltage pulse applied to the spot rearranges electric charge on the silicon oxide film and the insulating membrane of the nerve cell, creating a buildup of positive charge in the nerve cell which causes it to fire above a certain threshold. The silicon device is capable of triggering a single nerve cell without affecting other nearby neurons. The device complements the previously designed "neuron transistor," which receives ionic signals from nerve cells and transcribes them to electronic signals in silicon. "These two devices join the two worlds of information processing, the silicon world of the computer and the water-world of the brain," says the Max Planck Institute's Peter Fromherz (fromherz(a)vms.biochem.mpg.de) Developing this device for biomedical applications, such as computer-controlled artificial limbs, is not envisioned at the present moment, as researchers will first need to build and understand devices that interact with connective tissue and other non-neuronal cells in the body. (Peter Fromherz and Alfred Stett, upcoming article in Physical Review Letters; text and figures are available from AIP Public Information, 301-209-3091, physnews(a)aip.org.) - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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WANTED: anonymous remailer source code
by quazi＠banyan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi All. I'm interested in porting some remailer code to work on NT (most likely using NTMail as the smtp service). I'd like to be sure I'm starting my port from the most recent revisions, and the sources at the archive at berkeley seem a bit dated. Are they the latest sources? Are there more recent sources available somewhere? Thanks, Quazi

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Re: Silly technical question from a non-technical person
by droelke＠spirit.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > - For DES I think so, asked for others opinions, this might be the > next one to die, big project but possibly doable with lots of keys > at once > But, what is a good DES target to attack?? SSL was a great target because it is both visible and because it has a well defined open specification that made it easy to determine exactly what to attack (unlike Microsoft Access). I know someone who *used* to be in the ATM transaction business, but is no longer. Is the code from a credit card reader DES encrypted? We could be possible "tap" the serial port between the reader and the modem and get a byte stream in that manner.... but then again, my knowledge of those beasts is pretty limited. Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX http://spirit.aud.alcatel.com:8081/~droelke/

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