December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Wearing RSA shirt to school
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Let's get real. Yes, please. The head of Sun's network security group is a foreign national. They're doing DES and public key work. :)

2 1

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:30 PM 8/22/97 +0200, A druken remailer user wrote: > To continue... > Being an anonymous coward who hides behind remailers the few times Did Patrick Oonk send this one? > Tired of being an anarchist? Tired of waiting for Jim Bell >to rat you out as being a co-conspirator in his evil plot >to overthrow the government? Tired of standing in front of your >mirror, trying to practice acting surprised when armed forces >from a dozen government agencies kick down your door to announce >that someone nuked D.C., and they'd like to "ask you a few >questions?" If someone nuked D.C., most of those bastards would probably be dead. Then again... they propably have em stuffed in capsules, to be opened when communication is lost with Washington D.C. Millions of theses bastards!!!! All located on the surface of Uranus. Upon losing the signal with D.C., they'll fly to Earth, to once again enslave the free. What's the solution???!!!??? We must send all our nuclear arsenals to the surface of Uranus, and set them off, ONLY THEN WILL WE BE SAFE!!! >Peter Trei: > "Hi. I used to be a boring guy. I was so boring that none of the >assholes on the list even bothered insulting me, or forging posts in >my name. > "Then one day, my life suddenly changed. Someone forged a post to >the list in my name, and it was exciting. It was like getting robbed >at gunpoint. What a rush! Heheheh >Kent Crispin: > "This isn't Peter's conspiracy, its MINE! I mean, get real, I >work in a secret underground lavoratory as a government shill. > "Think about it. Who would you expect to conspire against a >bunch of anarchists...the government! You all know how much I >love the government and authority. I'm Louis Freeh's secret >lover. Janet Reno is going to have my baby. > "It's me! *I* am the one behind the SECRET CONSPIRACY AGAINST >THE CYPHERPUNKS LIST. I'm a STATIST, for God's sake, why won't >you believe me? > "Because I'm not one of the elitist 'chosen?' Fuck you." Heheh, well, at least they got Kent summed up in 3 paragraphs. >TruthMonger: > "Now Hettinga is stealing Tim May's lines. What the hell is >going on, here? Has *everybody* on this list gone crazy? > "*I* am the one who is *really* behind the SECRET CONSPIRACY >AGAINST THE CYPHERPUNKS LIST. Think about it. Everyone knows >that I'm a 33rd degree Mason. No...that's Tim May. > "Fuck this shit. From now on, I'm posting as Toto." heheh > There is no conspiracy by a secret government to destroy > the Constitution, enslave the people, and rule the world. "Like them new Stealth Helicopters, equipped with devices to drown out the sound." "Dale, where the hell did you hear that!?" "Alt.conspiracy.black.helicopters" > Remember, this is just a normal mailing list with a few list > members who are a little odd. There are no spooks. Except for Kent Crispin. > Waco was just a tragic accident. Ruby Ridge was a simple error > in judgement by a government agent who really feels bad about > following his superiors orders. Heavily armed U.S. Marines are > no match for a goat-herding boy with a .22, and it is only by > the grace of God that they are alive today. Oswald acted alone. Yeah, no one's safe when those god-damn goat herding sniper kids, lucky those good soldiers hit him fast! There is, however, a secret-conspiracy by Paul Pomes to shut down remailers. ConspiracyMonger "Ahhh, look, another mutilated cow." "Musta been them aliens." "Nah, it's them damn black helicopters. Killin' all my friggin livestock."

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.taylored.com This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last ping: Mon 4 Sep 95 4:00:26 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu ***+****--** 12:42 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ************ 11:36 99.99% hroller hroller(a)c2.org --********** 9:55 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org --++++++++++ 45:17 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .---------+- 2:49:48 99.99% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++-++++++ 44:09 99.99% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net -+-------.- 2:58:30 99.99% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org ----------- 1:42:59 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ***++*****-* 23:51 99.96% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++*+*++ + 1:04:53 99.93% replay remailer(a)replay.com _***+******* 17:24 99.86% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com ----- ----- 5:13:51 99.60% ncognito ncognito(a)gate.net #+**-** ** 6:07 98.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ***+** **** 5:08 98.91% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de *********** 5:15 97.26% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com .-.._._ --- 16:38:13 95.81% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net --- ----- - 4:03:05 95.06% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -----. --- 6:20:56 90.88% robo robo(a)c2.org -********** 17:00 90.58% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ******++*+** 7:45 99.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---++++-- ** 3:02:16 87.70% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org ---- . 5:35:11 77.43% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

None
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's not an _Onion_ satire: <http://apocalypse.berkshire.net/~ifas/fw/9707/update.html#aliens> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: bofus? Subject: Pat Robertson advocates stoning for crypto enthusiasts Date: Fri, 22 Aug 1997 07:39:49 -0800 Message-ID: <33FDB249.335F(a)mindspring.com> RuffinP(a)aol.com wrote: > > > > > > FREEDOM WRITER PRESS RELEASE > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 28, 1997 > CONTACT: Skipp Porteous (413) 528-3800 > > > > Robertson advocates stoning for UFO > enthusiasts > > > Great Barrington, MA -- In a recent > pronouncement, television evangelist and > head of the Christian Coalition, Pat > Robertson, advocated death by stoning for > crypto enthusiasts. > > Freedom Writer magazine, in its July/August > issue, mailed today, disclosed Robertson's > statement. Freedom Writer is published by > the Institute for First Amendment Studies, > a group that monitors the right. > > Robertson used the news of the July 25th > Senate Commerce Committee hearing to promote > his extreme beliefs. A segment on the July 27, > 1997 broadcast of The 700 Club featured news > of the Senate hearing. Employing the > historical event as a starting point, the > program delved into the possibility of the > existence of anonymous free speech on the > Internet. > > While Robertson viewed the Internet with > suspicion, on a more serious note, he > launched into a diatribe against those who > entertain the existence of uninhibited free > speech on the Internet. He said, in a > rambling discourse, that if such a thing > existed, it would simply create demons that > would lead people away from Christ. > According to Robertson, the threat is so > serious that people who believe in free > speech should be put to death by stoning -- > according to "God's word." > > "The Bible says the Earth belongs to man, > but the Word belongs to the Lord," > Robertson said. > > "He has given us the Earth. He also warned > us in the book of Matthew of the dangers of > corrupting forces such as the Internet which > can be used for evildoers: > > "'A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can > a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that > does not bear good fruit is cut down and > thrown into the fire. Therefore, by their > fruits you will know them. (Matthew 7:17-20)' > > "And you see, there is only one Word, and > that is the Word of God: > > "'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word > was with God, and the Word was God. (John 1:1)'" > 'For the Word of the Lord is right; and all his > works are done with faithfulness. He loveth > mercy and judgment: the earth is full of the > mercy of the Lord. (Psalm 32:4-5)' > > So there is no question about it." > > "Can a demon appear as a slanty-eyed, > funny-looking computer hacker? Of course > he can, or it can. Of course they can deceive > people. And if they can lead somebody away > from the true God, or away from Jesus > Christ, anyway it happens, it doesn't > matter, you will lose your salvation. It > doesn't matter how they get you. The > question is, did they get you, and under > what guise? > > "This is man in rebellion against God, who > refuses to take God's Law. And God says, > 'My covenant says you won't do this. And if > I find anybody in Israel,'-- "which is his > pure nation" -- 'If I find anybody in > Israel that's doing this sort of thing, > then I want you to take him out and dispose > of him." > > "It's a clear violation of God's word. > Stone them." > > Skipp Porteous, Freedom Writer publisher, > commented: "As the founder and chairman of > the Christian Coalition -- a group > dedicated to becoming the most powerful > political force in America -- Robertson's > extreme ideas need to be taken seriously, > for they not only negate pluralism, but > condemn to death those who dare to believe > differently." --------- End forwarded message ----------

1 0

Re: Wearing RSA shirt to school
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Grumpiness warning: I have held my tongue the past few months as all of these "this t-shirt has been declared a munition!!!" messages went out, but I can hold my tongue no longer. At 4:43 AM 9/4/95, Futplex wrote: >I wrote: >> With respect to possession within the U.S., there aren't any >> laws stopping you from waving strong cryptography around wherever you like >> (at least, not yet). > >---- >...and in private email, Jim Ray pointed out that showing the shirt to a >foreign national might technically violate ITAR... Nope, no more so than letting a foreign national read Schneier's book is a violation of the ITAR. If you dispute this, ask whether Schneier's book is banned from export (the book, not the optional diskette). It isn't. Nor are other cryptography _books_ banned from export. I'm not minimizing the issue of export of machine-readable code, as in diskettes. But to claim that a blurry, printed on cotton "barcode" is even remotely in the same class as exporting a workable set of cryptographic system routines, or that letting a furriner merely "gaze upon" this blurry barcode, is a violation of the ITARs is laughable. >Yeah, I suppose I overstated it a bit. It appears that if the ITAR do cover >the shirt (unclear at present, AFAIK -- any news on the CJR, Raph ?), then >flashing it at a furriner could constitute a violation. Thanks for the >correction. No. No more so than "flashing" a copy of a crypto book would constitute a violation. > >The gist of my previous message remains: No local or state authority in the >U.S. (of which I'm aware) classifies strong cryptography as a munition, >weapon, etc. I haven't heard of any restrictions on transporting crypto >across state lines, either. Unless the Feds start cracking down on high >schools, or the Perl-RSA shirt somehow violates some school dress code, (gang >colors ? ;) the original questioner need not fret about his son wearing the >shirt to school. It was this series of posts about whether wearing the "munitions t-shirt" near schools was a crime or not that made me think the silly season had arrived. If the t-shirt is a munition, and books are munitions, then libraries must be real "ammunition dumps," ready to explode at any minute. News at 11. Let's get real. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

Key attributes (was: pseudonyms & list health)
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone still has the flyer from the Crypto '95 rump session, there was a guy there talking about ANSI standards, and one of the things he mentioned in his talk was work they were doing on "key attributes." I spoke with him afterwards, and we had a lively discussion about this matter; especially with regard to the relationship between key certification and key attributes. I argued that certification is just another kind of attribute, while he is fairly hung up on certificate hierarchies, etc. (Of course, robust and well-implemented attributes couild be used to implement a hierarchical certification structure if that's what was desired, but there seems to be a deep-seated feeling among crypto folks of a certain ilk that such structure needs to be hard-coded into things.) I'll be following up on this matter with him when I am reuinited with my notes, which made an unintended trip to SF, while I only went to Mountain View. > >I could see such a system initially being piggybacked on PGP keys (the >signatures would not be understandable by PGP though), although for >Chaumian credential transfers the keys have to be specially structured >and that would require a new approach. > >Who would be willing and/or interested enough to use such a system if it >existed? > >Hal

1 0

Re: Shooting the taggers
by John Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Here in Santa Cruz, graffiti spray-painted on the walls of businesses >is a >big, and growing, problem. And laws require the businesses to paint >over >>he grafitti, or otherwise render it invisible, in a quick and timely >manner. (The idea is that the grafitti is offensive to the >sensibilities of >others, or somesuch, and that it encourages rival gangs to counter >with >their own grafitti.) No, the idea is that the taggers do their thing in order to see the results of their work on display. Paint over the results promptly, and there is no point to tagging. >There's a solution for taggers: snipers. A punishment far out of proportion to the crime. It is a mistake to think that all crimes should be punished by the most violent means possible. Notice that most proponents have never raised children. They need to learn the importance of proportionality. "John ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

2 1

Re: maximizing cryptographic return
by John A. Limpert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:49 PM 9/3/95 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >the question of the cost-effectiveness of phone encryption was raised by >my other message. I would like to question how cheaply good encryption >could be done on phones, with a poor quality microprocessor. It doesn't take much of a microprocessor to do real-time encryption and decryption of digitized voice, at least for DES. The problem is the vocoder. A good vocoder needs a fast DSP chip. A custom vocoder chip could cut this cost considerably, look at how cheap data pumps for V.34 modems have become with mass production. If ISDN ever becomes the mass market standard, replacing analog local loops, it would be very inexpensive to add encryption. Even with today's phone system, I can't see why a mass market secure telephone couldn't be built for less than $200. The problem is convincing enough people that they need secure telephones to get that mass market. The secure telephone also needs to be transparent to the users. It should be able to setup a secure connection without requiring the user to press any buttons or know what hardware is at the other end. The voice quality has to be much better than some of the "Donald Duck" quality systems that have been used in the past. -- John A. Limpert johnl(a)Radix.Net

1 0

Re: pseudonyms & list health
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:13 AM 9/4/95, Futplex wrote: >Deranged Mutant writes: >> My worry is about abuse. One would prefer to save endorsements and find >> a way to remove thumbs-downs... also how to prevent one from overdoing a >> thumbs-up or -down certification for a person (either to inflate or de- >> flate a reputation). > >A few nuisance lawsuits from people who were given thumbs-downs might do the >trick, as with employment recommendations in the U.S. :[ A good point that deserves further comment. Employers have taken to _saying nothing_ about past employees, for fear of lawsuits by disgruntled job seekers. So much for free speech, courtesy of the American legal system. But as we can't changed the litigious nature of American society (and maybe European society--I don't know), the emphasis ought to be on digital systems and reputations by pseudonyms. Hal's comment about transferring credentials is one approach. Sort of an automated version of "Pr0duct Cypher says the work of Sue D'Nim is good." At this point, not enough pseudonymns to make it very worthwhile, but someday... >ObTim: As in other reputation markets, some people will spread their blessings >more liberally than others. They do this at the risk of diluting the worth of >each credential granted. It all comes out in the wash. > >A reviewer named Susan Granger, for example, is known to me as a person who >routinely lauds lousy movies. Thus it's simple for me to ignore her positive >recommendations (I've yet to see a negative review from her). In fact, when >I observe that a new film prominently features her seal of approval in its >advertising, I take that fact as an indication of the lack of praise from >more discriminating reviewers. So a nominal "positive" credential may be >interpreted as an implicit negative credential, depending upon context. Another good point. I always think: "Ah, they couldn't get either Siskel or Ebert to endorse it." As Futplex notes, endorsements by second- or third-tier endorsers are often a _negative_ endorsement. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FROM MOUNTAIN MEDIA FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DATED AUG. 31, 1997 THE LIBERTARIAN, By Vin Suprynowicz 'Necessary to the security of a free State' J.P. recently wrote: "I agree that things like the court system can be privately funded. ... However, my greatest concern is that a military that has to run a "pledge drive" in order to provision itself would not be capable of posing a credible deterrent to any nations bent on conquering the US. If you could address this point, I would appreciate it. # # # O.K. ... First, the notion that it's all right to steal at gunpoint "some modest amount, as long it serves a legitimate public need" ignores the simple moral truth that the end cannot be allowed to thus justify the means. When I loot your paycheck without your permission to do "good works," I can't possibly know whether that leaves you one dollar short of the money you needed to buy medicine for your dying mother, or one dollar short of the money you needed to complete an experiment that might result in the discovery of a cure for cancer. There is literally no way to measure the opportunities I thus steal from you, and how their potential results might weigh against what (start ital)I(end ital) decide to do with your money. (Even assuming power won't corrupt me until I can blithely assure you that "tobacco subsidies" are "in the public interest.") But on to J.P.'s main point: the need to fund a standing, federal army. The only thing that grants the United States government any legitimacy -- that supposedly differentiates it from some gang of bandits that swarms down from the hills and extracts tribute for as long as the coast seems clear -- is the Constitution. The Constitution would have not have been ratified by enough states to take effect without solemn binding promises that a Bill of Rights would quickly be enacted. Without the Bill of Rights, the Constitution is invalid and of no force. The Bill of Rights prominently features the Second Amendment, which instructs us: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." This is a founding principle of our nation. Should the national government eviscerate or foreswear that principle, it is not only our right, but our duty, in Jefferson's words, to "alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government." The founding document does not find ANY role for a standing, professional army in preserving "the security of a free state." As a matter of fact, the founders traveled the land, preaching the EVILS of a professional, standing army. And they were right. Our domestic, professional, standing army today consists of individual legions, somewhat on the Roman model but also on the model of the personalized Waffen SS Divisions created as adjuncts to Hitler's Wehrmacht, with personal loyalty oaths sworn to the Fuhrer, and customized uniforms adopted with silver dagger or death's-head totems, etc. Currently going through precisely the kind of expansion and rearming that transformed Hitler's personal bodyguard from the scruffy SA brownshirts of 1934, to the well-armed, professional SS divisions of 1940, our own paramilitary legions are today dubbed "ATF, "FBI," "FBI Hostage Rescue," "DEA," etc. Some of these units now number in the THOUSANDS, and are authorized to deploy COMBAT AIRCRAFT. They routinely train with precisely the kinds of explosives and automatic weapons you or I could go to prison for merely possessing, and practice rapid helicopter deployment and "dynamic entry" into URBAN AREAS. These guys are not just getting ready to investigate the next Lindbergh kidnapping. Can such outfits exist in parallel with a strong citizen militia? They WILL not, and they are currently demonstrating this to us in spades, by infiltrating with agents provocateurs every legitimate citizen militia unit they can find, framing the leaders on amorphous "conspiracy" charges, and sending them away for decades. As they say in the popular sword and costume series, "There can be only one." But what is equally important, is to realize that a citizen militia is ADEQUATE to defend the security of a free state, even against the largest, most powerful, most technologically advanced power in the world. George Washington proved this in 1781. And for anyone who harbored the illusion that "conditions have so changed in 200 years" that this was no longer the case, the Vietnamese and then the Afghans successively proved it again, in our own lifetimes. Next time: Do we need a standing army, at all? Vin Suprynowicz is the assistant editorial page editor of the Las Vegas Review-Journal. Readers may contact him via e-mail at vin(a)lvrj.com. The web site for the Suprynowicz column is at http://www.nguworld.com/vindex/. The column is syndicated in the United States and Canada via Mountain Media Syndications, P.O. Box 4422, Las Vegas Nev. 89127. *** Vin Suprynowicz, vin(a)lvrj.com "A well-regulated population being necessary to the security of a police state, the right of the Government to keep and destroy arms shall not be infringed."

1 0